

- Instructions:-** 1. QuestionPaper-cum-Answer Sheet : Answer only in the space provided;
2. You may refer to notes in your own handwriting;
3. In True(T)/False(F) questions, *cancel* out by a \surd / $\cancel{\surd}$ what you consider inadmissible.

Q 1. Short Questions. Negative mark (- 0.5) for each incorrect answer.

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(a) A problem with the "Big-M" method for solving a linear program could be numerical instability

/1

(b) A stopping criterion in the Interior Point Method is based on duality gap.

/1

(c) If a totally unimodular square matrix A is invertible, its inverse is unimodular: T/\cancel{F}
Why? Because (i) Each element of A_{inv} is 0, ± 1 because |cofactors| are 0, ± 1
(ii) $|A_{inv}| = \pm 1$, since $|A| = \pm 1$

/3

(d) Saddle point always exists for a two-person zero-sum game: T/\cancel{F}

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
(e) The dual to the LP: $\{\text{Min } z \mid cx - z \leq 0, Ax = b, x \geq 0\}$ is : $\{\text{Max } p \cdot b \mid p \in R^n, q \in R, pA + qc \leq 0, -q = 1\}$
which is the same as the dual of : $\{\text{Min } cx \mid Ax = b, x \geq 0\}$

/2

(f) Prove that if an $(m \times n)$ matrix A with $m < n$ has full row rank, then $\text{rank}(AA^T) = m$
Suppose that $\text{rank}(AA^T) < m \Rightarrow$ There exists a non-zero vector say y^T s.t. $AA^T y^T = 0$
Therefore, $y^T AA^T y^T = 0$ which is a contradiction since $y^T A$ can not be zero (*why?*)
Hence, $\text{rank}(AA^T) = m$

/3

- (a) A fragment of a network $\langle N, A \mid 0, k, c \rangle$ is given below. Let $f^*_{ij}(1)$ and $f^*_{ij}(2)$ be an optimal set of flow assignments on the upper and lower (i,j) arcs whose capacities are $k_{ij}(1)$ and $k_{ij}(2)$. Assume that $C_{ij}(1) < C_{ij}(2)$. Then fill in the blanks with justification: - *an optimal assignment on the (i,j) arcs has the property:-*





$$f^*_{ij}(1) < k_{ij}(1) \Rightarrow \underline{f^*_{ij}(2)} = 0$$

$$f^*_{ij}(2) > 0 \Rightarrow \underline{f^*_{ij}(1)} = k_{ij}(1)$$


Justification (you can show by flow adjustment):- Suppose the * solution does not satisfy the above conditions; then make flow adjustment of ? at node i, maintaining conservation and decreasing the cost of pushing flow from i to j, contradiction as the flow assignment had been assumed to be optimal.

- (b) Given the closed network below, find an optimal flow assignment (Note: - obtain a feasible flow assignment if it exists by solving max flow problem on the modified network) /5+4



Transformed network with zero lower bounds, flow assignments and sat cut-sets

In the diagram below, the **init labels** in bold are the π_i 's at nodes and states on the edges.



Select the OK arc (1,2) and try flow re-routing; cut-set: $X=\{1,3,4\}$ gives $d=1$; *new labels in italics* at nodes and where changed on edges. Again no-rerouting possible, $X=\{1,3,4\}$ with $d=3$; (2,3) and (5,4) **changed labels** given in **ordinary bold**. Again no flow readjustment possible, X same with $d=1$. New *changed labels* are given in *italics*. One arc (1,2) ok and again flow re-routing not possible with $X=\{1,3,4,5\}$ with $d=2$. The new node labels are shown in **bold italics** and the edge labels after the flow-adjustment now possible shown also in bold italics with updated flows.

All arcs in kilter and optimum reached. **Check**:- Is the duality gap=0? Primal Obj = 14; Dual Obj (determine the phi values, psi being zero, why?) = 14 (phi values given on the edges adj. to the final edge state after the semi-colon for non-beta states).

Q 3.

(a) Show that in an $(n \times n)$ optimal assignment problem, at least one candidate is assigned to the job for which he is best qualified. **/ 4**

Suppose not. (Note that considering it as a LP, there are $(2n-1)$ constraints and n^2 variables with a high degree of degeneracy.) Let, as usual, u be the dual variable vector corresponding to the "persons" and v the dual variable vector corresponding to the m/cs. Clearly there do not exist (u,v) such that the dual constraints are: $u + v \leq c$ for this solution, CS conditions do not hold, and hence the solution non-optimal.


(b) Solve the following transportation problem: **/9**

6	2	4	6	$\leftarrow \{a_i\}$	0	2	4	5	6
3	0	2	4	$\leftarrow \{c_{ij}\}$	0	2	2	3	3
5	2	3		$\leftarrow \{b_j\}$					

Iteration: 0

	0	0	0	v	u	
1	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	0	-2	0
2	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Null</i>	0	-2	0
3	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	0	-3	-1 (new flow in italics $i \rightarrow j$)
4	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	0	-4	-2

Optimum reached (check duality gap=0)
 (The last flow assignmen shown in **bold italics**. Shipping Cost = 34)



Q 4. Consider a two-person zero sum game with `m' actions for the row player R, `n' actions for the column player C, the (m×n) pay-off matrix $A = (a_{ij})$ represents the pay-off to R by C, when R chooses action i and C chooses action j , and the two players play conservatively. (You may assume that A has all non-negative entries if required.) **/13**

We say that for C, action `k' dominates action `j' if $a_{ik} \geq a_{ij}$ for all i ; i.e., C will not be worse off whatever strategy R employs. Similarly, for R, action `r' dominates action `i' if $a_{rj} \geq a_{ij}$ for all j .

(a) Show that there exist optimal actions of the row and column players of an original game A which is the same as the game A' in which the dominated columns and rows (as defined) are deleted. **/ 4**

Let D_R and D_C be the sets of dominated rows and columns, respectively. Then, consider the expected pay-off expressions as in the Von Neumann's Theorem discussed in the class:-

$$\max_x \min_y \sum_j a_{ij} x_j y_j = \max_x \min_{j \notin D_C} \sum_i a_{ij} x_j = \max_x \min_{j \notin D_C} \sum_i a_{ij} x_j \stackrel{\text{(why?)}}{=} \min_y \max_{i \notin D_R} \sum_j a_{ij} y_j$$

Similar to the preceding

Note:- Check with the selection of pure strategies

(b) Given $A = \begin{vmatrix} 4 & 6 & 6 \\ 3 & 5 & 5 \\ 6 & 4 & 4 \\ 6 & 4 & 0 \end{vmatrix}$ $D_C = \{2\}$ $D_R = \{2,4\}$ **/ 9**

(i) obtain the undominated matrix $A' = \begin{vmatrix} 4 & 6 \\ 6 & 4 \end{vmatrix}$

(ii) Solve the game on A' , first verifying whether or not saddle point exists for A' .

Saddle point does NOT exist – *check*.

It can be easily seen that for the prime problem: $x' = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, $y' = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ is optimal to R' and C'
From the preceding, $x = (\frac{1}{2}, 0, \frac{1}{2}, 0)$, $y = (\frac{1}{2}, 0, \frac{1}{2})$ is optimal to R and C with value = 5

Note:- Check the two LPs