Battle of Imphal Battle of Imphal Part of Burma Campaign Date March 8 - July 3 , 1944 Location Imphal , Manipur , India Result Decisive Allied Victory Combatants Indian IV Corps Japanese Fifteenth Army Commanders Geoffrey Scoones Renya Mutaguchi Strength rising to : 4 Infantry Divisions 1 Armoured Brigade 1 Parachute Brigade rising to : 3 Infantry Divisions 1 Tank Regiment Casualties 12 , 603 54 , 879 South-East Asian campaign Malaya – Prince of Wales & Repulse – Thailand – Singapore – Indian Ocean – Andaman Islands – Burma – Chindits – Imphal – Central Burma – Dracula The Battle of Imphal took place in the region around the city of Imphal , the capital of the state of Manipur in North-East India from March until July 1944 . The simultaneous Battle of Kohima , is a part of the battle for Imphal , Kohima being on the only road by which supplies could reach Imphal by land from the railhead at Dimapur . The Imphal campaign ( also named `` Operation U `` ) was the turning point of the Burma Campaign , part of the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II . The situation In 1942 , the Japanese Army had driven the British , Indian and Chinese troops out of Burma . The retreat of the Allied Burma Corps stopped at Imphal , which lay in a plain on one of the few practicable routes through the ranges of jungle-covered hills which formed the border between Burma and India . Over the following year , the Allied troops slowly improved their training , equipment and morale , and increased the capacity of the lines of communication to the Assam front . At the start of 1944 , the Allies were poised to invade Burma on several fronts . Late in 1943 , the Japanese command in Burma had been changed . A new headquarters , Burma Area Army was set up under Lieutenant-General Masakasu Kawabe . One of its subordinate formations was 15th Army , whose new commander was Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi . By design or chance , Mutaguchi had played a major part in several Japanese victories , ever since the Marco Polo Bridge incident . His natural instinct was to mount an offensive against Imphal . He may also have been goaded by the first Chindit expedition launched by the British under Orde Wingate early in 1943 . Wingate 's troops had traversed with apparently insolent ease , terrain which Mutaguchi had earlier claimed would be impassable to the Japanese 18th Division which he commanded at the time . A spoiling attack to disrupt Allied plans was standard Japanese practice . Mutaguchi had larger ambitions . He planned to exploit the capture of Imphal by advancing to the Brahmaputra River valley , thereby cutting the Allied supply lines to their front in northern Burma , and to the airfields supplying the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek over `` The Hump `` . Mutaguchi 's plan was at first rejected by the staff at Burma Area Army . However , the headquarters for all the Japanese forces in South East Asia , Southern Expeditionary Army were in favour of it . Kawabe 's staff persuaded Southern Expeditionary Army that there were severe logistical risks with Mutaguchi 's plan , only to find that the Japanese Imperial Army HQ in Tokyo now supported it . To some extent , Mutaguchi and War Minister Hideki Tojo were persuaded by Subash Chandra Bose , who led the Indian National Army , a force of former Indian prisoners of war now fighting under the Japanese , that a victory such as Mutaguchi anticipated would lead to the collapse of British rule in India . In the end , the various intermediate headquarters allowed the plan ( now given the name U-GO ) to proceed , because mere passive defence of Burma would require as many reinforcements as the attack on Imphal . Also , if U-GO were successful , almost all the Allied attacks on Burma would have to be abandoned . The Japanese plan Imphal was held by the Indian IV Corps . Because the Allies were planning to take the offensive themselves , its units were thrown forward almost to the Chindwin River . Mutaguchi planned the `` Operation U `` in order to cut off and destroy the Allied units in their forward positions and then capture Imphal . The Japanese 33rd Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Motoso Yanagida would destroy the Indian 17th Infantry Division at Tiddim , then attack Imphal from the south . Yamamoto Force , formed from units of the Japanese 33rd and 15th Divisions under Major-General Tsunoru Yamamoto , would destroy the Indian 20th Infantry Division at Tamu , then attack Imphal from the east . The Japanese 15th Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Masafumi Yamauchi would envelop Imphal from the north . In a separate subsidiary operation , the Japanese 31st Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Kotoku Sato would isolate Imphal by capturing Kohima , then exploit to Dimapur . All Mutaguchi 's divisional commanders disagreed with the plan to some extent . Sato distrusted Mutaguchi 's motives , and Yanagida openly derided him as a `` blockhead '' . Yamauchi was already very ill and fatalistic . Their main reservations concerned supply . Mutaguchi had assumed success within three weeks . Adequate supplies after that period could be obtained only if the Japanese captured Allied supply dumps . Gambles such as this had worked in the past , but could no longer be relied upon to work given Allied air superiority and the improvement in morale and training of British and Indian troops . Also , the Japanese assumed that the British would be unable to use tanks on the steep jungle-covered hills around Imphal . For the sake of ease of movement and supply , the Japanese were leaving behind most of their field artillery , their chief anti-tank weapon . As a result , the Japanese troops would have very little protection against tanks if these were in fact used against them . Even as the Japanese prepared to launch their attack , on March 5 1944 the Allies launched the airborne phase of the second Chindit expedition . Japanese officers such as Major-General Noburo Tazoe , commanding the Japanese Army Air Force units in Burma , urged Mutaguchi to divert troops from his offensive to secure the Japanese rear areas against the Chindits . Mutaguchi dismissed these concerns , claiming that in a few weeks he would have occupied the air bases from which the Chindits were supplied . The battle Opening phases Indian IV Corps in Imphal was commanded by Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones . ( IV Corps in turn was part of Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant-General William Slim . ) When they received intelligence that a major Japanese offensive was impending , Slim and Scoones planned to withdraw into the Imphal plain and force the Japanese to fight with their logistics stretched beyond the limit . However , they misjudged the date on which the Japanese were to attack , and the strength they would use against some objectives . The Japanese launched their troops across the Chindwin River on March 8 1944 . Scoones only gave his forward divisions orders to withdraw to Imphal on March 13 . The Indian 20th Division under Major-General Douglas Gracey withdrew without difficulty , mainly because two of Yamamoto 's battalions from the Japanese 15th Division were delayed at Indaw in northern Burma by the Chindits and were unable to intervene . The Indian 17th Division under Major-General Cowan was cut off by the Japanese 33rd Division . The Japanese 215 Regiment captured a supply dump at MS 109 , twenty miles behind Cowan 's leading outposts . The Japanese 214 Regiment seized Tongzang and a ridge named Tuitum Saddle across the only road , a few miles behind the Indian 17th Division 's position . At Tuitum Saddle , 214 Regiment were unable to dig in properly before they were hit by the Indian 48th Brigade on March 18 . The Japanese suffered heavy casualties and were forced away from the road . Fighting around MS 109 was even more severe , but Cowan had taken steps to secure the most vulnerable point in the rear of his division , the bridge over the Manipur River . 17th Division crossed safely , demolishing the bridge behind them , and recovered the depot on March 25 . They were forced to abandon large amounts of supplies , but removed most of the vehicles , food and ammunition . The Japanese were left only such items as clothing and blankets . Scoones had nevertheless been forced to send the bulk of his only reserve , Indian 23rd Infantry Division under Major-General Ouvry Roberts , to the aid of 17th Division . The two divisions , now supplied by parachute drops from Allied aircraft , made their way back to the Imphal plain , which they reached on April 4 Meanwhile , Imphal had been left vulnerable to the Japanese 15th Division . The only force left covering the base , Indian 50 Parachute Brigade , was roughly handled at Sangshak by a regiment from the Japanese 31st Division on its way to Kohima . However , an earlier diversionary attack launched by Japanese 55th Division in Arakan had already failed . Slim was able to move the battle-hardened Indian 5th Infantry Division , including all its artillery and transport , by air from Arakan to the Central Front . The move was completed in only eleven days . Two of its brigades went to Imphal , and their leading troops were in action on April 3rd . Stalemate From the beginning of April , the Japanese attacked the Imphal plain from several directions : 33rd Division attacked from the south at Bishenpur , where they cut a secondary track from Silchar into the plain . Yanagida , its commander , was already pessimistic and depressed by the failure to trap Indian 17th Division . He had also been rattled by a garbled radio message which suggested that one of his regiments had been destroyed at MS 109 . He therefore advanced cautiously . By doing so , he may have lost a chance to gain success while the Indian 17th Infantry Division was resting after its retreat and Bishenpur was held only by Indian 32 Brigade ( from 20th Division ) . Mutaguchi removed him from command . Yamamoto Force attacked the Shenam Saddle on the main road from Tamu into Imphal . The Shenam Saddle was ideal defensive terrain . Despite using heavy artillery and tanks , Yamamoto could not break through Indian 20th Division 's well-sited defences . Detachments from two brigades of the Indian National Army fought on the Japanese side in this sector . The initial enthusiasm of most INA soldiers soon waned , and they deserted and straggled in increasing numbers . 15th Division encircled Imphal from the north . Its 60 Regiment captured a British supply dump at Kangpokpi ( also known as `` Mission '' , from a church there ) on the main Imphal-Dimapur road , but once again , the depot had already been emptied of food and ammunition. 51 Regiment seized a vital hill , Nungshigum , which overlooked the main airstrip at Imphal . This was a major threat to IV Corps , and on April 13 , Indian 5th Division counter-attacked , supported by massed artillery and the M3 Lee tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers . The Japanese regiment had no anti-tank weapons , and their troops occupying Nungshigum were driven from the hill with heavy casualties . Allied counter-attacks By May 1 , all the Japanese attacks were held . Slim and Scoones now began a counter-offensive against the Japanese 15th Division . This division was the weakest of the Japanese formations , and success against it would break the siege . Progress was slow . The monsoon had broken , and this made movement very difficult . Also , IV Corps was suffering some shortages . Although rations and reinforcements were delivered to Imphal by air , artillery ammunition was by now rationed . The steep ridges held by the Japanese were almost impregnable . However , the Japanese were at the end of their endurance . Neither the Japanese 31st Division which was fighting at Kohima , nor 15th Division , had received adequate supplies since the offensive began , and their troops were starving . This allowed Indian XXXIII Corps to drive the Japanese from Kohima at the end of May , and advance south . The troops of Japanese 15th Division were forced to abandon their defensive positions , to forage for supplies in local villages . Mutaguchi dismissed the mortally ill Yamauchi , but this could not affect matters . The leading troops of IV Corps and XXXIII Corps met at Milestone 109 on the Dimapur-Imphal road on June 22 , and the siege was raised . Although there was now no realistic hope of success , Mutaguchi ( and Kawabe ) continued to order renewed attacks. 33rd Division , reinforced by battalions from the Japanese 53rd Division and 54th Division and under a new forceful commander , Lieutenant-General Nobuo Tanaka , broke into the Indian 17th Division 's positions at Bishenpur , but failed to break through . Yamamoto Force also made repeated efforts , but by the end of June both formations had suffered so many casualties that they were unable to make any progress. 15th and 31st Divisions refused to make a renewed attack on Imphal from the North-East , and were in no condition to do so . End In fact , the Japanese had realised that operations ought to be broken off as early as May . At a meeting between Mutaguchi and Kawabe on June 6 , both used hara-gei , an unspoken form of communication using gesture , expression and tone of voice , to convey their conviction that success was impossible . But neither of them wished to bear the responsibility of ordering a retreat . Kawabe subsequently became ill with dysentery and perhaps physically unfit for duty . When he realised that none of his formations were obeying his orders for a renewed attack , Mutaguchi finally ordered the offensive to be broken off on July 3 . The Japanese , reduced in many cases to a rabble , fell back to the Chindwin river , abandoning their artillery and transport , and those troops too sick to walk . The defeat at Kohima and Imphal was the largest defeat to that date in Japanese history . They had suffered 55 , 000 casualties , including 13 , 500 dead . Most of these losses were the result of starvation , disease and exhaustion . By contrast , the Allies suffered 17 , 500 casualties . Both Kawabe and Mataguchi were relieved of command . Royal Air Force By mid-1944 , the Allied air forces had undisputed air supremacy over Burma . The last major effort by the Japanese Army Air Force had been over the Arakan in February and March , when they had suffered severe losses . During the Imphal and Kohima battles , they were able to make barely half a dozen significant raids . IV Corps enjoyed close air support from fighter bombers and dive bombers . Allied fighter bombers and medium bombers shot up and bombed enemy concen­trations , supply dumps , transport , roads and bridges all the way to the River Chindwin . The monsoon in no way diminished their activity . The Third Tactical Air Force ( TAF ) increased their sortie rate to 24 , 000 sorties during the worst four months of the monsoon , nearly six times the figure of the previous year’s record . The Allies could fly men , equipment and supplies into the airstrips at Imphal so although cut off by land , the town was not without a life line . Allied aircraft could also parachute ammunition , rations and even drinking water to surrounded units . No. 152 Squadron RAF was one of the squadrons of the TAF. It moved to Burma on 19 December 1943 . During the Battle of Imphal , the squadron operated from front-line strips supporting the 14th Army during its final conquest of Burma . Bibliography Sir William Slim , Defeat Into Victory , ( 1956 ) Don Moser and editors of Time-Life Books , World War II : China-Burma-India , ( 1978 ) , Library of Congress no 77-93742 Louis Allen , Burma : The longest War , Dent Publishing , 1984 , ISBN 0-460-02474-4 Notes See Wikipedia : Footnote3 ↑   World War II : China-Burma-India , Bibliography , page 157 External links Map JAPS INVADE INDIA FROM THE CHINDWIN http : //www.national-army-museum.ac.uk/pages/Second-war/far-east.html No. 1 Squadron , Royal Indian Air Force , Imphal , Assam , 1944 British leaflet dropped post-Impahl in Burma Categories : World War II operations and battles of the Southeast Asia Theatre | Manipur | History of Manipur | Battles of British India | 1944 In other languages : 日本語 Battle of Imphal Burma Campaign March 8 - July 3 , 1944 Imphal , Manipur , India Decisive Allied Victory Indian IV Corps Japanese Fifteenth Army Geoffrey Scoones Renya Mutaguchi rising to : 4 Infantry Divisions 1 Armoured Brigade 1 Parachute Brigade rising to : 3 Infantry Divisions 1 Tank Regiment 12 , 603 54 , 879 timelife_157 