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__TITLE__
<br /> <b>THE US</b>
<br /> <b>TWO-PARTY</b>
<br /> <b>SYSTEM:</b>
<br /> <b>past and present</b>

__TEXTFILE_BORN__ 2009-06-01T09:38:09-0700

__TRANSMARKUP__ "Y. Sverdlov"

__NOTE__ SUBTITLE is above TITLE in original.

__SUBTITLE__
<em>A View by Soviet Historians</em>

<p>     <b>PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW</b></p>

<p>     Translated from the Russian by <em>Sergei Sossinsky</em>
Designed by <em>Yevgeny Antonenkov</em></p>

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<em>Ha anzauucKOM HSbiKe</em></p>

<p>     <b>CONTENTS</b></p>

<p>     <em>&copy;</em> Progress Publishers 1988
<em>Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</em></p>

<p>     <em><SUB>v</SUB></em> 0506000000-285 <SUB>aa</SUB> <SUB>88</SUB></p>

<p>     K-------&#8226;---------------------33-OO</p>

<p>     014(01)-88</p>

<p>     ISBN 5-01-000526-3</p>

<p>     Foreword........................................... 5</p>

<p>     Introduction......................................... 7</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter One</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
Origins of the Two-Party System............... 26</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Two</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
The First Test: the Two-Party System at the Threshold</p>

<p>     of the 19th Century .......................44</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Three</em>. In Search of the Optimal Pattern: the First Party
Realignment (1816-1828) ..................... 66</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Four</em>. The Rise of New National Parties: the Democrats and</p>

<p>     the Whigs .............................. 85</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Five</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
The Crisis of the Two-Party System in the 1850s .... 105</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Six</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
Political Parties During the Civil War (1861-1865) .... 128</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Seven</em>. Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period (1865-</p>

<p>     1877).................................150</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Eight</em>. From Reconstruction to Big Business: Principal Trends
in the Evolution of the Two-Party System in the Late
1870s and 1880s .........................155</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Nine</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
The Two-Party System Against the Antimonopoly</p>

<p>     Movements of the 1890s ....................178</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Ten</em>.</p><p>
</p><p>
The Two-Party System in the Progressive Era.......199</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Eleven</em>. The Two-Party System: from World War I to the Great</p>

<p>     Depression .............................g21</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Twelve</em>. The Party Realignment in the Years of the New Deal:</p>

<p>     Specifics and Consequences ..................239</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Thirteen</em>. On the Road to an Interparty Balance ...........264</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Fourteen</em>. In Search of a Political Image: Democrats in the</p>

<p>     Opposition (1953-1960) ....................291</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Fifteen</em>. Consensus Questioned: the Two-Party System vs. Mass</p>

<p>     Democratic Movements (1960-Early 1970s)........317</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Sixteen</em>. The ``Rolling'' Realignment: Democrats and
Republicans in Conservative Times (Late 1970s and Early
1980s)................................345</p>

<p>     <em>Chapter Seventeen. A</em>. Time of Political Disillusionment: the Two-Party</p>

<p>     System and Voters in the 1970s-Early 1980s.......374</p>

<p>     Conclusion..........................................398</p>

<p>     A Short Bibliography of Works by Soviet Authors on the History of US
Political Parties .......................................401</p>

<p>     <b>FOREWORD</b></p>

<p>     American society has gone a long way in the two centuries of its
existence.</p>

<p>     These years have also seen a complex evolution of the two-party
system, a major structural element in the US political system
without which the mechanism of class domination by US ruling circles
would be inconceivable. There is nothing remarkable in the fact,
because this institution is part and parcel of the social and economic
structure which has undergone major change in the 200 years the
United States has existed. Being constantly in the focus of the
political process, the two-party system has a tremendous impact on the
course and nature of that process and is itself affected seriously by
the underlying social, economic, ideological and political processes
occurring in American society. It is self-evident that the role of
this institution, crucial for the functioning of capitalist society, has
notably changed. It is only natural that Soviet Americanists have
closely followed the evolution of the two-party system.</p>

<p>     In the past 10 to 15 years quite a few works on the history and
current state of the US two-party system have been published in the
Soviet Union. The authors of the present monograph proceed from
the Marxist concept of the two-party system. They realize that its
fundamental tenets differ from the notions of bourgeois scholars
and the stereotypes of the institution prevailing among the
American public, and have no intention of imposing their conclusions on
anyone. Ideological struggle does not preclude, on the contrary it
implies, academic debates, exchanges of opinion and polemic. The
purpose of the present book is to give foreign readers an idea of
how Soviet scholars today interpret issues, which they regard as
fundamental, having to do with the role of the two-party system in</p>

<p>     Name Index .</p>

<p>     6 Foreword</p>

<p>     US history, and of the results Soviet historiography has obtained in
studying associated problems.</p>

<p>     Acknowledging the achievements made by American scholars
in studying the history of the two-party system, the authors would
like at once to make several points of principle in the debate with
them. First, Soviet analysts reject the idea that the US two-party
system is unique. They view this system as one of the models of
capitalist society's political structure. At the same time, they show
that, apart from features common to all the other current
political structures in capitalist countries, the US two-party system has
specific features of its own. The most important is that no other
party, except a bourgeois one, has managed to fit into the
system. Second, differences between Soviet and American historians on
matters of principle have been reflected in their views on the
functions of the two-party system in the political process. As we see it,
the basic mission of that institution consists in protecting bourgeois
social relations and not abstract national interests. Third, Soviet
historians differ cardinally from American analysts in their approach
to factors which determine the evolution of the two-party system.
The Soviet scholars maintain that development of the two-party
system depends on social and economic factors and on the class
struggle.</p>

<p>     To corroborate these general assumptions the authors drew on
materials having to do with the two-party system at key junctures
in American history. This has determined the structure of the book.
The introduction attempts to single out some of the most
important methodological problems in studying the two-party system.
Further, the authors consider the major periods in US history from
the declaration of independence to our day. They provide instances
from US history to show how the two-party system evolved, how
its role changed in society, how this intricate political mechanism
operates under different conditions, what principles underpin its
functioning, what methods are used to protect the dominant
position of the bourgeoisie in the political process and to keep within
its orbit the social forces objectively hostile to the bourgeois
system.</p>

<p>     It is for the reader to judge to what extent these intentions have
been realised. The authors are prepared both to listen to critical
remarks, and to defend and develop their views on relevant problems
of US political history.</p>

<p>     <b>INTRODUCTION</b></p>

<p>     Parties are the basic support on which rests the political
structure of any modern society, including US society. Most closely
interacting with other components in the political system of
American society, chiefly the state, bourgeois parties have protected and
actively defended the interests of the US ruling class over two
centuries. Therein lies their principal mission in the political process.</p>

<p>     As capitalist society develops, the mechanism of the
bourgeoisie's political domination becomes more sophisticated. The role and
importance of non-governmental agencies and organisations, the
parties above all, grow abruptly in that mechanism. Parties
constitute the major leverage enabling the ruling class to secure its
dominating role in all spheres of life in capitalist society and in all parts
of the state machinery, while preserving the appearance of
democracy.</p>

<p>     Showing the main feature of bourgeois parties in the United
States, Lenin said that they operated as a &quot;bipartisan system.''^^1^^ The
US two-party system is a complex body whose activity follows
certain patterns. The concept of system is multifaceted and
substantial, requiring special analysis. Let us note only a few of the most
general features needed to describe the system. Parties form a
system mechanism chiefly because they have a common mission in the
political process---to protect and improve capitalist social relations.
This, however, does not exhaust the meaning of the system
concept. It includes an element of rivalry between parties involved in a
single complex. This is a very important feature as it gives the
bipartisan tandem the dynamics it needs to retain rank-and-file voters</p>

<p>     <b>^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;The Results and Significance of the US Presidential Elections&quot;, <em>
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 403.</b></p>

<p>     8 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 9</p>

<p>     within its orbit and to solve specific social and economic problems
with due account for the interests of the ruling class.</p>

<p>     The US two-party system is one of the models of bourgeois
society's political structure. The principles of bipartisanship were first
laid down in'18th-century Britain subsequently exerting an
influence on a number of other, chiefly English-speaking nations. They
were most fully realised in the United States where as early as the
beginning of the 19th century there were not just two political
groups or factions but real parties with a relatively ramified
organizational structures and a broad social base. It is important to point
out that from the outset the US two-party system was conceived as
&quot;an integral political mechanism of the parties and the standards of
behaviour and the basic principles of their interaction were
developed.''^^1^^ In other words, an integral social mechanism with definite
class functions was being built.</p>

<p>     As distinct from West European models, including the British
model, the US political system has been tightly closed for any other
party, except for a bourgeois party. The crisis of capitalism
associated with the victorious October Revolution in Russia, undermined
the foundations of private property relations, led to the ruling
circles in West Europe, Canada and Australia abandoning a purely
bourgeois party system. From then on, the bourgeoisie in these
countries was forced to rely on the assistance of social-reformist
parties to safeguard its domination. The United States is now
virtually the only country of state-monopoly capitalism where capital
rules without resorting to the assistance of reformist working-class
parties. The roots of this basic feature of the US political system
should be sought in the fact that the basic element of
capitalismprivate property---has functioned in the USA for a longer time,
more effectively and in a purer form than in other countries.</p>

<p>     Both Soviet and American literature contains different
definitions of the two-party system. On our part we propose the
following definition: the two-party system is a single political complex
consisting of two bourgeois parties operating in close interaction
and interdependence and linked together by fundamentally similar
goals pursued, however, by different methods depending on how
the goals are understood by the social groups whose interests are
represented and expressed by each party. As any other structure, the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ M. O. Troyanovskaya, &quot;Jeffersonian Republicans and the 1807 Embargo&quot;, in:
<em>Problems of Modern and Contemporary History</em>, Moscow, 1982, p. 153 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     party structure depends on the surrounding social environment and,
at the same time, retains a certain autonomy in respect to it.</p>

<p>     While laying emphasis on the autonomy of the two-party
system, it is to be admitted that social and economic processes and the
class struggle play a decisive part in that system's rise and evolution.
Lenin paid particular attention to this: &quot;In order to understand the
real significance of parties, one must examine ... their class
character and the historical conditions of each individual country.''^^1^^ A
complicated combination of social and economic factors, and class,
ideological and political struggles, on the one hand, the influence of
other elements in society's political system, on the other, and
finally, development patterns inherent in the two-party system itself---
all this determines standards and principles of the relationship
between parties within the system mechanism.</p>

<p>     Among the major principles of the relationship between parties
in the mechanism of the two-party system priority is undoubtedly
attached to the principle of consensus and alternative. Soviet
scholar A.A. Mishin has good reasons to say: &quot;Without consensus the
two-party system would be unable to effectively defend the
common interests of the ruling class. Without offering an alternative the
parties would completely lose their individual character.''^^2^^ It would
be appropriate, apparently, at this point, to explain what Soviet
scholars mean by the terms ``consensus'' and ``alternative'', because
there is a fundamental difference in how Soviet analysts and
bourgeois political scientists interpret these terms.</p>

<p>     The former believe that, despite the motley and amorphous
mass base, both leading parties in the United States are purely
bourgeois in nature. Hence the character and scope of the consensus. In
the Soviet view, it is a consensus within one class, and not all
American society, as advocates of the consensus school affirm. Marxist
historians have always had a sharply negative attitude to the theory
of US exclusiveness, a theory on which the concept of consensus
rests. &quot;As compared with Europe, political and economic
conditions of the life of North America's free population were more
favorable on the whole. Most of the population consisted of
smalland medium-size farmers, wages of workers and artisans were 30
to 100 per cent higher than in the mother country. Nevertheless,</p>

<p>~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;In Australia&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 19, 1977, p. 216.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ A. A. Mishin, <em>The Principle of Separation of Powers in the US Constitutional
Mechanism</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 153 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     10 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 11</p>

<p>     from the very outset American society was a class society, and
social contradictions continually aggravated rather than healed,&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>write the Soviet authors of a definitive work on US history. The
interparty consensus we refer to does not in any way imply
recognition of the concept of common interests of antagonistic classes.
That consensus is clearly restricted by the bounds of the two-party
system within which the two bourgeois parties operate on the basis
of a common belief that private property relations are the only
possible foundation for society's development. The parties try to
impose this view on all American society. Bourgeois propaganda
inculcates in public opinion the conclusion offered by American
political scientists, that when a party wins the election it means the
policy it publicized has been approved by the voters.</p>

<p>     This, of course, is a case of wishful thinking. The consensus in
ideology and politics has never been universal. In the course of
development the American people have been developing an
antimonopoly and anticapitalist tradition.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The question arises: is it possible to speak of an alternative
political course pursued by bourgeois parties strictly within the
framework of the capitalist system? In this case it is not an alternative to
the capitalist system and its institutions but simply a matter of
selecting means to sustain and strengthen the capitalist order.
Concerning the components of that institution Soviet historian V.P.
Zolotukhin writes: &quot;Both of them [the parties---<em>Auth.]</em> are political
tools of monopoly capital... But within these bounds there are
certain differences between them regarding the finer points of
ideological and political platforms and their mass base.''^^3^^ It is to be noted
that development of the alternative concept in respect to bourgeois
parties has a long history. The thesis that they are capable of
producing definite alternative political programs without transcending
the bounds of the capitalist system or threatening to undermine its
foundations, had been advanced by Lenin. The historical experience
of both European and North American capitalism shows that the
bourgeoisie's political leaders have worked out and implemented an</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>A History of the USA</em>, in four volumes, Vol. I, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1983,
p. 659 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     For further detail see: K. S. Gajiyev, <em>USA: Evolution of Bourgeois Consciousness</em>,
Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1981 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     V. P. Zolotukhin, &quot;The Results of US Elections&quot;, <em>Mirovaya economica i
mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya</em>, No. 1, 1977, p. 108.</p>

<p>     exceptionally wide range of the most varied methods of sustaining
its class domination. These methods range from super-reactionary
political programs of the Nazi type to bourgeois progressive
platforms.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The principle of consensus or alternative applies to some extent
to all party-political systems in the capitalist countries. But it stands
out in particularly bold relief in the two-party systems rather than
the multiparty systems where the existence of several parties
sharply complicates their relationships. The classical examples of that
principle are provided by the two-party systems consisting of two
purely bourgeois parties (Britain in the 19th century and,
particularly, the United States). Introduction of social-reformist parties
into the two-party system inevitably distorts the latter to a certain
extent changing the meaning of consensus or alternative. Thus,
these terms may be applied virtually to any bourgeois party-political
system (except the fascist system), but their actual content is
determined by specific historical development of a country, the
objective needs of capitalist development, and the subjective
understanding of these needs by party leaders. That content changed as the
basic stages in the development of American capitalism replaced
one another.</p>

<p>     Under free-competition capitalism the consensus was based on
the assumption that capitalism was the only possible way for
society to develop and that the principles of the 1787 Constitution were
the best form of political expression of this. America's entry upon
the stage of monopoly capitalism at the threshold of the 20th
century introduced certain changes into consensus relations leaving
their foundations intact. Advocacy of free competition was
relegated to the field of social folklore. In the actual policies of both
parties it was forced to the background by the avowal that huge
prospering corporations (monopolies) &quot;constitute an important step in
the direction of the better organisation of industry and
commerce&quot;^^2^^ and, therefore, make up the foundation of the American
system. In the 1940s and 1950s the consensus was extended to
include a number of postulates of state-monopoly regulation.</p>

<p>     The sphere of action and scope of the .alternative have also</p>

<p>     Concerning types of modern bourgeois parties see: N. V. Sivachev, &quot;On Some
Problems of State-Monopoly Capitalism&quot;, <em>Novaya i noveishaya istoriya</em>, No. 3, 1980.</p>

<p>     Herbert Croly, <em>The Promise of American Life</em>, The Macmillan Company, New
York, 1914, pp. 358-359.</p>

<p>     12 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 13</p>

<p>     changed in the course of historical development. At first,
alternatives offered by the parties had to do with their orientation to
different ways of capitalist development---commercial-industrial and
agrarian. Since the late 19th century alternatives generally implied the
dissimilar attitudes of the parties to the role of political institutions
in economic development and the class struggle. Finally, at the
contemporary stage the alternative essentially boils down to the
following, as the prominent political scientist, James McGregor Burns,
aptly put it: &quot;Party platforms and presidential statements show that
<em>most</em> Democrats stand for the increased use of government... They
show that <em>most</em> Republicans would restrict government in order to
give more scope to private initiative and investment.''^^1^^ In other
words, the axis round which current partisan and political polemics
revolve is the question of the nature and extent of state regulation
of social and economic processes.</p>

<p>     There are endless arguments in the USA on what the mutual
relations between the components of the two-party system should be
like. The liberal patriarch of historical studies, Henry Commager,
maintained: &quot;It is the virtue of the American party system that it
does not present the American people with the necessity of
fighting about principles.''^^2^^ He was echoed by an equally influential
member of the conservative wing of the US historical community
Clinton Rossiter who writes that the American two-party system
&quot;practically never, no matter which party wins and on what
promises, produces a government willing and able to put through a
program of thoroughgoing reform.''^^3^^ These statements clearly display
the desire to present the consensus type of relations between
parties as the optimal basis for the operation of the two-party tandem.
This standpoint, however, has its influential opponents. A leader
of the right-wing Republicans Senator Goldwater lectured his
colleagues: &quot;The Republican nominee cannot be a 'little Sir Echo of
Democratic Ideology', since this would deny the American people
the clear-cut choice they want.''^^4^^ Repeated statements to the same</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Annals of America</em>, Vol. 17, <em>1950-1960. Cold War in the Nuclear Age</em>,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., Chicago, 1968, p. 312.
<em>^^2^^<SUB>3</SUB>Ibid.,p</em>. 11.</p>

<p>     Clinton Rossiter, <em>Conservatism in America</em>, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1955,
p. 78.</p>

<p>     <em>Republican Politics. The 1964 Campaign and Its Aftermath for the Party</em>, edited by
Bernard Cosman and Robert J. Huckshorn, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York
1968, p. 6.</p>

<p>     effect were made by another pillar of conservatism Senator Robert
Taft. &quot;The only parties that have died are those that have forgotten
or abandoned the principles on which they were founded,&quot;^^1^^ he
pointed out. In this case the emphasis is on the alternative as the
principle underlying relations between parties.</p>

<p>     Obviously, both approaches exaggerate certain elements in the
intricate mechanism of the two-party system. Experience shows
that the system is most effective (from the standpoint of the ruling
class) when there is a balanced combination of elements of
consensus and alternative in the ideology and politics of the leading
parties. Tipping the balance in favor of one or another has an
immediate impact on the effectiveness of the whole political
mechanism. In the usual situation, rivalry between parties is built in the
USA on acknowledgement of a quite definite set of social,
economic and political values. It may be said that an interparty consensus
stabilizes ideological and political processes in the two-party
system, reinforces the existing distribution of forces, while a
constructive alternative secures the required dynamics of the system.</p>

<p>     The continual transformation of the consensus-alternative
elements in party stands serves as the most important means for the
two-party institution to oppose the movement for independent
political action. In principle, the following scheme may be drawn: the
ruling circles controlling the two-party system seek to implement a
political course such as would answer their interests as much as
possible. But that line inevitably leads to dissatisfaction among the
masses which begin a struggle to make the parties take into account
their needs as well. They seek their own radical alternative to the
platforms of the leading parties, which gives a boost to the
movement for independent political action. There is a conflict. Adoption
by the leading parties of the more moderate demands made by the
protest movements, while disturbing the consensus, abates the heat
of the crisis and pumps fresh blood into the two-party system. But
as soon as the crisis has blown over, the ruling circles once again
seek to restore the interparty consensus, albeit on another basis.
The conflict is settled each time depending on the actual balance of
class forces. The extent to which the party leaders are prepared to
modernise the ideological and political platforms of their parties is</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Annals of America</em>, Vol. 16, <em>1940-1949. The Second World War and After</em>,
p. 565.</p>

<p>     14 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 15</p>

<p>     directly proportionate to the pressure applied on them by the
rankand-file voters.</p>

<p>     The above scheme is easily confirmed by numerous examples
from the most different periods in American history. Perhaps the
clearest illustration is provided by Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal. Soviet analyst V.L. Malkov writes: &quot;Roosevelt turned out to be
slightly to the left of the line of behavior he himself thought
rational only under the impact of the popular forces. In other words,
the social reforms of the New Deal themselves and their depth
depended solely on 'pressure from outside.' &quot;' As soon as the pressure
abated, the desire of the Democrat leadership to engage in social
experiments significantly declined and, by contrast, the tendency to
seek a consensus with the Republicans grew stronger, this time the
consensus was on a statist basis however.</p>

<p>     A similar situation emerged in the 1960s, when there was a new
upsurge in mass protest movements. Perhaps the most trying
problem was to integrate the black movement into the system. The
ruling Democratic Party, however, by making some concessions,
compelled &quot;black Americans, hedged in by the two-party system, to
follow the tactic of the lesser evil and vote for Hubert Humphrey.&quot;<SUP>2
</SUP>Subsequently, when it became clear that the wave of the black
population's protest had receded, the Democrats were less inclined to
make concessions to the black voters. As a result, in the mid-1970s
the stands of the two parties on racial matters converged
significantly-</p>

<p>     Thus, the two-party system quite firmly neutralizes popular
attempts to break free of the ruling class' political control. No
wonder Lenin called it &quot;one of the most powerful means of
preventing the rise of an independent working-class, i.e., genuinely socialist,
party.''^^3^^ It is important to point out that the forces and movements
capable of providing a viable alternative are forced out of political
life onto the sidelines by the efforts of both bourgeois parties. It is
undoubtable, however, that much of the credit in the fight against</p>

<p>     the movements for independent action goes to the Democratic
Party which, since the late 19th century, has performed immense
services for the US Establishment by integrating within its structure
social forces seeking to break free of the control of the two-party
tandem. It is the basic tool for involving the working people in the
legitimate political process controlled by the monopoly bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     The above scheme of the functioning of the two-party system
may give rise to the illusion among readers that the entire political
process in the US appears to be extremely primitive, resembling a
monotonously swinging pendulum with an amplitude strictly
determined by cycles of consensus and alternative regularly replacing one
another. In actual fact, the situation is much more complicated.
The alternation of the ``consensus'' and ``alternative'' periods is
influenced not only by laws governing the operation of the party
system itself but also by factors outside the system. Government
activities, various dimensions of the class struggle, and finally (since
the USA has become a leading imperialist power) international
developments---all this has had a significant impact on the recurrence
and length of the consensus-alternative cycle. As a result of intricate
interaction between factors within and outside the system, the
consensus-alternative cycle becomes notably distorted. That cycle
should not be traced as a regular sine curve. But the fact that such a
cycle does exist seems undoubtable to us---the nearly 200-year-long
history of the two-party system confirms its existence.</p>

<p>     Thus, it has been stated that the consensus-alternative principle
opens up wide scope for maneuver by the components of the
twoparty system in order to hold class contradictions in check and
helps them retain their dominating position in the political process.
Of course, it would be wrong in terms of methodology to explain
the relatively high (as compared with West European countries)
social stability of American society by the fact that the country has
a unique party system serving &quot;to structure political conflict out to
soften the nature of that struggle.''^^1^^ The principal role here was
undoubtedly played by the specific features in the social and
economic development of the USA. As regards the 19th century, it is
necessary by all means to mention such factors as the existence of
enormous areas of ``unoccupied'' land, immigration from Europe on</p>

<p>     V. L. Malkov, &quot;Slightly to the Left of the Centre: the General and the Specific in
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Social Policies&quot;, in <em>American Yearbook</em>, Nauka Publishers,
Moscow, 1983, pp. 45-46 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     I. A. Geyevsky, <em>USA: The Black Problem. Washington's Policies on the Black
Question (1945-1972)</em>, Nauka Publishers, 1973, p. 258 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     V. I. Lenin, &quot;The Results and Significance of the US Presidential Elections&quot;, <em>
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 18, p. 403.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ David H. Everson, <em>American Political Parties. New Viewpoints</em>, New York, 1980,</p>

<p>     p. 30.</p>

<p>     16 Introduction</p>

<p>     a mass scale, and underdevelopment of the class structure. In his
day Karl Marx attached major importance to the latter
circumstance. He wrote that in the USA &quot;classes already exist, they have not
yet become fixed, but continually change and interchange their
component elements in constant flux.''^^1^^ The 20th century has
added to this such a factor as the enormous economic resources of
US monopolies which enable them to carry out extensive social and
political maneuvering. However, an impressive contribution was
made by political institutions, above all the two-party system which
demonstrated on many occasions its extensive possibilities in
manipulating public opinion and integrating the most varied protest
movements.</p>

<p>     What are the limits of the possibilities of bourgeois parties in
solving major problems facing American society? In answering the
question, one should keep in mind that the parties seek solutions to
the problems they face proceeding not from abstract public
interests. Lenin wrote: &quot;To see what is what in the fight betwen the
parties, one must not take words at their face value but must study the
actual history of the parties, must study not so much what they say
about themselves as their <em>deeds</em>, the way in which they go about
solving various political problems, and their <em>behaviour</em> in matters
affecting the vital interests of the various classes of society---landlords,
capitalists, peasants, workers, etc.''^^2^^ The overall interests of the
ruling class underlie the activities of the leading political parties in
the USA. Hence the quite definite limits to their possibilities.
However flexible a two-party system may be, whatever the margin of
safety it may possess, its potentialities are far from unlimited, because
there objectively exist, in capitalist society, a number of
antagonistic contradictions which cannot be eliminated by means of reforms.</p>

<p>     The history of the US two-party system has clearly confirmed
this on quite a few occasions. The classical example illustrating the
limits of this institution is the slavery issue. Up until the mid-1840s
the leading parties of those years---the Democrats and the Whigs---
quite successfully sidestepped the problem. At the time the
twoparty system and its parties were &quot;living symbols of national
political unity as well as powerful instruments for the reconciliation of</p>

<p>     Introduction 17</p>

<p>     sectional differences.''^^1^^ Subsequently, for another fifteen years
while the slavery issue was in the focus of the political struggle
between parties, the two-party system used different means in a bid to
find a palliative solution to the problem. In the final count, the
combination of two parties failed to absorb the interests of those
sections of the population which demanded restriction of slavery,
and as a result suffered a complete fiasco. Only a bourgeois
revolution was capable of cutting the knot. As the Soviet historian
R.F. Ivanov aptly remarked, those events &quot;are convincing evidence
that cardinal problems having to do with the struggle for power
between classes could not be effectively solved by means of
compromise&quot;.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The transition of the two-party system to a state-monopoly
basis in the 1930s and 1940s undoubtedly helped the monopoly
bourgeoisie at least partially to solve a number of important problems:
to begin with, it managed to put in some order the economic
mechanism of capitalist society. Abandoning the traditional principle
of the Federal government's non-interference in social and
economic processes, the new ideologists of the monopoly bourgeoisie
began to regard government regulation as a panacea of sorts capable of
ridding America of all troubles. However, the &quot;built-in stabilizers&quot;
had already shown that they were helpless under the impact of the
snowballing general crisis of capitalism. Today it is quite obvious
that stepped-up comprehensive regulation of American society's
vital activities by the federal government fails to create an image of
the USA as a model state for the rest of the world, the image the
US ruling elite needs so much. On the contrary, objective statist
processes have bred a whole complex of intricate problems and have
augmented dissatisfaction with the operation of the state-monopoly
system. A far from complete list of problems the two-party system
has to deal with daily includes the search for an optimal
combination of government regulation with market competition, for a
balance between the authority of the federal and state governments;
development of the most efficient model of regulating collective</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred H. Harbison, <em>The American Constitution. Its Origin
and Develofment</em>, W. W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., New York, 1955, p. 329.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>A History of the USA</em>, Vol. I, p. 457 (in Russian). For more detail on the
interpretation of the Civil War by Soviet historians see: R. F. Ivanov, <em>A braham Lincoln and the
Civil War in the USA</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1964; G. P. Kuropyatnik, <em>The Second
American Revolution</em>, Uchpedgiz Publishers, Moscow, 1961 (both in Russian).</p>

<p>     2-749</p>

<p>     Karl Marx, &quot;The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte&quot;, in: Karl Marx,
Frederick Engels, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers,Moscow, 1979, p. 111.
V. I. Lenin, &quot;Political Parties in Russia&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 18, p. 45.</p>

<p>     18 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 19</p>

<p>     bargaining; elaboration of crisis-prevention measures capable of
securing steady growth rates for the American economy, and the
place of small business in an economic system founded on the
domination of the giant corporations; development of methods to
integrate racial and ethnic minorities into the political system, and
ways to eliminate disproportions brought about by the
unprecedented militarization of the economy; neutralization of the destructive
effect of inflation on the capitalist world's financial system;
elaboration of measures against growing voter absenteeism, and the
widening of the credibility gap, etc. It is important to indicate the
scope of these problems. More often than not, they transcend
national borders and involve the whole capitalist system. No wonder,
then, that the two-party system is permanently unstable. Although
the statist approach to the solution of the key social and economic
problems has enabled the ruling circles to slightly localize critical
trends and prevent the party and political mechanism from
backfiring the way it did in the early 1930s, the contemporary state of
affairs in the two-party system can hardly be judged unequivocally. It
is no accident that many US political scientists view the future of
that institution pessimistically. They single out &quot;several trends
[which] indicate that the established parties decayed&quot;, and are
worried most of all by the fact that, in their view, &quot;not only have
parties lost the loyalty of the masses; they have also lost control over
the selection of candidates.''^^1^^ The rather hysterical cries about the
&quot;decayed parties&quot;, &quot;the approaching antipartisan age&quot;, reflect the
unfortunate state of affairs in the contemporary two-party
mechanism. Soviet analyst V.O. Pechatnov, who studies the latest trends in
the two-party system, quite legitimately states: &quot;There is a serious
weakening of the role played by the two-party system in shaping
voter behavior---it lias been transformed from its basic regulator into
one of the factors influencing election results.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The two-party system fulfills a number of quite definite
functions in the political process. These may be tentatively divided into
two categories---general and special functions. The general ones are
those that the parties carry out jointly with other elements of the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Thomas R. Dye, L. Harmon Zeigler, <em>The Irony of Democracy. An Uncommon
Introduction to American Politics</em>, Duxbury Press, Monterey, California, 1981, pp. 243, 237.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ V. O. Pechatnov, &quot;Certain New Trends in the Functioning of the Two-Party System
in the 1970s-early 1980s, in: <em>Problems of Americanistics</em>, The Moscow University Press,
Moscow, 1983, p. 79 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     bourgeois political system, with the federal government above all,
i.e. maintaining law and order based on the rule of private property.
The special functions are the responsibility of the two-party system
alone. They include ideological and organisational support of the
election campaigns, preliminary testing of new political doctrines,
and selection and training of personnel for the machinery of
government. The following should also be included in that category:
integration of the protest movements, securing the uninterrupted
operation of the mechanism for the smooth transition of power from
one faction of the ruling circles to another, rallying different groups
of the electorate in support of certain political programs, and
setting up reliable channels for ideological indoctrination of the voters.
Finally, in the USA it is very important to create firm links between
various echelons of power (federal, state and local). This is also a
responsibility of the national parties.</p>

<p>     It is impossible to understand the specifics of the two-party
system without taking into account that each of its components has to
perform quite definite functions which took shape as a result of US
historical development, and the different position each component
occupies in the structure of the bourgeois class domination. The
mission of the ruling party is to secure reliable channels of
communication between the government machinery and the other elements
of the political system. &quot;The ruling class of a capitalist country has
a broad arsenal of means for ideological influence, but the chief role
is played by bourgeois political parties,&quot;^^1^^ Soviet scholars point out.
We would add that the role of the ruling party is particularly great
in this sphere. The ruling party shoulders the main burden in
solving a problem of cardinal importance for the ruling circles---that of
fostering in the masses the illusion that the entire party and
political structure in capitalist society is supraclass and inculcating in the
working people an ideology which is alien to them. Finally, the
ruling party has the chief responsibility for running the machinery of
government.</p>

<p>     The opposition party is not directly linked to that machinery
and is not immediately responsible for the state of affairs in the
country. But its part in the political system and the mechanism of
the American bourgeoisie's class domination is no less important</p>

<p>~^^1^^ I. P. Ilyinsky, A. A. Mishin, L. M. Entin, <em>The Political System of Modem
Capitalism</em>, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya Publishers, Moscow, 1983, p. 108 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     20 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 21</p>

<p>     than that of the ruling party. Possessing much more leeway for
political maneuvering than the ruling party, it is used by the ruling
circles as a safety valve to lessen social tensions in the country. The
element of rivalry between the two bourgeois parties creates among
the electorate the illusion of a truly democratic political process
and the possibility of a real choice which would bring about
fundamental changes in the lives of people. Since the bourgeoisie,
including the monopoly bourgeoisie, is far from uniform in terms of
specific interests, an equally important function of the opposition
party consists in defending the interests of the ruling class minority in
the political process. The opposition party is a kind of balance in
mutual relations between different factions of the powers that be.
Since the ruling and the opposition parties perform different
functions in the political system, the former tends to adhere to a
political course with prevailing consensus trends which hold together
the system, while the latter is more prone to elaborating the
constructive alternative which provides the entire complex with
required dynamics.</p>

<p>     Of course, it would be wrong to explain the relatively high
effectiveness and stability of the two-party system only by
referring to the nature of relations between parties. Other
parameters of this institution must also be taken into account: its specific
organizational structure, for instance. Herein lies the peculiarity of
American parties as compared with the parties of other developed
capitalist countries. Parties in America are marked by a high degree
of decentralization, weak party discipline, absence of a political
body that would play the part of the organization's real political
headquarters on the national scale. It is important to note that all the
legislative acts are based on the assumption that the two-party
principle is unshakable, and are aimed at strengthening it in all ways.<SUP>1
</SUP>Works by many Soviet authors lay emphasis on the national scope
of the American parties' activities. Thus, I.M. Vail writes: &quot;
Whatever the level of legal regulation of parties in the United States, they
have always played the principal role in the country's political
mechanism and in the forming and functioning of its institutions.''^^2^^</p>

<p>~^^1^^ For further detail see: M. N. Marchenko, &quot;Regulation of the Activities of Bourgeois
Parties in the Political System&quot;, <em>in.Political Parties in the USA in Contemporary Times</em>,
Moscow, 1982 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     <em>Election Systems and Parties in the Bourgeois State</em>, The USSR Academy of
Sciences Institute of State and Law, Moscow, 1979, p. 5 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     Acknowledgement of the fact that national parties exist in the USA
in no way contradicts the conclusion that they are based on the
principle of decentralization. The latter is merely a specific form in
which the US bourgeois parties adapt to fulfilling their functions at
a federal level. &quot;The decentralized nature of the parties should not
be regarded as a weakness, on the contrary, it has a number of
incontestable advantages from the standpoint of securing the
domination of the US bourgeoisie,&quot;^^1^^ writes V.A. Nikonov. It provides
flexibility, opportunity for extensive maneuvering and taking account
of sectional particularities in the process of policy-making. That
structure makes it possible to combine organically the tactical
interests of the ruling circles' various factions without any particular
detriment to achieving the strategic objective---strengthening private
property relations. Finally, and this is particularly important, that
structure largely helps consolidate the party's social base and makes
it possible for the most diverse social groups to ``coexist'' within
one organization. Such coexistence is possible in principle,
because the grass roots of the party mechanism may in a certain
situation pursue a political course which is at odds with the
standpoint of the national leadership, without breaking with the federal
structure.</p>

<p>     Here we come to another important feature of American
parties---the multilayered nature (social heterogeneity) of their mass
base. At the end of the 19th century Engels wrote: &quot;The divergence
of interests even in <em>the same</em> class stratum is so great in that
tremendous area that wholly different strata and interests are represented
in each of the two big parties, depending on the locality, and to a
very large extent each of the two parties contains representatives of
nearly every particular section of the possessing class.''^^2^^ In their
theoretical and practical work American politicians attach
exceptional importance to sustaining that norm in the system of party
activities. An eminent analyst of partisan problems Seymour Lipset
wrote: &quot;A system' in which the support of different parties
corresponds too closely to basic sociological divisions cannot continue on
a democratic basis, for such a development would reflect a state of
conflict among groups so intense and clear-cut as to rule out all pos-</p>

<p>     V. A. Nikonov, <em>From Eisenhower to Nixon. A Page in the History of the
Republican Party</em>, Moscow, 1984, pp. 14-15 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     ``Engels to Friedrich Adolph Sorge in Hoboken, London, January 6, 1892&quot;, in:
Marx/Engels, <em>Selected Correspondence</em>, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 416.</p>

<p>     22 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 23</p>

<p>     sibility of compromise.''^^1^^ The desire to retain the multilayered
nature of the parties' mass base at any cost is not accidental. That
feature plays a no small role in sustaining the illusion that parties are
supraclass, and in implementing such an important function of the
party system as being the principal link between the ruling circles
and social forces. Of course, to insist that parties are supraclass
because their electoral base is heterogeneous would be not serious to
say the least. Lenin pointed out: &quot;The class division is, of course,
the ultimate basis of the political grouping; in the final analysis, of
course, it always determines that grouping.''^^2^^ However, the
influence of this aspect of the two-party system on subjective perception
of that institution by the voters is undoubtedly great. Senator
Clifford P. Case of New Jersey once said: &quot;The worst political disaster
that could happen to us would be a sharply defined division of our
parties along economic and class lines. Such a division would solve
no problems. It would bring us in sight of the day when the losers
in an election would begin throwing up barricades in the streets.
The reason why the American people, winners and losers alike
accept the results of an election is that they all know the successful
party represents no threat to the vital interests of any of them.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     The multilayered mass base, coupled with the decentralized
organizational structure of the parties and their desire to fulfill one
common mission in the political process, has a discernible influence
on the transition from one phase in the development of the
partypolitical system to another. In the USA the process occurs in the
form of party realignments---transition periods of a kind linking
together the elements of change, continuity and constancy in the
functioning of the two-party system.</p>

<p>     The term party realignment is widely used by both bourgeois
and Marxist scholars. However, the causes and meaning of the
phenomena are interpreted in far from similar ways. As a rule, the
former propose shifts in the voters' behavior as the motive force
behind that process rather than the sequence of stages in the
development of the capitalist formation. The problem is thus reduced to
bringing out &quot;critical elections&quot; abruptly changing earlier models of</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Sociology Today. Problems and Prospects</em>, edited by Robert K. Merton, Leonard
Boom, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1959, p. 93.</p>

<p>     V. I. Lenin, &quot;The Tasks of the Revolutionary Youth&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 7,
1961 p. 46.</p>

<p>     <em>Editorial Research Reports</em>, September 5, 1951, p. 583.</p>

<p>     partisan support. Actually, the critical elections are a result of crises
or turning points in the development of US capitalism. However,
the relationship is far from always revealed in such a
straightforward form in real life. Quantitative and qualitative changes in the
social and economic sphere do not necessarily immediately cause
relevant changes in the two-party system. But a sufficiently close
connection between the two does exist. It is these turning points in
social and economic development that &quot;determine the party
alignment of the social forces of the country concerned for many years
or even decades ahead.''^^1^^ But that is precisely what the Western
political scientists refuse to see. &quot;A purely functional approach to the
problem of development of the US party-political system prevented
the advocates of the critical elections theory to discover the
fundamental factors of the process,&quot;^^2^^ Soviet analysts remark. The
shortcomings of the critical elections theory are increasingly being seen
by American researchers^^3^^ currently seeking new approaches to that
major problem.</p>

<p>     In the history of the US two-party system it is possible to single
out three quite finished (the Era of Good Feelings; the Civil War
and Reconstruction; and the New Deal) and one uncompleted party
realignment (late 19th-early 20th century). The three major
periods of party realignment were directly linked to turning points in
capitalist development in the US: the transition from cottage
industries to large-scale industrial production, the replacement of free
competition capitalism by monopoly capitalism, and finally, the
rise of state-monopoly capitalism. Following the 1980 elections the
opinion was widespread among part of the American experts that
the US two-party system had entered a phase of party
realignment.^^4^^ As we see it, the conclusion is somewhat premature. Of
course, the last 15 years have seen certain changes in the two-party
system as compared with the model formed in the years of the New
Deal. But for the changes to become irreversible, it is necessary for</p>

<p>     ' V. I. Lenin, &quot;Political Parties in Russia&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 18, p. 45.</p>

<p>     K. S. Gajiyev, N. V. Sivachev, &quot;The Problem of the Inter-Disciplinary Approach
to 'New Scientific' History in Contemporary American Historiography&quot;, in: <em>Questions
of Methodology and History of Historical Sciences</em>, Moscow, 1978, p. 139 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     See, for example, Jerome M. dubb, William H. Flanigan, Nancy H. Zingale, <em>
Partisan Realignment. Voters, Parties, and Government in American History</em>, Sage
Publications, Beverly Hflls, 1980.</p>

<p>     ``America's 6th Major Vote Shift&quot;, by Robert Kelley, <em>The New York Times</em>,
November 11, 1980.</p>

<p>     24 Introduction</p>

<p>     Introduction 25</p>

<p>     the social and economic trends which gave rise to them to be
adequately reflected in the political course of the two leading parties.</p>

<p>     Both of them, however, are still encountering serious difficulties
in searching for new political recipes corresponding to the realities
of state-monopoly capitalism of the 1980s.</p>

<p>     The two-party system, its mechanism, norms and principles of
its activities, did not emerge overnight. The system passed through
several phases in its development. Tentatively, one may single out
two major stages in the two-century long evolution which
approximately coincide with the period of free competition capitalism and
its monopoly stage. The first can be described in short as a time
when the norms and principles of relations between parties in the
political system emerged. The major feature of that process was its
spontaneous nature. Initially many of the contemporary norms of
activity of the party-political mechanism were subjectively rejected
by the leaders of the emergent parties. The element of system was
exceptionally weak, which continually led to the two-party
mechanism going askew. That, in turn, resulted in the instability of the
entire party-political system, frequent regroupings, the
disappearance of old parties and emergence of new ones. Only gradually, in
the process of a cruel struggle, as society's class structure was
crystalized, did the parties become firmly institutionalized as an
important component of capitalist political system and turn, just like the
state itself, into reliable defenders of the interests of the US
bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     The second stage, coinciding with the stage of monopoly
capitalism, is marked by the final institutionalization of the two-party
system in the structure of American monopoly, and subsequently
state-monopoly, capitalism. Every passing year makes more and
more obvious a trend toward greater juridical regulation of the
parties' activities and legislative support and protection of the two--
party system. Since the late 19th century the idea that parties have a
vested interest in the presence of a politically healthy rival has
become axiomatic in US political thinking. As a result the party
system has acquired the qualities of a much more stable,
institutionalized entity. It is less frequently subject to realignments. With the
adoption of the statist platform by the two-party system, its
political spectrum has become more homogeneous, which has had an
impact on the functioning of the system mechanism. Finally, as
imperialism has sunk roots in the United States, the general role of this</p>

<p>     institution has changed in the country's political life. In the early
stages of capitalist development, the parties protected the
domination of the bourgeois-planter bloc but at the same time contributed
to a number of progressive (for the time) social and economic
reforms, democratization of public and political life, enhancing the
political participation of rank-and-file voters. Now the two-party
sytem has become a basically conservative force and a serious
obstacle in the way of social progress. This circumstance was
specially emphasised in the <em>New Programme of the Communist Party
USA:</em> &quot;The present two-party system is a vise within which the
state-monopoly power seeks to confine class conflicts and social
pressures, thus ensuring its own rule.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Of course, these general observations hardly exhaust the subject
of the two-party system. In the chapters below it will be shown
how the principles typical of this institution operated in specific
historical reality in the highlight periods of US history.</p>

<p>     <em>New Programme of the Communist Party USA. The People Versus Corporate
Power</em>, New Outlook Publishers &amp; Distributors, New York, p. 47.</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 27</p>

1

<p>     <b>ORIGINS OF</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM</b></p>

<p>     The historical significance of the American Revolution
consisted in removing obstacles in the way to the establishment of the
capitalist social and economic system in North America. The
obstacles included British colonial oppression in the first place, feudal
survivals in North America's social order in the second place, and
slavery for the blacks in the third. Establishing a bourgeois society in
North America, the US War of Independence was a social and
political revolution. The major social transformation it carried out
included the laying of the bourgeois-democratic political and legal
foundations of the United States. The revolutionary bourgeois--
democratic transformations, in their turn, created favorable
conditions for the founding of political parties. It was only in the
revolutionary period in North America that there appeared factions,
political groupings and blocs engaged in acute ideological rivalry and
seeking contacts with rank-and-iile voters and a wide mass support.</p>

<p>     The change in the nature of political factions after 1776 was
largely due to the increase in the size and social cross-section of the
electorate: in many states property qualifications were reduced, in
Pennsylvania the right to vote extended to all adult male
taxpayers, and on the territory of Vermont to all free men.</p>

<p>     The fact that all government bodies were now elected was very
important in strengthening the political role of ordinary Americans.
In addition, the revolution introduced frequent replacement of
government body members. In all the states the chief executive, the
governor, was reelected every year, as well as the members of the
lower, and in most states of the upper, chambers of the legislatures.
Democratization of political power in the USA and its stronger
dependence on rank-and-file voters had an inevitable impact on the
activities of individual representatives and political factions.</p>

<p>     The sharp increase in the representation of the Western counties
in many states also resulted in serious changes in North America's
political mechanism enhancing the role of petty bourgeois
votersfarmers and shopkeepers---and a corresponding drop in the influence
of Eastern voters from the upper and middle bourgeois strata. The
change in representation led to the appearance in the legislatures of
radical political factions which had not, and could not have, existed
there before 1776.</p>

<p>     The emergence of various political factions after 1776 was also
made possible by the bills and acts legalizing the activity of political
opposition in the states. In the colonial period criticism of the</p>

<p>     The genesis of political parties in the United States dates back to
the revolutionary period of 1776-1783. However, political divisions
which at first glance did not differ from the divisions of the
American Revolution had existed earlier as well. The political groupings
of the colonial age and the revolution period were frequently even
called by the same name---factions. But a comparative analysis of
factions in the colonial age, on the one hand, and those in the
revolutionary period, on the other, reveals fundamental differences
between them enabling us to regard the latter as the predecessors of
the first American political parties.</p>

<p>     The first distinguising feature of the political factions of the
colonial period is that, as a rule, they were narrow elitist and often
focussed round a clan. Irrespective of whether they were in power or
in the opposition, factions of this type grouped around one
influential family whose members fought for the right to distribute both
top and lower administrative posts.</p>

<p>     The <em>de facto</em> inheriting of assembly seats by influential clans
freed legislators in the colonies from dependence on voters. In
actual life not the assembly members were humble servants of the
voters, but on the contrary, voters obligingly elected the economic
rulers. Dissent was excluded. Let us point out, finally, that the
jurisdiction of the elected assemblies in the political system of the
colonies was severely restricted---they were overshadowed by
governors and councils appointed by the crown and combining supreme
executive, legislative and judiciary powers. On the whole the
political order in the colonies did not even have a semblance of bourgeois
democracy. That was why the struggle for the latter was a highlight
of the American Revolution.</p>

<p>     28 Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 29</p>

<p>     government was regarded by the courts as an offence under common
law, which extremely restricted opportunities for action, and even
more so the establishment, of opposition factions. Immediately
after the declaration of independence, most states adopted bills of
rights proclaiming, in addition to other democratic rights, freedom
of speech, of the press, assembly and worship. The bills of rights
were part of the constitutions, and, therefore, legal opportunities
for criticising the authorities and establishing opposition factions
were defended by the states' fundamental laws.</p>

<p>     The political divisions of the revolutionary period were most
clearly seen in Pennsylvania where acute debates on the state's
constitution led to the rise, in Jackson Main's words, of &quot;the first party
system&quot; in North America.^^1^^ Democrats favoring the most
progressive state constitution of the revolution period approved in 1776
came to be called Constitutionalists and the moderates were called
Republicans. The leaders of Constitutionalists supported an
egalitarian social and economic program providing for the elimination of
extreme inequality by means of government measures. The
principle of equality was to be implemented not only in the political
but also in the social and economic sphere.</p>

<p>     Clinton's grouping in New York was a politically distinct
pettybourgeois faction. Its platform and activities reflected the
contradictory nature of the petty bourgeoisie, their capacity, on one fine
day, to turn from enemies of wealth to the fervent worshippers of
the Golden Calf. A leader of the true Whigs, as members of the
patriots' left wing in New York called themselves, George Clinton has
been traditionally regarded in American historiography as a radical,
a leveller or in any case a democrat. And it was only relatively
recently in a fundamental study about the rise of the Democratic
Republicans in New York that Alfred Young^^2^^ showed their leader
Clinton and his surrounding to be American nouveaux riches, those
members of the middle and lower strata of white Americans who
succeeded in thriving on the difficulties of the revolution rising
from nobodies to the economic elite, after which they began to vie
for the leading place in the system of political power with the
dominating families---the Schuylers, the Livingstons and the Pendletons.</p>

<p>     Jackson Turner Main, <em>Political Parties before the Constitution</em>, The University of
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1973, p. 174.</p>

<p>     Alfred Fabian Young, <em>The Democratic Republicans of New York, The Origins,
1763-1797</em>, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1967.</p>

<p>     Despite the existence of petty-bourgeois factions during the
revolution and their strong positions in some states, they were never
able to establish themselves as national political parties. When in the
1790s the two bourgeois parties---the Federalists and the
Republicans---were established in the USA, the petty-bourgeois blocs and
groupings did not even attempt to form an opposition but, on the
contrary, joined them, chiefly as a left wing of the Republicans.
The inability of the petty-bourgeois groupings in various states to
develop into national political parties, as, say, the Populists did at
the end of the 19th century, was due chiefly to the weak
development of the mass democratic movements at the time. Even the
largest mass popular movement of the time, the Daniel Shays
Rebellion practically did not go beyond the bounds of one state. The
social and political conditions necessary for the rise of a national
radical party were absent in the USA in the latter part of the 18th
century.</p>

<p>     Although petty-bourgeois political factions in the USA during
the revolution were unable to unite on a national level, they
undoubtedly influenced the genesis of national political parties. The
American bourgeois-planter elite played the chief role in erecting
the framework of the two-party system. They could not ignore the
successes of the petty-bourgeois factions in the revolutionary period
and, in order to secure their support, were forced to include some
of their demands in their platforms. In addition, the spirit and
traditions of the petty-bourgeois party opposition which arose in the
period of the revolution had influenced the entire subsequent
American history and were revived occasionally in different states, and
in periods when the condition of the petty bourgeois deteriorated,
even on a national level.</p>

<p>     The age of the American Revolution ended in a political
division which was a prologue to the emergence of national political
parties in the 1790s. The significance of the Federalist and the
Antifederalist movements in the 1780s lies in the fact that they were
the first nationwide political groupings and aimed at winning a
political victory at the federal level.</p>

<p>     In our view, it is necessary to single out two stages in the
genesis and evolution of the Federalist movement which was crowned</p>

<p>     <b>30 Chapter One</b></p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System <b>31</b></p>

<p>     by the adoption of the US Constitution in 1787.</p>

<p>     During the first stage---from the late 1770s to 1783-the
Federalists pursued the aim of assigning extensive economic powers to
the Continental Congress which was nationwide political body.
Their platform included planks on extensive domestic (on terms
favorable to large creditors) and foreign loans, the setting up of a
national bank to finance war expenditures and to secure optimal use
of national capital, providing the Continental Congress with the
right to turn free lands into government property, and also
measures intended to set up the Congress' own funds. The Federalists'
economic platform alone proved incompatible with the principle of
state sovereignty laid down in the 1781 Articles of Confederation
and required their radical revision or even repeal.</p>

<p>     It is not difficult to see that the Federalist economic program
corresponded chiefly to the interests of the Northeastern
commercial and financial bourgeoisie. No wonder its members played a
leading part among the Federalists. At the same time their ranks
were also open to those politicians of the South who realised that
rejection of the &quot;national approach,&quot; as the Federalists often dubbed
their approach to solving economic problems, could lead to the
downfall of the Union of thirteen states and, as a result, to defeat in
the war. The Federalist refrain was to grant the Continental Congress
the &quot;power of purse&quot; including the right to force bonds on the
states shirking their financial obligations.^^1^^ In its finished form the
idea of expanding the Federal government's financial and economic
prerogatives was presented by Alexander Hamilton in <em>The
Continentalist</em> articles in 1781.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Federalists' social motives---use of central power for control
over and repressions against the mass movements---took shape
during the second stage of their movement, in the period from 1783 to
1789, when class contradictions sharply aggravated within the
country and it became clear that without being subordinated to a single
higher will the states would be unable to cope not only with the
financial and economic chaos but also with social cataclysms. The</p>

<p>     <em>Letters of Members of the Continental Congress</em>, edited by Edmund Cody Burnett,
in 8 volumes, P. Smith, Gloucester, Mass., 1963, Vol. V, pp. 305, 478, 504, 536 547-
Vol. VI, pp. 41-42,58.;</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Papers of Alexander Hamilton</em>, Volume II, 1779-1781, Editor: Harold C.
Syrett, Columbia University Press, New York 1961, pp. 400, 402-404, 408, 651, 654, 661-
665, 670, 671; Vol. Ill, New York, 1962, p. 114.</p>

<p>     fact that the Federalists first advanced the economic demands and
then the social ones does not mean, however, that the authorities
obtained economic functions first and social functions later. Both
functions were established simultaneously, but at the beginning of
the revolution were in the hands of the state governments, because
the federal government was not particularly important.</p>

<p>     At the second stage in the Federalist movement, there was an
abrupt increase in the share of top plantation owners who, it was
quite obvious, to a no lesser extent than the Northeastern
bourgeoisie were interested in defending large-scale property from mass
radical movements. Their ideological leader James Madison became
known as the &quot;philosopher of the American Constitution&quot; of 1787.
The Constitution itself was a collection of political, government and
legal principles preached by the moderately conservative wing of
the revolution.</p>

<p>     The experience of the Federalist movement was tremendously
important for the future national political parties in the sense that
in that movement, for the first time, leaders of political groupings
of various hues and colors, people holding different social and
political views, acquired and displayed the ability to reduce their
principles to a common denominator and bring them together in a
common platform of the political union. The program and ideology of
the Federalist movement were most fully expressed in articles under
the heading <em>The Federalist</em> published in 1787-1788 and written by
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay (the role of the
latter in writing the articles was a minor one). The two main authors,
Hamilton and Madison, as well as the groups of the movement they
represented---the Northeastern bourgeoisie and the Southern
plantation owners---had considerable differences in their social beliefs. But
these differences were skilfully overcome in <em>The Federalist</em>. Thus,
the leaders of the Northerners and the Southerners achieved a
consensus in the sensitive issue of slavery (a cynical betrayal by the
Northerners of the 1776 tenets: the authors of <em>The Federalist</em>
proclaimed the black slave &quot;as divested of two fifths of the man&quot;).^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Federalist movement managed to secure the support of
prominent members of the patriotic camp's left wing. This is
explained not only by skilfull Federalist propaganda but also by the
goals of the Federalists. Centralization of political power in the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Papers of Alexander Hamilton</em>, Vol. IV, 1962, pp. 510-512.</p>

<p>     32 Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 33</p>

<p>     USA corresponded not only to the class purposes of the
propertied elite, although it was aimed primarily at promoting their
interests. It objectively contributed to strengthening the national
sovereignty of the USA, being condition for retaining and
developing the country's economic independence and prestige on the
international scene dominated by the European monarchs. This
meaning and purpose of federal centralization were deeply felt by
many Democrats, above all Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin and
Benjamin Rush who joined the Federalists.</p>

<p>     Containing the demand to protect national industry and trade
from foreign competition, the Federalist platform was widely
supported by the urban lower strata---artisans, wage-earners and
craftsmen. In New York and Pennsylvania, for instance, the urban lower
strata refused to continue following the Clinton faction and the
Constitutionalists, when they adopted Antifederalist positions, and
gave their votes to Hamilton's party.</p>

<p>     The opposition to the Federalists inherited not only the
principle of state sovereignty but also the democratic ideas of the
American Revolution. On the whole, however, the Antifederalists were
not identical to the left wing of the patriotic camp, they were a
complex and motley movement in class terms. As in the case with
the Federalists, the Antifederalists were headed by members of the
bourgeois-planter elite expressing the interests of the social strata
for various reasons not interested in extending the prerogatives of
the federal government (for example, many Southern plantation
owners supporting the Antifederalists regarded the strengthening of
the central government only as the way to the economic rise of the
commercial and financial bourgeoisie). The social base of the
Antifederalist movement consisted of rural petty bourgeois, owners of
unprofitable or low-profit farms situated mostly in the Western
areas. As opposed to the owners of commercial farms in the settled
Eastern areas who associated the rise of the federal government
with hopes for better opportunities to export agricultural produce
to the other states, the owners of small and noncommercial farms
perceived a different aspect in centralization of federal power---the
inevitable growth of bureaucracy, taxes, etc.</p>

<p>     In the economic field the Antifederalists' relationship with the
petty-bourgeois political blocs and spontaneous actions of the
popular masses in the revolutionary period was reflected in a negative
attitude to excessive taxes, defense of paper money, and advocacy</p>

<p>     of measures aimed at easing the debt burden of the rural
bourgeoisie. Among the Antifederalist leadership these measures were
supported by those Southern plantation owners who were heavily
indebted to domestic and foreign creditors. As the rank-and-file
members of the movement, the Southern Antifederalists opposed
Federalist attempts to make the issuing of money the monopoly of the
federal government, give it the right to levy both direct and indirect
taxes, and refund the Confederation's debts at nominal value.</p>

<p>     In politics the Antifederalists' ties with the democratic
groupings of the revolutionary period were reflected in favoring
supremacy of legislative power in respect to executive power, frequent
reelection of government organs and so on. The Antifederalists were
particularly distressed by the absence of the Bill of Rights in the
proposed federal Constitution. They protested against the principle
that all executive power be vested in the President (as the authors
of the Constitution suggested) and put forward the idea of a
collective executive body.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Antifederalists, however, failed to follow the left-wing
principles of the revolutionary camp in a number of issues and
made serious concessions to the authors of the 1787 Constitution.
Most of them agreed with the Federalist demand to considerably
extend the term of office of the head of Executive power. They
consented to a bicameral legislature, a Supreme Court and other
innovations going against the Articles of Confederation. Finally, they
adopted a frankly defensive position in the fight against the
Federalists. Having failed to propose a positive alternative to the federal
Constitution, their captains only demanded to introduce
amendments. In terms of original ideas, independence, radical measures
aimed at solving the economic and political problems of the USA,
the Antifederalist platform trailed behind the Federalist program.
No wonder then, that, having ceded to their opponents on one,
albeit most important, issue---inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution---the Federalists in effect deprived them of weighty
arguments in the ideological struggle.</p>

<p>     <em>The Letters of Richard Henry Lee</em>, edited by James Curtis Baliagh, in 2 volumes,
Da Capo Press, New York, 1970, Vol. II, pp. 433, 438, 442-443; <em>The Papers of George
Mason</em>, edited by Robert A. Rutland, in 3 volumes, The University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, Vol. in, 1970, pp. 880-881, 916, 972, 981, 989, 1050.</p>

<p>     3-749</p>

<p>     34 Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 35</p>

<p>     The victory of the Federalists over their opponents and
ratification of the 1787 Constitution prepared a new stage in the
genesis of US political parties. Now intrastate contradictions were
inevitably revealed at a national level, in the Congress and
government. The formerly autonomous and isolated socio-economic and
political interests now clashed within the united national state.</p>

<p>     The first US national government formed in 1789 was founded
on a nonpartisan basis. But soon after George Washington took the
oath of office and the House of Representatives and the Senate
went into session political factions began to emerge. By an ironic
twist of fate Washington, a staunch opponent of factional strife,
appointed the founders of the future rival political parties----
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson---to two key posts in the
government (secretary of the treasury and secretary of state). As early
as 1790-1791, discussions of Hamilton's bills led to Congress
splitting into Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans.</p>

<p>     The rise of the first national parties laid the foundations of their
mutual relations typical of the history of the US two-party
systemconsensus and alternative. The Hamiltonian Federalists and the
Jeffersonian Republicans overcame the hostility marking the attitude
of their predeccessors---the Federalists and the Antifederalists---to
the Federal Constitution and federal government and reached a
consensus on this basic issue. The basis of the consensus---loyalty of
both parties to federal government, the 1787 Constitution, and on
the whole to the social and political principles that had triumphed
in the final stages of the American Revolution---was reflected in
both the ideology and the political practice of the rival parties. The
names of the newspapers, the mouthpieces of the two parties, the
Jeffersonian <em>National Gazette</em> and the Hamiltonian <em>Gazette of the
United States</em>, as well as the similarly sounding names of the
editors---Fenno and Freneau, seemed to symbolize their unity regarding
the bourgeois foundations of the USA. From the very outset the
Jeffersonian Republicans unequivocally stated their intention to act
as a legal opposition and resist the Hamiltonian Federalists
exclusively within the framework of the existing political system. The
form of political opposition chosen by Jefferson and his party laid
the cornerstone of the US two-party system---a consensus in
supporting and strengthening the bourgeois foundations of the United States.</p>

<p>     The differences between the two parties in determining
prospects for US development took shape in the 1790s. They featured
prominently in all the principal issues of domestic, economic and
foreign policy. The sharpness of the debates between the
Hamiltonians and the Jeffersonians even gave ground to historians to
consider them the most highly ideologized parties in American history.</p>

<p>     In the political field Hamilton and his followers favored
strengthening the institutions and laws which promoted narrow class
interests of the bourgeois-planter elite, and restricting and holding in
check the bourgeois-democratic transformations of the American
Revolution. The Federalist Party, that came to power in the 1790s,
showed itself, among other things, to be a party supporting law and
order.</p>

<p>     By contrast, the Jeffersonian Republicans came out as advocates
of developing and multiplying the revolution's bourgeois--
democratic innovations and extending bourgeois-democratic rights and
liberties to new sections of the population. The Republicans'
political strategy to a larger extent corresponded to the objective
requirements of consolidating the bourgeois social and economic system in
the United States, because the 1776 Revolution did not close but
opened the age of bourgeois revolutions in the USA which was
completed only after the Civil War and Reconstruction in 1861-1877.
The Jeffersonians' political strategy secured a broader mass base for
them and was a major factor contributing to the ousting of the
Federalists by the Republicans from the commanding positions in the
country's political system in the early 19th century.</p>

<p>     It was no accident that the Jeffersonians called themselves
Democrats and Republicans (both names are to be found in historical
literature). It was under the banners of democracy and
republicanism that they launched their first attacks against Hamilton and the
Federalists proclaiming them to be the sworn enemies of the
American Republic who were conspiring to overthrow it. One after
another articles began to appear in the Republican press accusing the
secretary of the treasury of monarchal sympathies and the desire to
alter the US system of government according to the British model.
They claimed that Hamilton repeatedly offered a sceptre and
crown to George Washington and attempted to introduce customs
and habits prevailing in British Parliament.</p>

<p>     Apart from fair observations Republican propaganda contained
obvious exaggerations. Monarchic inclinations were alien to the Fe-</p>

<p>     <b>36</b> Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins of the Two-Party System 37</p>

<p>     deralists including their moderate leaders Alexander Hamilton and
John Adams: they believed that the very conditions for non--
republican governmental political forms had been uprooted in the USA.
At the same time the Federalists seriously differed from the
Jeffersonians in defining republicanism, the basis of the US government
system. Their model of the ideal republic rejected the principle of
political democracy as an inessential ingredient of republicanism.
Democracy, as they saw it, implied such political forms and
developments as direct expression of the popular will (direct election
of representatives, legislative referendums and voter initiatives,
mandates to representatives), supremacy of legislative power over the
executive, the extension of suffrage to the unpropertied strata and
so forth.</p>

<p>     The most sophisticated argument in the Federalist criticism of
political democracy consisted in asserting that precisely that form,
rather than oligarchic principles was the true enemy of the
republican system and contained the roots of any despotism including
monarchy. This postulate was intended to make the Federalists out
as the real defenders of republican system and the Democrats as
the worst enemies of republicanism.</p>

<p>     The Federalists referred to examples from the history of ancient
republics showing how certain political demagogic leaders used the
popularity they gained among the people to demolish republican
liberties. But most often the Federalist leaders appealed to the
experience of the French Revolution. The unexpected metamorphoses
of that revolution, its sweeping changes from broad participation of
the popular masses in political activity to the rise of despotic rule
by the Directory, the consuls and then the Bonapartist regime were
to serve, in the Americans' eyes, as a vivid illustration of the
postulate that dictatorship develops from democracy, being the latter's
other side.</p>

<p>     The Brumaire 18, 1799 coup and the proclaiming of Bonaparte
First Consul, virtually the dictator, from the standpoint of
Federalist propaganda, meant the end of the natural degeneration of the
democratic republic into a tyranny, a process whose beginning was
invariably associated with the coming to power of the Jacobin party
and Robespierre.</p>

<p>     The idea that political democracy was incompatible with any
long-term existence of the republican system served as a pretext for
the Federalists to demand restriction of various liberties won by the</p>

<p>     people in the course of the American Revolution. Such demands
were heard particularly frequently in the 1790s, marked by the
mass democratic upheavals under the impact of the French
Revolution, farmer actions, including the famous 1794 rebellion in
Pennsylvania.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The 1787 US Constitution which was, according to its authors,
to become a reliable sword and shield of bourgeois-planter rule, in
the view of the Federalists was not fully up to the task in the new
historical conditions (the reason for this was, primarily, the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, something which
was not envisaged by its founders but approved by the American
legislators under the pressure of the masses in 1789).</p>

<p>     The most impressive contribution to the criticism of the US
Constitution's democratic articles was made by the Federalists
during discussions in 1798 of the notorious Alien and Sedition acts.
These acts regarded as a criminal offence any opposition to the
government's domestic or foreign policy actions and reduced to
naught the importance of the first article of the Bill of Rights
proclaiming freedom of speech, of the press, and assembly. Most
Federalists urged to crack down toughly, without consideration for the
Bill of Rights, on anyone who, in printed word or orally, would
question the loyalty of a legislator or government member to the
Constitution, liberty and the happiness of the people. Another,
truly Jesuitic way of backing reactionary bills was shown by Robert
Harper.</p>

<p>     Harper was among the first to show that the Constitution may
be interpreted in any, even extremely reactionary, spirit, if that
corresponded to the interests of the powers that be. Yes, he agreed, the
Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press. But does
freedom of speech and the press, Harper inquired, include the right</p>

<p>     For examples of criticism by Federalist leaders of political democracy see: <em>Annals
of the Congress of the United States. 1st Congress. The Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States, with an Appendix</em>, Volume I: <em>March 3, 1789 to March 3,
1791</em>, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1834, pp. 733-734; <em>Seventh Congress, 1st Session
(December 7, 1801 to March 3, 1803)</em>, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1851, p. 41;
Cir<em>cular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789-1829</em>, in 3 volumes, edited by
Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., Vol. 1, the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill,
1978, pp. 191-192; <em>Documents Relating to New England Federalism. 1800-1815</em>, edited
by Henry Adams, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1877, pp. 347, 363; <em>Works of
Fisher Ames. With a Selection From His Speeches and Correspondence</em>, ed. by Seth Ames,
Vol. II, Da Capo Press, New York, 1969, p. 4.</p>

<p>     38 Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 39</p>

<p>     goals to the interests of the commercial and financial
bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     The chief plank in Hamilton's economic platform---to pay all
US debts, both of states and of the federal government, at nominal
value---was fully in line with the interests of the financial
bourgeoisie in the Northeast holding a lion's share of government bonds and
other debt securities. Most of the latter were soldiers' certificates
which had passed from the hands of the original owners, who had
lost faith in them, to the hands of the financial magnates. Since the
magnates bought the certificates at a price not higher than 10 to 12
per cent of their nominal value, it was easy to calculate that, if
Hamilton's plan was implemented, their profit would be up to 1,000
per cent. The Jeffersonian Republicans opposed Hamilton's project
with another proposal widely supported by the taxpayers at whose
expense it was intended to pay the government debt, namely, to
pay at nominal value only those certificates that were in the hands
of the original owners, and refund the other securities at their
actual value or annul them altogether.</p>

<p>     Hamilton's counterarguments presented in a report to Congress
boiled down to the assertion that his plan for redeeming the
government debt was the only way to provide a stable and long-term
basis for public credit. The need for credit, he maintained, was one
of the most important ones in any country. But to obtain credit,
one has to learn to pay back one's debts regularly. On the whole,
Hamilton's concept of the government debt was quite an ingenious
way of ideologically backing the close ties between America's
bourgeois government and the Northeast financial tycoons and
moneylenders, constituting the backbone of the Federalist Party. If
Hamilton's project were approved, 80 per cent of annual government
expenditures would go to pay the creditors holding government
bonds and securities.</p>

<p>     The setting up of a national bank by the US government also
conformed to the interests of the financial-usurious bourgeoisie.
Measures of the Federalist Party aimed at encouraging national
industry were in line with the interests of manufacture owners. As to
middle and small property owners, including owners of scattered
manufactures, they lacked government patronage. The latter
circumstance was skilfully taken advantage of by the Jeffersonian
Republicans who included in their program a whole series of measures
aimed at protecting the interests of artisans, small industrialists and</p>

<p>     to resort to slander and sedition? In this way he quite easily showed
the limits of freedom, the right to determine which, i.e. to qualify
the printed or oral word as slander and sedition, belonged naturally
to the government.^^1^^</p>

<p>     According to the Federalist doctrine the ideal political system
was to be completely free of passions and conform, as George
Cabot pointed out, to the once established legal standards and laws.<SUP>2
</SUP>The idea of the &quot;power of laws&quot; underlying the Federalist ideology
confirms that they were a party of law and order wishing to be free
of the whims of the crowd. This may raise doubts at first glance,
because the principle of power of laws, popular in the 18th century,
originally had a progressive ring to it, aimed as it was by the
revolutionary bourgeoisie and its intellectual leaders against the arbitrary
rule of the monarchs. But the thing is that, having come to power
(and the experience of the American Federalists confirms this), the
bourgeoisie began to use it for conservative ends, namely, to
support the existing order. The power of laws was applied in the USA
in 1790s and 1800s not against the arbitrary rule of the English
monarch, as has been the case before 1776, but against any
spontaneous expression of the popular will.</p>

<p>     The class bias of the Federalist Party was most fully revealed in
its economic program. Both contemporaries and historians
acknowledge that the Federalist economic program set forth by Hamilton
in 1790-1791 and approved by Congress was the initial cause of the
split of American politicians into conflicting parties. Moreover,
Hamilton's economic program signified a serious transformation of
Federalist goals of the 1787 vintage and led to serious disturbances
in the bourgeois-planter bloc.</p>

<p>     The bourgeois-planter bloc arose in the years of the
revolutionary war and reached its greatest strength in the year the Federal
Constitution was adopted, which marked the establishment of the
political rule of the Northeastern bourgeoisie and the Southern
plantation owners in the country. But unity of the two classes
with different interests had no historical prospects. The first
fissures appeared in the early 1790s. Federalism of the 1787 vintage
began to crumble when Hamilton openly subordinated Federalist</p>

<p>     <em>Annals of the Congress of the United States. 5th Congress, May 15,1797 to March 3,
1799^.2161</em>.</p>

<p>     ``George Cabot to Timothy Pickering, 14 February, 1804&quot;, in: <em>Documents Relating
to New England Federalism</em>, p. 347.</p>

<p>     40 Chapter One</p>

<p>     Origins
of the Two-Party System 41</p>

<p>     some commercial groups.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Although the Jeffersonian Republicans in the 1790s included in
their program demands consonant with the interests of commercial
and industrial capitalism, they were chiefly advocates of America's
agrarian development. The advocacy of agrarian development by
the Jeffersonian Republicans caused many historians to accuse
them of Utopian thinking. It must be kept in mind, however, that,
in the time Hamilton and Jefferson lived, development of the
nation along the lines of agrarian rather than industrial capitalism
seemed a more realistic road. North America was a profoundly
agricultural country, and the availability of enormous unsettled lands
led many enlightened thinkers to believe that farms and rural
districts, rather than manufactures and cities, would develop in the
country.</p>

<p>     Jefferson himself favored development not simply along
agrarian lines but along the agrarian-farmer road which meant the
prevalence of small-commodity farms. However, as early as the 1790s
that ideological line taken by Jefferson came into sharp
contradiction with historical reality. Although Jefferson and other
Republican leaders propagated the idea of &quot;government of the fanners, by
the farmers and for the farmers&quot;, it was slaveholding plantation
owners who seized the leading position in the party. The existence
of a growing faction of slaveholding plantation owners in the
Jeffersonian Republican Party constituted a mortal threat to the
democratic agrarian dream of its leader.</p>

<p>     Was Jefferson himself aware of the dangers inherent in the
cohabitation of such contradictory social and political elements in his
party? In replying to this question it is to be kept in mind that in
his forecast of the future of plantation slavery Jefferson relied on
the economic situation of the 1770s and 1780s. Specialized in
producing expensive tobacco, plantation slavery was suffering from a
long-term crisis. Jefferson believed that the effect of that crisis
together with the ban on import of slaves into the USA (effective
from 1808 and provided for in the Federal Constitution) would
result in the natural death of the shameful phenomenon.</p>

<p>     Jefferson could not foresee the unexpected, and extremely
favorable for plantation slavery, zigzag in the latter's development at</p>

<p>     See: V. A. Ushakov, <em>America Under George Washington (Political and Social
Problems of the USA in 1789-1797)</em>, Nauka Publishers, Leningrad, 1983, pp. 193-196 (in
Russian).</p>

<p>     the end of the 18th century. A sharp increase in demand for cotton
and the invention in 1793 of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney gave a
kind of second wind to slavery in the United States. The
slaveholding plantation owners began to adapt very rapidly to the cotton
boom; they gained glowing hopes as to the economic future of their
plantations which they actively switched to cotton-growing. The
industrial revolution and capitalism were a sort of midwife for
plantation slavery. Jefferson foresaw many social troubles
accompanying the development of industrial capitalism, but neither he nor
anyone else of the American Democrats had expected such a surprise.
History had given the role of leader in the agrarian coalition set up
by the Jeffersonian Republicans to the plantation owners and not
the farmers. The dramatic clashes in the agrarian coalition, however,
were still far ahead. Jefferson could not foresee them, energetically
founding what he thought would be a party of the democratic
agrarian future of the USA.</p>

<p>     Since 1792-1793 differences between the Federalists and the
Republicans had come to embrace US foreign policy. They even
began to be known as the British and the French parties due to their
openly avowed foreign-policy preferences. The Federalist leitmotif
was that expanding economic and political relations with Britain
was a tactical move, because it was the surest way ultimately to
secure stable political independence and economic self-sufficiency for
America. They insisted that the USA would become a strong power
only provided there was lasting peace, and in order to sustain that
peace it was necessary to make certain concessions to Britain. The
economic arguments put forward by the Federalists were founded
on the fact that, on the one hand, American exports to British
dominions constituted the principal source of income of American
merchants, and on the other, duties on British goods imported into
the USA were dozens of times larger than those on French imports
and were the main source for the replenishment of the country's
treasury.</p>

<p>     The Federalists' political argument aimed against France went
as follows: in laying down the American government's strategic line
it was necessary to keep in mind that the former US ally could no
longer be regarded as a stable, and therefore strong and reliable,
political system due to the revolution that had broken out in it, and
that an alliance with a destabilized power involved dangers and
unpredictable consequences. The Federalist position was quite cyni-</p>

<p>     42 Chapter One</p>

<p>     origins</p>

<p>     of the Two-Party System 43</p>

<p>     ists and the Republicans to the utmost. In 1798-1799 the
Republican Party began to prepare for the 1800 elections which, as its
leaders saw it, were to seal the fate of the American Republic. The
Kentucky and the Virginia resolutions compiled by Jefferson and
Madison were to constitute the party platform in the coming political
clash. In a terse and expressive style Republican propaganda
pointed out the negative and unpopular results of the Federalist rule:
British influence, a regular army, direct taxes, the government debt,
a costly navy and the aristocratic spirit. The Jeffersonian Republicans
pledged to do away with these.</p>

<p>     cal: they were prepared to unilaterally denounce the 1778 Treaty
and leave republican France face to face with the
counterrevolutionary conspiracy of European monarchs.</p>

<p>     Jefferson and his surrounding approached the question of
choosing the United States allies from different positions. The
presenting of the fallen Bastille's keys to George Washington by France
in 1789 was not a token gesture in the eyes of the secretary of
state, but marked the beginning of the highest stage in the political
alliance between France and North America. Now it was an alliance
between two political communities which were founded, as distinct
from all other states of the world, on popular consent! Jefferson
firmly rejected Hamilton's reasoning which proclaimed
Franco-American treaties annuled. The Jeffersonians took a more
careful approach to the issue of military obligations to France. Lacking
a navy and regular army, America, as Jefferson saw it, should
refrain from taking part in hostilities.</p>

<p>     The Federalist foreign policy triumphed in 1795 when the Jay
Treaty was concluded and ratified. That treaty secured
exceptionally favorable conditions, as compared with other countries, for
Britain's access to the American market, and confirmed all the prewar
debts of the former colonies to the mother country. The struggle
around Jay's treaty was attended by an episode clearly showing the
organizational state of US political parties. During debates on the
financing of the treaty in the House of Representatives, the
Republicans gathered for their first caucus. This, however, failed to rally
the party followers and some of them voted together with the
Federalists. The Federalists won by a three-vote margin.</p>

<p>     The victory of the Federalist candidate John Adams in the 1796
election led to the formation of the most conservative government
since the United States had been founded. The Federalists'
antipopular domestic and foreign policy culminated in the adoption in
1798 of the Alien and Sedition acts and the launching of a
hysterical anti-French campaign. The Congressmen passed 20 acts aimed at
preparing for war. The administration set up a Navy Department,
decided to build 25 frigates and arm merchantmen, and sanctioned
the seizure of French vessels on the high seas. The Congress
annulled all treaties with France and decided to enlist 10,000
volunteers in the army for three years. A real estate tax was introduced to
cover war expenditures.</p>

<p>     John Adams's policies aggravated tensions between the Federal-</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 45</p>

2

<p>     <b>THE FIRST TEST:</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM</b></p>

<p>     <b>AT THE THRESHOLD
OF THE 19TH CENTURY</b></p>

<p>     fects&quot; of party spirit. These antipartisan views may be traced back
to the 18th-century British tradition. In the works of Edmund
Burke, Lord Bolingbroke, and David Hume it was asserted that the
division of people into parties or factions was harmful to society as a
whole, because it promoted the interests only of a narrow minority
to the detriment of society as a whole.</p>

<p>     The matter was that neither the Federalists nor the Republicans
regarded each other as parts of the two-party mechanism at the turn
of the 19th century. On the contrary, each side sought to destroy
its opponents as a party, not physically as in France, but winning
over the rank and file. In practice the Federalists attempted to
achieve this by accusing their opponents of backing the interests of
France at the end of the 1790s. This, in particular, resulted in the
Alien and Sedition acts of 1798. In his Inaugural Address the
Republican President preferred to gloss over the party differences of the
1790s, ascribing them---as the Federalists had done in their
timelargely to foreign political influence: &quot;During the throes and
convulsions of the ancient world, during the organizing spasms of
infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost
liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should
reach even this distant and peaceful shore.''^^1^^ But this public address
by Jefferson contained a new thought, a hint that a legal opposition
to the ruling party had the right to exist: &quot;All too, will bear in mind
this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all
cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that
the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must
protect, and to violate which would be oppression.''^^2^^ As subsequent
events showed, the Republicans never made use of their rights and
opportunities as a ruling party to suppress the opposition, as the
Federalists had attempted to do in 1798.</p>

<p>     By contrast, immediately after the Republicans came to power,
they tried to smooth over the contradictions between the two
parties, thus seeking to set up a <em>modus Vivendi</em> with their political
opponents. That was why it was the Jeffersonian Republicans who
managed to establish interaction with political opponents in the
first two-party system in US history. In addition, in his Inaugural
Address the new President publicly voiced his desire to observe de-</p>

<p>     <em>The Portable Thomas Jefferson</em>, edited by Merrile D. Peterson, The Viking Press,
New York, 1976, p. 291. 
~^^2^^ <em>Ibid</em>.</p>

<p>     For the first time in the short history of the USA, on March 4,
1801, power passed from one political party to another. The
victory of the Republicans ousting the Federalists from office as a result
of the 1800 elections was preceded by nearly a decade of partisan
rivalry accompanied by the parties' organisational establishment
and final formulation of political creeds. The foundations of
interaction between the bourgeois parties were laid in the late 1700s and
early 1800s.</p>

<p>     The Jeffersonian. Republicans made a major contribution to
shaping the principles of coexistence with their opponents, the
Federalists. The ideological commitments of the Republican Party
were based on the aspirations of the planters of the South, the
farmers and part of the bourgeoisie. Having come to power, the
Republicans were forced to largely modify the principles they had
advanced while being in the opposition. The new trends in their
policies had to do with realities of American economic life, rapid
development of capitalism and also the .need to coexist with their
political opponents. The fate of the very institution of US political
parties largely depended on the extent to which the Republican
leadership managed to establish relations with the defeated Federalists.</p>

<p>     The existence of two opposing parties in American political life
was obvious as early as the 1796 election. Nevertheless, the desire
to rid society of party divisions was characteristic, paradoxically, of
the leaders of both parties---the Federalists Hamilton, Adams, Fisher
Ames and the Republicans Jefferson, Madison, James Monroe, John
Taylor and others. It was no accident that the Farewell Address of
the first US President who witnessed the early differences in
Congress contained an appeal to rid the country of the &quot;baneful ef-</p>

<p>     46 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 47</p>

<p>     mocratic principles of government. Among the latter he listed
freedom of political and religious beliefs, freedom of the press and
freedom of the individual, a peaceful attitude to all countries, an
honest payment of debts, encouragement of agriculture and commerce,
rejection of political alliances with European powers, &quot;a well
disciplined militia---our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of
war&quot;, rigid economy in government and so on. Jefferson
specifically pointed out that his was a chosen country with &quot;room enough
for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation&quot;.
The President expressed the hope that national unity would be
achieved, for &quot;every difference of opinion is not a difference of
principle. We are all republicans---we are all federalists.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     ``We are all republicans---we are all federalists,&quot; that much
quoted phrase largely determined the tone of the new administration.
This line suited many Republican leaders not interested in cardinal
reforms. It also quelled the anxieties of the Federalists who feared
repressions and persecutions.</p>

<p>     The Republican Administration's desire to improve relations
with the Federalists was reflected in a moderate patronage policy,
i.e. in replacing Federalist officeholders by Republican colleagues.
Jefferson was to solve this problem during his first months in office.
Both Republicans and their political opponents watched most
attentively how Jefferson would behave.</p>

<p>     In January 1802 the <em>National Intelligencer</em> published a
preliminary list of persons removed from their posts with an analysis of the
reasons for their dismissal. Of the 90 cases reported, 21 were known
as President Adams' midnight appointments which he made in the
last days and hours in office. All these appointments without
exception were annuled by Jefferson. In another issue the same paper,
drawing on a source close to the administration, listed the five most
frequent reasons for removal of Federalists: &quot;1. Defalcation in the
paiement of monies actually received, or which ought to have been
received, or a failure to account to the Treasury. 2. Gross
immorality of character. 3. Incompetency to discharge official duties. 4.
Negligent attention to the discharge of duties. 5. Settled hostility and
active enmity to republican principles.''^^2^^ Apparently, membership
in the Federalist Party as such was not among the immediate
pretexts for dismissals.</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ The Portable Thomas Jefferson, pp</em>. 291-294.
<em>National Intelligencer</em>, August 14, 1801.</p>

<p>     In view of the fact that some Republicans were displeased with
the excessively moderate patronage policy, Jefferson was forced to
undertake a more resolute attack against the Federalists. He wrote
in a letter to William Duane, editor of the Philadelphia <em>Aurora</em>, in
summer 1803: &quot;Of 316 offices in all the United States subject to
appointment and removal by me, 130 only are Federalists.''^^1^^
Regardless of how precisely Jefferson estimated his achievements in
the field of patronage policy, it is clear that there was a sufficient
number of Republicans in government office in 1801-1802 to
pursue the course charted by the new administration.</p>

<p>     In choosing candidates for his own administration Jefferson
enjoyed greater freedom than in the patronage policy. It went without
saying that all the Federalist cabinet members would retire and the
President's associates---the major figures of the Republican
movement in the 1790s---would be appointed instead of them. In
appointing the heads of the six executive departments the new
President did not only take into account their professional and personal
merits but also sought to consolidate the Republican Party, i.e. he
wanted his cabinet members to represent different sections of the
country. James Madison (Virginia) was appointed Secretary of
State, while New Englanders Henry Dearborn and Levi Lincoln
(both from Massachusetts) were made Secretary of War and
Attorney General of the United States, respectively. A Northeasterner,
Gideon Granger from Connecticut, was appointed Postmaster
General. After Robert Livingston (New York) and Samuel Smith had
refused the office of Secretary of the Navy, it went to Robert Smith
from Maryland. The most difficult problem was Albert Gallatin's
appointment as Secretary of the Treasury. This was partly due to
the fact that Gallatin was of Swiss origin; but Gallatin's appointment
was particularly important, because the Federalists' finance policy
was the main object of Republican criticism in the 1790s, while
Gallatin was well known for his attacks, first as Senator and then as
Representative, against Hamilton.</p>

<p>     The transfer of power from one party to the other was
completed by the time the first session of the 7th Congress convened on
December 7, 1801, in the new US capital-Washington. The
Republicans had a majority in both branches of the legislature: 18
Republicans against 14 Federalists in the Senate and 68 Republicans</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Quoted from: Raymond Walters, Jr., <em>Albert Gallatin, Jeffersonian Financier and
Diplomat</em>, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1957, p. 161.</p>

<p>     48 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 49</p>

<p>     against 39 Federalists in the House of Representatives. As compared
with the previous House of Representatives with 42 Republicans
and 58 Federalists, this was a major victory for the Republican
Party which could secure successful implementation of the course
envisaged by the Jeffersonians.</p>

<p>     Jefferson wrote in 1819, i.e. seven years before his death, in a
private letter about the &quot;revolution of 1800&quot; affirming that his
party's coming to power was &quot;as real a revolution in the principles of
our government as that of 1776 was in its form.''^^1^^ This not an
unsubstantiated opinion of one of the Founding Fathers after whom
a whole early period of American history (Jeffersonian democracy)
has been named, nevertheless, requires a critical approach.</p>

<p>     The first social and political measures implemented by the
Republicans showed not only a desire to fulfill the promises made
during the 1800 election campaign but also an urge to compromise
with their political opponents. This resulted in a certain evolution
of the Jeffersonian party's ideological and political commitments.
The element of the alternative was reduced in the programs of the
Republicans and the Federalists at the beginning of the 19th
century as compared with those at the end of the 18th century, which
reflected the consolidation of the two-party system as a political
mechanism.</p>

<p>     This was confirmed, for example, by the Republican
Administration's attitude to banks. It is known that the issue of setting up a
national US bank was the initial point and catalyst of
contradictions which surfaced in Congress at the beginning of the 1790s. Yet
bank institutions, in particular the Bank of the United States, were
not mentioned either in the President's Inaugural Address, or his
message to Congress, or in the debates in both houses. On the
one hand, the passivity of the Republican Administration may be
explained by the fact that the Bank charter was to expire only in
1811 and the existence of banks had become an incontestable
reality of American life. On the other hand, many party leaders such as
the Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin regarded bank activities as a
substantial backing for implementing the Republicans' fiscal policy.
By 1800, 29 banks had operated in the country, an impressive figure
in comparison with the four opened before 1791. Besides, by the
beginning of the 19th century banking had spread beyond the main</p>

<p>     <em>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, in 10 volumes, edited by Paul L. Ford, Vol. 10,
New York, 1899, p. 140.</p>

<p>     commercial centers. This was apparently a result of the rapid
growth of US trade, particularly foreign trade, and also the
objective interest of the agrarians in banking.</p>

<p>     A certain democratization of public life and new opportunities
for agrarian strata brought about by Jefferson's Administration
resulted in business losing its exclusively aristocratic, elitist nature. In
addition, banking policies were a means to expand the Republican
Party's social base by attracting commercial and financial circles of
society to the administration's side.</p>

<p>     Certain differences on the issue of banks arose between
Jefferson and Gallatin when the Secretary of the Treasury proposed to
set up a New Orleans Bank after the Louisiana purchase in 1803.
The President took a negative stand and explained that, first, it
would further increase the influence of the banks in general and,
second, would provoke opposition in the country which had already
been strong enough in view of the Louisiana purchase. Gallatin, on
the other hand, kept in mind only the convenience of the Treasury
and ignored the political consequences of the action, explaining to
the President that the new bank would be very convenient for
transferring money (no need to transport them in the literal sense) and
also for collecting taxes. As a result, the President was compelled to
agree with Gallatin's reasoning.</p>

<p>     Thus, the Republican attitude to banks had changed
significantly since the 1790s. The Treasury's dependence on successful
operation and further extension of banks resulted in the early 19th
century in a situation where the Republicans sought not to
eliminate banks but to strengthen their influence in them.</p>

<p>     In a bid to weaken the inter-party struggle, the Republicans
also implemented a very limited reform of the judiciary system.
As no other issue, the struggle around the functioning of the
courts most visibly reflected an open Republican-Federalist
conflict.</p>

<p>     When Jefferson's party came to power not a single Republican
occupied an office in any federal court, and for that reason it was
obvious to Jefferson that it was necessary to modernize the judiciary
system, particularly the 1801 Act adopted a month before Adams
retired (when it was already known that the Federalists had lost the
1800 elections). Jefferson mentioned this in his first annual message
to Congress in December 1801: &quot;The judiciary system of the
United States, and especially that portion of it recently erected, will of</p>

<p>     4-749</p>

<p>     50 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 51</p>

<p>     course present itself to the contemplation of Congress.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The new President said nothing about revision of the
Constitution, about additional explanations to existing texts of certain
articles, the need for Congress to elect members of the Supreme
Court, and reducing the term in office of the Supreme Court
Justices.</p>

<p>     The repeal of the Federalist 1801 judiciary act on July 1, 1802,
provoked the profound disappointment of the Federalists. The <em>
National Intelligencer</em> had the following comment to make: &quot;Some of
the federal prints have gone into mourning for the judiciary act...
And well may they mourn. They have lost a friend in need; the
only friend left them amidst their misfortunes.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     However, when in 1804 the future leader of the Old
Republicans faction in Congress, John Randolph, attempted to impeach a
Federalist Supreme Court justice, Samuel Chase, the initiative failed
to gain the support of the administration and was defeated.</p>

<p>     There are no indications that in 1803-1804 the administration
was preparing any further attempts to attack the country's judiciary
system which remained, as formerly, under Federalist control. In
addition to the unsuccessful impeachment of Chase, the Marbury
v. Madison, and Stuart v. Laird cases considered in 1803-1804 laid
the ground for a <em>modus vivendi</em> between the Republican
Administration and the Federalist Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice
John Marshall. Chase remained in office until his death in 1811, but
he no longer played a significant role in the country's political life.</p>

<p>     Chase's acquittal was an example of the reluctance of Jefferson
and the moderate Republicans behind him to aggravate relations
with the Federalists. The example of Chase's abortive impeachment
shows how and under what circumstances the Republicans and
Federalists would arrive at a consensus.</p>

<p>     Seeking to strengthen his positions in the Northeastern areas of
the USA by attracting merchants and land speculators of New
England to his side, President Jefferson tended to support what was
known as the Yazoo compromise in 1805.</p>

<p>     The Republicans were also forced to some extent abandon the
principles of reducing the prerogatives of executive power and strict
interpretation of the Constitution they advocated in the 1790s</p>

<p>     <em>A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897</em>, Ed. James
D. Richardson, Vol. I, GPO, Washington, 1896, p. 331. 
~^^1^^ <em>National Intelligencer</em>, July 14, 1802.</p>

<p>     when it came to purchasing Louisiana, proclaiming US foreign trade
embargo in 1807 and also a program of internal improvements.</p>

<p>     On the other hand, the Republican Party managed to retain the
element of alternative in domestic and foreign policies in respect to
the Federalist course. This involved, above all, the repealing of all
internal taxes in 1801-1802. It is obvious that the pro-Republican
sections of society (farmers, plantation owners, part of the
bourgeoisie operating on the domestic market, and lower strata in towns)
had a vital interest in the repeal of internal taxes which they
regarded as apolitical, inquisitorial and immoral. At the same time the
commercial bourgeoisie of the Northeast backing the Federalists
was the chief payer of foreign taxes. That was why they favored
retaining internal taxes and reducing external ones. When in January
1802 the Federalists submitted a bill to the House of
Representatives calling for a repeal of import duties, it was rejected by the
Republican majority of the House: 45 voted for the bill (37
Federalists and 8 Republicans) and 49 voted against it (all Republicans).^^1^^</p>

<p>     When the bill to repeal the internal taxes was submitted, the
Republicans in both the House and the Senate voted unanimously
for it.^^2^^ (In the House the majority was joined by the North
Carolina Federalist, John Stanley.) As a result, in April 1802 the
President signed the act to repeal all internal taxes except the tax on the
sale of public lands^^3^^ and post taxes.</p>

<p>     Another major trend in US fiscal policy, as the leaders of the
Republican Party saw it, was to sharply reduce federal defense
expenditures and also the machinery of government as a whole. This
could only be done provided there was peace between the USA and
other countries. In Jefferson's opinion, it was quite sufficient to
insulate the country from European cataclysms, and this would enable
America to trade freely with all the countries of the world. On many
occasions, including his Inaugural Address, the President spoke
of the need to abstain from joining any political alliances, believing
that such a policy would offer America excellent opportunities to
remain outside military conflicts. The country's geographical re-</p>

<p>     <em>Annals of the Congress of the United States. Seventh Congress. The Debates and
Proceedings in the Congress of the United States. Seventh Congress, 1st Session, December
7, 1801, to March 3, 1803</em>, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1851, p. 444.
<em>^^2^^<SUB>3</SUB> Ibid., pp</em>. 250, 1074.</p>

<p>     It concerned only the sale of land, and not the land tax that had been repealed.
<em>Ibid.</em>, p. 1323-1326.</p>

<p>     52 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the I 9th c. 53</p>

<p>     moteness contributed to this possibility as well. There is nothing
remarkable, therefore, in the fact that the President began his annual
message to Congress with the news that peace would soon be
restored in Europe and hence the political situation in the world was
shaping up quite favorably for the US. Thereby the Republicans
were able to save money by reducing federal expenditures on the
Army and the Navy. The President wrote to the Republican
governor of New Jersey Joseph Bloomfield on December 5, 1801: &quot;We
can now proceed without risk in demolishing useless structures of
expense, lightening the burthens of our constituents, and fortifying
the principles of free government.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The voting in the House and the Senate on the bill fixing the US
defense budget for peace time proceeded according to party
affiliation: 39 for the bill and 24 against it in the House, and 15 for it and
10 against in the Senate.^^2^^ The President noted with satisfaction the
results of voting on reduction of expenditures on the army and the
navy in a letter to Gallatin on December 31,1802. Referring to
economy on military spending the President emphasized the need for
using financial resources exclusively for maintaining existing naval
vessels. In the future he proposed to build only small, defensive
vessels, expressing the belief that the US would never be an aggressor
in any war.</p>

<p>     Besides the Republicans' successes in Congress where they pushed
forward the administration's fiscal policy, they were credited
with achievements in democratizing public life. This concerned,
primarily, the repeal of the Alien Act adopted by the Federalists in
1798, according to which immigrants could become US citizens
only after 14 years of residence. The second antidemocratic law
adopted by the Federalists, the Sedition Act, expired in 1801 and
was not debated despite desperate attempts by the Federalists to
revive it at the 6th Congress. It is noteworthy that Jefferson publicly
pardoned all those convicted under the Sedition Act and dropped
the charges against the editor of the Republican <em>Aurora</em> William
Duane whose case was still pending under a resolution of the
Senate.</p>

<p>     In March 1802 a proposal was submitted to the House of Re-</p>

<p>     presentatives to revise the acts concerning naturalization and return
to the 1795 act requiring only 5 years to obtain US citizenship. On
the next day, March 11, a similar bill was put to the vote in the
Senate where it was approved on April 3 as the law on revising and
amending the acts concerning naturalization. On April 14 the
President signed the act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,
and to repeal the acts heretofore passed on the matter.</p>

<p>     The solution of the agrarian problem took a special place in
Republican policy. The agrarian dimension was the most important
one in the Republican Party's economic program, because all the
other Republican constructions were based on and around it---the
attitude to foreign trade, development of manufactures, etc. Being
largely a party of agrarians and putting problems of the country's
agricultural development to the fore, the Republicans advanced a
clear alternative to the Federalist plans and policies of the 1790s. It
is necessary to note that, having solved the agrarian problem by
purchasing Louisiana and securing democratic access to the free lands,
the political opponents of the Federalists managed to retain a highly
alternative domestic policy. As a result, in the early 19th century
US capitalism began to develop in the most progressive manner for
its time.</p>

<p>     Jefferson specifically singled out the development of
agriculture, regarding it as the basis for the country's economic progress as
a whole. However, not only economic but also social and political
considerations underlay the Jeffersonian preference for the agrarian
development of US capitalism. As early as 1785-1786 Jefferson
shared with Madison his views on the undesirability of intensive
industrial development in the USA to the detriment of agriculture.
Noting the disastrous plight of landless poor people in Europe, the
future President sought to prevent the appearance of a similar class
in his country. &quot;Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated
lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property
have been so far extended as to violate natural right.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Both Jefferson and Madison believed that it was necessary to
continually renew the reserve of free land by expanding to the
West, and with a fortunate turn of events, in the Southern direction
(Florida), too. It is in the above context that the purchase of the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Papers of Thomas Jefferson</em>, Vol. 8, <em>25 February to 31 October 1785</em>, Julian
P. Boyd, Editor, Princeton University Press, 1953, p. 682.</p>

<p>     Quoted from: Dumas Malone, <em>Jefferson and His Time</em>, Volume Four, <em>Jefferson the
President. First Term, 1801-1805</em>, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1970, p. 95.
<em>Annals of Congress</em>, 7th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1202, 195.</p>

<p>     54 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of tin&quot; 1 9th r. 55</p>

<p>     territory of Louisiana by the United States should be considered.</p>

<p>     On the other hand, the Louisiana purchase was also necessary
from the viewpoint of US commercial interests---both for Western
farmers and Northeastern merchants. Under the Jay Treaty and a
treaty concluded by Thomas Pinckney with Spain in 1795, both the
former and the latter used the Mississippi as a trade artery. That is
why when Spain decided to transfer the territory of Louisiana to
the French government, Jefferson and Madison, as most Americans,
perceived this as a serious threat to the further advance to the West,
particularly in areas west of Kentucky and Tennessee.</p>

<p>     After Spain banned American trade with New Orleans via the
Mississippi in October 1802, many senators and among them quite
a few Federalists were horrified by the catastrophic consequences
of that ban for the American economy. They said that the
American settlers in the West had conquered and settled in the wilderness
introducing the ways of civilized society where only a few years
before the roaring of wild animals was heard. Now the position of
these farmers was threatened. In addition, it was regarded as
undesirable for the United States to have such a powerful neighbor as
France was in those years. The Republicans saw the immediate
purchase of the territory of Louisiana from Napoleon as the most
favorable way out of the prevailing situation.</p>

<p>     The signing in 1803 of the treaty by Napoleon and American
delegates in France on the purchase for 15 million dollars of the
territory of Louisiana which was 140 per cent larger than the area of
the US at the time, posed a number of complicated constitutional
problems for the Republican Administration. The President wrote
on that score: &quot;Every eye in the US is now fixed on this affair of
Louisiana. Perhaps nothing since the revolutionary war has
produced more uneasy sensations through the body of the nation.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The need for territorial expansion by the young republic as such
was not questioned by the Republican leaders. In a letter to a
future US President Andrew Jackson, Jefferson wrote that the
interests of the nation required that the country be expanded.</p>

<p>     The Republican press enthusiastically hailed the news of the
Louisiana purchase. The <em>Philadelphia Aurora</em> rejoiced &quot;that the
objects for which a war was so violently advocated have been obtained
without bloodshed or the creation of an enemy. That the free and</p>

<p>     perpetual sovereignty of all the Mississippi has been obtained to
us.''^^1^^ <em>National Intelligencer</em> wrote: &quot;By the cession of Louisiana,
we shall preserve peace, and acquire a territory of great extent,
fertility, and local importance... A nation, whose population is doubled
in twenty-four years ... only requires peace.''^^2^^ Discussing the
financial aspect of the purchase and criticizing the Federalists who
regarded 15 million dollars as too expensive for such an acquisition,
<em>National Intelligencer</em> in August 1803 mentioned Federalist editions
which only recently maintained that purchasing New Orleans was
worth any sum of money, while one paper wrote that to purchase
Louisiana for 50 million dollars would have been a very profitable
deal indeed.^^3^^ In January 1804 <em>National Intelligencer</em> was in raptures
over the moral implications of the purchase: &quot;They had extended
the blessings of liberty to a hundred thousand beings who were
added to the population of their country, ... they had acquired a
new world, and had laid the foundation for the happiness of
millions yet unborn! &quot;^^4^^ It follows from the above excerpts that the
two principal Republican papers saw no negative aspects in the
Louisiana purchase, focussing on praising their President and the
party. Federalist John Rutledge noted in a letter to his
correspondent that popular rejoicing over the Louisiana purchase was such, it
was not to be overcome by the strength of reason.</p>

<p>     Indeed, Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana was exceptionally
important for the country's economic growth. To begin with, the
Republicans solved the problem of land for many years to come,
providing for the unimpeded development of agriculture.
Simultaneously with talks on the purchase of Louisiana and treaty
ratification, i.e. in 1803, Congress appointed a committee to investigate
the question of sale of public lands. The committee included
members from five states (Kentucky, Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee and
Virginia). In January 1804 it proposed a bill according to which the
size of land tracts was reduced four-fold as compared with the 1796
act, and the price fell to 1 dollar 64 cents per acre (as compared
with 2 dollars).^^5^^ On March 26 the bill acquired the force of law.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Philadelphia Aurora, July</em> 8, 1803.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Intelligencer, July</em> 8, 1803.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>National Intelligencer</em>, August 17, 1803.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>National Intelligencer, January</em> 30, 1804.</p>

<p>     See: <em>Annals of the Congress of the United States. Eighth Congress. October 17,
1803 to March 3, 1805</em>, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1852, pp. 950, 1294.</p>

<p>     <em>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, Vol. 8, p. 145.</p>

<p>     56 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 57</p>

<p>     Thus, by solving the land problem and securing the most
democratic access to free land for the time being, the Jeffersonian
Republicans managed to implement a basic plank of their platform in spite
of the Federalist Party which supported the development of
commerce and manufactures.</p>

<p>     Besides, having purchased Louisiana, the Republicans secured
free navigation along the Mississippi. They often referred to the
circumstance as providing new opportunities for merchants in general
and those in the Northeast in particular. For the Republicans,
encouragement of trade had always been part and parcel of the
country's agricultural development.</p>

<p>     The Louisiana purchase enabled the Republicans to largely
satisfy the economic interests of different groups of the US population:
of farmers by providing them with fertile land and easing the terms
of buying it by the 1804 act; of planters in the Southwestern states
by encouraging their territorial expansion in the Western direction
and allowing slaves to be brought to new territories; of merchants
interested in developing the domestic market; and of those in the
Northeast engaged in import-export trade.</p>

<p>     Republican successes brought about an abrupt weakening of the
Federalist Party, which was made clear by the outcome of the 1804
elections: Jefferson won 162 elector votes, while his opponent
Charles Pinckney had only 14 (9 from Connecticut, 3 from
Delaware and 2 from Maryland). A certain realignment was observed in
the country's public life: the focus of the political struggle shifted
from the Republican-Federalist conflict to rivalry between factions
within the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     During his first term in office Jefferson managed to retain the
party's unity in Congress. In the end of 1804, however,
contradictions emerged between the Republicans leading to the rise of what
was known as the Randolph group in the House of Representatives.
Members of the group were mostly planters from the country's
Southeast, who supported the views of the Old Republicans. What
they did not like was that an important element of Hamilton's fiscal
system---the Bank of the United States---had been preserved, that
executive powers had grown and so on. They demanded that the
country's political system be significantly revised, thereby accusing
the President and moderate Republicans who supported him of
having lapsed into Federalism.</p>

<p>     The Republican Party's motley social base largely accounted for</p>

<p>     the sharpening of contradictions within its ranks. The rise of John
Randolph as head of the opposition faction occurred gradually and
was finally completed only in 1806 when he publicly acknowledged
his oppositional stand in respect to the administration: &quot;If we
belong to the third party, be it so.''^^1^^ The underlying cause of these
moods was the dissatisfaction of a certain part of the Republican
planters with Jefferson's policy. Former Antifederalists, these
planters surfaced in the Republican Party in the 1790s (particularly
after the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions were proclaimed) because
of their adherence to the principles of purely agrarian elitist society
and the doctrine of states rights. From the platform they stood on
they could not grasp the new political situation which took shape in
the country following the advent to power of the Republican Party.
Defending the interests of planters living on the Southeastern
seaboard and lacking opportunities to move West, the Old Republicans
had hoped to see more fundamental changes introduced by the
moderate Republican Administration. They sought in-depth reforms
of political institutions, and wanted the administration to ignore
completely the country's commercial and manufacturing interests and
particularly those of the Northeast.</p>

<p>     An ideological leader of the Old Republicans, John Taylor,
explained the group's dissatisfaction in a letter to James Monroe in
the following way: &quot;There were a number of people who soon
thought and said to one another that Mr. Jefferson did many good
things, but neglected some better things, who came to view his
policy as very like a compromise with Mr. Hamilton's.''^^2^^ Indeed, after
Federalism was defeated, it acquired a new life in partnership with
Republicanism. As a result, principles of the Republican Party
became nominal rather than true.</p>

<p>     In the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions the Old Republicans,
and their leader in Congress John Randolph above all, saw the
essential meaning of their program. The states rights doctrine
advanced in these documents provided for a weakening of the federal
Government. But in his actual policy Jefferson hardly intended to
blindly follow the concept. Only naturally, therefore, many of his
actions such as the Louisiana purchase and setting up a Territorial</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Annals of the Congress of the United States. Ninth Congress, December 2, 1805, to
March 3, 1807</em>, Gales and Seaton, Washington, 1852, p. 775.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Quoted from: Lance Banning, <em>The Jeffersonian Persuasion. Evolution of a Party
Ideology</em>, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978, p. 282.</p>

<p>     58 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 59</p>

<p>     government there, retaining the Bank of the United States, a
moderate patronage policy, leaving the Federalists in their offices in
the Supreme Court, and also the Yazoo compromise were regarded
by Randolph and his followers as revision of the basic principles of
the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     The struggle between the Old and the moderate Republicans
unfolded when Congress debated such important issues as the
Territorial government of Louisiana, the Yazoo compromise, impeachment
of Supreme Court justice Chase, the embargo on US foreign trade,
adoption of the program of internal improvements, measures in
preparation for the Anglo-American war of 1812, entry into the war
and so forth. To a certain extent the Old Republicans continued the
traditions laid by the Antifederalists in the 1780s: both had a
negative attitude to the strengthening of the federal government and
championed states rights. However, while the opponents of the
Constitution were often motivated by democratic purposes,
democratization of public life was hardly a goal of the Old Republicans.
Opposing the Yazoo compromise, advocating Chase's impeachment
and resenting protection of US foreign trade interests by the
federal government, Randolph and his followers primarily sought to
weaken the position of the commercial and manufacturing
bourgeoisie. The desire to impeach Chase and carry through a judiciary
reform basically pursued the aim of excluding Federalists from
political life.</p>

<p>     It is not easy to estimate the exact number of votes in the
House of Representatives permanently controlled by Randolph. In
April 1806 Jefferson told Wilson Nicholas that Randolph had &quot;only
5 or 6 followers&quot; in Congress. In May of the same year the
President estimated the number as &quot;4 to 6 or 8&quot;.^^1^^ Keeping in mind that
during the discussion of the Yazoo compromise and the resolution
on Chase's impeachment Randolph had been supported by a larger
number of congressmen that subsequently made up the Randolph
group in the House, there were only seven permanent members in
the group. They were James Garnett, Abram Trigg and Philip
Thompson from Virginia, Richard Stanford and David Williams
from South Carolina, Thomas Thompson from New Hampshire and
one representative from the West, Thomas Stanford. Frequently
Randolph was supported by five Southerners: William Bibb and</p>

<p>     Thomas Spalding from Georgia, Christopher Clark from Virginia,
Edward Lloyd and John Archer from Maryland. The invariably
southern origin of the group's members (excluding Standford)
points to the underlying economic reason for the opposition of
Randolph and the Old Republicans to the policy of the party's
moderate wing, including the administration.</p>

<p>     It should be noted once again that, despite the apparent
democratic bias of some of the Old Republicans' demands (opposition to
the Territorial government of Louisiana and the desire to reform
the country's political institutions), their real purpose was to
strengthen the elitist position of the Southeastern planters at the expense
of the remaining sections in American society, including the
farmers.</p>

<p>     In the early 19th century the US capitalist farmers did not have
their own program of goals and actions running counter to the
interests and strivings of the majority of planters who, just like a
considerable part of the bourgeoisie, supported the domestic policy of
the Jeffersonian Republicans. The farmers's main demands at the
turn of the 19th century were the repeal of the internal taxes,
democratization of access to the land and advance to the West. Having
satisfied these demands, the Jeffersonian Republicans not only
secured free development of agriculture along the capitalist road but
also prevented the rise of independent farmer movements. By their
domestic and foreign policies the Republicans on the whole
managed to keep plantation owners, farmers and a considerable part of
the bourgeoisie in the Northeast within their sphere of influence.
Such is the essence of the socio-political phenomenon known as
Jeffersonian Democracy. The party aspect of the phenomenon boils
down to the ability of one party to embrace and satisfy different
sections in society by the measures adopted.</p>

<p>     The scope of social sections whose interests the Jeffersonian
Republicans took into account in their policy-making grew wider
when the war between England and France was resumed in Europe,
which had considerable consequences for American trade. England
and France began to seize vessels belonging to neutral countries and
sailing for the ports of the belligerents. In 1805 the American ship
<em>Essex</em> carrying goods to the French West Indies was captured by the
British. By 1806 more than 120 American merchantmen had been
detained.</p>

<p>     In America these events had the most serious impact on the in-</p>

<p>     <em>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, op. cit.</em>, Vol. 9, p. 447.</p>

<p>     60 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 19th c. 61</p>

<p>     terests of the commercial bourgeoisie of New England which made
up the backbone of the Federalist Party. In the tense situation the
dissatisfaction of the Northeastern bourgeoisie acquired a political
thrust. On May 9, 1806, <em>National Intelligencer</em> wrote that an end
had come to the time of &quot;harmony and brotherly love.''^^1^^ The
prestige of the Jeffersonian Administration fell: the Federalists
believed that the President had failed to show the required firmness
and resolution in defending America's national interests.</p>

<p>     The international situation had become more complicated by
the end of 1807, particularly after the British government had
decreed a ban on neutral ships trading with France and other
European countries Now, America's foreign trade was indeed in the
balance.</p>

<p>     After Pinckney's unsuccessful attempt to conclude an
acceptable treaty with Great Britain, Jefferson made a speech in Congress
on December 18, 1807, on the need to introduce an embargo.
Export of American goods to all foreign ports was to be discontinued,
and special vessels were to be provided to verify fulfilment. All sea
trade was put under the direct control of the President. Foreign
ships were to leave American ports.</p>

<p>     Under the circumstances the embargo was an attempt to find an
alternative, on the one hand, to war, and on the other, to
subordination of American interests to England, and to some extent, to
France. The embargo was a continuation of the tradition going back
to the prerevolutionary years of banning import of foreign and
export of American goods. Since the cessation of foreign trade
inflicted considerable harm on the American bourgeoisie, the Republican
Administration presented it as an unpleasant but necessary step.
The embargo, however, had far-reaching economic and political
consequences which it was difficult for the legislators to foresee. As
a result of foreign trade stoppage the whole American economy
suffered considerably, and this concerned not only merchants and
traders but also the broadest sections of the population. This was the
main reason for dissatisfaction with the administration's policy,
which, on the one hand, led to a certain strengthening of
Federalism and, on the other, to growing differences within the Republican
Party.</p>

<p>     Discontent among the groups of the bourgeoisie interested in</p>

<p>     <em>National Intelligencer</em>, May 9, 1806.</p>

<p>     foreign trade led in practice to frequent violations of the embargo.
Despite the additional acts of January 8, February 25 and March
12, 1808, and of January 9, 1809, which gave greater powers to the
President and extended the punitive functions of the customs
officials, it became clear in early 1809 that violations of the embargo
were continuing.</p>

<p>     Paradoxically, the Federalists resorted to the same tactic in
1808 as the Republicans did in 1798 in response to the Alien and
Sedition Acts: they turned to the state legislatures aiming to repeal
the laws approved by the federal government and the Supreme
Court. Resolutions were adopted in Massachusetts and Connecticut
according to which the state legislatures could determine whether
government acts were constitutional or unconstitutional, and the
acts banning foreign trade were declared null and void. Thus, by
1808 the Republicans and the Federalists had changed places in
their theoretical constructions as compared with the end of the
18th century. The latter became advocates of states rights, while
Jefferson, who in his time (during the rebellion of Pennsylvania
farmers in 1794) had sharply condemned government use of the army
and navy to suppress internal disorders, acquired that right under
the 1808 act and made use of it. He regarded violation of the
embargo by New Englanders as treason.</p>

<p>     Indeed, it is known that in 1808 Federalist leaders were engaged
in friendly correspondence with the English. The latter promised
commercial advantages to New England in exchange for its
neutrality in case of war. Many believed that the coming Anglo-American
war would lead to New England's secession. Subsequently, in 1814,
the Hartford Convention further strengthened these apprehensions.</p>

<p>     The timespan from the 1806 elections to the 1808 presidential
elections was very important in this respect. While between 1800
and 1807 the influence of the Republican Party had been growing
throughout the country, in late 1807 the situation changed. On the
one hand, the unpopular embargo strengthened the Federalists'
positions. The following facts are significant in this regard. Up till
1807 the governors of all the New England states, except for
Connecticut, had been Republicans. A year later all New England
governors without exception were Federalists. In New York and
Massachusetts, for example, the Federalists won a majority in 1808 and
seized commanding heights in the state legislatures. Historian
Marshall Smelser wrote: &quot;The elections of 1800-1806 might have de-</p>

<p>     62 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of the 1 9th c. 63</p>

<p>     stroyed Federalism, if it had not had the stimulus of the embargo
issue to revive it in 1808.'^ On the other hand, the differences,
which had taken shape within the Republican Party by 1806,
resulted in a final split in Congress between the moderate Republicans
supporting the administration and the Randolph group. Therefore,
the Republican Party approached the 1808 elections not at all as
united as it used to be in 1800 or 1804. There is no doubt that
Jefferson's foreign trade policy, the embargo and the issue of relations
with Britain played a significant part in this.</p>

<p>     Attention should be drawn to the fact that the embargo was a
kind of protectionist tariff which, in turn, led to a rapid growth of
manufactures in the US after 1807. As the conflict with England
developed from 1807 to 1814, more large-scale, machine enterprises
became widespread on a par with small-scale domestic
manufactures. Jefferson later openly admitted that the factory system was
inevitable. In 1816 he wrote to Benjamin Austin: &quot;We must now place
the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist... He, therefore,
who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us
either to dependence on that foreign nation, or to be clothed in
skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one
of these; experience has taught me that manufactures are now as
necessary to our independence as to our comfort.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     A positive attitude to manufactures was even more clearly
apparent in the activity of Jefferson's successor, Madison. In his
annual messages to Congress in 1809, 1810 and 1811 the new
President emphasized the importance of domestic manufactures, noting
the growth of professional occupations. Madison also insisted that
manufactures played a major role in securing primary wants and US
defense. The Report on Manufactures presented to Congress by the
Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin in April 1811 remarked with
satisfaction that nearly two-thirds of the apparel and cloth consumed
in the US were made at American manufactures.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Thus, on the question of manufactures the Republicans, during</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Marshall Smelser, <em>The Democratic Republic. 1801-1815</em>. Harper and Row,
Publishers, New York, 1968, p. 176.</p>

<p>     <em>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, Eds. Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery
Bergh, Vol. XIV, The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States
Washington, 1905, p. 391, 392.</p>

<p>     <em>Annals of the Congress of the United States. Eleventh Congress. First and Second
Sessions. May 22, 1809, to May 1, 1810</em>, Gales and Seaton. Washington, 1853, pp. 2223-
2239.</p>

<p>     Madison's first term, largely adopted the original arguments advanced
by the Federalists at the end of the 18th century. The internal
improvements program proposed by the Republican Administration
in 1808 also represented a major stage in the evolution of
Republican theory and practice.</p>

<p>     In his second Inaugural Address Jefferson spoke about the time
when the treasury would be free of debt and the surplus would go
to building bridges, canals, roads and other major enterprises within
each state. The President specified that such a system of internal
improvements would be carried through only in peacetime. A few
weeks later Jefferson received a report from Gallatin that the
revenues of the treasury were larger than expected. The President replied
that this situation drew closer the time when Americans would
undertake a program of building &quot;canals, roads, college, etc.&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>Thus, as early as 1805 Jefferson was ready to abandon one of the
cornerstones of Republican ideology---reducing government
functions to the minimum---and proposed a whole system aimed at
enhancing the prerogatives of the federal government. The President's
viewpoint was backed by members of the administration.</p>

<p>     In the early 19th century, when the American frontier was raised
beyond the Alleghenies and particularly after the Louisiana
purchase, the American agrarians---both planters and farmers---were
largely cut off, due to the absence of transport arteries, from the ports
on the Eastern seaboard through which trade in agricultural
produce was carried on with the countries of Europe. That was why
the program of internal improvements advanced by the Republican
Administration was not in the interests of businessmen in the
Northeast but rather of agrarians in the West. Successful
development of American manufactures, which revived the trade turnover
and expanded the domestic market, also required better operating
means of communication and transportation in the country.</p>

<p>     This was the subject of a report to Congress made by the
Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin on April 6, 1808. He proposed an
extensive and well thought out plan for internal improvements
furnished with calculations. Gallatin's report is also interesting because
it marked a new turn in Republican theory and practice: the
Republicans undertook to implement one of the basic Federalist
principles---federal government intervention in the country's economic life.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Writings of Thomas Jefferson</em>, ed. by Paul L. Ford, Vol. 8, p. 357.</p>

<p>     64 Chapter Two</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
at the Threshold of t!i&quot;e 19th c. 65</p>

<p>     Gallatin's report specified what internal improvements were to
be carried through, where and how. Intended for ten years,
Gallatin's program envisaged projects beyond the financial reach of
individual states and also outside the possibilities of private
entrepreneurs. In the Secretary's words the system of internal improvements
was in the interests of the entire Union and was to establish
economic links between the country's most remote parts.</p>

<p>     Since the embargo policy had failed and relations between the
US and Great Britain continued to worsen in 1809-1812, the
Congress in the period under consideration was unable to resume
debates concerning the Gallatin plan. However, relevant petitions by
the advocates of the internal improvements policy continued to be
sent to the country's highest legislature in 1810, 1811 and 1812.</p>

<p>     Deteriorating relations with England produced new problems
having to do with preparations for the impending war. The struggle
between and within the parties intensified. The now traditional
differences between the Old Republicans and the administration paved
the way for the emergence of the Young Republicans faction
representing the interests of the Southwestern areas of the country. The
administration's positions were weakened by the anti-Madison
group of ``invisibles'' in the Senate and also by the Richmond junta
which grew stronger after the 1808 elections and tended to support
various factions on different issues of the prewar agenda. At the
same time the Federalists considerably strengthened their positions
before the war taking advantage of the unfortunate embargo policy
and the discontent on this account of different groups of the
population interested in resuming US foreign trade at all costs: the
Federalists regained the upper hand in New England and also in some
parts of New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>     The appearance on the political scene of the Young Republicans
who acted as a united front at the first session of the 12th Congress
in support of hostilities against Great Britain, was not only
associated with expansionist moods in the South and the West, but also
reflected a major realignment of forces in the country's political life.
The Young Republicans or War Hawks occupied prominent posts in
the government in mid-1811: Henry Clay from Kentucky bacame
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John Calhoun from
South Carolina and Felix Grundy from Tennessee were members of
the House Committee on Foreign Relations headed by Peter Porter
from New York. The Young Republicans movement was far from</p>

<p>     homogeneous: no wonder soon after the end of the War of 1812 it
fell apart prompting the emergence of two contradictory trends,
Clay's nationalist American System and Calhoun's states rights
doctrine. However, before the war the Young Republicans were
cemented by expansionism, which, as well as the desire to return to the
United States the right to trade freely with all countries, served as
the basis for the alliance between Southern and Western interests
within one faction.</p>

<p>     On the other hand, military preparations and the declaration of
war were opposed in Congress by the Old Republicans and the
Federalists. When on May 30, 1812, President Madison presented a
war message saying that the US was at war with Great Britain, all
the Federalists without exception and 15 Republicans supporting
Randolph voted against.</p>

<p>     The War of 1812 began in a complicated domestic political
situation. All the government's attempts to rally the country in the face
of the coming crisis fell through. Differences between the
Republicans and the Federalists, and also splits within the Republican
Party, resulted in a pre-crisis situation in American political life on the
eve of the war and after the end of the war in the downfall of the
Republican-Federalist two-party system.</p>

<p>     S'irsi Party</p>

<p>     ( 1 8 1 ft-</p>

3

<p>     <b>IN SEARCH OF THE</b></p>

<p>     <b>OPTIMAL PATTERN:</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE FIRST</b></p>

<p>     <b>PARTY REALIGNMENT</b></p>

<p>     <b>(1816-1828)</b></p>

<p>     clearly advance its demands, to say nothing of implementing them.
There still existed influential groups of the commercial and
financial bourgeoisie in the Northeast oriented primarily to developing
foreign trade, although their influence decreased as the time went
on. The cotton boom had abruptly changed the situation in the
South: the demand for that raw material in the textile industry
rose steeply. The chief consumers of cotton at the time were the
English textile mills. Young American industry was obviously
unable to consume such a large amount of raw cotton which, as a
result, went to the external market. Frontier development continued
in the West where the picture was made even more varied by the
semi-subsistence farms of the pioneers who developed new lands.
This variety of economic structures resulted in an acute struggle
between individual groups of the ruling class on questions of
protectionism, internal improvements and finances. On the other hand,
there was an equally inevitable variety of purely local demands and
problems.</p>

<p>     The realignment of forces was primarily caused by the struggle
around the entire set of issues concerning capitalist development in
the United States and by the need to adjust the party-political
structure to changes in the social and economic field. The
simultaneous existence of several modes of production and their uneven
development even within the bounds of one and the same section
promised the appearance of a very large number of political groups.</p>

<p>     The end of the war gave rise to many problems. The chief
one among them was British competition. The embargo put on
trade with England had served as a strong protectionist tariff. Now
the situation had changed. A stream of British goods inundated the
American market, Britain sought &quot;to stifle in the craddle those
rising manufactures in the United States.''^^1^^ Americans worried
whether their industry would hold its own in the unequal struggle:
in late 1815 and early 1816 petitions poured into Congress
demanding measures to protect American industry. The finance problem
was equally important: finances were in a nearly chaotic state.
At the end of 1815 President Madison addressed Congress with the
direct statement that the critical situation with government finances
required restoration of the National Bank of the United States to
put them in some order.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Mies' Weekly Register, January</em> 4, 1817, p. 280.</p>

<p>     The end of the Anglo-American War of 1812 marked the
beginning of a major party realignment initially associated with the Era
of Good Feelings. At the time the former political associations
fell into disarray and then broke up, and larger blocs began to form
on the splinters of numerous small groupings. These larger blocs
subsequently gave rise to new parties. The Era of Good Feelings,
which created the illusion of universal reconciliation and the
disappearance of conflict between parties, ended in an acute strife
heralding the advent of Jacksonian democracy.</p>

<p>     Major changes in the country's social and economic
development were the chief cause of the coming realignment. Serious
changes had occurred in the world economy by the end of the
Napoleonic Wars. Taking advantage of its industrial supremacy
in 1815, Britain came in fact to possess a monopoly of world
trade in all the most important industries. The Peace of Ghent
had already marked Great Britain's disavowal of the former
policy of mercantilism and its transition to the principles of free trade.
For the United States this meant that former differences in trade
policy engendered by such measures as the Jay Treaty objectively
lost any significance. One might say that the end of the Napoleonic
Wars, which had sharply worsened conditions for the development
of American trade, largely contributed to the final reorientation of
the American economy. A decisive turn to the development of the
domestic market was being made. The existence of several modes
of production developing parallel to each other highlighted the
American economy at the time. The industrial revolution in the
Northeast was only in its early stage, although its very first steps
were quite impressive. The industrial bourgeoisie was unable to</p>

<p>     68 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     First Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1816-1828) 69</p>

<p>     federal government, to rally the entire population to support the
administration, and to amalgamate parties in the administration.<SUP>1
</SUP>However, although there already were differences among the
Federalists due to the separatist behavior by some of them, such
amalgamation was rejected by the Republican leadership. The
Republicans still thought it necessary to fight against the
Federalists until the 1816 presidential elections. They scored a landslide
victory at the elections. James Monroe received 183 electoral votes,
while the Federalist candidate Rufus King had only 34 (
Connecticut, Delaware and Massachusetts). King even lost the elections in
his own state, New York. The Federalist Party was rapidly
declining as a national political force. It was following the victory in the
elections, during the 1817 tour of New England, that Monroe began
to make conciliatory passes to the Federalists, attempting to win
them over to his side. The Federalists were only too eager to meet
him halfway. It was then that the Era of Good Feelings was
mentioned for the first time.</p>

<p>     The Federalists were losing influence not only as a result of
their incorrect line during the war years. The chief reason was that
in the first postwar years the Republicans managed to solve most
of the problems over which they had argued with the Federalists.
The ground was virtually cut from under the feet of the
Federalists as a result of the policies pursued by the Republican
Administration. This brought in a short period of time when only the
Republican Party operated at the national level. The Federalists also
suffered heavy losses in the states. If in 1814-1820 they held ground
in 11 states out of 18, and were uncontested in 5 states (New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island and Delaware), in
1818-1820 their influence existed only in 7 out of 21 states.^^2^^ Even
in Delaware, where the Federalists had prevailed until the late
1820s due to specific circumstances, they were forced to yield to
the Republicans for some time.^^3^^ In effect, the first phase of the</p>

<p>     ``Letters of James Monroe to George Hay&quot;, <em>Bulletin of New York Public Library</em>,
Volume VI, January to December 1902, New York, 1902, p. 228.</p>

<p>     Derived from Stanley B. Parsons, William W. Beach, Dan Hermann, <em>United States
Congressional Districts 1788-1841</em>, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1978,
pp. 146-207.</p>

<p>     See Richard P. McCormick, <em>The Second American Party System. Party Formation
in the Jacksonian Era</em>, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1966,
pp. 147-154.</p>

<p>     Most of the issues determining the political situation in the
first postwar years (up to 1819) were brought to the fore by the
war which showed the glaring weakness of the American armed
forces, industry and finances, and also a virtually total absence of
internal transportation routes. Therefore a number of measures---
the rechartering of the National Bank of the United States,
adoption of the first protectionist (still moderate) tariff,
implementation of internal improvements by Congress in 1816-1819---made
the Republicans relinquish their former agrarian Utopias still
further. At the same time, these measures were necessary to solve the
most urgent problems and strengthen the foundations on which
the American economy was to develop in the future. Thus, the
bill to set up the second National Bank was submitted to
Congress by John Calhoun; it passed the House by 80 votes against 71,
with 39 Federalists and at least 26 Republicans voting against
(the party affiliation of 6 others is unknown), while in the Senate
7 out of 12 Federalists voted against the bill. The picture was
roughly the same when the bill on the tariff was adopted in April
1816: among the 54 congressmen who voted against the bill, the
Federalists and the Republicans had an equal number (23 each)
with 8 others of unknown party membership. In the Senate 4
Federalists out of 10 and 3 Republicans out of 21 voted against
the tariff.^^1^^ New England's Federalists now feared that adoption of
the tariff would harm this area's commerce. By contrast,
Republicans regarded industry and commerce as a useful supplement to
agriculture also strengthening the republic. Such an evolution of
the Republican Party led to a large broadening of its political
platform. The Republicans now tended to identify the party's interests
with the interests of American society as a whole. The Republican
Administration at the time sought to become a symbol of
nationwide concord. It is to be noted once again that many measures
implemented by the Republicans had caused acute clashes between the
parties in the recent past. Now they were regarded as necessary in
order to stabilize the situation in the country.</p>

<p>     In the political sphere the Republicans saw their chief aim in
strengthening national unity. During the War of 1812 proposals
had been made to unite all parties on a platform of support for the</p>

<p>     Albert Castel, Scott L. Gibson, <em>The Yeas and Nays. Key Congressional Decisions
1774-1945</em>, New Issues Press, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1975, p. 32.</p>

<p>     70 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     !&#8226; irst Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1816-1828) 71</p>

<p>     realignment had been completed by 1820---one of the parties in the
former party system had ceased to exist as a national force.</p>

<p>     The subsequent struggle was waged within the Republican
Party. Identifying itself with society as a whole and seeking to
cater to the interests of as many different sections and groups as
possible, the Republican Party turned into a loose conglomerate
destined to fall apart at the first serious worsening of the social,
economic and political situation. There were additional factors
which hastened the process. The first among them was the
territorial extension of the parties' sphere of operation as a result of
new states joining the Union. Following the War of 1812, this
happened every year (Indiana became a state in 1816, Mississippi
in 1817, Illinois in 1818, Alabama in 1819, Maine in 1820,
Missouri in 1821). The Federalists did not represent a real political
force in any of these states. From the very outset only one party
existed there, the Republicans; in Mississippi, the party system began
with the Democratic Party^^1^^, and the political struggle went on
exclusively between the rival factions of that party.</p>

<p>     The 1819 economic crisis and the debates on admitting
Missouri into the Union dealt the final blow to the Republican Party.
A specific feature of US development at the time was that the
industrial revolution had not finally won out in the country.
Despite high growth rates American industry could hardly satisfy
even the needs of the domestic market and secure reliable links
within the economy, to say nothing of relations with the world
market. For a certain time, the plantation business of the South,
which was living through a cotton boom and high cotton prices,
with most of the cotton being exported to Britain, became the most
developed sector of the US economy. Karl Marx wrote: &quot;Without
slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be
transformed into a patriarchal country.''^^2^^ Close links with the
world market no doubt helped the Southern planters realize their
social and economic interests and advance clear demands at an
early date, chief among which was the unconditional preservation
of slavery as the foundation of the entire Southern economy.
Another consequence of the cotton boom was that the planters</p>

<p>     2 Stanely B. Parsons, William W. Beach, Dan Hermann, <em>op. cit</em>. p. 242.</p>

<p>     Karl Marx, &quot;The Poverty of Philosophy&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, <em>
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 6, 1976, p. 167.</p>

<p>     expanded areas where cotton was grown and got into debts
hoping that prices would continue to rise.</p>

<p>     The same is true of the farmers. The outcome of the war had
significantly changed the situation west of the Alleghenies. The
Indian tribes had been forced back, and the treaties with Spain
had left the lands acquired in 1803 to the United States. The
colonization of Western lands had acquired unheard-of
proportions. This, in turn, led to a land boom giving rise to numerous
companies speculating in land. The speculator became a
commonplace, although denounced, figure. Speculation and the desire to
acquire land as quickly as possible and extend sown areas resulted
in debts that were enormous for their time. The debt to the federal
government for the land sold was 3 million dollars in 1815, 7
million in 1818, and 22 million in 1819.' The whole system founded
on mutual obligations which were not soundly backed up and
operated in extremely chaotic financial situation, was bound to
collapse at the first serious shock. Such a shock was the 1819 crisis
which put the new landowners in dire straits. Unable to meet
their obligations in good time, many farmers and planters turned
into insolvent debtors. The country was seized by a general feeling
of disaster about which the editor of a popular and influential
Republican weekly wrote. Making common cause with the
Southerners from the <em>Kentucky Reporter</em>, he saw the reason for the
country's misfortunes in public lands speculation by both real
and self-styled financiers. He wrote: &quot;The banks have conspired
with the government to promote it---the former by lending money
to the speculators, and the latter by the wretched system of
selling the lands on credit.''^^2^^ The New York Republicans supported
their counterparts in Richmond who protested against the ruling
of the Supreme Court which found unconstitutional the state laws
on bankruptcy and the right of the states to tax the stock of the
National Bank branches.^^3^^ The 1819 crisis marked the beginning
of the end of the Era of Good Feelings and simultaneously prepared
the ground for the unity of Southern and Western interests.</p>

<p>     The situation in the South and in the West, which took shape</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>American State Papers. Class VIII, Public Lands</em>. Vol. Ill, Washington, 1834,</p>

<p>     p. 460.</p>

<p>     *</p>

<p>     <em>Mies' Weekly Register</em>, September 4, 1819, p. 10.
' <em>Albany Argus</em>, October 29, 1819, p. 2.</p>

<p>     72 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     First Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1816-1828) 73</p>

<p>     that &quot;those who fasten upon the public lands with one moment's
encouragement, can never afterwards be loosened from their</p>

<p>     hold.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Thus, many people in the West and in the South were dissatisfied
with what the federal government was doing. In the existing
oneparty system the West and the Southwest served as a catalyst for
the rise of trends within the Republican Party which held undivided
sway at the national level. It is noteworthy that, given the
emergence of trends within the Republican Party, the West could be a
reserve for &quot;political infantry&quot; and give it support in Congress and
during elections. In addition to the common interests of South and
West displayed during the crisis years, the South, a traditional
participant in the party-political struggle, could provide the political
leadership in the emerging coalition.</p>

<p>     The Missouri crisis was another factor hastening the falling apart
of the Republican Party. Originally the proposal by New York
representative James Tallmadge to admit Missouri to the Union as a
free state, provided there was the relevant provision in its
constitution, was regarded as another Federalist intrigue aimed at
splitting the Republican Party. The opinion was even widespread in the
Republican Party that the crisis itself stemmed from the desire of
De Witt Clinton's followers from New York to unite with the
Federalists and split the Republicans.^^2^^ Indeed, the New York
Federalists had seen in the emerging conflict an opportunity to bury
differences and join the Republican Party on equal terms. The issue
of slavery---a new one for the country---took the Republican Party
by surprise. The motley opposition to Missouri's admission to the
Union as a slave state encountered stubborn resistance by the
Southerners who clearly realized that it was a matter of life and death
for them. No wonder that during the Missouri debates they clearly
indicated that, if the outcome of the argument was unfavorable,
the Southern states might secede from the Union and set up their
own, separate confederation^^3^^.</p>

<p>     Of course, not all Southerners were prepared to be consistent
to the end, at least openly. However, the South was still strong</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>American State Papers</em>. Vol. 4, p. 468.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ See: Shaw Livermore, Jr., <em>The Twilight of Federalism. The Disintegration of the
Federalist Party, 1815-1830</em>, Gordian Press, New York, 1972, p. 94.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ &quot;Letter of Spencer Roane to James Monroe, February 16th, 1820&quot;, <em>Bulletin of the
New York Public Library</em>, Vol. X, March 1906, No. 3, pp. 174-175.</p>

<p>     as a result of the crisis, increasingly pushed the local Republicans
toward conflict with the Federal Government. Both the farmers
and the planters naturally demanded lower prices at public land
sales and, after the crisis began, a change in terms of sale. These
appeals evoked a weak response on the part of the Republican
powers that be. For a long time the Republicans had regarded the
western lands as an inexhaustible sorce for replenishing the federal
treasury. It was repeated many times that the revenues were
earmarked to finance all internal improvements, strengthen the army and
navy, and pay the federal debt. Almost all postwar projects to build
roads, canals, ports and make other internal improvements were
based on the assumption. Proposals to revise land legislation were
rejected, and the Congress Committee for Public Lands refused
all requests from settlers to extend credit repayment deadlines.
The committee submitted to Congress a report underlying the
1820 act only when the situation produced by the crisis was
aggravated to an extent that it could no longer be ignored. The report
had proposed to abolish the sale of lands on credit, reduce minimal
size of the plots sold and cut the price of land. The adoption of the
act somewhat relaxed the situation, but in 1822 and 1823 it proved
necessary to extend the operation of the 1821 Law for the Relief to
Purchases of Public Lands to help people pay their debts. In early
1824 the Committee on Public Lands advised the Congress not to
renew the act. That did not mean, however, that the situation had
improved. In January 1826 petitions were forwarded from Alabama
and Indiana to ameliorate the lot of people who had bought public
land and were still in debt. The committee refused to take action on
these petitions. On the whole the situation in the West changed
very slowly during the entire period. Acute differences remained
between the federal government and state legislatures which, like
the Illinois assembly, urged &quot;some quat and radical change&quot; in the
mode of selling public lands.^^1^^ The administration's attitude to the
activity of the squatters remained intolerant. The Committee for
Public Lands not only dismissed the petitions to take into account
squatters' rights, granting them only in exceptional cases, but also
denounced the practice every way it could. Yet in the West
squatters' rights were regarded as a guarantee that the land would really end
up in the hands of the actual settlers. The committee believed</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>American State Papers</em>, Vol. 4, 1834, p. 871.</p>

<p>     74 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
( 1816-182S)</p>

<p>     enough at the time thanks to its exceptional economic
condition and traditional political influence. Moreover, a member of the
&quot;Virginia dynasty&quot; was still in Washington. The voting in the House
of Representatives was no longer partisan but rather openly
sectional. A united Southern bloc cast votes against Tallmadge's
proposal in the House in February 1819. The same picture was
observed in the Senate during voting on the proposal to withdraw
the Tallmadge amendment to the bill to admit Missouri to the
Union. A year later, in voting to admit Missouri as a slave state to
the Union, the Southerners were practically unanimous during the
entire course of discussions.</p>

<p>     The Missouri crisis definitively undermined the traditional
basis of the former Republican Party---the bloc between the planters
of the South and the bourgeoisie of the North. This was reflected in
the overall crisis of the Republican Party. Arguing for Missouri's
right to join the Union without any restrictions, the Southerners
referred to the &quot;genius of '76.&quot; Their opponents quite reasonably
retorted that the matter did not concern abstract rights of the
people but &quot;a desire to hold slaves&quot; and the urge to &quot;give an almost
boundless expanse to the anti-republican principles.''^^1^^ On a par
with Christian arguments and all sorts of good intentions, they
advanced a quite clear proposal to limit the territory to which
slavery would be extended and ban slavery to the west of the
Mississippi. The Republicans now not only ostracized each other
from republican principles but also occupied directly opposite
positions on a number of questions. Another dimension of the
emergent crisis of the Republican Party was the struggle around
the caucus. Having flared up after the 1820 elections, the struggle
reflected the antagonism between participants in the Missouri
Compromise who officially still remained members of one party.</p>

<p>     Finally, the Missouri crisis largely shaped the emerging party
system. One of the most important conditions for its existence and
successful functioning was the need to answer the question on the
attitude to slavery. The answer was found: the problem should be
hushed up in every way and its aggravation avoided. Moreover, the
political parties managed successfully to ignore and sidestep the
issue, thereby preventing an acute domestic political crisis. This
was facilitated by the fact that the southern and the northern co-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Niles' Weekly Register</em>, October 2, 1819, p. 71.</p>

<p>     lonization flows to the West did not actually meet anywhere and
the industrial bourgeoisie of the North was still in the making. Of
course, this was only a stopgap measure. Furthermore, the Missouri
Compromise in the final count contradicted the interests of the
country's development. Extension of the Union was blocked for a
long time. The next state, Arkansas, was admitted to the Union
only in 1836.</p>

<p>     For the Republican Party the Missouri crisis was practically the
final blow which led to its collapse. According to the local press as
early as 1819, differences between the Federalists and individual
rival factions of Republicans had virtually disappeared in New
York.^^1^^ Organizations operating under the name of the Republican
Party occupied directly opposite positions on the same issues. For
instance, the Central Corresponding Committee in New York on
behalf of the Republican Party gave credit to De Witt Clinton
for his stubborn opposition to the spread of slavery and consistent
implementation of the internal improvements course.^^2^^ At the same
time a meeting of Republican members of the state legislative
assembly headed by Martin Van Buren accused Clinton of betraying
the interests of the Republican Party and indulging Federalists who
had not repented and not abandoned their views. Similar
accusations were made in early 1821 by delegates at a New York Western
District Republican Convention.^^4^^</p>

<p>     That the party had split became fully apparent at the 1820
presidential elections when the Republican nominee James Monroe
was elected virtually unanimously. Monroe became the only
President in US history to be reelected for a second term after an
economic crisis. The elections might have seemed to be a total
victory for the Republicans. Actually the party's influence was very
small. Only a small share of those eligible to vote took part in the
elections. At the national level the Republican Party ceased being a
force effectively controlling the electorate. This made its position
particularly vulnerable since the country was entering a phase of</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Albany Argus</em>, February 26;April 16;May 7;September 10, 1819.</p>

<p>     <em>The Voice of the People. General Republican Address to the Free and Independent
Electors of the State of New York</em>, E.A.E. Mosford, Printers, Albany, 1820, pp. 2-3.</p>

<p>     <em>Republican Nomination for Governor and Lt. Governor. With an Address to the
Electors of the State of New York</em>, Albany, 1820, p. 8.</p>

<p>     <em>Western District Republican Senatorial Nomination at a General Convention of the
Republican Delegates</em>, Geneva, 1821, pp. 15, 17.</p>

<p>     76 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     First Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1816-1828) 77</p>

<p>     rapid development at which major political decisions had to be
worked out and implemented.</p>

<p>     The early 1820s saw the end of the period of &quot;putting into
order&quot; the United States economy seriously disorganized by the
foreign-policy crisis of the early 19th century, the war, and a change in
the conditions of economic development. The conflict between two
trends in capitalist development was the substance of the struggle
waged by numerous factions in the subsequent period.</p>

<p>     ``Extensive&quot; development included opening up new lands in the
West, passing from semi-subsistence farming to an economy
producing for the market, involving new sections of the population in
capitalist economic relations and setting up new industrial,
commercial and financial enterprises. All this implied an appropriate
policy that would consist of measures securing sufficient money in
circulation, ameliorating the position of indebted agrarians, and
providing relatively easy access to Western lands when they were
not regarded as a source of federal income; and implementing
internal improvements that would make it easier to move West.
Protectionism should, on the one hand, safeguard American
industry and, on the other, not hamper the appearance of cheap
goods on the domestic market.</p>

<p>     The other way---``in-depth'' development---involved honing the
economic system that had shaped in the United States by the first
half of the 1820s so as to improve its operation. The sections of
the bourgeoisie and, to a lesser extent, planters who had already
found a stable place in the existing structure were the advocates of
the latter way. They pinned hopes not so much on new
opportunities provided by the opening up of the West and the industrial
revolution, but rather on further strengthening and developing what had
been achieved. Such development was contingent on an orderly
financial system of which the National Bank was the center, and the
existence of a federal debt which would be covered by the federal
government. The bank itself and its depositors closely associated
with their European counterparts were to enjoy certain privileges
guaranteed by the government. The advance to the West became
unnecessary and even dangerous, since representation of the
numerous Western states in Congress could threaten the existing order.
Internal improvements were considered only to the extent they
contributed to the stable functioning of the existing system rather than
its expansion. Western lands were to be sold at the highest prices. It</p>

<p>     is obvious that the highway of capitalist development securing the
most leeway was associated with the former trend. Under the
circumstances, the latter trend could play a conservative role and lead
to a premature narrowing of the basis for capitalist development.
However, it was a widest basis for capitalist development, the basis
which was only being laid at the time and which could provide for
the highest growth rates in the future.</p>

<p>     Finally, there existed a tremendous territorial difference in
conditions of capitalist development. Many of the problems which
were a daily reality of life in the cities of the Atlantic seaboard and
factory towns in New England were simply incomprehensible to the
farmer stubbing a piece of land he had just purchased or occupied
as a squatter. Besides, both trends were present to some extent in
all three main structures developing in the economy of the United
States: in the North where the industrial revolution-was only
beginning, in the slaveholding South, and in the colonized West.
Together with the fluid class structure typical of the early stage in the
industrial revolution, all this led to the emergence of numerous
factions defending social and economic interests of various sections
and groups. The cleavages between the numerous groups resulted in
the disappearance of the objective basis for the existence of the
Republican Party. A new stage in the realignment began in 1820-1822:
the splitting up of the former political entities at the state level.</p>

<p>     The new stage in the realignment was marked by the appearance,
on a par with the old candidates speaking on behalf of the
Republicans and occasionally the Federalists, of many candidates without
a clear-cut partisan identity. Such was the case, for example, in
Massachusetts, New York and South Carolina, three states in three
different areas where the party system consisted of Federalists and
Republicans. In many states---New York, New Jersey, North
Carolina and Ohio---new groups appeared: the National Republicans.
Republicans advocating states rights were active in the elections in
Virginia and South Carolina. The process acquired a clearer nature
in 1822-1824: the disintegration intensified. Out of 24 states only
seven---Rhode Island, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois,
Mississippi and Missouri---retained the party groupings existing in 1820
without change, and the four latter states preserved their one-party
system which had emerged when they were admitted to the Union.
By 1824, states with a more complex social and economic
structure---Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North</p>

<p>     78 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     Carolina---had four or five party-political groups sufficiently strong
to get into federal Congress.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Thus, new, largely intermediate, groupings reflecting the altered
balance of social, economic and political forces, sprang up on the
ashes of the former party system. This situation gave rise to one of
the most important features in the new party system. As distinct
from the former system which emerged at the congressional level as
a result of differences between factions, the incipient party system
was taking shape on the basis of unity of groupings and factions
which emerged at the state level and only subsequently grew
larger.</p>

<p>     The enhanced role of the states and local politics in this period
was due not only to the variety in conditions of social and
economic development but also to the altered conditions in which the
country's political system as a whole was functioning. A
significant democratization of the state political system began in the
1820s: to begin with, the electorate was greatly broadened by the
elimination of various property qualifications. Another aspect in
the democratization of the political process was that more voters
took part in choosing the electors. All this meant that the former
methods by which only a relatively narrow section of the electorate
could be controlled had become increasingly less suitable.</p>

<p>     This process had to do with a major trend in the political
struggle in 1820-1824---the polemics concerning the system for
nominating the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party. Under the
one-party system which emerged in the Era of Good Feelings,
nomination by the Republican caucus almost automatically meant
election to the presidential office. But it was this method that drew
the criticism of many Republicans some of whom already called
themselves Democratic Republicans or occasionally Democrats.
The former nomination system when voting was in the hands of the
members of the congressional faction had come into acute
contradiction with democratization of political life in the country. The
congressmen themselves spoke very cautiously on the subject in
1823-1824, mostly referring to the need for unity in the
Republican Party and the glorious traditions of the past, or even asserted
that they visited the meeting of caucus members as private per-</p>

<p>     sons.^^1^^ Moreover, during debates concerning the caucus problem
the question arose whether in caucus voting account should be
taken of the &quot;three-fifths rule&quot;, i.e. of the black population of the
Southern states, giving these states additional mandates.^^2^^ The
South had ceded its leading position by that time: the North
had left it behind in terms of population size and it now held the
balance in the House of Representatives. Seeking to retain the
former system the Southerners attempted to preserve their
influence and domination in the Republican Party at the national level.
However, this proved impossible after the Missouri crisis. As an
organizational embodiment of the bloc between the planters of the
South and the big (mostly financial) bourgeoisie of the North
formed during the Revolution and War of Independence, the caucus
was doomed to perish. The question of caucus activity introduced
considerable dissention into the ranks of the Republicans or what
was left of the Republican Party. Some of them denounced the
very idea of a caucus,^^3^^ others wavered now rejecting the practice
altogether and then trying to revive the political cadaver referring
to the need for party unity embodied in the caucus.^^4^^ It is to be
recalled that the first conventions held at the county level in
1822-1823 were gaining increasing popularity. The transition to
the convention system was the next step toward broader
political associations consonant with the new conditions.</p>

<p>     The fall of the caucus system had another important aspect.
Rejection of the practice meant a further separation of the
machinery of government and the legislature from the incipient party
machine. If at the early stages in the development of American
society the Congress faction successfully combined these aims,
now legislative power was to be separated from the machinery of
political parties which had not been envisaged in the Constitution
but had become necessary for the operation of the entire political
system. The more complicated tasks facing the political parties
made it imperative for them to be more rigorously organized.</p>

<p>     The nominating of presidential candidates on the eve of the</p>

<p>     See: <em>Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents 1789-1829</em>, Chapel Hill,
1978. Vol. 3.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Miles' Weekly Register</em>, November 1, 1823, p. 129.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^ Miles' Weekly Register</em>, January 17, 1824, pp. 305-308, February 14, 1824,
<em>pp.369-37Q;Albany Argus, May</em> 20, 1823.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Albany Argus</em>, May 9, May 20, 1823.</p>

<p>     Calculated from: S. Parsons, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 210-285.</p>

<p>     80 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     First Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1 816-1828) 81</p>

<p>     1824 elections showed that major political groupings were emerging
at full blast in individual states and some of them had already
started to form blocs with each other. The nomination of Henry Clay
was most revealing in this respect. A Southerner by origin, he was
a &quot;man of the West&quot;, an advocate of the interests of that part of
the country.^^1^^ His &quot;American System&quot; in effect envisaged a
fundamental restructuring of the entire foreign and domestic trade of
the United States, and wide-scale internal improvements capable of
uniting the country into a single whole. The principal component
holding the entire system together would be industry which would
process what was produced by the West and the South. Industry
should be safeguarded from foreign competition by a system of
protective tariffs.</p>

<p>     This project undoubtedly reflected the interests of the growing
industrial bourgeoisie. However, despite the impressive growth
rates of industry, Clay's project lacked a real basis. American
industry was still unable to consume all the cotton produced by the
South (most of it still went to Britain) or fully satisfy the rising
needs of the West. The American System reflected not the real
possibilities but rather the appetites of the growing American
bourgeoisie. In the actual circumstances of 1824, Clay's followers
were forced to form blocs with those whose platform was at least
outwardly similar to their own views---the traditional circles of the
commercial and financial bourgeoisie also favoring stronger federal
government and retention of the National Bank. The measures
Clay proposed at the time were in line with the needs of
bourgeois development but in the final count conformed to the ``
indepth'' development trend. However, on their basis it was
possible not only to rally advocates of such measures on a national
scale but also reach broad sections of voters in different parts of
the country---from Pennsylvania to Ohio---with the appeal to &quot;
protect our farmers and mechanics against the destructive influence of
foreign competition.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Presidential candidate John Quincy Adams was equally class
biased but even more conservative, representing the interests of
New England's financial bourgeoisie. The weakest candidate was</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Argus of Western America</em>, October 10, 1822.</p>

<p>     <em>To the People of Ohio, Cincinnati, October 8, 1824</em>, Phila Committee of
Correspondence, Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette, 1824, p. 1.</p>

<p>     William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury in Monroe's
Administration, representing the interests of the Southern banking houses.
He had been nominated by the Republican causus. But only 66
of the 216 Republicans then in Congress took part in the caucus.
Nomination by such a strongly criticized institution contributed
to Crawford's weakness.</p>

<p>     Finally, quite a special position was occupied by Andrew
Jackson. A major planter, he was also known as a fighter against the
Indians and was, therefore, popular in the West. The victory at New
Orleans made him a figure of national prominence. His candidacy
was favored by the Democratic Republicans of Pennsylvania and
Jackson's nomination was accompanied by an acute criticism of the
government's economic policy, occupation of the White House by
the &quot;Virginia Dynasty&quot;, and the caucus system.^^1^^
Characteristically, the Pennsylvanians' appeal was supported by Jackson's followers
in Tennessee, the initiative, moreover, coming from the latter. The
authority of the new institution for nominating the presidential
candidate---the convention---was on Jackson's side. In this respect
only Adams could be compared to him. Clay's men tried by all
means to organize equally impressive measures in his support,
but their efforts only resulted in county and electoral district
conventions.</p>

<p>     If nominating a presidential candidate provoked sharp quarrels,
the candidacy for Vice-President went without particular
disagreement to John C. Calhoun. All candidates unanimously agreed that
the Southerners had to be appeased.</p>

<p>     The 1824 elections also marked the turning point in the rise of
the new party-political system: of 24 states 18 chose electors by a
direct vote. That was why taking the vote to the Congress was in
the final analysis in contradiction with the new trend reflecting the
general democratization of political life, on the one hand, and the
separation of the government machinery from the party machine,
on the other. None of the four candidates received a majority, and
all of them together had much less votes compared to the total
number of those eligible to vote at the time. The results of the
elections clearly showed that nomination of too many candidates at</p>

<p>     <em>Address of the Democratic Republican Committee of Alleghany County,
Pennsylvania, friendly to the election of Gen. Andrew Jackson, to the office of President of the
United States</em>, 1824, pp. 6, 8, 15.</p>

<p>     6-749</p>

<p>     82 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     First Party Realignment</p>

<p>     (1816 1828) 83</p>

<p>     Following the outdated line of identifying the interests of his
administration with those of the nation as a whole, Adams rejected
any measures aimed at strengthening the positions of his own party
as unnecessary and even harmful. The appointment to high offices
of severed former Federalists the President regarded as fit for
these offices provoked further accusations. The Vice-President
from the South deliberately contributed to opposition activity.</p>

<p>     At the same time, on the eve of the next election, the leader
of the National Republicans enjoyed extensive support outside New
England, and his followers not only firmly supported his economic
policy^^1^^ but also cast well-founded doubt on Jackson's ability to
govern the country.^^2^^ On the other hand, a very broad but
amorphous coalition began to emerge on the eve of the elections, bringing
together farmers of the West and the South, Southern planters,
the rising industrial bourgeoisie, the petty and middle bourgeoisie
of the towns---merchants, craftsmen, small and medium financiers
and the emerging working class. The rise of this coalition marked
the end of the period which began with the Era of Good Feelings.</p>

<p>     Jackson's victory in the 1828 presidential elections did not
mean an end to the struggle over the ways of capitalist development
or the rise of a new party system. The problem of ``in-depth'' or
``extensive'' development would be solved in the course of an acute
struggle to implement the government's measures. The erection of
the framework of the party system had not been completed: there
was actually only one party which had not passed the test of being
in power, while the opposition was yet to get itself constituted in
respect to this party's activity. At the same time, many of the
spontaneously established standards in the operation of the party
system had already been tested in the course of the realignment
which was nearing its completion. Multistratal parties became the
rule: the importance of this principle was confirmed by the 1824
elections. Another major principle of the operation of the US
party system---its decentralization---was established in the course of
the struggle around the caucus problem. The emerging convention</p>

<p>     the national level inevitably led to dispersal of forces resulting in
the electorate getting out of control. It became equally clear that
a decisive victory in the elections could be won only by a
candidate from a broad inter-sectional coalition. A big role in the rise
of such a coalition was played by the opposition against the
activities of the Adams Administration. It was after the 1824
elections that two opposing groupings were definitively formed: the
National Republicans and the Democrats (divided at the state level
into Democrats and Jacksonian Democrats).</p>

<p>     There was an extraordinary variety of groups in individual states
following the 1824 elections. Groups of National Republicans,
Jacksonian Republicans, Jacksonian Democrats, Republicans,
Federalists, States Rights Republicans, and Republican followers of
Adams operated in Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South
Carolina. Each of these factions was sufficiently strong to send its
followers to federal Congress, but none of them was capable of
proposing a sufficiently broad program of its own answering the needs
of the country as a whole, to say nothing of implementing such a
program. The outcome of the 1824 elections did nothing to clear
up the question of directing government policy along the highway
of capitalist development in the United States.</p>

<p>     Adams' economic policy was essentially a continuation of
the line followed by all American governments after the War of
1812: he favored strengthening federal government, extensive
internal improvements, coordinated measures to develop industry
and introduce order into the monetary system. However, these
aims were now obviously insufficient. Rapid development of
capitalism required the utmost freedom of competition.
Retention of any privileged institutions and the framework of all kinds
of systems hindered that development rather than assisted it.
The peculiar nature of the National Republicans as an intermediate
grouping consisted in the fact that its program was aimed not at
future objectives but rather at consolidating and developing what
had already been achieved. It was for this reason that the program
Adams set forth encountered strong opposition despite the fact
that it was sufficiently corroborated and answered the actual needs
of the country better than any other similar program previously.
Some additional factors contributed to the President's failures.</p>

<p>     <em>Proceedings of the Administration Convention, Held at Frankfort, Kentucky.
December 17, 1827. An Address to the Freemen of Kentucky, from a convention of
delegates friendly to the re-election of John Qfiincy Adams</em>, 1827, pp. 5-9.</p>

<p>     <em>Address of the Administrative Convention, Held in the Capitol at Raleigh</em>,
December 20, 1827, p. 5.</p>

<p>     Derived from: S. Parsons, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 210-285.</p>

<p>     84 Chapter Three</p>

<p>     system not only successfully combined a wide range of local
interests and organizational decentralization with national
objectives but also made it possible to control the mass base of the
political parties to a much greater degree than formerly. A more
mature party-political structure involving much broader sections of
the population than the former semi-patriarchal system, the rapid
growth of the economy attended by an equally rapid emergence of
contradictions---all this was bound to make the era of Jacksonian
Democracy a period of acute political strife.</p>

4

<p>     THE RISE OF NEW</p>

<p>     <b>NATIONAL PARTIES:</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE DEMOCRATS</b></p>

<p>     <b>AND THE WHIGS</b></p>

<p>     The events of 1824-1828 quite obviously showed that the
transition from a peculiar multiparty or factional period in the party
alignment to political rivalry between two national parties was
imminent. The appearance of a whole set of new contradictions
within American society was a specific reason for channeling the
chaotic political process mostly concentrated at the state level
into the avenue of rivalry between major alignments---the
administration and the opposition (National Republicans and Jacksonian
Democrats respectively, prototypes of the Whigs and Democrats).
The 1830s were marked by deep-going changes in the social and
economic sphere associated with American capitalism entering the
stage of free enterprise and the rise of the basic classes in
capitalist society---the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat. New
phenomena in the economy and public life, as well as the new
contradictions, were the result of the industrial revolution,
developing at the time chiefly in the Northeast of the US, the farmer
colonization of the West, and the adaptation of plantation system
in the South to new conditions. The expanding territory,
population growth, changes in its structure, migration and immigration,
involvement of new strata in the capitalist economy---all this
markedly altered the social and political context in which contradictions
between classes and groups in society developed, provoked a change
in the political system as a whole, and contributed to the
appearance of new parties of the American bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     Changes in the balance of power between the US
geographical sections showed that contradictions between the bourgeoisie
and the planters were gradually growing. This made it urgent for
politicians from the free and slave states to unite in national group-</p>

<p>     86 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 87</p>

<p>     ings. The politicians aware of the need to change the outdated
party structures emphasized that national parties could prevent
the conflict between North and South. The thought was
classically set down in 1827 by Martin Van Buren, senator from New York
at the time. He wrote that by combining &quot;the planters of the South
and the plain Republicans of the North, they would prevent
conflict between the slave and free states.''^^1^^ Although Van Buren put
forward the Utopian idea of reviving the old Republican Party, the
fact that he and also quite a broad range of followers in New York,
Illinois and some other states recognized the parties' positive role,
was undoubtedly of major importance.</p>

<p>     An unprecedented &quot;electoral machine&quot; operated successfully
in the 1828 presidential campaign, but the results of the elections
showed that the objectives formulated by the leader of the
Jacksonians, Van Buren, in 1827 had hardly been attained. The results
of the voting in the Electoral College, and the popular vote
demonstrated the sectional split which had already been characteristic
of the first parties in the 1790s. Jackson won by a large margin
(practically the largest possible) in the planter (particularly
cotton) South, while in the North (New England) Adams scored an
impressive victory.</p>

<p>     The election results, particularly a comparison of 178 electoral
votes for Jackson with Adams' 83, to a certain extent concealed
the important fact that the National Republicans offered stiff
competition to the Jacksonians in a number of states. In addition,
Jackson's opponents were elected governors of eight states in
1828-1829.^^2^^</p>

<p>     As to the Jacksonians, only the test of power and
responsibility for the country's political course could show how strong the
coalition, which had emerged during the elections, was in reality.
Both new political associations---the Jacksonians and the National
Republicans---faced an objective dilemma: either to evolve into stable
national parties or to leave the political scene after the
presidential elections.</p>

<p>     The vigorous political course proclaimed by Jackson in his</p>

<p>     Donald B. Cole, <em>Martin Van Buren and the American Political System</em>, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, p. 151.</p>

<p>     <em>American Governors and Gubernatorial Elections, 1775-1978</em>, Compiled by Roy R.
Glashan, Meckler Books, West port, 1979, pp. 50-51, 108-109, 116-117, 142-143, 200-
203,244-245,316-317.</p>

<p>     very first presidential message provoked a further
differentiation of political forces. The message contained many newly defined
points, although the appeal to return to the ideals of Jeffersonian
times was the dominant theme. The proposal to reduce the navy
and land forces, appeals to pay off the public debt at an early date,
to cut down, albeit cautiously, the protective tariff, and a
suggestion to simplify the government machinery---all this appeared to
be in the spirit of the Old Republican school of thought and seemed
to be quite neutral were it not in such a sharp contrast to the
course pursued by the previous administrations. The apparently
traditional phrases included some dictated by the spirit of the
times---for example, the proposal to adopt an amendment to the
Constitution doing away with the Electoral College and introducing
direct elections of the President and Vice-President.</p>

<p>     The deepest political consequences resulted from the phrase
in the message which declared that the Bank of the United States
&quot;has failed in ... establishing a uniform and sound currency&quot; and
questioned &quot;the constitutionality and the expediency of the law
creating this bank.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     However, certain serious events contributing to the
consolidation of parties occurred before the main points of Jackson's
message concerning the bank materialized into specific political
actions. Frequently, particularly in the first years, the measures
of the Jackson Administration were contradictory in nature giving
rise simultaneously to centripetal and centrifugal trends within
the rival groupings. For example, the presidential veto on the
bill for federal financing of the National Cumberland Road from
Maysville to Lexington (Kentucky) was positively viewed by the
Jacksonians in the South but at the same time provoked a wave of
dissension, albeit shortlived, in the West and in mid-Atlantic
states. At the same time, during the Nullification crisis of 1831-
1833 Jackson took an ultranationalist stand in respect to the South
Carolinians who intended to nullify the protective tariffs of 1828
and 1832.^^2^^ This led to John C. Calhoun's group temporarily leaving
the Democratic Party, on the one hand, and created possibilities</p>

<p>     J. D. Richardson, <em>A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1897</em>, Vol. II, Washington, 1898, reprint 1968, pp. 442-462.</p>

<p>     The President's position was set forth in a proclamation of December 10, 1832 in
which the behavior of the South Carolinians was qualified as ``treason'' (J. D. Richardson,
<em>op. cit.,p</em>. 654).</p>

<p>     88 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 89</p>

<p>     for an alliance between nationalist Daniel Webster, a foremost
leader of the opposition, and the President, on the other.</p>

<p>     The needs of the political struggle drew attention to the
problem of party organization. Thanks to the mobilization of
potential accumulated in the previous period, Jackson's followers
managed to close their ranks. This had an impact on the situation
within the federal government: the number of members
supporting the administration increased in the 21st and 22nd
Congresses. The Jacksonians scored a number of victories at the
gubernatorial elections in 1829-1830, as a result of which they controlled
the executive in 17 out of 24 states.</p>

<p>     The National Republicans were aware that their chief weakness
dating back to the Adams Administration was the absence of a
strong party organization. Now they attempted to turn the tables
by drawing simultaneously on old devices and the latest experience.</p>

<p>     The forming of opposition organizations at the state level
proceeded more actively and by means of newer methods. National
Republicans gained opportunities there to conclude an alliance with
other opposition forces. Jackson's opponents united with
Antimasonic organizations in some states in the course of the struggle for
power. The Antimasonic movement was based, in the final count,
on the desire of members of the petty bourgeoisie occupying an
intermediary position between the poles of capitalist society---the
big bourgeoisie and the proletariat---to bring into agreement the
political rights proclaimed in the federal and state constitutions
and the real possibilities to enjoy these rights. Hence the antielitist
and egalitarian moods of the Antimasonic literature in which,
however, the religious, moral and ethical element was also strong. Of major
importance was the fact that this broad, although purely ``Northern'',
movement of an egalitarian inclination assumed the form of a political
party in the years of Jackson's rule, and that these Antimasonic
parties were mostly in the opposition to Jackson. It points to the
limited nature of the Jacksonians' democratism, as well as of the
entire period of Jacksonian democracy, which was nothing else but
the class limitedness of bourgeois democracy initially ``
programmed'' to safeguard, although in new conditions and by new
methods, the domination of the big bourgeoisie and the planters.^^1^^</p>

<p>     In Soviet literature the term &quot;Jacksonian democracy&quot; is usually applied to the
period when Jackson's Democratic Party was in power. The class nature of Jacksonian
democracy was dealt with by N. N. Bolkhovitinov, see: N. N. Bolkhovitinov, <em>USA: Problems</em></p>

<p>     Antimasonic parties had been active in New York and
Pennsylvania since 1826. Relying on the programs objectively aimed
against the privileged classes, they (particularly in New York)
initially sought to separate from the parties operating in the state,
submitting their own tickets at the elections.^^1^^ However, the need to
rely on a strong candidate inevitably prompted the Antimasons to
support other groups of Anti-Jacksonians. Thus, at the New York
gubernatorial elections in 1832 the National Republicans and the
Antimasons united to support Francis Granger.^^2^^ However, things
did not go any further than local alliances.</p>

<p>     On the eve of the 1832 presidential elections the Antimasons
assembled to their national nominating convention (the first in
American history). It was attended by 115 delegates from 13
states. The leaders of the Antimasons clearly realized that victory
was impossible without an alliance of opposition forces, and
proposed to several prominent opposition members to be a presidential
candidate from their party. But due to differences among the
Anti-Jacksonians a common candidate was not found.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Clay's and Webster's entourage for a long time refused to
accept the idea of a national convention strongly urged by the
AntiJacksonians locally. When the convention finally gathered in
Baltimore in December 1831 and officially announced Clay's
nomination, no clear policy-making statements were made. On the whole,
the National Republicans attempted to rely on traditional issues such
as internal improvements at federal expense and protectionism, or
became absorbed in constitutional debates concerning the
prerogatives of the branches of power. All of this, in effect, repeated the
American System that had been rejected by the Southerners in the years
of the Adams Administration. No wonder Clay's followers were unable
at this stage to secure support of their natural allies, the Southerners,
advocates of states rights, who had split away from the Jacksonians.</p>

<p>     The cohesion of the opposition members at the national level
depended directly on the vigorous action of the Anti-Jacksonians at</p>

<p>     <em>of History and Contemporary Historiography</em>, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1980, pp. 253-
281 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     Jabez D. Hammond, <em>The History of Political Parties in the State of New York</em>,
Vol. II, Syracuse, 1852, pp. 386-391.
<em>^^2^^ Ibid., p</em>. 396.</p>

<p>     <em>Autobiography of Thurlow Weed</em>. Edited by his daughter Harriet A. Weed, Mifflin
and Company, Boston, Houghton, 1883, pp. 389-391.</p>

<p>     90 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 91</p>

<p>     the local level. In the years of Jackson's first administration,
however, the state opposition ``parties'' were unequal in political weight
and acted separately. Numerous and different groups of Jackson's
opponents---they got their candidates elected to the House of
Representatives of the 21st Congress (1831-1833) in 19 out of 24
states---reacted to the administration's individual steps and the
appeals of the opposition leaders in different ways. It became
obvious that a special logic of the political struggle existed at the
federal and the state levels where the leaders were to communicate
with the rank-and-file voters. Critical speeches against the
administration from the Senate or House rostrum could bring the
opposition members the applause of the Washington public, but the
same words frequently had quite a different ring in the states. In
the opinion of an early historian of the Whig Party, Richard
McKinley Ormsby, the National Republicans relied chiefly on that
the people, together with them, would denounce Jackson for his
rejection of the experience of past administrations. But, the author
wrote, &quot;correct principles do not always secure the triumph of
a party... To suppose that the mass of American voters had
deliberately examined and pronounced upon the great questions so
carefully weighed and setted by such Democrats as Clay, Calhoun ...
would be ridiculous.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     In order to rally the forces of the opposition in the
prevailing situation it was necessary for the national leadership to actively
pursue an extremely pragmatic course supported by party rhetoric.
The opposition lacked such leadership. The polemic over the Bank
of the United States exacerbated the social and political situation
which, in its turn, accelerated the process of party formation.</p>

<p>     In the 1832 presidential elections, however, the issue of the
Bank of the United States was in the focus of attention and in
effect the struggle was waged not between Jackson and Clay but
between the President and the bank. Yet, the results of the
elections did not differ significantly from those obtained in 1828.
The consequences of the differentiation of political forces became
apparent later.</p>

<p>     Nevertheless, the balance of power had changed: thejacksonians
were gaining political weight. Jackson's electorate gradually as-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ R. McKinley Ormsby, <em>A History of the Whig Party</em>, Crosby, Nichols &amp; Co., Boston,
1859, pp. 190-191.</p>

<p>     sumed a truly national scope. This occurred because thejacksonians
managed to push back the opposition in New England, the states
which were the mainstays of the National Republicans. On the
whole, however, as in 1828, the alignment was sectional and
unbalanced: in the South and the Southwest the rivalry between major
groups was even less than in 1828, thejacksonians prevailed there;
New England remained loyal to the opposition.</p>

<p>     With the defeat of the supporters of the bank in the elections,
the struggle round the largest financial institution of the country
became even more acute.</p>

<p>     The Democrats' intention to do away with the bank reflected
a phenomenon of major importance for America at the time: the
transition was under way to a new stage in capitalist development,
the stage of free competition. The bank was the focus of the forces
of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie and the part of the
industrialists who had only recently passed from commercial
operations to running factories. The bank was a powerful privileged
corporation regulating, and inevitalby restricting, the scope of
credit operations and holding back the issue of ``cheap'' paper
money. At the same time, the rapidly developing economy badly
needed easily available money. Modern historians carry on
endless arguments on the role of the Bank of the United States in the
country's development, on the consequences of its elimination,
and Jackson's motives in his war against the bank.</p>

<p>     At the same time it was undoubtable for historians and
contemporaries alike that a major part was played here by purely
political motives. The bank carried immense political weight. It was
well known that its leadership had supported President Adams in
1828, to say nothing of financing Clay's campaign in 1832 and of
the bank president Nicholas Biddle's relations with the
opposition leaders. Senator Thomas Hart Benton (Democrat, Missouri)
remarked in the course of the congressional debates in 1834: the
bank &quot;was born a political institution, and was the first measure
of the Government to develop the line which so long and so distinctly
marked the political parties of this country... The political grammar
was now strangely confused. Many men have got into wrong places.
They wear the name of one party, and act on the principle of the
other ... but this bank question ... would set all right.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     <em>The Congressional Globe, Containing Sketches of the Debates and Proceedings of</em></p>

<p>     92 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 93</p>

<p>     Subsequent events showed that the 1832 campaign affected the
rise of the opposition party in a fashion similar to the compression
of a spring: the onslaught by the Jacksonians pushed back the
disunited opposition, but soon it received powerful impulses
enabling it to recover.</p>

<p>     The Anti-Jacksonians were assisted not only by the
stepped-up differentiation of social forces, which led to a large group
of bank supporters leaving the Democrats. In the course of
congressional debates concerning the bill to extend the bank charter in
1831 the opposition supporting the bank accused Jackson of &quot;
executive usurpation.&quot; The accusation was theoretically elaborated
and emotionally colored. From that time on the opposition
reporters called Jackson King Andrew and cartoonists depicted the
President wearing a crown and with a scepter in his hand. Finally,
opposition propaganda interpreted events occurring at the state
and the national level in the same vein.</p>

<p>     Withdrawal of the federal deposits from the Bank of the United
States in September 1833 and their transfer to state banks meant
that the Democrats had taken a resolute step in solving the
financial problem which was very important for the country. The
Democratic Party had, on the whole, mapped out its political course
by that time. The course consisted of measures which, unlike the
opposition's program, in particular the American System, provided
for greater freedom of enterprise (unrestricted and unregulated by
a paternalistic government) including a more active colonization of
the West.^^1^^ In addition, the Jacksonians acted on the bank issue as
opponents of privileged corporations.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The party differentiation, which became more intense after
the withdrawal of the federal deposits, was not, however,
straightforward and did not lead to a split of social forces within the parties
as depicted by the American historians of the Progressive School
and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The relationship between the socio-</p>

<p>     <em>the Twenty-Third Congress</em>, Two Volumes in One, First Session, The Globe Office for the
Editors, Washington, 1835, pp. 285, 286.</p>

<p>     Preemption Acts providing Legal Titles to the settled land, which were important
for farmers and particularly for squatters, were adopted by Congress on the initiative of
the Democrats in 1830-1834.</p>

<p>     See: N. K. Romanova, &quot;The Reasons for the Jackson Government's Fight Against
the Bank of the United States&quot;, in: <em>American Yearbook 1977</em>, Nauka Publishers, 1977,
Moscow, pp. 86-108.</p>

<p>     economic sphere and the political sphere was not, and could not be,
straightforward. The actions of participants in the political process,
including party leaders, were determined primarily by
considerations stemming from the struggle for power. Of course, these
actions were undertaken in and influenced by the specific social and
economic situation. In selecting the issues on which they could
effectively fight their opponents, politicians had at their disposal
a set of problems pushed to the forefront by the objective course
of the country's economic development. However, the subjective
choice could have an impact on the outcome of many processes
which were independent of the actors on the political stage. The
bank issue, for instance, linked closely together the short-term
considerations of Jackson, Biddle and Clay, and the new
phenomena underway in the country's economy.</p>

<p>     In the case we are concerned with, the Anti-Jacksonians, on
the whole, did not represent the conservatives who championed the
privileges of the old commercial and financial bourgeoisie and the
upper stratum of the planters linked to it. On the other hand,
submitting the bank issue to &quot;popular consideration,&quot; as
President Jackson's messages claimed, the Jacksonian leaders were, in
effect, least of all concerned with whether the country's
population would benefit from the elimination of the Bank of the United
States. Both the Democrats and their opponents wanted to win
the elections in the prevailing political setting, and to do this they
had to secure the support of the largest number of voters. Hence
the motley social composition of the electorate supporting the
Democrats and the opposition.</p>

<p>     Considering the reasons for the defeat in 1832, the
opposition leaders correctly pointed to the dispersal of forces. Union
with the Southerners became an urgent problem. The way to that
union lay through the Compromise of 1833 when Clay officially
denounced one of the cornerstones of his American System,
protectionism, submitting and pushing through a bill reducing import
tariffs.^^1^^ It was a deliberate effort to piece together an opposition
bloc. To dissociate themselves from the defeat they suffered under
the name of National Republicans, and also to elaborate on the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Thomas H. Benton, <em>Thirty Years' View; or A History of the Working of the
American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850</em>, in two volumes, Vol. I, D.
Appleton and Company, New York, 1854, pp. 342-344.</p>

<p>     94 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 95</p>

<p>     ``executive usurpation&quot; charge and criticism of King Andrew and
Tory Democrats, the opposition party soon came to be called the
Whig Party.</p>

<p>     The measures the bank president, Nicholas Biddle undertook
in response to Jackson's decision to withdraw federal deposits
partially coincided with an objective deterioration of the
economic situation, which created the basis for a sharp growth of
opposition parties locally. This was particularly typical of the
Middle Atlantic states. The year 1834 brought the Whigs their first
successes. They gained control over the municipality in New York.
Their candidate to the office of mayor Gulian Verplanck received
only 213 less votes than the Democrat Cornelius Lawrence. The
margin between the candidates of these parties had been 5,000
votes at the previous elections. The Whig state convention
nominated William H. Seward candidate for the office of governor.
However, Democrat William L. Marcy was reelected with a close margin
(he received 51.8 per cent of the votes). In 1834 Whig candidates
stood for election in gubernatorial elections of nine states and won
in four (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Louisiana and Indiana). All in
all, 52 Whigs from 16 states were elected to the House of
Representatives of the 23rd Congress (1833-1835).<em>^^1^^</em></p>

<p>     According to contemporaries, in 1834 the Whig Party
consisted of former National Republicans---supporters of Adams,
Clay and his American System; a group of Southerners who
expounded the states rights doctrine, or nullificators; and also those
who were previously in the Antimasonic Party. The Whigs were
also joined by those Democrats who were dissatisfied by Jackson's
tough behavior during the &quot;bank war,&quot; in short, all those who were
affected by the Whigs'words about Jackson's &quot;executive usurpation&quot;
and the resultant vulnerability of freedom and national prosperity.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The fragmented nature of the opposition party affected the
preparations for the 1836 campaign. Appeals to give up all
personal feelings for the sake of the party's success did not lead to
cohesion. Without holding a national convention the Whigs
nominated three candidates through the system of state conventions
and legislature caucuses; it was expected that each of the candi-</p>

<p>     J. D. Hammond, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 439-443; derived from: S. B. Parsons et al, <em>United
States^ Congressional Districts, 1788-1841</em>. Westport (Connecticut), 1978, pp. 288-373.</p>

<p>     <em>The Whig Almanac of 1838</em>, quoted from W. Dean Burnham, <em>Presidential Ballots
1836-1896</em>, Arno Press, A New York Times Company, 1976, p. 1.</p>

<p>     dates would rely on the support of his section.</p>

<p>     The tactic failed and the Democratic candidate Van Buren won
the election. Thereby the Democrats showed that their party was
quite a stable organization capable of surviving the departure from
the political scene of its national leader, Jackson who had united it
for many years.</p>

<p>     The 1836 campaign was remarkable not only because the
Democrats showed the strength of their party machine. In the
course of that compaign party rivalry became more intense: the
gap in votes received by the candidates of both parties was closing.</p>

<p>     The latter development occurred as a result of a reduction of
Democrat influence in the South. Northerner Van Buren in the
eyes of the slaveholders could not be compared to planter Jackson.
John Quincy Adams wrote in his memoirs that the abolitionists'
activity roused &quot;in the heart of the slave-holder the terror of his
slave, and it will be a motive with him paramount to all other never
to vote for any man not a slave-holder like himself.''^^1^^ The average
gap in votes received in 1836 was only 11 per cent (in 1828 and
1832 it was 36 and 34.10, respectively). The Antimasons no longer
took part in this campaign as a third party. The influence of that
group dwindled in the states too. Everything pointed to the
progressive simplification of the party structure at the local level. The
number of groups was reduced: three or four ``parties'' were
operating in half of the states in 1832-1834, and there were more than
two ``parties'' in only a quarter of the states in 1834-1836.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The 1836 elections heralded difficult times for the Democratic
Party. A new problem began to emerge among the difficulties
involved in regulating relations between the Democrats,
conservative on the financial question, and the left wing of the party
represented by the Locofocos, a petty-bourgeois radical movement
favoring hard currency. For the first time since the Missouri
Compromise leaders of both parties began to speak aloud about slavery.
The growing popularity of abolitionism in the North resulted in a
stream of petitions to Congress denouncing slavery. According to
the congressional procedure the petitions were to be considered in</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to
1848</em>, edited by Charles Francis Adams, Vol. IX, J. B. Lippincott &amp; Co., Philadelphia,
1876 p. 252.</p>

<p>     Derived from: S. Parsons, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 288-373.</p>

<p>     96 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 97</p>

<p>     one of the chambers. This meant that the slavery issue,
deliberately hushed up for such a long time, would be inevitably discussed.
The way out was found by the Southern Democrats who proposed
the &quot;gag rule&quot; according to which the abolitionist petitions were
simply shelved.</p>

<p>     Debates concerning the &quot;gag rule&quot; showed that the Whigs and
the Democrats solved the problem of the Southern and Northern
wings in different ways. In the voting on the petition problem the
Northerners and the Southerners from the Whig Party were
invariably on different sides of the barricade. The Democrats displayed
an enviable unanimity with a minimal number of &quot;renegade
Northerners&quot;. The Democrats even attempted to use this for their own
ends by making the slavery issue a partisan one. When in January
1838 Calhoun submitted a number of resolutions aimed at testing
the Senate's attitude to the slavery issue only two Northern
Democrats voted against them. Calhoun made some interesting remarks
on the subject: &quot;Whatever positions the parties may take, in the
event of such division, one or the other would be considered
more or less favorable to the abolition cause... I hold that the only
possible hope of arresting the progress of the abolitionists in that
quarter is to keep the great parties there united against them, which
would be impossible if they divide here.''^^1^^ On the whole, this was
formally the case, the Northern Whigs rejecting the gag rule were
not defending the abolitionists but the constitutional right of
petition. The Whig leader, Henry Clay, delivered a special speech in
the Senate denouncing the enemies of slavery and rejecting the
accusation made by the Democrats that the party was linked to
the abolitionists.^^2^^ The slavery issue, however, had not come to the
forefront of political life. This enabled the parties to retain unity
albeit to varying degrees.</p>

<p>     The period from 1836 to 1840 was decisive for the Whigs in
terms of consolidating their organization and electoral support.
Whig organizations were created in the South and West. The worst
economic crisis in the country's history which broke out in 1837
contributed to an energetic mustering of Whig forces. On the one</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Congressional Globe Containing Sketches of the Debates and Proceedings of
the Twenty-Fourth Congress, First Session---Volume</em> III, The Globe Office for the Editors,
Washington, 1836, p. 226.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Globe..., Third Session</em>, Volume 7, Washington, 1839, Appendix,
Febr. 7, 1839, pp. 354-359.</p>

<p>     hand, this automatically put the Democratic Administration in
a difficult position, and on the other, made the Whig idea on the
government's active part in the country's economic life attractive to
some extent.</p>

<p>     The processes occurring within the party also contributed to
the strengthening of the Whigs. The leader group changed, an
increasing influence being enjoyed by ``professionals'' with
extensive experience in the party struggle at the local level. This involved
a certain reappraisal of values. The opposition scored a series of
successes at the elections to the assembly in New York and other
cities. In 1836 the Whigs controlled the executive in 11 states and
in 1837, in 14 states. This undoubtedly bred optimism and, with it,
an interest in the methods of political infighting which until then
remained a monopoly of the Democrats. The Whigs' new approach
also completed the reorganization of party structures in the states
in 1840. This made it possible to knock together an immense Whig
bloc at the presidential elections. As analysts indicate, by 1840 the
parties in the states had already shown the ability to control the
extent of voter participation in elections of different levels.<SUP>1
</SUP>Besides, the spectrum of parties had become much simpler. If
in the 24th Congress (1835-1837) three or four parties were
represented in delegations of seven states, in the 26th Congress (1839-
1841) only three congressional delegations were multiparty.^^2^^ The
variety of party labels was replaced by uniformity---the terms
Democrats and Whigs came into general use.</p>

<p>     These changes were summed up by the presidential campaign
of 1840. Even the parties' national conventions were symptomatic:
the Whigs held theirs in Harrisburg (Pennsylvania) in February and
the Democrats in Baltimore in May 1840. For the first time in
American practice the Democrats adopted a party platform. The text of
the platform reflected the growing influence in the party of the
slaveholding wing. States rights were proclaimed to be inviolable
and abolitionism was denounced.^^3^^</p>

<p>     The Whig convention showed that, having analyzed their
deSee: William G. Shade, &quot;Political Pluralism and Party Development: The Creation
of a Modern Party System: 1815-1852&quot;, in: <em>The Evolution of American Electoral
System, Greenwood</em> Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1981, pp. 85-87.
Derived from: S. Parsons, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 288-373.</p>

<p>     <em>National Party Platforms</em>, in two volumes, compiled by Donald Bruce Johnson,
University of Illinois Press, Vol. I, <em>1840-1956</em>, Urbana, 1978, pp. 1-2.</p>

<p>     7-749</p>

<p>     98 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 99</p>

<p>     movements aimed against the growing social inequality inherent in
developing capitalism. Objectively such a situation was fraught
with serious political conflict and the undermining of the power
of traditional ruling elites. The fact that the Democratic and Whig
parties gained control over the electoral process and managed to
rally the broad national electorate to support their candidates
indicated that members of the ruling circles had adapted to the
new conditions and worked out effective tools to fight for power.</p>

<p>     The events of 1836-1840 put politicians before an important
fact: the division into two parties had become a permanent feature
of American reality. The subsequent alternation of Whig and
Democratic administrations (Democrat James K. Polk won in 1844
and Whig Zachary Taylor in 1848) stimulated an inquiry into the
theoretical implications of this phenomenon. A long-lived
antipartisan tradition suggested rejection of the very idea of a legal
opposition party. During the long years the Democrats prevailed (from
1828 to 1840) they denounced the Whigs as aristocrats and, in their
rhetoric, refused to admit the thought that the people might
support the opposition.^^1^^ Until then the priority in advancing
arguments in defense of the opposition's rights belonged to the
National Republicans and the Whigs. In 1840, a prominent Whig
pamphleteer Calvin Colton wrote: &quot;The two great parties of this country
will always remain nearly equal to watch each other, and every few
years there must be a change. This is essential to the preservation
of our liberties.''^^2^^ Defeat prompted the Democrats to alter their
approach to the subject and immediately after the elections of
1840 the leading Democratic organ <em>Democratic Review</em> remarked
that following three presidential terms there was every reason to
permit the opposition constituting half the nation to take its turn
at the helm of power.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Parties were no longer regarded as temporary associations of
bad guys seeking to seize power. On the contrary, parties came to
be seen as permanently operating organizations.</p>

<p>     Characteristically, contemporaries recognized the expediency
of the two-party system in particular. A state with strong traditions</p>

<p>     See: M. Wallace, <em>Ideology of Party in the Antebellum Republic</em>, University
Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1973, pp. 363-383.</p>

<p>     Quoted from: William R. <em>Brock, Parties and Political Conscience: American
Dilemmas 1840-1850</em>, KTO Press, Millwood, New York, 1979, p. 22.</p>

<p>     See: M. Wallace, <em>op, cit.</em>, p. 70.</p>

<p>     feats, the party's leaders had finally realized that success in
elections depended on careful organizational and propaganda
preparations. As a result the Whigs left their teachers, the Democrats,
behind and conducted a campaign which, in the view of William
N. Chambers, was run by an unprecedentedly developed party
machine. Richard J.Jensen aptly compared the Whigs' level of
organization to that of the militia of the time. The Whig party
personnel was just as well trained and directed to recruiting and
mobilizing forces. The party also held parades with banners flying
and torch marches. The real test of the strength of the Whig
organization came when it was decided to rely on the candidacy of
another war hero, William Henry Harrison, who was not a dark
horse in the full sense of the word but still was far behind other
potential Whig candidates in experience of political activity.
Harrison became a popular hero only thanks to the exceptionally active
propaganda campaign launched by the Whigs.</p>

<p>     The election results showed that both parties managed to
secure voter participation in the presidential campaign
unprecedented in the country's previous history: 2,412,000 voters or 80.2
per cent of the adult white males eligible to vote took part.
Harrison gained the upper hand in many states which had regularly
(since 1828) given preference to the Democrats. The change in the
voting of the Southern states (Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia)
was particularly impressive.</p>

<p>     The 1840 presidential elections played a major role in the
development of the American two-party system. This was not only because
for the first time two equally strong parties operated on the national
scene with sophisticated organization capable of rallying an
overwhelming majority of the electorate. The participation in voting
at the presidential elections of an unprecedented number of voters
had profound class implications. The consolidation of US
bourgeois parties was accompanied by the growing political activity of
new broad sections of the population, a marked democratization
of public life, and, as a result of extension of voting rights, the
appearance of potential opportunities for broad masses of the
population to take part in the electoral process. However, as the
experience of working-class parties operating in some states of the
Northeast at the turn of the 1830s, as well as that of Antimasonic
organizations, showed, democratization of political life also involved
more vigorous action by various kinds of spontaneous protest</p>

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<p>     <b>100 Chapter Four</b></p>

<p>     New National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 10!</p>

<p>     of party struggle, New York legally formalized the need to support
rivalry between the two parties in 1841 when a special rule was
adopted providing for the appointment of election inspectors
from each of the two parties. Similar rules were adopted in New
Jersey in 1868 and in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania in 1873.'</p>

<p>     Censure of any third parties accompanied recognition of the
two-party system in the country's political life. The rise of the
Democrats and the Whigs, particularly on the state level, involved
the leading parties absorbing a whole number of third parties
frequently advocating radical solutions to certain social and economic
or moral and ethical problems. This clearly showed the class
implications of the two-party system.</p>

<p>     The history of American political parties confirms Lenin's idea
that &quot;the ruling party in a bourgeois democracy extends the
protection of the minority only to another <em>bourgeois</em> party.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Defence of the bipartisan principle acquired particular
importance in the 1840s. Another third party, the Liberty Party,
appeared on the national scene as early as 1840: its role in the
subsequent development of the party system, however, was far from
ordinary.^^3^^ The forming of the Liberty Party on the basis of the
abolitionist movement, and also the aggravation of the factional
struggle between supporters and opponents of slaveholders in
both leading parties, showed that contradictions were growing
within the political system founded on a compromise between the
planter South and the industrial North. Under the circumstances
it was doubtful that the Democrats and the Whigs would be able to
retain the specific consensus on the slavery issue, a consensus
which was based on a common desire to sidestep the problem that
involved serious difficulties for the major parties.</p>

<p>     The country's recovery from the protracted depression which
had started in 1842 contributed to many social and economic
questions which used to be in the focus of parties' attention in the
late 1830s---the economic role of the federal government, finances,</p>

<p>     J. J. King, <em>The Concept of the 2-Party System</em>, Phd University of Pennsylvania,
1950^. 70.</p>

<p>     V. I. Lenin, &quot;The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky&quot;, <em>Collected
Works</em>, Vol. 28, 1977, p. 245.</p>

<p>     In 1840 the candidate of the Liberty Party, James G. Birney, received only 7,000
votes. But the very fact that in the year the two-party Democrat-Whig system flourished,
the monopoly of the leading parties in the electorate was not absolute is quite symbolic.</p>

<p>     etc.---losing their top-priority importance. The first symptom of
the changed situation was the debate on the annexation of Texas.
The debate centered on the question of slavery and its spreading to
new territories. The very fact that a subject so carefully avoided in
the recent past became the main issue in the struggle between
parties and, moreover, was instrumental in the election campaigns (e.g.
the 1848 presidential campaign) pointed to cardinal changes in the
objective content of the political process.</p>

<p>     The election platforms adopted by the Democrats and the
Whigs in 1844 reflected the balance of power between the parties'
main factions. The leaders of both parties---Clay and Van Buren---
regarded as the front running presidential candidates spoke against
the annexation. Their motives in this case were complex. On the
one hand, they were obviously guided by the desire to preserve the
unity of the ranks of the Democrats and the Whigs which could be
undermined if the question of slavery arose. On the other, the
position occupied by both candidates reflected the moods of broad
circles in the Northeast, West and even South who saw in the
annexation the threat of serious international complications (war with
Mexico above all), disturbance of normal commercial and business
relations, and also the probable strengthening of the position of
the slaveholders if several slave states were to be created on the
territory of Texas.^^1^^</p>

<p>     However, influential groups existed in both parties whose aim
was the ratification of the annexation treaty. True, the annexation
supporters among the Whigs did not have enough influence. The
Southern wing of the party, led by Alexander H. Stephens and
Robert Toombs, was united by the desire to preserve the
compromise in the party, which was possible only provided the question of
slavery and, therefore annexation, would not be widely discussed.
The Whig national convention nominated Clay as the candidate
for the presidency. Slavery and Texas were not mentioned at all in
the adopted platform, and all attention was focused on
advertizing Clay's candidacy. So, the temporary party unity was
artificial as the Whigs in effect attempted to ignore the most acute issue</p>

<p>     Clay and Van Buren set forth their positions in official messages published in April
1844 immediately after it became known that the treaty on the annexation of Texas had
been signed on April 12, 1844. For the text of the messages, see <em>History of American
Presidential Elections 1789-1868</em>, Volume I, Editor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Chelsea House
Publishers, New York, 1971, pp. 814-817, 822-828.</p>

<p>     102 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     Now National Parties:
Democrats and Whigs 103</p>

<p>     extensive influence in the South. They represented the sections of
Southerners with an interest in preserving a firm alliance with the
Northern bourgeoisie founded on the compromise providing for the
unconditional retention of slavery. The majority at the 1844
Democratic national convention belonged to the Southerners.
The convention nominated the Southerners' compromise
candidate---the governor of Tennessee, James K. Polk. Nomination of a
Southerner predetermined the Democratic Party's platform: it
included the Southerners' main demand---an early annexation of
Texas.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The convention of the Liberty Party was also held before the
1844 elections: once again it nominated James G. Birney. The
adopted platform openly denounced the Southerners'
expansionism and demanded an early end to slavery on the entire
territory of the US. Actually the first antislavery political document,
the platform, as well as Birney's candidacy, proved to be
unrealistic for most of the electorate brought up in the traditions of
compromise between North and South. The candidate of the Liberty
Party did receive 62,000 votes or ten times more than in 1840, but
this was only 2.3 per cent of the total.^^2^^</p>

<p>     As a result, Polk won the elections, but he was not far ahead of
Clay who altered his position on the annexation of Texas at the
last moment. The adoption of the annexation idea, even with
certain reservations, cost Clay votes of the abolitionists who
preferred Birney.</p>

<p>     In subsequent years American reality continued to produce new
acute problems to solve which both the Democrats and the Whigs
did not have the necessary ideological and political tools. At the
same time the parties had exhausted the supply of positive measures
they were called upon to implement in the years of their rise. They
had solved to better or worse the key political problems of the
1830s on which the different sections of the bourgeoisie and the
planters held different views and which stimulated the polarization
into the Democrats and the Whigs.</p>

<p>     The US expansionist war against Mexico launched by the Polk</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Volume I, <em>1840-1956</em>, pp. 3-4.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957</em>, U.S. Department
of Commerce, Frederick H. Mueller, Secretary, Bureau of the Census, Roger W. Burgess,
Director, Washington, 1960, p. 683.</p>

<p>     facing the country. From the purely partisan viewpoint, however,
this course could be called pragmatic, because it enabled members
of factions with virtually opposite views to remain within one
organization: if the followers of Alexander H. Stephens hardly
differing from the Southern Democrats stood on the southern wing
of the Whigs, the northern wing included, for example, the New
York state Whigs Thurlow Weed and W. H. Seward who favored
the idea of gradually doing away with slavery, and also the
Conscience Whigs led by John G. Palfrey and Charles Francis Adams
who energetically protested against the spreading of slavery.</p>

<p>     Unlike the Whigs who based their policy on a compromise
between the opponents and advocates of slavery, the Democrats
witnessed after 1840 the ongoing process of the strengthening of
the slaveholding wing. In addition to purely political reasons
such as the defeat of Northerner Van Buren in the elections, there
were objective causes underlying this development: the growing
aggressiveness of the Southerners seeking by means of expansion to
consolidate their position in the face of the maturing adversary---the
industrialists of the North.</p>

<p>     The formerly undercurrent processes in the party surfaced
during the Democratic National Convention of 1844, when the
slaveholders scored a final and complete victory. However, the
alignment of forces among the Democrats was more complicated than
simply a division into Northerners and Southerners. On the left
wing of the party were Van Buren's followers, who had come to be
called Barnburners, directing their efforts to social issues----
criticism of corruption, the banks and corporations. They proposed
projects to lower the price of land and further democratize public
life. The right wing included conservative Democrats contending
with the Van Buren group for control over the party
organizations in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ohio and
Tennessee. They relied on the more prosperous sections of the
population with an interest in intense industrial development, land
speculation and a ramified banking system.</p>

<p>     However, it was not the conservative Democrats but the
Southerners who were the Barnburners' main rivals. The most militant
were Calhoun's supporters, mostly the Old South planters inclined
toward expansion. In addition to these &quot;extremists,&quot; the
Southwestern Democrats headed by the Senator from Mississippi Robert
J.Walker, moderate when it came to expansion, also enjoyed</p>

<p>     104 Chapter Four</p>

<p>     Administration in May 1846 made the problem of the spread of
slavery, long avoided by both leading parties, a reality. At the
beginning of the war, in the course of debates in Congress
concerning military expenditures, it became clear that party unity marking
the congressional factions of Whigs and Democrats was a thing of the
past. A rapprochement began between the Conscience Whigs and
the abolitionist Whigs on the one hand, who, unlike the
conservatives in their party, regarded the war as a planter conspiracy to
spread slavery, and Van Buren's Northern Democrats demanding
an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of American troops
from Mexico, on the other. The split in the congressional factions
of both parties was aggravated by debates on the proviso
submitted by Northern Democrat David Wilmot in August 1846 to the
bill on expenditures for talks with Mexico (actually to purchase
Texas), which would ban slavery on all lands bought from Mexico.
The Wilmot Proviso was adopted through the joint efforts of the
Northern Democrats and the Northern Whigs, with Southerners
from both parties voting against it. From that moment on the
process of differentiation within both parties was stepped up,
becoming the typical feature of the two-party system's
development up to the Civil War.</p>

5

<p>     <b>THE CRISIS OF</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM</b></p>

<p>     <b>IN THE 1850s</b></p>

<p>     In the history of the US the decade before the Civil War of
1861-1865 was a period of intense social and economic
development when the industrial revolution in the Northeastern free
states entered the concluding phase.^^1^^ At the same time a serious
obstacle existed on the way to the further establishment of
capitalist relations---plantation slavery in the South. It became of critical
importance to determine the prevailing direction in the evolution of
American capitalism, to fundamentally rebuild the existing
structure of social and economic relations, and implement an extensive set
of bourgeois-democratic reforms capable of giving free rein to the
growth of productive forces. The increasing incompatibility
between the systems of free labor and slaveholding, which were
opposite in nature, was becoming more and more obvious. The
country's ongoing development demanded that slavery be done away
with as soon as possible. The social composition of American
society underwent significant change. The influence of the
industrial bourgeoisie had grown considerably, the share of farmers and
workers had increased in the electorate, and their economic
interests prompted them to reject the policy of compromises and
embark upon direct conflict with the slaveholders.</p>

<p>     Acute contradictions were sapping the ruling bourgeois-planter
bloc. Members of the industrial bourgeoisie in the Northern states
and slaveholders of the South supported two fundamentally dif-</p>

<p>     A. I. Blinov, &quot;Concerning the Time and Specific Features of the Industrial
Revolution's Completion&quot;, in: <em>American Yearbook, 1971</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1971,
pp. 29-43; A. V. Yefimov, <em>USA: Options of Capitalist Development (Pre-lmperialist Age)</em>,
Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1969, pp. 223-290 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     106 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the 1850s 107</p>

<p>     ferent ways of economic development: the former advocated
stepped-up industrial development and, eventually, doing away
with slavery; the latter preferred the agrarian road requiring
unconditional retention of slavery in the states where it had become
firmly established and its spreading to the new lands of the
American West. A powerful wave of the increasingly radical popular
movement against the expansion of slavery was rising in the country.
A revolutionary situation was shaping up in the US during this
historical timespan, class and political forces were regrouping at a
fast pace.</p>

<p>     The 1850s became a turning point in the activity of American
political parties. As has been noted previously the ideological
principles of the Democrat-Whig two-party system were laid in the
1830s when relatively slower rates of production growth and the
existence of broad spheres for capital investment made it
possible to avoid sharp conflicts and find ground for compromises
between the needs of the free-labor and slaveholding systems. All the
components of the political machinery were subordinated to the
task of preserving the prevailing social and economic structure
intact and strengthening the alliance between the bourgeoisie of
the North and the planters of the South on the basis of mutual
concessions. The party leadership of the Democrats and the Whigs
saw a threat to the existing political balance in the exacerbation
of the slavery problem and for that reason aimed all efforts at
neutralizing that problem and excluding it from the sphere of the
interparty struggle. However, the principles unde'rlying the
operation of the entire bipartisan mechanism obviously contradicted
the objective course of US social, economic and political
development which required immediate solution of the slavery problem.</p>

<p>     During a sufficiently long period of time, virtually from the
declaration of independence, the American two-party system had
been a tool with the help of which the ruling classes managed to
keep intersectional conflicts within the Constitutional framework.
The adding of new territories to the Union as a result of the
annexation of Texas (December 1845) and the Mexican War (1846-
1848) brought the question of slavery in these lands to the
forefront of the country's political life, led to the exacerbation of
contradictions in the ruling bourgeois-planter bloc and stepped up the
polarization of class and political forces. The two-party mechanism
backfired during the 1848 election campaign when a third, anti-</p>

<p>     slavery Free Soil Party^^1^^ appeared on the political stage of the
Northern states and focussed the election platform on the demand
to restrict slavery to the existing boundaries. The new party brought
together the most consistent opponents of the expansion of slavery
as well as advocates of bourgeois-democratic reforms who had
left the traditional parties due to sharp differences with their
leaderships. The Free Soil presidential candidate Martin Van Buren
received 10.12 per cent of the popular vote, delivering a heavy blow</p>

<p>     to the Democrats and the Whigs in the Northwest and some states of
New England.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Federal Union was rocked by another political crisis in
1849-1850 with the epicenter this time in the slaveholding states
of the South. The prologue to the crisis was the address of
congressmen from Southern states published in January 1849. The author
of the address was Senator John Calhoun (Democrat, South
Carolina) who at the time remained the leading figure among the most
rabid defenders of slavery. This document called upon all
Southerners regardless of party affiliation to unite efforts to preserve the
institutions of slaveholding society.^^3^^ To support their words the
Southerners, both Democrats and Whigs, held a nonpartisan
convention in Nashville (Tennessee) on June 3-12, 1850. The cornerstone
of the resolutions it adopted was the idea of the unhampered spread
of slavery to Western territories. The Nashville convention showed
the growing influence among the slaveholders of extreme
expansionist circles favoring the secession of the Southern states from
the Union. The extremists raising their heads in the South, on the
one hand, and the growing antislavery movement in the Northern
states, on the other, were threatening the very existence of the
twoparty system.</p>

<p>     Under the circumstances the conservative leaderships of the
Democrats and the Whigs worked out a plan to settle the
conflict. A specially set up Senate committee chaired by the politically
experienced Whig Henry Clay of Kentucky, submitted to Congress
a series of legislative measures which became known as Clay's</p>

<p>     The name of the party came from a key principle of its political platform Free Soil
\vhich meant turning the American West into a section free of slavery.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U. S. Elections</em>, Editor: Robert A. Diamond,
Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, 1975, p. 268.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>The Works of John C. Calhoun</em>, Vol. VI, <em>Report and Public Letters of John C.
Calhoun</em>, edited by Richard K. Cralle, Russell &amp; Russell, New York, 1968, pp. 311-312.</p>

<p>     108 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the T \vn-Party System</p>

<p>     in rl.e <em>\K50s</em> 109</p>

<p>     Compromise of 1850. California was admitted to the Union as a
state with a constitution banning slavery. The slave-trade was
abolished in the District of Columbia. The status of new
territories---Utah and New Mexico---was to be determined by their
population. A more effective Fugitive Slave Law was enacted in the
interests of the Southern planters.</p>

<p>     The implementing of the principles of the 1850 compromise
did not lead to stabilization of the political situation in the country.
Broad sections of the population in the Northern states were
outraged at the adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law and resisted it in
practice. The supporters of the compromise had failed to contain
the wave of extremist movements in the South either. The
compromise resulted in a split in both political parties in Georgia, Alabama
and Mississippi. The old parties fell apart in these states, and the
Democrat-Whig two-party system ceased to exist in its traditional
form for some time. The most rabid advocates of slaveholding,
mostly Democrats, denounced the ban on slave trade in the
District of Columbia and California's admission to the Union as a free
state as tipping the former political balance between North and
South, and united in the States Rights Party. The Whigs and the
Democrats who supported the 1850 compromise and believed that
the Union could be saved only through mutual concessions by both
sides and an end to agitation over the slavery issue, rallied into the
Union Party. And although at the cost of immense efforts the
Unionists managed to stamp out the flames of secession and
complete the organizational rout of their opponents in the 1851
elections to the Senate and state government agencies, the threat of a
new flareup of extremism in the South remained. The crisis of the
US political system caused by the inability of the American
twoparty mechanism to solve the explosive slavery problem
continued to aggravate.</p>

<p>     With the slavery issue coming into the focus of US political
life, the evolution of both leading parties proceeded at faster
rates. Considerable changes had occurred in the political mechanism
of the Democratic Party by the early 1850s. After the once
powerful group of supporters of former President Andrew Jackson was
removed from leadership, leading positions were occupied by a
coalition of conservatives and members of the proslavery wing.
Inclined to mutual compromises, this coalition began to play the
chief role in determining the party's political strategy, and firmly</p>

<p>     controlled the party machinery. The leaders of the conservative
group (James Buchanan, Stephen Douglas, Lewis Cass) urged the
preservation of slavery in the South, recognized the planters' right
to develop new Western areas, insisted that the Southerners'
property was inviolable, and denounced in the sharpest terms any
attacks against institutions of slaveholding society. They regarded
the slavery problem as the principal factor destabilizing the
political situation in the country and, for that reason, sought by all
means to remove it from the sphere of inter-party struggle.^^1^^</p>

<p>     As the crisis of the slave-holding system was coming to a head,
the extremely expansionist trend in the Southern wing of the
Democratic Party managed to broaden its social base through
redoubled efforts; the exponents of that trend (Jefferson Davis,
Robert Rhett, William Yancey) loudly voiced their claims during
the political upheavals in 1849-1850. The extremist moods were
whipped up by the big, cotton-exporting planters, and also by the
average slave-holders with their typical craving for more and more
territories where unrestrained slavery would open up new
opportunities for them to strengthen their economic position and to rise
to the more prosperous circles. The idea of ultra-expansionism also
found a response among the poor whites of the South whose
condition Karl Marx, who actively wrote for the progressive American
paper <em>New York Daily Tribune</em> from 1851 to 1862 and paid the
closest attention to the political situation in the USA, compared
&quot;with that of the Roman plebeians in the period of Rome's extreme
decline. Only by acquisition and the prospect of acquisition of new
Territories, as well as by filibustering expeditions, is it possible to
square the interests of these *poor whites' with those of the
slaveholders, to give their restless thirst for action a harmless direction
and to tame them with the prospect of one day becoming
slaveholders themselves.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The most rabid advocates of slaveholding sought to establish
the planters' complete political hegemony over the Federal Union
and favored the most extreme methods of struggle and even
secession. Their expansionism knew practically no bounds. They sought</p>

<p>     <em>The Letters of Stephen A. Douglas</em>, edited by Robert W. Johannsen, University of
Illinois Press, Urbana, 1961, pp. 341, 452.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Karl Marx, &quot;The North American Civil War&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels,
<em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 19, 1984, pp. 40-41.</p>

<p>     110 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the 1850s <b>111</b></p>

<p>     up development of capitalist relations in the country with active
participation by the federal government and involved setting
up a national bank, introducing protectionist tariffs and
implementing a set of internal improvements. From its inception the
party's political image was determined by a group of
conservatives including the Whig &quot;old guard&quot; (Henry Clay, Daniel Webster,
Millard Fillmore). The policy of the party leadership was directed
to stabilizing the political system, overcoming sectional trends,
strengthening the alliance between the Northern bourgeoisie and
the planters in the Southern states and settling differences between
them by means of compromises.</p>

<p>     In order to retain unity in the ruling quarters the conservatives
simply attempted to hush up the dangerous subject of slavery,
switch interparty polemics into the channel of old arguments
concerning economic issues and foreign policy and revive discussions of
local questions. The conservatives did not mind the spread of
slavery to the Western lands within the bounds established by
the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (not beyond latitude 36&deg;30'
North).</p>

<p>     In a situation when the slavery issue was pushed to the
forefront of political life in the country, the strategic line of the
conservative Whig leadership aimed at neutralizing that issue was at odds
with the objective course of the country's development and led
the party into a dead end. The Whig Party suffered a shattering defeat
in the elections of 1852 when the Democratic candidate Franklin
Pierce, in the past a Senator, was elected President. Despite the
wish of its leadership, the Whig Party virtually split along the
NorthSouth line in the course of debates on slavery in Western territories.
The Whig camp began to disintegrate. During the election campaign,
a proslavery group emerged, opposing itself to the rest of the party.
A group of influential members of the Southern wing of the party
headed by Senator Robert Toombs and Representative Alexander
Stephens (both from Georgia) published a manifesto in which it
refused to support the candidacy of General Winfield Scott, a
Mexican War hero, accusing him of failing to officially express
his support for the Fugitive Slave Law. The Northern wing of the
party, in its turn, was seized by strong antislavery feelings. Links
within the Whig Party were growing weaker, while some groups,
factions and state organizations displayed the desire for greater
autonomy and independence from party leadership.</p>

<p>     to spread slavery not only to the Western lands of the USA but also
to the territory of certain Central American countries. The problem
of finding and opening up new lands for slavery became even more
acute for the slaveholders in the 1850s: the drive to expansion is
inherent in the plantation economy. The gradual impoverishment
of the soil in the Southeast and the Southern border states
provided an additional incentive for slaveholders to expand areas where
southern agricultural crops were grown. The expansion to the
West was of exceptional political importance to them. Admission
of new slave states would further strengthen the positions of the
planter oligarchy in the country's political life.</p>

<p>     The bounds of the Democratic Party and the entire two-party
system were becoming increasingly narrow for superextremists of
the Yancey and Rhett type; they had turned into an obstacle on
the way to realization of their plans. The extreme advocates of
slave states rights openly challenged the leadership of the
Democrats at the national party convention in May 1848 when part of
the Southerners led by Yancey submitted for the draft election
platform a resolution setting down the principle of spreading
slavery to the Western lands. The convention rejected the resolution
by a majority of votes. The extremists undertook another attempt
to consolidate the forces of the slaveholders and knock together
a Southern States Rights Party in place of the Democrats and
the Whigs at the convention in Nashville in June 1850, but their
plans also failed.</p>

<p>     The Western and the Southern states continued to be the
bastion of the Democratic Party in the early 1850s. The Democrats
were influential among the bulk of the Southern slaveholders,
commercial and financial circles, the petty bourgeoisie, workers,
immigrants in the Northeastern states and farmers in the West. The
dominant ideological concept of the Democrats was the narrow
interpretation of the Constitution restricting the authority of the
federal government and, as a result, expanding states rights.
Opposition to strong federal government, preference to the country's
agrarian development, the demand for stepped-up colonization of
Western lands, support for the principle of free trade, and opposition to
the setting up of a national bank---all combined to form the
foundation on which the classes and social sections in the Democratic
Party's electoral body came together.</p>

<p>     The political program of the Whig Party was aimed at stepped-</p>

<p>     <b>112 Chapter</b> Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the &quot;i850s <b>113</b></p>

<p>     The American two-party system entered a period of acute
political crisis in the second half of the 1840s and early 1850s.
The Democrat-Whig mechanism had functioned smoothly only
until the subject of slavery was placed on the agenda. The failure
of both political parties was obvious. The Democrat-Whig
combination was losing support among the masses and backfired more
and more often. Throughout the 1840s and early 1850s, third
antislavery parties in the Northern states---the Liberty Party, Free
Soilers, Free Democrats---on the one hand, and extreme slaveholder
organizations, on the other, had become a permanent factor of US
political life. Attempting to sidestep the slavery question the
Democratic and Whig parties were increasingly losing ground. As the
conflict between the two ways of capitalist development grew
deeper, the economic problems involving tariff policy, railway
construction, and development of the West came to be more
closely linked to the solution of the slavery problem, adding new
dimensions to the confrontation between North and South.</p>

<p>     In January 1854 a bill was introduced to Congress on the
entry into the Union of the territories of Kansas and Nebraska
situated north of the 36&deg; 30'parallel, the limit of slavery expansion
established by the Missouri Compromise. The Democratic Party
initiated the bill, while Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois was
its actual author. The bill was founded on the Squatter (Popular)
Sovereignty doctrine according to which the population of the new
states was to decide whether there would be slavery there or not.
This concept appeared in the political arsenal of the Democrats in
the second half of the 1840s in the course of debates concerning
slavery on the lands annexed from Mexico as an alternative to the
Wilmot Proviso. Its main idea was defined in December 1847 by
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan. Initially, implementation of the
Squatter Sovereignty principle was to take the edge off the
intersectional conflict but in the long term it might result in
predominant development of the system of free labor, while
unconditionally observing the right of slaveholders to expand beyond old
territory. As the slavery issue grew more urgent the Democratic
Party leadership was frantically looking for a new, more solid
compromise-between North and South than that of 1850, capable of
stabilizing the foundations of the US party and political system and
putting an end once and for all to polemics on the dangerous
subject of slavery. Members of the conservative group believed that</p>

<p>     the adoption of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill would blunt the debates
at the national level and transfer the problem of slavery to the local
level where it would be discussed by the innabitants of the
territories. Senator Douglas hoped that implementation of the Squatter
Sovereignty doctrine would return peace to the country and cement
the foundations of the Union.</p>

<p>     The Democrats and the Whigs of the Southern states viewed the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill in a different light. Under their pressure the
conservatives agreed to include into the bill an amendment of Whig
Senator Archibald Dixon (Kentucky) repealing the provision of the
Missouri Compromise on the division between the free and slave
territories, and thereby removing the geographical barrier to the
spread of slavery, which made it possible, in principle, for slavery
to further expand to the Western lands north of the 36&deg;30 parallel.
The latter circumstance prompted the Southerners to unanimously
support the bill. Thus the slaveholders laid claim to undivided
hegemony on the scale of the whole country. The unprecedentedly
tense struggle in Congress over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill from
January to May 1854 finally ended with the bill being approved.
President Pierce signed the bill on May 30.</p>

<p>     Debates on the Kansas-Nebraska Act showed the total
untenability of the political course pursued by the leadership of the
Democratic and Whig parties. The attempts of the party leaders to
withdraw the slavery issue from the sphere of the political struggle proved
futile. The repealing of the provision of the Missouri Compromise
and the threat that slavery would spread to the areas of the West
brought into motion the most varied sections of the population
in the free states. A strong wave of the antislavery movement
rose in the North in response to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Actions
by the broad popular masses against expansion of slavery acquired
an unprecedented scope and a rather radical ring. The events in
Kansas following the enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska Act crossed
out all hopes held by the conservative wing of the Democrats
that a new compromise could be achieved on the slavery issue and
peace and order restored in the country. Increasingly frequent
clashes between the supporters and opponents of slavery in that
state in spring 1855 developed into organized hostilities. The
situation was extremely tense. The struggle between North and
South for western territories entered the decisive phase. The
country in effect split into two hostile camps.</p>

<p>     8-749</p>

<p>     114 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the 1850s <em>IIS</em></p>

<p>     The political course pursued by the leadership of the
Democratic Party which, under pressure from the Southerners, had taken the
road of supporting slaveholder expansion was firmly denounced by
members of the antislavery wing and part of the Jacksonian
Democrats. Both the leaders and the rank and file of the
Democratic Party were dissatisfied with the policies of the Pierce
Administration. The contradictions on the slavery issue that had been
piling up in the party for many years resulted in a serious split
of its ranks. The first to leave the Democratic Party
immediately after the enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska Act were those
who favored territorial restriction of slavery. They were headed
by Senator Preston King (New York) and Representative David
Wilmot (Pennsylvania). Their example was followed at the
beginning of the 1856 election campaign by certain Jacksonian
Democrats led by Francis Blair who blamed the party leadership for
fanning the flames of intersectional conflict and had lost all hope of
overcoming the Southern bias in the party's ideology and practical
activities. &quot;It is the Southern politician and the Northern traitor
who have done the mischief, and whom we wish to restrain,&quot; wrote
the New York Democrats opponents of the expansion of slavery in
an address to voters at a convention in July 1856 where they had
assembled to announce their break with the Democratic Party.
&quot;That party of glorious memory, which once spoke and acted
for freedom, has fallen into the hands of office holders and
political adventurers, serving as the tools of a slaveholding oligarchy.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     In a context of abrupt aggravation of the slavery problem the
political course of the Whig conservative leadership aimed at
sidestepping that problem doomed the party to collapse. A final split
in the Whig Party occurred in the course of debates on the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The alliance between its Northern and
Southern elements broke down. The Whig leaders were unable to propose
a constructive way out of the catastrophic situation the party was
in and were increasingly losing ground. Ex-President Millard
Fillmore sadly concluded that his political principles were not viable:
&quot;I am constantly misrepresented both in North and South. In
the North I am charged with being a Pro-Slavery man, seeking to</p>

<p>     extend slavery over free territory, and in the South, I am accused
of being an abolitionist.''^^1^^ After the death of Henry Clay and
Daniel Webster in 1852, the Whigs were left without experienced
political leaders. Lacking centralized leadership the Whig Party
had split into numerous small rival groups, and in mid-1854 least
of all resembled a national political organization.</p>

<p>     The party ceased to exist in one state after another. By the
fall of 1854, the Whigs had totally disappeared from the political
scene in the Northwestern states where the question of Western
territories' status was particularly acute due to geographical
factors. The inhabitants of that area, primarily the farmers, had a
vested interest in banning slavery on the new lands. The last
pillars of the Whigs in the Southeastern and Southwestern states
crumbled in 1854. Dissatisfaction with the moderate political course of
the Whig Party was smoldering among the planters: unrestrained
expansion of slaveholding to the West was held back by the party's
inability to provide an answer to the slavery question. Under the
circumstances, many Southern Whigs had defected to those who
favored unrestricted extension of slavery to the Western lands,
which became obvious in the course of debates on the
KansasNebraska Bill, and declared that they were joining the
Democratic Party. The civil war in Kansas and a new upsurge in the
antislavery movement marked the final decline of the Whig Party. The
1856 elections wrote the last page in its history. Having suffered a
shattering defeat the last groups of Whigs ceased to exist in the
Northeastern and the Southern border states.</p>

<p>     The Kansas-Nebraska Act shook the very foundations of the
institutions of political power. An acute political crisis broke out
in the country demonstrating that the Democrat-Whig
combination had exhausted its possibilities and its political forms, ideology
and politics no longer corresponded to the changed conditions. The
two-party system proved unable to solve the entire set of problems
facing the country in the 1850s and closely associated with the
slavery issue. Moreover, it turned into an obstacle in the way of
America's social and economic progress and suffered a complete
failure. The old parties lost control over broad sections of American
society. The regrouping of class and political forces was proceeding at a</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Millard Fillmore Papers</em>, edited by Frank H. Severance, Kraus Reprint Co.,
Volume <b>II,</b> New York, 1970, p. 365.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Proceedings of the Democratic Republican State Convention. At Syracuse, July
24, 1856. The Address and Resolutions</em>, printed by order of the Convention, Albany,
1856, p. 6.</p>

<p>     8&laquo;</p>

<p>     <b>116</b> Chapter Five</p>

<p>     rapid pace in the country. The bloc of the commercial-financial
bourgeoisie, slaveholders and farmers was crumbling, which was reflected
in the downfall of the Whig Party and the crisis of the Democrats.</p>

<p>     The Democrat-Whig party system was swept away by an
unprecedented antislavery movement of the broad sections of the
population in the free states who were unable to express their interests
within the framework of the old two-party system. At the same
time, the political principles of the Democratic and Whig parties
did not withstand the onslaught of the expansionist circles of
slaveholders who sought to gain the commanding heights in the
Union and saw the extension of the plantation economy to the
territories of the West as the only condition to strengthen their
economic and political positions.</p>

<p>     The collapse of the two-party system was due to complicated
social, economic and political processes occurring in American
society in the mid-19th century. The inability of the Democrats
and the Whigs to find the key to the problem of slavery prevented
them from grasping a whole range of major developments which
had occurred as a result of American capitalism passing over to the
concluding stage in the industrial revolution under the impact of an
abrupt acceleration of economic growth rates. The problem of
further opening up of the American West acquired major
importance because both systems---free and slave labor---due to the internal
patterns of their development needed continuous expansion beyond
the old territory. This problem proved in the final count to be an
insurmountable obstacle for the two-party mechanism. The old parties,
the Whigs above all, still relied on the long-established social and
economic processes and relations between the country's sections
and held on to a political structure formed in the first 25 years of
the 19th century. Development of the West, demanding above all an
immediate solution to the problem of the status of new territories,
undermined the traditional status quo and went beyond the
political principles preached by the Democratic and Whig leaders.</p>

<p>     The Northwest was traditionally the sore spot of the
twoparty system. The policy of compromise with the slaveholders
pursued by the Democrats and the Whigs did not find support
among the population of this section. It was in the
Northwestern states that the two-party tandem repeatedly suffered
serious failures. Third, antislavery parties---the Liberty Party in 1844,
the Free Soilers in 1848, the Free Democrats in 1852---played</p>

<p>     havoc with the Democrats and the Whigs there. Since the
mid18408, the period of particularly heated debates on the slavery
issue, the Northwest had come to feel ill at ease within the
traditional framework of the US two-party system. Karl Marx regarded
the Northwest as &quot;a power that was not inclined either by
tradition, temperament or mode of life to let itself be dragged from
compromise to compromise in the manner of the old
Northeastern states.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     At the turn of the 1850s the economic problems traditionally
focussed on by Democrats and Whigs were blunted to some extent
by the industrial boom, an influx of foreign capital into the
American economy, the development of the country's Western areas,
and the Gold Rush in California. Questions of tariffs, the banking
system, internal improvements for some time lost the urgency
they had had in the 1830s and 1840s.</p>

<p>     The 1850s saw an unprecedentedly acute crisis of the
twoparty system as a political institution of the ruling bloc of the
bourgeoisie and plantation owners. The obvious inability of the
Democratic and Whig leadership to settle the question of slavery shook the
faith of the ruling classes in political parties as a mechanism for
preventing critical situations. A number of politicians questioned
the feasibility of the further existence of two parties.^^2^^ During his
presidency (1849-1850), General Zachary Taylor favored the
idea of creating one conservative party capable of localizing
intersectional conflicts in place of Democrats and Whigs.^^3^^</p>

<p>     The process of the realignment in the two-party system, which
began in the mid-1850s and continued right up to the end of
Reconstruction in the South, was the most important result of the
fall of the Democrat-Whig combination and a consequence of
deep-going social, economic and ideological changes in American
society. With the collapse of the old party mechanism, the political
forces of the advocates and opponents of slavery formerly confined
to that mechanism, came out into the open. The period of party
realignment was essentially marked by confrontation and open</p>

<p>     Karl Marx, &quot;The North American Civil War&quot;, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 42.</p>

<p>     <em>The Papers of Andrew Johnson</em>, Editors: Leroy P. Graf and Ralph W. Haskins,
University of Tennessee Press, Vol. II, Knoxville, 1970, pp. 69, 161.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Michael F. Holt, <em>The Political Crisis of the 1850s</em>, John Wiley &amp; Sons, New York
1978, p. 76.</p>

<p>     <b>118 Chapter</b> <em>Five</em></p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two Party System</p>

<p>     in the KS5O<SUB>S</SUB> i r-</p>

<p>     clashes between them in the various spheres of public life.</p>

<p>     The Republican Party became the chief motive force of the
party-political regrouping in America in the middle of the last
century. The rise of the Republican organization occurred under
the direct impact of the outburst of popular protest against the
approval of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and was a logical outcome of
a long struggle waged by the population in the Northern states
against slavery. The Republicans entered the political arena with
a program aimed at eventually abolishing slavery, fundamentally
changing the prevailing social and economic structure and clearing
the way for unfettered development of American capitalism.</p>

<p>     A coalition of farmers, workers and intellectuals led by the
progressive industrial bourgeoisie arose within the framework of
the Republican Party on the basis of the movement against the
expansion of slavery and political omnipotence of the slaveholder
oligarchy and for an effective program of measures to stimulate
the national economy and provide for democratic use of national
lands. The American industrial bourgeoisie was stating with
increasing firmness its intention to take political power over the Union
into its hands by constitutional means, that is, by winning a
majority of votes in the elections. The first Republican organization
appeared in Ripon (Wisconsin) in March 1854. The Republican
Party came into being in virtually all the free states in the summer
and fall of 1854. Usually, the founders of the party were the most
consistent opponents of slavery, including many abolitionists who
favored effective action against plantation owners' expansionism.</p>

<p>     The hostilities in Kansas at the end of 1855 and in the first
half of 1856 had immense repercussions, aggravating the political
situation in the country and involving different sections of the
Northern states' population in the struggle against slavery. The
Republican Party's prestige rose immensely, making it the true
focus of attraction for all antislavery forces. In 1855-1856 the
Republicans managed to considerably extend the ranks of the party
coalition by bringing under its banners opponents of further expansion
of slave holding territories from among the Democrats and also
members of the antislavery wing and some of the conservatives
from the Whig camp.</p>

<p>     The laying of the basis for the Republican Party's political
course on the slavery issue occurred in a continuous struggle
between three groups---radicals, conservatives and moderates. The pro-</p>

<p>     gram of the radical wing (Charles Sumner, Salmon Chase, Henry
Wilson and Joshua Giddings) envisaged not extending slavery to
the free lands of the American West, repealing the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850, banning slave trade between states and outlawing
slavery in the District of Columbia. &quot;A strict confinement of slavery
within its old terrain, therefore, was bound according to economic
law to lead to its gradual extinction, in the political sphere to
annihilate the hegemony that the slave states exercised through the
Senate,&quot; wrote Karl Marx. &quot;In accordance with the principle that
any further extension of slave territories was to be prohibited by
law, the Republicans therefore attacked the rule of the slaveholders
at its root.''^^1^^ Denouncing slaveholding in the 1850s, the radical
Republicans did not, however, call for its abolition in the Southern
states and for freedom to black slaves, believing that this would
contradict the Constitution.</p>

<p>     The line of the conservatives (Edward Bates, Francis Blair,
Thomas Corvin, and Simon Cameron) simply repeated the political
principles held by the leadership of the defunct Whig Party. Their
demands were limited to restoring the Missouri Compromise.
Members of the conservative wing admitted the possibility of
slaveholding extending to the Western lands south of the line set
down in the compromise of 1820 and were prepared to agree to
the admission of new slave states to the Union. The conservatives
realized that the conflict between the free and slave states had
gone very far and sought a new deal with the planters in order to
achieve political stability in the country. Thus, the conservative
faction of the Republican Party clearly bore the imprint of the old
parties' ideology and politics.</p>

<p>     The moderate opponents of the expansion of slavery were
gradually coming to play first fiddle in the party. Headed by
William Seward,.William Fessenden, Lyman Trumbull, and
Abraham Lincoln, they sought to prevent the Republicans from
resorting to extreme forms in attacking the institutions of slaveholding
society. In the 1850s the logic of the political struggle forced
moderate Republicans to seek a rapprochement with the radicals on the
basic issues of domestic policy. They saw the key to the solution
of the slavery problem in a course aimed at territorial restriction of
the sphere where slaveholding prevailed, but disapproved of the</p>

<p>     <b>^^1^^ Karl Marx, &quot;The North American Civil War&quot;, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 41.</b></p>

<p>     120 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the T\VD-Party Svstcin</p>

<p>     in ttu- ! 85Os 12 i</p>

<p>     radicals' demand to ban slave trade between states and repeal the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Gradually they succeeded in turning
the party toward a more moderate line in respect to the slavery
problem and largely neutralizing radical moods typical of the
Republicans in the early period of their activity.</p>

<p>     The collapse of the Democrat-Whig two-party mechanism in
the mid-1850s led to a disruption of the entire political system in
the USA and became one of the reasons for invigorated action by
different movements whose growth had been quite successfully
contained by that mechanism in the past. An extremely
chauvinistic organization, the Know-Nothing Party^^1^^ appeared on the
political horizon in summer 1854. The Nativists (as the Know-Nothing
Party members were occasionally called) declared that their main
aim was to fight for the political rights and economic privileges of
citizens born in the USA. They insisted that only native-born
Americans could make use of the Western lands. The Know--
Nothings demanded that the political influence of immigrants be restricted
and they be excluded from officeholding in all federal, state, and
municipal bodies. They sought to reduce the flow of immigrants
from overseas, revise the immigration laws and establish twenty-one
years residence for naturalization. The ideology of the Nativists
was imbued with religious prejudice against the Catholics and the
Catholic Church. Consolidation within a single national
organization of all those who wanted to restrict immigration occurred at
a national constituent convention held in New York on July 17,
1854. In political terms, the Know-Nothings differed significantly
from parties in the traditional sense of the word. They called
themselves an order, and the organization's activities were wrapped in
a veil of secrecy. The names of its leaders were also unknown.
Annual meetings of the national council, the central body of the order,
were held behind closed doors. Only native-born, Protestant
Americans could become members of the Know-Nothing Party.</p>

<p>     Political Nativism brought together members of different trends
who often had directly opposite ideas of how to solve the slavery
problem. Contadictions between the Northern and Southern wings
of the Know-Nothing Party finally resulted in a serious split of their
ranks at the national convention in February 1856. The oppo-</p>

<p>     According to the rules members of the secret party would answer any questions
concerning his involvement in its activities with the words &quot;I know nothing.''</p>

<p>     nents of the expansion of slavery left the Know-Nothings and began
to look for closer contacts with the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     The middle of 1855 was a landmark in the political
evolution of the Nativists who entered upon a new phase in their
activity. The American Party (as the Know-Nothings came to be
called since June 1855) had made a <em>zigzag</em> in its development and
turned into a conservative force which worked to stabilize the
foundations of the political system by taking the edge off the
slavery problem. Now the party was headed by a galaxy of new
leaders who had defected to the advocates of restricted
immigration from the defunct Whig Party (Millard Fillmore, John Bell
and John Crittenden). Founded on a non-party basis, the order of
Nativists was increasingly evolving into a political party with the
appropriate organizational structure. The Know-Nothings discarded
the shroud of secrecy. Having become a frankly conservative
organization, the American Party had lost the appeal it once held
for voters and drove away the masses of farmers, workers and
the petty bourgeoisie who sought to put an end to the extension
of slavery to the Western territories of the USA. The party's
influence tended to wane with every passing day.</p>

<p>     The election campaign of 1856 took place in an extremely
tense situation caused by further polarization of political and class
forces, and was marked by an unprecedented and dramatic struggle.
The situation was particularly tense because of the events in Kansas.
The presidential elections ended in victory for the candidate from
the Democratic Party, former Secretary of State, James Buchanan.
The decisive part in his election was played by the fact that he won
not only in the South, a traditional domain of the Democrats, but
also secured the support of voters in a number of free
statesCalifornia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois and Indiana---who
were persuaded that a Republican Administration would inevitably
break up the Union. The Republican candidate John L. Fremont
was ahead in all the other Northern states. The overall results of the
1856 elections---Democratic victory in most free states---enabled the
opponents of the expansion of slavery to look optimistically to
the future. An editorial in <em>theNew York Weekly Tribune</em> exclaimed:
&quot;We have lost a battle... A party of yesterday, without
organization, without official power, without prestige, and latterly
almost without hope, has not overborne the oldest party in the
country, with ... its million and half of voters, trained by the habits</p>

<p>     122 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the 1850s <b>123</b></p>

<p>     of a lifetime to vote without question or hesitation whatever bears
its label... The Bunker Hill of the new struggle for Freedom is
past; the Saratoga and Yorktown are yet to be achieved.''^^1^^ A
shattering defeat in the presidential election was suffered by the
candidate from the American Party Millard Fillmore. The influence
of the Nativists fell abruptly. Their last organizations in the states
had ceased to exist by fall 1859.</p>

<p>     The second half of the 1850s was a period of acute struggle
for political power between the Northern industrial bourgeoisie
and the slaveholders of the South. A strong impact on the
partypolitical processes in this timespan was made by the economic and
financial crisis of 1857 as a result of which industrial output was
reduced, cotton consumption decreased and cotton prices fell
notably. Economic troubles strengthened the intention of the
Southern planters to open up new territories for slavery in the
West. The extreme expansionists managed to considerably increase
their influence and gain control over organizations of the
Democratic Party in most Southern states. The American South was seized by
a fit of hysterics in October 1859 when John Brown raided Virginia
at Harpers Ferry. The ideological arsenal of the supporters of
slavery was supplemented by a new doctrine according to which
slaveholders' property was to be protected by the federal government in
the territories. The concept of Southern Democrats underlay
the ruling of the Supreme Court on the case of the slave Dred Scott
in 1857, which in effect legalized slaveholding in all territories.</p>

<p>     The political struggle in the country on the admission of Kansas
to the Union entered the decisive phase in 1857-1858. Elections to
the legislative assembly of that territory were held on December 21,
1857, and were attended by a new wave of violence by the
Missouri slaveholders. Seizing most precincts, hired bands of
Southerners demanded of the settlers that they support only the candidates
favoring admission of Kansas into the Union as a slave state. Under
the circumstances most free colonists refused to take part in the
elections. Receiving a majority of seats in the legislature, the
supporters of slavery approved, a constitution which legalized slavery
at the session opened in January 1858 in Lecompton and submitted
it to the Federal Congress as a bill. On February 2, on the insistence
of the Southern Democrats, President Buchanan urged in a special</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>New York Weekly Tribune</em>, November 8, 1856, p. 4.</p>

<p>     message to Congress that the constitution be approved.</p>

<p>     However, the discussion that flared up around the
Lecompton Bill dashed the hopes of its supporters. The attempt by the
Southerners to violate the squatter sovereignty principle by pushing
through the bill on the admission of Kansas into the Union as a
slave state contrary to the will of the bulk of its population,
encountered the stubborn resistance of Northern Democrats----
followers of Senator Stephen Douglas---who, in a coalition with the
Republican faction, managed to have the bill rejected in the House
of Representatives. The debates on the Lecompton Constitution
ended in a split among the Northern Democrats. An internal quarrel
flared up in the Democratic camp. Members of the presidential
faction in the conservative group hoped to settle the Kansas issue
once and for all and urged that Kansas be immediately admitted
to the Union as a slave state. The ``insurgent'' Democrats led by
Douglas denounced the Lecompton Constitution and demanded
that new elections be held to the legislative assembly of Kansas.
The supporters of the squatter sovereignty doctrine were not in
the least enchanted with the idea of the Southern Democrats to
legalize slavery on all the territories of the West. The split among
the Democrats showed that the coalition of the Northern
commercial-financial bourgeoisie and Southern planters serving as the
backbone of the party had developed a serious fracture.</p>

<p>     The presidential elections of 1860 were held at a time when
contradictions in the ruling bourgeois-planter bloc on the slavery
issue had come to a head and the polarisation of social and
political forces in the country had been generally completed. Political
power in the Federal Union was the chief issue in the election
campaign. It was up to the Americans to decide who would stand at
the head of the nation: the industrial bourgeoisie relying on the
support of broad sections of the population in the Northern states
or the compromise-inclined alliance of the Southern slaveholders
and the commercial-financial circles of the North. &quot;There never
has been a more critical period in the history of the United States
than the present,&quot;^^1^^ wrote the <em>New York Herald</em>. The Democratic
national convention in Charleston (South Carolina) on April 23-
May 3, 1860, ended in another split between the conservatives and
the proslavery group. The Southerners demanded that slavery be</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>New York Herald</em>, February 1, 1860, p. 28.</p>

<p>     124 Chapter Five</p>

<p>     Crisis</p>

<p>     ~&gt;i&quot; the Two-Partv System</p>

<p>     in the 1850s 126</p>

<p>     permitted on all territories of the USA without any restrictions on
the part of the federal government.^^1^^ They were no longer satisfied
with the squatter sovereignty principle which placed the systems
of free labor and slavery in equal conditions and was the
cornerstone of the conservative political philosophy. The Democratic
Party entered the decisive phase in the 1860 election campaign in
a state of profound crisis. The slaveholders held a convention in
June in Richmond (Virginia) where they nominated John
Breckinridge as their presidential candidate. Members of the Democratic
conservative wing nominated Senator Stephen Douglas at a
convention in Baltimore (Maryland) on June 18-23. The division of
Democrats into supporters of Douglas and Breckinridge spread
like a chain reaction from state to state.</p>

<p>     The presidential elections of 1860 ended in victory for
Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the Republican Party. With his
inauguration on March 4, 1861, the principle of territorial restriction
of the sphere where slavery prevailed became official policy of the
federal government. The advent to power of the Republican
Administration meant an overthrow of the hegemony of the
slaveholding aristocracy over the Union by peaceful, constitutional means.
Clearly realizing that their political domination had suffered a
shattering blow, the extremist plantation owners appealed to the
population of the Southern states to secede from the federation
and form an independent slaveholding entity. This is what Karl
Marx had to say on the subject: &quot;The Union was still of value to the
South only so far as it handed over Federal power to it as a means
of carrying out the slave policy. If not, then it was better to make
the break now than to look on at the development of the
Republican Party and the upsurge of the Northwest for another four
years and begin to struggle under more unfavourable conditions.
The slaveholders' party therefore played <em>va banquel</em> When the
Democrats of the North declined to go on playing the part of the
'poor whites' of the South, the South secured Lincoln's victory by
splitting the vote, and then took this victory as a pretext for
drawing the sword from the scabbard.''^^2^^ The focus of the secession
movement was in the states of the Southeast and Southwest which</p>

<p>     <em>Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention Convened at Charleston, S. C.,
April 2.3, 1860</em>, Thomas McGill, Printer, Washington, 1860, pp. 19, 35-40. 
~^^2^^ Karl Marx, &quot;The North American Civil War&quot;, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 42.</p>

<p>     seceded from the Union in December 1860 and January-February
1861. Their example was followed in April-June 1861 by some
border states of the South (Virginia, North Carolina and
Tennessee) and Arkansas. On February 4, 1861, the rebels assembled at
a convention in Montgomery (Alabama), proclaimed a
Confederation of Southern States, adopted its Constitution and elected
Senator Jefferson Davis as its President.</p>

<p>     The American parties had gained extensive experience by 1860-
1861 in settling critical situations caused by acute contradictions on
the slavery issue. The entire range of crisis-settling means was
applied to prevent the country from being divided. The economic
basis of conservatism was the established structure of commercial
relations between the Northern areas and the states of the
slaveholding South. In social terms the conservatives chiefly represented
the interests of the commercial and financial circles in the
Northeast which maintained business contacts with the planters that
were profitable for both sides: they granted large subsidies to the
latter and invested considerable capital into the economy of the
slave states. The first attempt to draw up a plan of a political
compromise and prevent secession was undertaken in Congress when
two special committees were formed (on December 4 in the House
and on December 6, 1860, in the Senate) to consider the prevailing
critical situation and determine measures to localize the conflict.
A conference, convened on the initiative of the Virginia legislature,
opened in Washington on February 4, 1861 to draft an agreement
between the free and slave states so as to prevent the Federal Union
from falling apart. It was attended by delegations from 21 Northern
and Southern border states. It was a very representative assembly.
The delegates included prominent politicians---Republicans,
Democrats, and former Whigs. Business circles were also widely
represented. The three extraordinary bodies recommended virtually identical
proposals. These included a series of amendments to the American
Constitution which would ban slavery in Western territories north
of the 36&deg;30'parallel. Slavery would remain legal in the Western
lands south of the line and could be developed. The Federal
Congress would no longer have the right to interfere in questions of
slavery in all Southern states and the District of Columbia, to outlaw
import and export of slaves from one state or territory to another,
and raise taxes on slaveholding. It would be the duty of the US
government to observe strictly the Fugitive Slave Law and reimburse</p>

<p>     <b>126 Chapter Five</b></p>

<p>     i:* of the Two-Party System</p>

<p>     in the IbSOs 1 27</p>

<p>     the cost of the slave to the owner if the former was not found
and returned to his master.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The submitted draft proposals resembled claims in the form of
an ultimatum which, if accepted, would enable the slave states to
remain in the Union rather than a compromise intended to reconcile
the conflicting sides. Their proslavery bias was clearly apparent to
the Republicans who managed to shelf the resolutions of the
conciliators during the congressional voting. Finding no response in
the highest legislative body of the country, the proposals of the
conservatives were left high and dry. It became patently obvious
that under the circumstances peaceful settlement of the
fundamental differences by means of a compromise was impossible, and
the positions of the opposing sides on the key problems of domestic
policy remained irreconcilable.</p>

<p>     Meanwhile, the Southern separatists grew more aggressive with
every day. They hastily made open military preparations and sought
to provoke clashes with troops loyal to the federal government. On
April 12, 1861, armed units of the slaveholders attacked and after
a brief siege forced to surrender the garrison of Fort Sumter which
defended the sea approaches to Charleston. In response, on April
15, President Lincoln decreed mobilization of the militia in the
states loyal to the government and ordered the Confederates to
end the rebellion in 20 days. As Republican Congressman George
Julian wrote, &quot;To the very last the old medicine of compromise and
conciliation seemed to be the sovereign hope of the people of free
States... They clung to it, till the guns of Fort Sumter roused them
from their perilous dream.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The political crisis of 1860-1861 ended in the country's
division and the beginning of the Civil War. The blame for the war lay
exclusively with the slaveholders of the South who refused to solve
the problem of slavery in a constitutional way and resorted to
secession. Unable to settle the conflict between the free and the
slave states, prevent the breaking up of the Union and the ensuing
Civil War with all its bloodshed, the American parties displayed</p>

<p>     <em>A Report of the Debates</em> &amp; <em>Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference
Convention, for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, held at
Washington, D.C. in February, A. D. 1861</em>, by L.E. Chittenden, D. Appleton &amp; Company,
New York, 1864, pp. 440-444.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Political Recollections of G. Julian, 1840 to 1872</em>, Jansen and McClurg Co.,
Chicago, 1884, p. 186.</p>

<p>     their complete bankruptcy. The institution intended to strengthen
and stabilize the domination of the ruling classes proved unable
to fulfill the functions assigned to it. The two-party system clearly
demonstrated its limited possibilities and the inability to deal
with the crucial problem of slavery. The entire political system
lost its balance. The slavery issue paralyzed the activities of all
the branches of government---executive, legislative and judiciary.
The authority of presidential power fell to an unprecedented low.
In the course of election campaigns from 1844 to 1860 not a
single US president was even nominated by the convention of his
own party to run for another term. The political downfall of the
parties signified that a profound crisis had gripped the ruling US
elite whose course aimed at achieving compromises between the
Northern bourgeoisie and the slaveholders in the Southern states
had definitely become outdated. The crisis was the result of
pressure on the part of the broad popular masses refusing to put up
with the further existence of slavery and demanding that the slavery
issue be immediately settled on a democratic basis.</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (186 1-1865) <b>129</b></p>

6

<p>     <b>POLITICAL</b></p>

<p>     <b>PARTIES DURING</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE CIVIL WAR</b></p>

<p>     <b>(1861-1865)</b></p>

<p>     members of both parties were frequently on the verge of
antagonistic conflict.</p>

<p>     The provocative attack by the Southerners on Fort Sumter
(South Carolina) triggered off the Civil War and led to the
spreading in the North of profound and universal feeling of patriotism.
Resolutions adopted at meetings and assemblies and public appeals
made by prominent intellectuals of the North demanded an
immediate suppression of the rebellion and punishment of its
perpetrators---the Southern slaveholders.^^1^^ However, despite the belief bred
by patriotic moods that the rebels would soon be defeated, the
North found itself in an extremely unfavorable situation from the
military standpoint in spring 1861. The small and poorly trained
army of the North could not resist the Southern Confederation's
military power. Lack of resolution and hesitation in taking important
decisions, and incompetence in the highest echelons of military
command and government^^2^^ were typical of the first period in the
war. They stemmed from the alignment of political forces in the
North and the class interests of the Northern big bourgeoisie.
Fear of revolutionary change in the country, which was inevitable
if the war against the rebels were to become a popular war against
slavery, held the bourgeoisie back in its struggle against the
Confederation.</p>

<p>     The first period of the Civil War, a period when in Marx's words
the war was waged constitutionally, became instrumental in the
political realignment that was gaining momentum. During that
stage the historical conditions determining the dynamics of each
party's internal development were finally formed and the forms and
basic lines along which the entire political mechanism would further
develop in wartime were outlined. They were determined by the
specifics of class struggle in the North which in this period did not
go beyond bourgeois parliamentarism. The peaceful constitutional</p>

<p>     The Civil War of 1861-1865, a peculiar form taken on by the
second American bourgeois-democratic revolution, inflicted the
final blow against the entire former political structure of society.
In terms of political history this period was unique because during
the war the class struggle assumed the form of a large-scale armed
conflict in the course of which all the cardinal problems were solved
on the battlefield for the first time since the American nation had
been founded. The bourgeois revolution helped American society
to get out of the dead end it was in and determined the ways of its
further development. It also showed the untenability of traditional
doctrines on the evolutionary nature of US social and political
institutions allegedly not subject to revolutionary change. The
collapse of the two-party system thereby proved that apologetic
concepts of &quot;American exclusiveness&quot; were false.</p>

<p>     Destruction of the two-party system by the explosive
potential inherent in the slavery issue did not mean elimination of the
institution of political parties in the North of the USA. Parties
continued to operate despite the absence in their relations of the
main element of a system---elastic balance between trends toward
interparty agreement (consensus), on the one hand, and the
tendency toward political rivalry (alternative), on the other. In the
period of the coming revolution the usually balanced state of these
two invariable attributes of the two-party mechanism was abruptly
distorted due to disappearance of consensus and a change in the
very nature of the alternative. So, parties in the North united by
a common purpose of saving the Union still remained as if at
different poles during the Civil War. The Republican and the
Democratic systems of values differed radically, and mutual relations between</p>

<p>     See, for example: Henry W. Bellows, <em>How We Are to Fulfil Our Lord's
Commandment, 'Love Your Enemies,' in a Time of War. A Sermon Preached in All Souls's Church.
New York. June 2, 1861</em>, Baker &amp; Godwin, Printers, New York, 1861, pp. 5-6.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ The nature of social and political processes in the US at different stages in the war
has been closely analyzed by Soviet historians in the following works: R. F. Ivanov, <em>The
Civil War in the USA (1861-1865)</em>, the USSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Moscow,
1960; Idem., <em>Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War in the USA</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow,
1961; G. P. Kuropyatnik, <em>The Second American Revolution</em> (all in Russian).</p>

<p>     9-7&laquo;</p>

<p>     130 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     means of political struggle which the supporters and opponents of
slavery resorted to in settling interparty conflicts had a special
impact on the first period of the Civil War.</p>

<p>     The ruling Republican Party was to play the decisive part in the
rise of interparty relations. But the party continued to be torn apart
by the confrontation between conservatives and radicals. &quot;It is
anxious regard for the wishes, advantages and interests of the
spokesmen of the <em>border slave states,&quot;</em> shown by the leadership of the
Republican Party headed by Lincoln, &quot;that has so far broken off
the Civil War's point of principle.''^^1^^ This course could have resulted
in political debacle for the party and a military catastrophe for the
North.</p>

<p>     The existence in the North of considerable forces
sympathizing with the Democratic Party made it particularly important for
the Republican Party to decide to what extent political opposition
was permissible in wartime. Realizing the need to neutralize the
opposition for the time of the war, the party leaders suggested
that the Republicans &quot;throw off the old and assume a new
designation---the Union party&quot; to unite under one roof all the patriots of
the North regardless of their political convictions and party
affiliation.^^2^^ Plans to set up a Union coalition envisaged restricting
oppositional activities by loyalty to the administration's military course.
The Republicans warned the opposition that &quot;no man ought to be
allowed to mask his enmity to the government behind the name of
the democratic party.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Having contributed a great deal to the setting up of the Union
coalition, members of the Republican Party's conservative wing
saw in it an opportunity to establish relations with the Democrats
of the Northern and border states. At the same time an obvious aim
of the conservatives was also to neutralize the radical Republicans
as much as possible. The uncompromising stand of the radicals
clearly demonstrated during the secession period was regarded by
the conservatives as a direct threat to their own plans for waging
the war. That was why the conservatives attempted to dissolve the</p>

<p>     Republican Party in the Union coalition by their interpretation
of its aims and deprive the party of its strong antislavery thrust.
They urged President Lincoln abandon antislavery rhetoric and
&quot;change the question before the Public from one upon Slavery, or
about Slavery for a question upon Union or Disunion.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Union coalition became the touchstone in the
establishment of relations between parties during the war. The stand the
conservative Republicans took on the slavery issue provided a
possibility of reviving the initial elements of a consensus between
parties. They believed &quot;that any attempt to make this war
subservient to the sweeping abolition of Slavery, will revolt the border
States, divide the North and West, invigorate and make
triumphant the opposition party, and thus defeat itself as well as destroy
the Union.&quot; The idea of consensus was also promoted by a
moderate group whose leader, President Lincoln, said: &quot;My paramount
object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to
save or to destroy slavery.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Ascendency in the party ideology of the Republicans of the old
Whig imperatives with their deliberate hushing up of the slavery
issue would mean a step back for the party as compared with its
position in the 1860 election. In a situation when the conservatives
were relentlessly drawing the Republican Party into the pitfall of
the amorphous and apolitical Union coalition, only vigorous action
by the radical Republicans could save it from destruction. The
radical policy largely prevented the party from compromising on
matters of principle and kept it on antislavery positions.</p>

<p>     The desire to consolidate and radicalize the party soon
compelled the radicals to interfere actively in affairs having to do with
waging the war. The radicalization of the Republican Party was
significantly stepped up with the setting up of a Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War in which the radicals prevailed from
the outset. The committee's sphere of action was extremely broad:
virtually any aspect in government policy from 1861 to 1865 in
some way had to do with the war. Military strategy and tactics,
whether or not the professional skills of an officer conformed to</p>

<p>     Karl Marx, &quot;A Criticism of American Affairs&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels,
<em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 19, p. 227.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden</em>, edited by John Bigelow, Vol. I,
Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1908, p. 156.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Springfield Republican</em>, August 10, 1861.</p>

<p>     <em>The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln</em>, Roy P. Easier, Editor, Rutgers
University Press, Vol. IV, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953, p. 317.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. V., p. 545.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 388.</p>

<p>     132 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) 133</p>

<p>     the initiatives of the moderate and conservative Republicans. If
awareness of the need to destroy the institution of slavery at an
early date compelled the radicals to vote as one man for all
antislavery measures without exception, in discussing various aspects of
economic policy they were relatively rarely unanimous in
appraising the bills.^^1^^ A clash of class interests, complicated intermeshing
and mingling of old party imperatives inevitably accompanied the
uniting of different social forces on a radical antislavery platform.
It is to be added that the narrow local interests of one or several
states bearing on particular issues of Republican economic policy
only multiplied and deepened differences between radicals. The
inability of the radicals to propose their own program of economic
change gave other groups in the party a chance to find a common
language with the opposition on questions having to do with
tariff policy, finances, public works and distribution of public
land. However, the proportion of economic measures in the overall
government policy was relatively small, and their political
importance as compared with major questions of the war comparatively
insignificant. Yet the very fact that the advocates of compromise
gained the first opportunities to conclude a compromise was
revealing.</p>

<p>     Relations between the leading parties of the North largely
depended also on the situation in the Democratic Party.
Considerable changes occurred in the ideological principles held by the
Democrats as a consequence of the war. The former factional
division into advocates of squatter sovereignty and opponents of
any modernization of the institution of slavery was replaced by a
new principle in the alignment of forces in the party. The attitude
to the war and the slaveholding Confederation pushed former
differences to the background becoming the chief criterion in
the political tendency of different groups. Two leading political
slogans appeared in party rhetoric, one of which urged that the war</p>

<p>     An example is participation by the radicals in discussing such important economic
measures as the Homestead Bill, Merrill's bill on distributing public lands, a bill on the
Pacific Railroad, and the 1862 bill on a high protectionist tariff. See: <em>The Congressional
Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First Session of the Thirty-Seventh
Congress</em>, The Congressional Globe Office, Washington, 1861, pp. 132-140; <em>The
Congressional Globe, The Thirty-Seventh Congress. The Second Session</em>, Part I, Washington, 1862,
pp. 132-139, 140, 909-910; <em>The Congressional Globe: Containing</em> the <em>Debates and
Proceedings of the Second Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress</em>, Part 3, Washington, The
Congressional Globe Office, 1862, pp. 2114, 2160, 2432, 2625-2634, 2840.</p>

<p>     the post he held in the armed forces, logistics, organization of
military operations, federal military expenditures and military
contracts---all these important questions were examined by the Joint
Committee. A major achievement of the radical Republicans was an
extensive campaign they waged to remove generals who were
known for their defeatist attitudes---John F. Potter, Charles P. Stone,
and also Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Armies George B.
McClellan.</p>

<p>     The propaganda activities carried on by the Joint Committee
played a major part in rallying and activating broad popular masses
in the North opposed to slavery. <em>The New York Times</em> wrote about
&quot;thousands and tens of thousands throughout the country ... who
insist that the Government ought immediately to raise the
standard of liberation.''^^1^^ As Karl Marx put it, in December 1861 &quot;the
United States has evidently entered a critical stage with regard to
the <em>slavery question.''^^2^^</em> With the upsurge in the mass antislavery
movement in the North, the radicals stepped up their action even
more. In the course of the second session of the 37th Congress
they undertook a number of actions aimed at decisively uprooting
slavery in the country. The radicals in the Congress managed to
rally the Republican Party in support of the bills to free the slaves
in the District of Columbia and on US territories. Legalization of
drafting freed blacks into the armies of the North was another of
their important achievements. Finally, with the second bill on
confiscation adopted (it provided for liberation of fugitive slaves
and slaves confiscated from the rebels, and the possibility of
drafting blacks into special black units), the radicals compelled the
administration to resort to more resolute methods of waging the war.
Prodded by the radical Republicans in September 1862 President
Lincoln agreed to issue a Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation
as a measure prompted by military exigencies.</p>

<p>     The radicals' firm stand on the slavery issue drew the line
beyond which the ruling party could not make concessions to the
opposition without violating its platform. As to the possibility of
compromising with the Democrats on issues not related to slavery
or the conduct of the war, the radicals practically did not resist</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The New York Times</em>, August 6, 1861.</p>

<p>     Karl Marx, &quot;The Crisis over the Slavery Issue&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels,
<em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 19, p. 115.</p>

<p>     134 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) 135</p>

<p>     be denounced and peace restored with the Southern states, while
the other unconditionally supported all military measures by the
Federal Government.</p>

<p>     The new alignment of forces in the Democratic Party had
certain similarities with the antebellum division into factions. To a
certain extent the divisions into supporters of Douglas and
Breckinridge and into advocates of war and peace coincided, which was
due to objective causes. Rejection by the Southerners of Douglas'
squatter sovereignty placed most Northern Democrats in
opposition to the Confederation and the border-state Democrats
sympathetic to the Confederation. On the other hand, Breckinridge's
followers who had remained in the Union after the war broke out
advocated peace with the Confederation, since that was in tune
with the interests of the political elite in the border states. It is
undoubtable, however, that in a context of the rising bourgeois
revolution the coinciding of these political groups had many
exceptions.</p>

<p>     Prominent advocates of peace with the Confederation,
Representatives Clement L. Vallandigham (Ohio), John A. Logan (
Illinois), Senators Breckinridge (Kentucky) and James A. Bayard (
Delaware) said that they preferred &quot;to see a peaceful separation of these
States, than to see endless, aimless, devastating war.''^^1^^ The true
intentions of the Peace Democrats became obvious after their
spokesmen publicly declared that they feared radical changes in the
country: &quot;In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing
the insurrection, I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable
conflict for this purpose shall not degenerate into a violent and
remorseless revolutionary struggle.''^^2^^ The term &quot;revolutionary
struggle&quot; referred to any attempts to interfere in the affairs of the
institution of slavery. It was fear of the rising bourgeois
revolution that underlay the ideology of the peace group of the
Democratic Party aiming all its efforts at preventing a 'Violent and
remorseless&quot; struggle.</p>

<p>     A considerable part of the Democrats opposed the peace
advocates in the party and separated themselves firmly from the</p>

<p>     Southerners rejecting the legitimacy of secession. The group of War
Democrats was much larger than the ``peace'' faction, since it was
the Breckinridge faction which lost the largest number of followers
in the North as a result of secession. In formulating their action
program the War Democrats encountered quite a few objective
difficulties. Members of this group faced the dilemma of either
being loyal to the government or remaining true to their own
partisan principles. The difficulty of their position lay in the fact
that many of them were unable to draw the line between support
for the idea of restoring the Union and support for the Republican
Party. Quite justly they feared that the Democratic Party line
would melt away in the powerful propaganda campaign launched by
the Republicans in support of the Union. On the other hand, they
would not accept the course of the Peace Democrats who directly
urged the members of this faction to take a firm stand against
government measures. Under the circumstances the group
leaders---Congressman John A. McClernand (Illinois), Senators James
A. McDougall (California), Andrew Johnson (Tennessee) as well as
Douglas himself---found it necessary to emphasize all the time that
they stood in &quot;equal, irreconcilable, and undying opposition both
to the Republicans and Secessionists.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     An acute conflict between supporters of the political ideas of
Douglas and those of Breckinridge on the attitude to the Civil War
and the Union coalition marked both the situation in the
Democratic faction in Congress and the overall situation in the party
during preparations for the 1861 elections. Very soon major differences
on the extent of supporting government war measures emerged
between various members of the group of War Democrats. The
part of the War Democrats who had feared during the first months
of the war that the party would lose its face were its principles
identified completely with the principles of the Republican
platform formed a new faction---moderate War Democrats. Since the
1861 elections this faction was headed by Governor of the State
of New York Horatio Seymour. The ideological basis for their
separation from the rest of Douglas' followers was the refusal
of the moderates to support government measures if certain
conditions were met. The most important of these was to retain slavery</p>

<p>     <b>Quoted from: Robert W. Johannsen, &quot;The Douglas Democracy and the Crisis of
Disunion&quot;, in: <em>Civil War History</em>, Vol. 9, September 1963, pp. 245-246.</b></p>

<p>     <b><em>The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First
Session of the Thirty-Seventh Congress</em>, The Congressional Globe Office, Washington, 1861,
p. 379.</b></p>

<p>     <b>^^2^^ <em>The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln</em>, Vol. V, pp. 48-49.</b></p>

<p>     <b>136 Chapter Six</b></p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) 137</p>

<p>     in some states^^1^^ and showed that consolidation of the opposition
was basically completed. They also indicated that the party had
recovered from the crisis of 1860 and significantly raised its
competitiveness on the national scene. The establishment of the
opposition by the end of 1862 had a major impact on the state of
interparty relations. With consolidation of oppositional forces the ruling
party now had a real rival in politics whom it had to reckon with.
The appearance of rival signalled that the plans of the Republican
leadership to involve all the Democrats in the Union coalition had
fallen through. The course toward politically neutralizing the
opposition proved to be more or less fruitful only in respect to one of
the three factions in the Democratic Party---the War Democrats.</p>

<p>     The emergence of the opposition bloc under the Peace
Democrats was due to a specific alignment of class forces at the first,
``constitutional'' stage in the Civil War. The principal class
antagonism between the bourgeoisie of the North and the slaveholders of
the South in this period took the form of the armed struggle
between the opposing sides. In the North of the US the class struggle
between supporters and opponents of slavery was not so clear-cut.
The fact that from the outset of the war many Democrats
professed sincere loyalty to the idea of saving the Union largely
contributed to their acceptance as partners and not enemies of the
Lincoln Administration. Mutual acknowledgement by the parties of
constitutional principles of government in the North underpinned
interparty relations. This, in turn, led most leaders of both parties
to realize the need for their coexistence on the national political
scene. The adherence of the Republican and the Democratic
leadership to traditions of bourgeois political culture implying legal
opposition to the ruling party's course prevented the leading
parties from turning into totally antagonistic organizations.
However, the irreconcilable conflict on the slavery issue between
opposing forces in the revolution in the North---radical Republicans
and Peace Democrats---still involved the danger of political destabi-</p>

<p>     <b>^^1^^ The Democrats won the gubernatorial elections in New York and New Jersey and
state elections in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Illinois. In six states the
Democrats won elections to the US Congress taking 35 seats in both chambers away from the
Republicans. In Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Wisconsin and New
Jersey the Peace Democrats, the main candidates from the party in the elections, proved
stronger than the candidates of the Union coalition combining the War Democrats and
mostly conservative Republicans.</b></p>

<p>     after the end of the war both in the loyal and the rebel states.
The existence of certain common elements in the views of the
Peace and the moderate War Democrats---above all their joint
interest in preventing the Civil War from turning into an antislavery
war-made it possible for a strong opposition bloc to emerge.
The opposition slogan laid down in the Address of Democratic
Members of the House of Representatives of the United States, to
the Democracy of the United States went as follows: &quot;The first
step towards a restoration of the Union as it was is to maintain the
Constitution as it is.''^^1^^ The stream of antislavery initiatives the
radical Republicans hurled at the opposition in the Congress
stepped up consolidation of the bloc of the moderate and Peace
Democrats.</p>

<p>     Democratic participation in discussing the administration's
economic policies was a special aspect in the opposition's activity
in Congress. If in debating antislavery initiatives Democrats were in
opposition to Republicans in most cases, in the given instance
members of the Democratic Party made a complete about-face.
Some of the Republican bills submitted to Congress were supported
by more Democrats than Republicans.^^2^^ That was due to a number
of objective economic and political reasons. A most important
reason undoubtedly was the similarity of economic interests shared
by members of the Northern bourgeoisie belonging to different
political parties. Another reason was that all Democratic factions
without exception had to be constantly concerned with
strengthening their mass base in order to operate more or less successfully
at the federal level. Laying emphasis on resistance to antislavery
measures, the Democrats at the same time could not afford
opposing most of the administration's economic measures. Fear of being
accused of obstructionism, which could lead to the forced
elimination of the opposition from political life in wartime, kept the
Democrats from totally resisting the Republican administration's
course.</p>

<p>     The 1862 elections brought victory to Democrat candidates</p>

<p>     <b>Clement L. Vallandigham, <em>Speeches, Arguments, Addresses and Letters</em>, published
by J. Walter &amp; Co., New York, 1864, p. 365.</b></p>

<p>     <b>^^2^^ See: Leonard P. Curry, <em>Congressional Democrats: 1861-1863</em>, in: <em>Civil War History</em>,
Vol. 12, September 1966, pp. 218-219.</b></p>

<p>     138 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) 139</p>

<p>     most of the Democrats and conservative Republicans and would be
closed only to traitors and Republican abolitionists.^^1^^ Despite the
fact that Weed's movement failed to yield the expected results,
the threat of a split in the ruling party did exist. It was clear that
the most conservative members of the Republicans could go very
far in resisting radical trends---even to completely breaking with
their own party. It was also revealing that in their struggle against
radicalism the conservative Republicans regarded Democrats as their
allies.</p>

<p>     Fertile soil for the development of conservative trends in
Republican policies was provided by the need to solve the
problem of the Union's reconstruction. Opponents of a radical course
attempted to make reconstruction policy the chief means in the
struggle against the deepening of the revolution by asserting their
monopoly on working out government programs in this field.
Having secured a firm party line on the slavery issue during the
second stage in the war, the radical Republicans proved unable
to resist forces interested in achieving an interparty compromise
when reconstruction problems were being decided. United by a
single desire to make emancipation an imperative of reconstruction,
the radicals, nevertheless, lacked any clear-cut single program of
specific reconstruction measures. Individual members of the party's
radical wing differed in their views on the status of the former rebel
states, methods of setting up loyal governments in these states, and
also the legal rights of loyal citizens in the South.^^2^^</p>

<p>     Lack of detail in the radical reconstruction plan and absence
of unity in radical views on many reconstruction-policy problems
sharply reduced the effectiveness of the radicals' participation in
the political struggle. It was largely due to this circumstance that
Lincoln, concerned with the possible danger of a split in the party,
managed to make his Proclamation of Amnesty and
Reconstruction the basis of government reconstruction policy. The vague and
ambiguous wording of many provisions in the President's
Proclamation, due to which the political meaning of the document could be</p>

<p>     lization. That danger could be eliminated only provided the parties
managed to achieve a compromise in solving major social and
political problems on the agenda---tougher methods of fighting the war
or problems of reconstruction.</p>

<p>     The Northerners' military defeats in the summer and fall of
1862 made the threat of Washington's capture by the rebel forces
very real and enhanced the political activeness of the masses. The
situation in the country strained to the limit by the widespread
antislavery mood demanded that the Lincoln Administration take
resolute steps and resort to tougher methods of waging the war.
The irresistible logic of historical development finally forced the
Republican leadership to make an about-face in the war policy^^1^^ and
embark upon a revolutionary war against the rebels. Although
the leadership of the ruling party had agreed to wage the war by
revolutionary methods under pressure from the popular masses,
it had no interest in deepening the revolution and sought, in
Lincoln's words, to prevent the military conflict from degenerating
&quot;into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle.''</p>

<p>     The desire to restrict the radicals' activities was common to
both the conservative Republicans and their political opponents,
the Democrats. The leaders of the Democratic Party in the North
by all means resisting any further revolutionary change in the
country proved to be the potential allies of the moderate and
conservative Republicans during the new stage in the war. The class
interests shared by members of the Northern bourgeoisie
belonging to different political parties underlay their resistance to
revolutionary trends and in the final count constituted a most important
reason for the rise of a sufficiently stable interparty consensus---an
inevitable attribute of the political structure taking shape in
wartime.</p>

<p>     The steady growth of the antislavery movement led to a
radicalization of the Republican Party's course and a considerable
toughening of the government's war policies. That provoked a wide
response among the conservative circles. The New York conservative
Republicans headed by Thurlow Weed proposed to set up a new
coalition party which, as its would-be founders saw it, would unite</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Springfield Republican</em>, January 21, February 15, 1863.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ See, for example: Charles Sumner, <em>His Complete Works. With Introduction by
George Frishie Hoar</em>, in 20 volumes, Vol. X, Negro University Press, New York, 1969,
pp. 166-290 <em>-Jnside Lincoln's Cabinet. The Civil War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase</em>, edited by
David Donald, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1954, p. 264.</p>

<p>     <b>See: Karl Marx, &quot;American Affairs&quot;, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, <em>Collected
Works</em>, Vol. 19, p. 180.</b></p>

<p>     140 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) <b>141</b></p>

<p>     interpreted in different ways, proved instrumental in its being
supported by both conservative and moderate Republicans as well as
Democrats.^^1^^ The attitude of members of the war and moderate
factions in the Democratic Party to the administration's
reconstruction policy, revealed new reserves for the forming of elements of
interparty agreement. The support, even if indirect, of the
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction by a considerable number
of the Democrats became an important phase in the development
of relations between both parties. It indicated the scope of change
in the Democrats' ideological views and their readiness to
compromise with the conservative and moderate Republicans in solving
fundamentally important war issues.</p>

<p>     The ideological restructuring of the Republican Party along
radical lines, externally manifested during the second stage of the
war in the administration's tougher war policy, could not but tell
on the attitude of different Republican factions to the opposition.
On the one hand, Republican awareness of the need to change the
nature of the war in connection with solution of the slavery issue
objectively widened differences between the ruling and
opposition parties and strengthened alternative aspects in relations between
extreme poles 'of the political spectrum in the North---radical
Republicans and Copperhead Democrats. On the other hand, the
conservatives' resistance to further deepening the revolution forced
the Republicans to approach opposition demands with greater
caution. Since, moreover, members of different factions held
fundamentally different views of the opposition, it was even more
difficult to work out a single political line on the issue.</p>

<p>     The 1862 elections had clearly shown that the opposition was
gaining strength. The tendency continued to develop in 1863. An
important distinguishing feature of opposition growth at the
beginning of the second stage in the Civil War was the wide spread in
the North of secret counterrevolutionary clubs and associations
led by Copperhead Democrats.^^2^^ Knights of the Golden Circle, Or-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ See, for example: <em>The New York Times</em>, December 10, 1863; <em>The Political Status
of the Rebellious States, and the Action of the President in Respect Thereto</em>, Albany,
1864, p. 3; <em>The Real Motives of the Rebellion. The Slaveholders'Conspiracy, Depicted by
Southern Loyalists in Its Treason Against Democratic Principles, as well as Against the
National Union: Showing a Contest of Slavery and Nobility Versus Free Government</em>, New
York, 1864, pp. 12-14.</p>

<p>     According to expert estimates there were 50,000 members of such organizations in</p>

<p>     der of American Knights and Sons of Liberty were underground
paramilitary organizations which carried on their activities under
the strictest secrecy and had a ramified network of branches in
many states of the Midwest. The chief purpose of the Copperhead
clandestine organizations was to undermine the military, economic
and political efforts of the Union government. The most
reactionary part of the Democratic Party's peace faction led by Clement
L. Vallandigham maintained direct contact with underground
counterrevolutionary organizations and supported their activities.</p>

<p>     The rise of extremist trends in the activities of the Copperhead
opposition which more and more frequently resorted to
nonparliamentary means of struggle against the administration, made it
imperative for the Republican leadership to intervene urgently. The
former Republican policy of involving all three Democratic
factions as partners in the Union coalition proved absolutely
ineffective at the given stage. The Republicans fully realized that each of
the groups in the Democratic Party required a differentiated
approach by the administration. In view of this the general political
line of the Republican leadership in respect to the Democrats
changed cardinally: from actions aimed at preventing
antigovernment actions by the opposition on the whole the Republicans were
forced to pass to restraining its most extremist elements. Joint
participation by all three Republican factions in working out a
common strategy to resist the opposition resulted in the emergence
of two interrelated trends in the party. One of these was aimed at
restraining oppositional moods among the loyal Democrats, and
chiefly among members of the moderate war faction, so as to break
them away from the nucleus of the Copperhead opposition. The
chief proponents of this trend---the conservative
Republicansproclaimed the opposition lawful, but, in the new context, intended
to allow it only &quot;reasonable freedom of discussion and criticism.&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>The second trend called for tougher measures of public and
political control over the activities of the extremist Copperheads
including censorship and the arrest of disloyal persons. The initiators of
this line---the radical Republicans---believed the Democrats' &quot;jeal-</p>

<p>     Indiana alone and 85,000 in Illinois. (J. M. Hofer, &quot;Development of the Peace Movement
in Illinois During the Civil War&quot;, <em>in: Journal of Illinois State Historical Society</em>, Vol. XXIV,
No. 1, p. 123.)</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Springfield Republican, March</em> 10, 1863.</p>

<p>     142 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During tlie Civil War (1S6 1-J865) <b>14.}</b></p>

<p>     ousies and antipathies&quot; in respect to Republicans &quot;are now more
than ever irrational&quot; and their &quot;clamors of opposition are now more
than ever unpatriotic.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The first trend in anti-opposition policy, to implement which
the moderates and conservatives had attempted to use the means
(proven futile in practice) of the nonpartisan Union coalition,<SUP>2
</SUP>showed its ineffectiveness from the very outset. The moderate
Democrats replied rather evasively to the administration's appeals
referring to the negative example of the War Democrats who had
broken off all relations with their party in order to join the Union
coalition. In their words, the moderate Democrats &quot;have learned
by experience how futile it is to abandon their own party, in any
hope of gain to the country or of advantage to themselves by going
into any new-fangled organization.''^^3^^ Due to the above
circumstances it was the resolute measures in respect to the opposition
advocated by the radicals that gradually became the basis for
government policy in this field.</p>

<p>     The policy of active resistance to the extremist opposition
received its first powerful impulse at the end of September 1862
with the issue of a presidential proclamation suspending the writ of
<em>habeas corpus</em> for the time of the war. Under the proclamation
&quot;all Rebels and Insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the
United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments,
resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice ... shall
be subject to martial law and liable to trial and punishment by
Courts Martial or Military Commission.''^^4^^ Lacking a clear legal
definition of disloyal practice, the proclamation became a major
weapon in the hands of the leaders of the Republican Party to fight
the political opposition during the new stage in the war. Suffice
it to say that in Illinois alone between June and October 1863
more than 200 Democrats were arrested for treason and 800 for
desertion.^^5^^</p>

<p>     The chief aim of the new Republican tough line---to fight the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Works of Charles Sumner</em>, Vol. IX, p. 198.</p>

<p>     <em>The New York Times</em>, October 21, 1862; <em>Springfield Republican</em>, November 1,
1862; <em>Springfield Republican</em>, March 10, 1863.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Atlas &amp; Argus</em>, February 16, 1863.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln</em>, Vol. V, pp. 436-437.</p>

<p>     Stephen L. Hansen, <em>The Making of the Third Party System. Voters and Parties in
Illinois, 1850-1876</em>, UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor, 1980, p. 139.</p>

<p>     peace faction of the Democratic Party---was most clearly apparent
in early May 1863 when the leader of the Peace Democrats
Vallandigham was arrested on orders from General Burnside on
accusations of treason and spying for the Confederation. On
September 15, 1863 the above proclamation was supplemented by another
in which loyalty and disloyalty to the government were defined in
even more general terms.^^1^^ As early as the beginning of 1863
government policy in respect to the opposition included censorship of
the Democrats' extremist press. The Postmaster General ordered
that disloyal papers be dropped from the list of periodicals
distributed by the mail service, and sale of these papers was banned.</p>

<p>     In a public address to the Democrats of the state of New
York President Lincoln insisted that the administration's tough
line in regard to the abettors of the rebels was justified.
Suspension of the writ of <em>habeas corpus</em> and the campaign of arrests of
disloyal persons were described by Lincoln as necessary preventive
security measures.^^2^^ Lincoln's position was the best of evidence
that the radical course toward a tougher policy in respect to the
opposition was accepted by the Republican leadership as an
underlying party doctrine.</p>

<p>     The measures undertaken by the Republicans in the course of
their crackdown on the opposition showed that in the new stage
of the war the political struggle was increasingly going beyond the
generally accepted parliamentary framework. The switch from
passive to active resistance to extremist opposition elements required
new, major forms of struggle waged on a mass scale. The
Republican Party found such forms in the activities of numerous patriotic
leagues, parties and clubs arising to deal with rebel actions in the
rear of Union troops. As the participants in the club movement
put it, the main aim was &quot;to discountenance and rebuke by moral
and social influence all disloyalty to the Federal Government.&quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>The radical Republicans practically everywhere played an active
part in setting up and leading patriotic leagues and associations.
Union leagues were progressive and democratic organizations. It</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln</em>, Vol. VI, pp. 451-452.</p>

<p>     <em>Correspondence in Relation to the Public Meeting in Albany</em>, Albany, N.Y., 1863,
pp. 5-6.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Henry W. Bellows, <em>Historical Sketch of the Union League Club of New York. Its
Origin, Organization, and Work, 1863-1879</em>, Club House, New York, 1879, p. 37.</p>

<p>     144 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (186 1-1865) <b>145</b></p>

<p>     was their purpose to &quot;foster a spirit of Patriotism and Loyalty;
... use all proper means for exposing and suppressing treason and
punishing traitors.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The leagues concentrated primarily on propaganda aimed at
splitting the opposition. Coordination of propaganda work in the
Union movement was carried out by the Loyal Publication Society
and the Philadelphia Board of Publications. Founded on February
14, 1863, the Loyal Publication Society by the end of the year
had as recipients of the publications 649 Union leagues and
associations; 474 Ladies' Associations; 21,160 private individuals; 744
editors; and the soldiers in the Army. The following figures speak
of the Society's publishing activity: in 1863 the Society put out
42 pamphlets in more than 400,000 copies and in 1864
approximately the same number in 515,000 copies.^^2^^ The Board of
Publication was equally active: in 1863-1865 the Board published 104
pamphlets in a total of more than a million copies.^^3^^</p>

<p>     The widespread popular pro-Union movement provided
considerable support to the Republican Administration and its struggle
against the opposition. In effect the party received a ready-made
well organized and operating propaganda machine capable of
successfully influencing voter behavior. The military structure and
military discipline in force in many Union leagues enabled the
Republican leadership to effectively fight the extremist forms of
opposition. At the same time, participation of many War Democrats
in league activities dovetailed with the intention of moderate and
conservative Republicans to resort more widely to compromise
measures to restrain the opposition.</p>

<p>     The campaign to bridle the opposition had yielded real results
as early as the end of 1863. The Republican policy aimed at
splitting the bloc of opposition forces and isolating the peace faction
of the Democrats conformed best of all to the imperatives of the
time and the situation existing among the opposition forces. The
growing role of ideology in the activities pursued by both parties,</p>

<p>     an acute political struggle concerning methods of conducting the
war, and also the need to adapt to the Republican
Administration's new political line in respect to the opposition were the causes
of growing ideological differences between groups in the
Democratic Party. These differences were particularly clearly displayed
during preparations for and the course of the 1863 elections.
Dominating practically all the state party organizations the Peace
Democrats openly said that the abolitionist line of the Republican
Administration &quot;was not merely a danger to the institute of slavery, but
to our whole political system.&quot; They urged voters to overthrow
&quot;the Abolitionists at the pools&quot; and re-establish &quot;constitutional
principles at the North.&quot; The moderate War Democrats who
showed their negative attitude to antislavery measures of the
administration but, nonetheless, possessing extensive freedom of
action were regarded by the Copperheads as potential allies in
elections.^^2^^ However, the moderate Democrats themselves showed
no desire to draw closer to the Copperhead opposition. &quot;Our
Democracy do not, while condemning Vallandigham's arrest,
approve of any thing but his right to utter his peace notions, not by
any means endorsing his peace notions,&quot; wrote the prominent
leader of the moderate Democrats Samuel S. Cox.^^3^^ Another leader
of this faction, Samuel J. Tilden, urged all Democrats in an open
letter entitled &quot;The Perils of the Union---The Limits of a
Constitutional Opposition&quot; to distinguish between an opposition proposing
constructive alternatives to the government course and a faction
catering to purely partisan interests.^^4^^</p>

<p>     As a result of the new realignment in the Democratic Party
the Peace Democrats were unable to win in any of the gubernatorial
elections, The fall in the percentage of votes for candidates from
the Democratic Party was catastrophic in the states of the
Midwest.^^5^^ The ousting of the rebels from the Mississippi valley contrib-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Address of the Democratic State Central Committee</em>, Printed at &quot;The Age&quot; Office,
Philadelphia, 1863, pp. 5, 8</p>

<p>~^^2^^ &quot;C. Vallandigham to M. Marble, May 15 and 21, 1863&quot;, <em>M. Marble Papers</em>, Cont. 4,
Library of Congress.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ &quot;S. Cox to M. Marble, June 1, 1863&quot;, <em>M. Marble Papers</em>, Cont. 4, Library of
Congress.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>The Writings and Speeches of Samuel J. Tilden</em>, edited by John Bigelow, in two
volumes, Vol. I, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1885, p. 338.</p>

<p>     Joel H. Silbey, <em>A Respectable Minority. The Democratic Party in the Civil War Era,
1860-1868</em>, W.W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., New York, 1977, pp. 146-147.</p>

<p>     10-749</p>

<p>     See a copy of the Patriotic League Rules in: <em>Gideon Welles Papers</em>, Cont. 47,
Library of Congress.</p>

<p>     Frank Freidel, &quot;The Loyal Publication Society: A Pro-Union Propaganda Agency&quot;,
in: <em>Mississippi Valley Historical Review</em>, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, December 1939, pp. 362-363.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Union Pamphlets of the Civil War (1861-1865)</em>, edited by Frank Freidel, Vol. I,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967, p. 8.</p>

<p>     146 Chapter Six</p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil \Var (186 1- lKf&gt;5) 147</p>

<p>     terparty relations largely depended on the situation in each of the
parties during the concluding stage in the war. Although the idea of
re-electing Lincoln undoubtedly prevailed in the party, a certain
part of the radical Republicans held a different opinion. Dissatisfied
by the President's reconstruction policy, these radicals harbored
the idea of running their own candidate in the elections and
founding a new party, Radical Democracy. The platform of the new party
approved at the founding convention in Cleveland (Ohio) demanded
a firm suppression of the rebellion and an early restoration of the
Union; adopting an amendment to the Constitution prohibiting
slavery on the entire territory of the US; and providing exceptional
rights to the Congress in implementing reconstruction. A major
point of the platform was the confiscation of the rebels' lands
and their distribution among the soldiers and actual settlers.<SUP>1
</SUP>Fearing a split in the ruling party on the eve of the elections,
Lincoln, at the same time, had no desire to make concessions to the
radicals on the reconstruction issue being perfectly aware that the
presidential reconstruction plan would secure the existing level of
interparty relations. Having included in the platform of the
Republican Party one of the most important demands made by the
radicals---to adopt immediately an antislavery amendment to the
Constitution^^2^^---and having provided certain concessions to the radical
insurgents in the field of patronage policy, Lincoln still managed
to reunite them with the Republicans leaving the moderately
conservative reconstruction course untouched.</p>

<p>     The absence of radical demands on reconstruction in the
Republican platform implied that the party leaders were still
interested in preserving and developing a consensus with Democrats
on the issue. The Democrats, on their part, displayed a similar
interest. With the passing of leadership into the hands of the
moderate Democrats who managed not only to run their own candidate
in the presidential elections but also to significantly change the
party's general line on the question of the attitude to the war,^^3^^ the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Edward McPherson, <em>The Political History of the United States of America during
the Great Rebellion 1860-1865</em>, Da Capo Press, New York, 1972, pp. 412-413.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Proceedings of the First Free Republican National Conventions, 1856, 1860 and
1864</em>, published by Charles W.Johnson, Minneapolis, 1893, pp. 225-226.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ At the National democratic Convention in Chicago the candidate of the moderate
factions McClellan opposed the Copperhead candidate Horatio Seymour who had firmly
linked himself by that time to the extreme right group in the party. Affirming their monop-</p>

<p>     uted to a normalization of life in this section which had been
regarded earlier as the chief bulwark of the Copperhead
opposition due to the economic difficulties existing there. Activization of
the popular movement in defense of the Union served as a barrier
to spreading the extreme rightist views among the mass of
Democrat voters. It is also to be noted that the Peace faction had lost
credibility in the eyes of the voters by taking part in direct action
against the government course in waging the war. Thus, the Peace
Democrats of New York were behind the actions by workers of
Irish origin against slave emancipation and the military draft,
which enabled the Republicans and loyal Democrats to accuse them
of abetting the rebels.^^1^^ The Democrats' defeat in the elections of
1863 virtually brought to nothing the tendency, which had arisen in
1862, for the Peace and moderate factions to draw closer. The
moderate Democrats were fully justified in accusing their Peace
colleagues of the failures which had befallen their party. One of the
leaders of the moderate faction wrote: &quot;Victory was in our grasp.&quot;
But the &quot;foolish peace principles of Mr. Vallandigham and his
immediate followers afforded a plausible pretext for charging the
Democratic Party with opposition to the war.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Elaboration of a new political line in respect to the opposition
was a major contribution by the Republican Party to the laying of
the foundations of interparty relations. If the political struggle
between parties concerning the reconstruction issue prepared the
ground for a compromise between them and contributed to an
interparty consensus, then the Republican leadership's new
approach to the opposition problem helped determine the ruling
party's partners in the political structure of wartime. The War
and moderate Democrats had now definitely become such
partners. In effect a purposeful policy by the Republicans provoked a
realignment of forces within the Democratic Party on whose results
the future relations between parties depended. The concluding stage
in this process took place during preparations by both parties for
the 1864 presidential elections.</p>

<p>     The elections were a test of the strength of the relations which
arose between parties in the years of the war. The nature of in-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Albon P. Man, Jr., <em>Labor Competition and the New York Draft Riots of 1863</em>, in:
<em>Journal of Negro History</em>, October 1951, p. 381.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Joel H. Silbey, <em>A Respectable Minority</em>, pp. 118-119.</p>

<p>     <b>148 Chapter Six</b></p>

<p>     Political Parties
During the Civil War (1861-1865) 149</p>

<p>     compromise aspects in relations between the parties in this period
did not lead the Republican Party to depart from its firm
antislavery position. On the contrary, it was the Democratic Party that was
forced to make concessions to the Republicans on the slavery issue
in order to pay for their part in the interparty bloc.</p>

<p>     The wartime party political structure in the North of the US was
the organizational expression of the party realignment which had
occurred under the most severe circumstances. It proved
impracticable to restore the two-party system during the war. A system of
two leading parties whose basic task it is to defend the existing social
and economic order, may exist provided parties agree on the
solution of major questions facing society. During the Civil War when
one of the parties intended, in opposition to the other, to
significantly change the obsolete social system based on slavery and make
it conform to the new, higher level of productive forces, there was
no question of agreement between the parties' global interests.
This led to a combination of leading bourgeois parties operating on
the political scene which only outwardly resembled a two-party
system, but actually lacked the backbone of the latter. The
objective tasks of the wartime political structure were much more
modest than those of the classical two-party system: it was to prevent
the parties in the North from turning into antagonistic
organizations, and remove . the threat of political destabilization which
amounted to military catastrophe for the North. The party--
political structure was aimed at preventing bourgeois-democratic
transformations from being extended in the country, and
eliminating the possibility of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of
the radical Republicans in the war years. Essentially its
establishment was a sort of test in the course of which the parties adapted
to the changing social and economic conditions, grew used to each
other, and determined their place and role in the future two-party
system.</p>

<p>     opposition party considerably expanded its possibilities for political
maneuver. Although the Democratic candidate McClellan ceded
victory in the presidential elections to the Republican leader
Lincoln, the overall results of the elections seemed encouraging for
the Democrats. McClellan received 45 percent of the popular vote
(Lincoln had 2,330,552 votes and McClellan, 1,835,985). The
large number of votes cast for candidates from the Democratic
Party showed the growing strength of the Democrats and a certain
extension of their mass base thanks to voters dissatisfied with the
ruling party's policies, chiefly immigrants and the poorest classes of
the population. The rising competitiveness of the Democratic Party
was explained by changes in the party leadership and the new
leaders' rejection of the unpopular peace program.</p>

<p>     The realignment in the Democratic Party leading to a stronger
position of the moderate war faction was the most important
reason for the party program's reorientation in respect to the war
and reconstruction. Joint resistance by the moderates and
conservatives in the Republican and the Democratic parties to a new radical
initiative in the field of reconstruction policy---the Ashley Bill---was
a notable landmark in the strengthening of the positions of the
interparty moderate-conservative bloc.^^1^^ Approval of the
antislavery amendment to the Constitution by both parties during the
concluding stage of the war considerably consolidated the achieved
level of interparty relations, and extended prospects for further
development of the interparty consensus.^^2^^ The moderate--
conservative consensus in the reconstruction issue stimulated the
establishment of the wartime political structure which was completed after
the presidential elections of 1864 with the ``compromise'' duties
distributed between the parties. The rise in the proportion of</p>

<p>     <b>oly to nomination of the presidential candidate in the course of the struggle, the
moderate Democrats concluded an agreement with the Copperheads granting them the exclusive
right to draw up the party platform. The Democratic platform called for hostilities to be
immediately ceased and peace signed with the Confederates. Only subsequently did
McClellan repudiate the basic plank of the platform and speak out for war until victory. (James
G. Blaine, <em>Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield</em>, in two volumes, Vol. I,
The Henry Bill Publishing Company, Norwich, Conn., 1884, pp. 527-530.)</b></p>

<p>     <b><em>The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the Second
Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress: Special Session of the Senate</em>. Part I, The
Congressional Globe Office, Washington, 1865, pp. 120-124, 155-156, 174-175, 301; <em>The
Congressional Globe. Second Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress: Special Session of the
Senate</em>, Part 2, pp. 967-971.</b></p>

<p>     <b>^^2^^ <em>The Congressional Globe...</em>, Part I, pp. 258-262, 523, 524, 525-526, 531.</b></p>

7

<p>     <b>POLITICAL</b></p>

<p>     <b>PARTIES IN THE</b></p>

<p>     <b>RECONSTRUCTION</b></p>

<p>     <b>PERIOD (1865-1877)</b></p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) <b>151</b></p>

<p>     developed in 1865-1869, i.e. the years of active implementation of
the Reconstruction program.</p>

<p>     The tragic death of President Lincoln in the last days of the war
influenced the political situation in the country. On April 15, 1865,
the post of chief executive went to War Democrat Andrew Johnson
who was elected Vice President in 1864 from the Union coalition.
During the Civil War Johnson-senator and subsequently military
governor of Tennessee---became widely known for his advocacy of
tough government measures in respect to the rebels and open
hostility to the Southern slaveholding aristocracy. All of this, as well
as his active role in the past as a leader of the Democratic Party,
drew close attention of and gave rise to certain hopes among
members of the opposing political groups.</p>

<p>     After the end of the war the radical Republicans focussed
efforts on a plan to provide suffrage to liberated blacks. In their
opinion, only that measure could prevent the revival of the former
Southern oligarchy and its return to power in the federal bodies.
A considerable expansion of the number of Republican voters
through the involvement of the liberated blacks would enable the
ruling party to control the social, economic and political
processes in the postbellum South. However heavy a loss it might have
been for the Republican Party and the country as a whole,
Lincoln's death did not deprive the members of the radical group of
hopes for the future. The radicals believed that the new President
held more radical ideas on reconstruction than Lincoln.^^1^^ They did
all they could to protect the new President from the influence of
his conservative advisers in the administration. In the course of
numerous meetings with Johnson and also in many letters radical
Republicans promised to support the President and assured him
that they were his sincerest friends.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The radicals' chief opponents---the moderate and Peace
Democrats---however, also tended to view Johnson as their follower who,
in addition, was sensitive to the slogans and appeals of the Demo-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ James M. McPherson, <em>The Struggle for Equality. Abolitionists and the Negro in the
Civil War and Reconstruction</em>, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964,
p. 314.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz</em>, edited by Frederic
Bancroft, Vol. I, October 20, 1852-November 26, 1870, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York,
1913, p. 258; James G. Blaine, <em>Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield</em>,
Vol. II, The Henry Bill Publishing Company, Norwich, Conn., 1886, p. 14.</p>

<p>     The fall of plantation slavery and victory in the war against the
rebel slaveholders highlighted the first phase in the bourgeois--
democratic revolution in the USA. A logical extension of the
revolutionary course should have been confiscation of the planters' lands
and their distribution among the blacks and landless whites;
granting economic, political and civil rights to the liberated slaves on an
equal footing with the whites; and depriving the
counterrevolutionary planters of political power in the South.^^1^^ Only resolute
implementation of these measures could radically step up the
highly necessary transition from slave to hired labor, a process
which, as some American scholars saw it, was the backbone of
postbellum Reconstruction of the South.^^2^^ The acute political
struggle to continue the revolutionary course yielded tangible
results until the early 1870s after which the revolution started to
decline.</p>

<p>     Like the Civil War, Reconstruction played an important role in
the history of American political parties. Although the popular
masses were not so active and the forms and methods of political
struggle were not so diverse as they had been during the Civil War,
Reconstruction saw the end of a major realignment of class and
political forces, which turned the wartime political structure into a
new two-party system. The political tendencies of wartime were
definitively materialized, the ideological foundations of the new
party tandem were laid, and the principles of party interaction were</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>A History of the USA</em>, Vol. I, p. 461.</p>

<p>     Eric Foner, <em>Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War</em>, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1980, p. 98.</p>

<p>     152 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) 153</p>

<p>     opponents to retain power in their hands for a long time. However,
what they feared even more was extension and deepening of
revolutionary change in the country inherent in radical Reconstruction
plans. &quot;Give the black man equal political rights in our country and
you give him equal social rights,&quot; insisted the Democrats.^^1^^ The
experience of the political struggle during the Civil War showed
the Democrats that the means and methods, as well as the
underlying ideology of the Union coalition, were quite sufficient to hold
back the onslaught of the radical Republicans. That was why they
viewed the head of the Union coalition, President Johnson with
hope, expecting him and his conservative colleagues to take resolute
action against radicalism. At the same time the Democrats had no
desire to bind themselves by a political alliance with the
conservatives from the Union coalition intending to direct their actions
from the sidelines.</p>

<p>     At the beginning of his career, the new President enjoyed a
highly favorable attitude on the part of members of various
political groups. But now he was in a difficult situation. The leader of
the Union coalition realized that the major objective the coalition
was set up to fulfill, to bring the war to a victorious end, had been
attained. With the end of the war began the gradual disintegration
of the coalition's electorate: the voters who had realized the futility
of isolated actions to save the Union and had joined the coalition
during the war, began to return to their former parties. Johnson
was faced by the real threat of becoming a president without a
party were he to prove unable to retain the different political forces
within the Union coalition and direct them toward solution of new
problems in the Reconstruction period. The President attempted
to make his Reconstruction program sufficiently attractive to both
conservative Republicans and a considerable part of the Democrats.
Underlying the program was the concept of the fruits of victory.
The concept was similar to the views of the Unionists from the
border states and differed from the Republican Reconstruction
doctrine. Giving no thought to the lot of the black population in
the South, Johnson believed that the only terms under which the
rebel states would return to the Union and have their political
rights restored was a pledge of allegiance by former rebels (except</p>

<p>     <em>Negro Suffrage and Negro Equality</em>, Address of State Central Committee, The
Office of the ``Age'', Philadelphia, September, 1865, pp. 2-3, 4.</p>

<p>     cratic Party. A series of defeats the Democrats suffered in election
campaigns during the concluding stage of the war forced the party's
ambitious leadership to take a closer look at the changing
political situation. As many Democrats saw it, Lincoln's death and the
end of the war promised a new heyday for the party seeking by all
means to restore its former positions in national politics. The
Democrats believed that the party would politically profit from the
Democratic past of the new President, as well as the fact that quite
a few conservative Republicans and Democrats were among
Johnson's entourage due to the whims of the founders of the Union
coalition. The Democrats were certain that in the nearest future
Johnson would break off any relations with the radical Republicans
in the government and, in implementing his Reconstruction
program, would lead the conservative forces in their campaign against
radicalism.</p>

<p>     Despite the fact that the end of the war removed the original
cause of differences between moderate War and Peace Democrats,
friction between them continued. It was largely caused by the
Peace Democrats' intentions to prevent the party from drawing
closer to the War Democrats, those &quot;who shrank away in our times
of trouble&quot;^^1^^ rather than issues of Reconstruction policy. Both
moderates and Peace Democrats believed that the victorious North
should show leniency to the former rebel states and restore the
Southerners' former political rights as soon as possible. They
hoped that that would help reunite Northern and Southern
Democrats within the old party framework giving the opposition party
more chances to compete successfully with the Republicans. The
opposition leaders continued to accuse the Republican Party of
being despotic, violating the Constitution and seeking to use
wartime methods to fight their political opponents in the South. The
Democrats sharply criticized radical Reconstruction plans, above
all, the intention of the left-wing Republicans to grant equal
political rights to blacks and whites using the authority of the federal
government. In the opinion of the Democrats, this measure would
&quot;result in the degradation of the white race to the level of the
black.&quot; The party leaders justly feared that political equality of
the black and white Americans would enable their Republican</p>

<p>     <em>Letters and Literary Memorials of Samuel J. Tilden</em>, edited by John Bigelow, Vol. I,
Harper &amp; Brothers Publishers, New York and London, 1908, pp. 214-215.</p>

<p>     154 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) 155</p>

<p>     for the political and military elite of the Confederation), approval
by the legislatures of these states of the antislavery amendment to
the Constitution, cancelling of all debts of the Confederate
government and nullification of the secession ordonnances adopted by the
legislative assemblies of the rebel states on the eve of the war.
Leaving the right to settle all future racial issues with the
legislatures of the Southern states, Johnson firmly dissociated himself
from the left-wing Republicans who cherished radical plans of
transforming the South.</p>

<p>     Hoping to implement most of the intended measures before
the Congress began its work, Johnson, without losing any time, set
about realizing his Reconstruction program. On May 30, 1865, he
issued a proclamation on reconstruction of North Carolina; two
weeks later an absolutely identical proclamation appeared on
Reconstruction of Mississippi. By fall, presidential Reconstruction
had gotten underway in practically all the Southern states. Strange
as it may seem, however, its political results were directly opposite
to what was expected. The Southerners everywhere subverted
efforts to ratify the 13th amendment to the Constitution abolishing
slavery on the entire territory of the United States. They appointed
people who could not even be granted amnesty under the
presidential plan to posts in government bodies. Thus, the legislature
of Georgia nominated Alexander H. Stephens, former vice--
president of the Confederacy, to the US Senate, while the legislative
assemblies in Mississippi and South Carolina proposed to elect to
Congress two high-ranking military who had commanded rebel
troops during the war. The legislators in the Southern states drew
up and discussed new civil codes known as black codes according
to which the liberated blacks would at best receive the rights of
``second-rate'' citizens.</p>

<p>     The inadequate results of presidential Reconstruction inevitably
hastened the downfall of the Union coalition and helped
consolidate the members of its main group---the Republicans---on the basis of
nonacceptance of Reconstruction measures being undertaken. If an
overwhelming majority of the Democrats expressed growing
satisfaction with the President's policy, the Republicans increasingly
often drew attention to radical versions of Reconstruction which
seemed to be the only viable alternative to the presidential course.
Like Senator John Sherman of Ohio, many moderate and
conservative Republicans believed that support for radical plans of granting</p>

<p>     suffrage to the blacks was the lesser of two evils as compared to
approval of Johnson's Reconstruction program. Since the liberation
of slaves in the South increased representation of the Southern
states in the Congress,^^1^^ someone, either the Republicans or the
Democrats, stood to gain. The Republicans could gain the
advantage only by granting suffrage to the blacks.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The radical Republicans did everything they could to make the
disintegration of the Union coalition irreversible, because it
answered their interests of strengthening the partisan spirit and
consolidating the Republican Party on the basis of radical principles. As they
saw it, if the presidential Reconstruction plan were adopted &quot;the
South will soon be again in the hands of the proslavery element&quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>and urged that the process be stopped. When the 39th Congress
convened in December 1865, the radicals focussed on waging their
struggle against the President within the walls of the highest
legislative body. They took advantage of the fact that there were three
times more Republicans than Democrats in both chambers, and
launched a broad offensive against Johnson's Reconstruction
plan. They succeeded in keeping out of Congress the delegates
elected in the former rebel states according to the presidential
Reconstruction program. To achieve this, they managed to rally the
forces of all the Republicans. The political struggle in the Congress
grew even more acute after moderate Republican Lyman Trumbull
submitted to the Senate two bills aimed at changing the status of
the liberated blacks. One of the bills extended the term of
operation of the Freedmen's Bureau set up in early 1865 to help the
freed slaves, and gave it the right to distribute public land among
blacks in the South. The other bill granted freed blacks the basic
civil rights. Johnson vetoed both bills^^4^^ and found himself in
isolation in his own party which accused him of helping his political
opponents, the Democrats. The Republicans passed the bills by a</p>

<p>     Before the war black slaves were also regarded as part of the population in the
Southern states in determining representation in the Congress, but according to the
adopted rules a slave was counted as three-fifths of a free citizen.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ George H. Mayer, <em>The Republican Party. 1854-1964</em>, Oxford University Press, New
York 1964, p. 134.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz</em>, Vol. I, pp. 259, 265.
Edward McPherson, <em>The Political History of the United States of America During</em></p>

<p>     <em>the Period of Reconstruction, (From April 15, 1865, to July 15, 1870)</em>, Negro
Universities Press, New York, 1969, pp. 68-72.</p>

<p>     156 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) 157</p>

<p>     second unanimous vote overruling the presidential veto which
infringed on congressional rights in implementing the Reconstruction
program.</p>

<p>     The collapse of the moderate-conservative interparty bloc
which had emerged at the concluding stage of the war, was another
major consequence of the political struggle around TrumbulPs bills.
Johnson's Reconstruction policy proved to be the wedge which
destroyed the consensus between the opponents of radical measures
in both parties. Encouraged by the prospect of an early reunion
with their Southern colleagues in the party, the Democrats refused
to make concessions to the Republicans and sacrifice party
principles in order to gain partners in the fight against radicalism. Support
of the conservative program of presidential Reconstruction promised
them much more than flirting with the leaders of the ruling party's
right wing might have offered. At the same time moderate and
conservative Republicans in the Congress finally abandoned their
illusions regarding the intentions of the new President. Promising
the Southerners a return of their former political influence in the
country, the presidential Reconstruction program was too
conservative even for moderate and conservative Republicans. Under the
circumstances, the right-wing and moderate Republicans decided
that since the radical plans of transforming the South were popular
among voters in the North, they would do better if they support
these plans, simultaneously blunting their revolutionary edge
whenever possible.</p>

<p>     The tendency toward political polarization and greater
isolation of both parties' positions in the Congress was most clearly
manifest in the 39th and 40th Congresses during debates on the
14th amendment to the Constitution which made blacks and whites
equal before the law, and also the three acts on Reconstruction
which set forth in great detail the terms under which the former
rebel states would be readmitted to the Union.^^1^^ Although in the course
of discussion all these measures acquired a more than moderate
quality, they still included many points from the radical
Reconstruction plan which secured both radical and conservative Republican</p>

<p>     support for them. During congressional debates the Democrats acted
as an equally united front, if not more so, rejecting all the
Republican initiatives which were contrary to the presidential policy.<SUP>1
</SUP>Differences between Republicans and Democrats came to a head
during debates on the impeachment of President Johnson who was
accused by the leaders of the ruling party of arbitrarily removing
his political adversaries from government posts. If the Democrats
unanimously favored acquitting the President on all points of the
accusation, most of the Republicans came out against Johnson.<SUP>2
</SUP>Seven conservative Republicans who voted together with the
Democrats in favor of Johnson were severely criticized by their party
colleagues.^^3^^</p>

<p>     The election campaigns of the Reconstruction period once
again displayed the tendency toward disintegration of former
political alignments and enhancement of the partisan spirit. The
Union Party, the Johnson Administration's chief political base,
ceased to exist on the eve of the elections of 1866. The War
Democrats were leaving it so as to reunite with the Democratic Party
which they viewed as a reliable adversary of radical Reconstruction.
And conservative and moderate Republicans left the Union
coalition precisely because its activities and principles were associated
with Johnson's policy which meant playing down the results of the
war for the Republican Party. Consolidation of Republican ranks
brought the radicals a major victory in the elections in 1866,
because by that time their program had become the backbone
of the ruling party's Reconstruction course.^^4^^ The 1866 elections
undermined the Republican positions to some extent due to
resistance by the voters in Kentucky, Maryland, Connecticut and
Ohio to radical plans of granting political rights to the blacks.</p>

<p>     <em>The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the First
Session, the Forty-Ninth Congress</em>, Part 3, The Congressional Globe Office, Washington,
1866, pp. 2465-2466<em>;Ibid.</em>, Part II, pp. 1361, 1374-1375; <em>The Congressional Globe. First
Session, Fortieth Congress; Special Session of the Senate</em>, Washington, 1867, p. 157.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Congressional Globe. Fortieth Congress, Second Session</em>, Supplement,
Washington, 1868, pp. 411-414, 415.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Michael Les Benedict, <em>The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson</em>, W. W.
Norton &amp; Company, Inc., New York, 1973, pp. 181-182.</p>

<p>     As a result of the elections radical Republicans gained control over all the
legislatures in the Northern states and considerably strengthened their positions in the US
Congress driving out not only many Democrats but also moderate and conservative
Republicans.</p>

<p>     <em>The Congressional Globe. The Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress</em>,
Part II, pp. 1182, 1213-1215, 1459-1467; <em>Congressional Globe and Appendix. First
Session. Fortieth Congress</em>, The Congressional Globe Office, Washington, 1867, p. 215, 638.</p>

<p>     158 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) 159</p>

<p>     because they were afraid that new Reconstruction proposals would
appear that would infringe on the Southerners' rights. After the
end of the 1868 election campaign they showed more interest in
searching for other questions not directly connected to
Reconstruction problems. They believed that discussion of these questions
would help them snatch the political initiative from the
Republicans' hands.</p>

<p>     Processes occurring in the economy had a decisive impact on
the activities of the bourgeois parties in the 1870s. The abolishing
of slavery in the course of the Civil War provided an impulse for the
development of capitalism in breadth and in depth. The final stage
of the industrial revolution involved stepped-up concentration and
centralization of capital and America's development from an
agrarian to an advanced industrial country. In the early 1890s the
US came to occupy the first place in the world in output of
industrial goods.</p>

<p>     Quantitative changes in the sphere of production paved the way
for the appearance of the first monopolies in the 1870s. The ``old''
free-competition capitalism was losing its positions to the ``new'',
monopoly capitalism. The pools were the first form of capitalist
associations. They were particularly actively set up in railroads after
the beginning of the economic crisis of 1873-1878. Simultaneously
other forms of monopolies developed in industry, e.g. the trusts
which proved to be a more optimal form of big capitalist property.
The first trust, the Standard Oil Company, was founded by John
Rockefeller in 1879. It was soon followed by others: the
cottonseed oil trust in 1884, the linseed oil trust in 1885, and alcohol, sugar,
lead and other trusts in 1887. The domination of corporate capital
gradually spread to an increasing number of industries, commerce
and transport.</p>

<p>     Having caused a fundamental change in the alignment of class
forces, the rise of monopolies gave a peculiar shape to the party--
political mechanism. The gradual narrowing of the ruling class's social
base and the concentration of power in the hands of the monopoly
elite became the typical trends of the period when free-competition
capitalism developed into monopoly capitalism. The fact that the
bourgeois party machinery was subordinated to the interests of Big
Business was evident in the latter's control of key posts in the
government and other organs of power, the appearance of stock
owning politicians, and the bribing of officials. For example, in the</p>

<p>     However, even defeat in the elections in some states did not weaken
the consolidation of the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     Having brought victory to the Republican candidates for
president and vice-president, Ulysses S. Grant and Schuyler Colfax,
the elections of 1868 firmly consolidated the balance of political
forces prevailing in the country after the end of the war. The
Republican Party's victory in 25 out of 33 states, including Southern
ones, dispersed the fears of the moderate and conservative
Republicans that the former rebels would be able to restore their
political power. The leaders of these groups ascribed all the
achievements of the radical stage in Reconstruction to themselves.^^1^^ At
the same time, enjoying the political fruit of the radical course,
moderates and conservatives believed that it should not be
extended any further. Their intentions were quite clearly displayed when
the demand for black suffrage already confirmed by the 14th
amendment to the Constitution and the Reconstruction Acts was
incorporated in the Republican election platform in the form of a
strongly watered down compromise. This was explained by the
fact that &quot;if at the beginning of radical Reconstruction the
bourgeoisie was forced to rely on the black popular masses in the
struggle against the planters, it was no longer necessary as the
bourgeoisie strengthened its positions in the South in the course of
Reconstruction.' Successful actions by the blacks in the South as
well as major social clashes between the proletariat and capitalists
in the North frightened the party's right-wingers and prevented
them from further supporting the radical course. Thus, the
bourgeoisie of the North began to voice its intention to curtail
Reconstruction measures already after the 1868 elections.</p>

<p>     The tendency toward completing revolutionary
transformations was welcomed in the Democratic Party for obvious reasons.
Defeated in the 1868 elections, they were forced to put up with
the irreversible social and economic changes in the South.
Moreover, since the initiative in implementing Reconstruction measures
remained in the hands of the Republicans for another four years,
the Democrats gradually lost interest in debating these issues</p>

<p>     <em>Republican Congressional Committee, 1867-1869. Emancipation!
Enfranchisement! Reconstruction! Legislative Record of the Republican Party During and Since the
War</em>, Published by the Union Republican Congressional Committee, Washington, 1868,
pp. 1-8.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>A History of the USA</em>, Vol. I, p. 497,</p>

<p>     160 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) 161</p>

<p>     US Senate, known in the 1880s as the millionaires' club, most
senators were closely linked to industrial, financial and railroad
corporations.</p>

<p>     As spokesmen for Big Business gained political power, projects
of radical Reconstruction, which underlay the activities of the
Republican Party's left wing, were forgotten. Having defeated the
insurgent South and restored the Union, the bourgeoisie of the North
came out firmly against any further deepening of the revolution.
The most conservative forces grew more active within the ruling
class, seeking to shift the axis of political life to the right and
launch an offensive against the working people's democratic gains.
The change in the direction of the principal blow was due to the
fact that social and political polarization in society put new tasks
before the bourgeois parties which, above all, had 40 limit the scope
of the class struggle and prevent the emergence of political
organizations of workers and farmers. In view of this, peace in the
Southern &quot;rear area&quot; and the assistance of former enemies could largely
facilitate the task of resisting the new danger.</p>

<p>     The fact that part of the bourgeoisie discontinued its support
for the revolution was reflected in attempts by the Republican
Administration of Ulysses Grant (1869-1877) to contribute to
curtailing Reconstruction programs and blunting their democratic edge.
The administration did not help the radical Republicans when the
Democrats came to power in a number of Southern states relying
on the terroristic Ku Klux Klan organizations and whipping up all
sorts of chauvinistic moods among the white population. Not only
did it fail to take any measures to suppress anti-black terror but, on
the contrary, in 1872 it sanctioned an act on general amnesty
restoring the rights of the former rebels on a national scale.^^1^^ The Grant
Administration refused to apply the anti-Ku Klux Klan acts of 1870-
1871 against the growing forces of the counterrevolution.
Reflecting the moods of big industrial capital, the ruling group was not
interested in deepening the revolution and practically prevented its
development. Its demagogic appeals on the importance of
continuing Reconstruction, the tactic of waving the &quot;bloody shirt&quot; so as to
remind the contemporaries of the party's achievements in the years
of the Civil War were due to the need to retain control over the party</p>

<p>~^^1^^ R. F. Ivanov, <em>The Blacks' Struggle for Land and Liberty in the South of the USA
(1865-1877)</em>, Moscow, 1958, pp. 288-298 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     machinery in the Southern states which supplied a large part of
the voters. It is not surprising therefore that ten Southern states
secured victory in the 1872 elections for the leader of that part of the
Republican Party, Ulysses Grant.^^1^^ It is this circumstance which
explains the remarkable persistence shown by this group in
preserving the status quo in the section. The &quot;Southern subject&quot; was
used as a sort of smokescreen to hide counterrevolutionary
intentions.</p>

<p>     The ruling circles' stand was supported by the leadership of the
Republican Party's moderate faction expressing the interests of the
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of the Northeast and the
Midwest. The moderates launched an extensive campaign to brainwash
the public into believing that traditional ways of dealing with the
Southern states in the period of Reconstruction had not only
become obsolete but had even turned into an obstacle to raising new
issues in political life. Most members of the Grand Old Party soon
realized that it was important to develop a new, liberal attitude to
the South. The general opinion was expressed by future president
Rutherford Hayes: &quot;The wish is to restore harmony and good
feeling between Sections and races. This can only be done by peaceful
methods.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The achievement of greater intraclass unity within the ruling
bloc was hastened by the transition of petty-bourgeois democrats to
conservative positions, while in the first stage of the revolution they
had acted in alliance with the popular masses. The reason for this
development was that Reconstruction, as a specific stage in the
bourgeois-democratic revolution, only indirectly affected the
interests of workers and farmers whose chief demand (the Homestead
Act) had been satisfied in the course of the Civil War. The
insufficiently high level of class self-awareness possessed by the
proletariat and the absence of mass organizations adhering to revolutionary
positions played into the hands of the reactionary forces. Taking
advantage of contradictions between various sections of the
population, petty-bourgeois democrats openly favored a revision of
relations with the Southern states.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections</em>, Editor: Robert A. Diamond,
W., Congresional Quarterly Inc., 1975, pp. 235, 274.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Hayes. The Diary of a President. 1875-1881</em>, edited by T. Harry Williams, David
McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1964, p. 85.</p>

<p>     11-749</p>

<p>     <b>162</b> Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     Political Parties in the Reconstruction Period</p>

<p>     (1865-1877) <b>163</b></p>

<p>     growth in the political prestige of the Democratic Party was largely
promoted by the fact that it managed to strengthen its positions in
the Midwest where it supported mass popular demands (low tariffs,
cheap money, and restriction of the power of the railroad
corporations). The Democrats showed exceptional vigor in drawing
immigrant workers into the orbit of their influence in the New
England cities.</p>

<p>     Structural changes in the Democratic Party's social base were
accompanied by an evolution of its ideological and political
orientation. The new line in the behavior of the Democrats was manifested
in solving specific problems of social and economic development in
the South and contributing to the growth of industry and enterprise.
Major financial benefits for the bourgeoisie, subsidies for the
railroad corporations, tax policy---such was a far from complete list of
forms of patronage in respect to the new capitalists of the South.
As the Reconstruction programs were toned down, relations
between the bourgeois parties were increasingly marked by unity of
interests in the economic sphere. Contradictions between the former
adversaries were smoothed out giving place to a consensus on most
issues facing the country. For the bourgeois parties to draw closer,
however, another important condition was necessary---the
Democrats had to accept the results of the war and the Republicans to
abandon the policy of revolutionizing the South.</p>

<p>     Most of the Democrats demonstrated their readiness to
conclude a compromise with the Republicans during the election
campaign of 1872 when they supported the candidacy of Horace
Greelley and the platform of the Liberal-Republican Party securing
the support of four Southern and two Western states. However, the
restructuring of the Democratic Party had not been completed at
the time yet. Some of the Democrats formed their own political
organization voting for Charles O'Connor and John Quincy Adams in
the elections. The platform they adopted denounced the
treacherous behavior of the &quot;false leadership&quot; and quite clearly indicated
the importance of carrying on the fight to repeal the amendments
to the Constitution enacted during the years of the revolution. But
supporters of this viewpoint were obviously a small minority.
Slightly more than 18,000 people voted for them.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The economic crisis of 1873-1878 sharply aggravated the class</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 41-42.</p>

<p>     The leading part in shaping the new approach to the South
belonged to politicians in the states bordering on it. In 1869 they
managed to get an amnesty act passed in Missouri restoring the
political rights of the former rebels. The reform movement
organizationally formed during the election campaign of 1872. This led to the
appearance in the Republican Party of a group which aimed to leave
their own political organization. It included such prominent figures
as Carl Schurz, Horace Greeley, Charles Francis Adams, Lyman
Trumbull and others. The opposition founded the Liberal-Republican
Party which believed that &quot;universal amnesty will result in complete
pacification in all sections of the country.''^^1^^ Thus, the new
approach to the South made an absolute out of the policy of
compromise with the former Confederates and refused to support the rights
of the blacks, former allies in Reconstruction. From the viewpoint
of American Marxist historians reformism of this kind meant &quot;
complete abandonment of the revolution in the South, and surrender of
the Negro minority there to the organized violence of the arrogant
planters.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     At the same time, the world outlook of the Liberal-Republicans
combined conservative ideas with some ideas of a positive nature.
Their politicians launched a drive for democratization of the political
system within the framework of the bourgeois country. Their calls
for reform of the civil service and introduction of secret ballot in
elections were aimed against such negative things widespread in the
two-party system as corruption, bribery and bossism. It was this
aspect in their activities which, following the defeat of the Liberal--
Republican Party in the elections of 1872, gave rise to the faction of
``independents'' who organizationally belonged to the Republican
Party but retained the right to choose their own candidates to the
highest organs of power.</p>

<p>     The shift to the right by the Grand Old Party made it possible
for it to draw closer to the Democrats for whom the postwar period
had become a major stage in fundamental renewal in order to adapt
to the new social and economic conditions. The Democrats had
turned from a political organization of the slaveholder oligarchy
into a party of the new bourgeoisie and big farmers of the South. The</p>

<p>     <b>^^1^^</b> <b><em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 44.</b></p>

<p>     <b>^^2^^</b> <b>William Z. Foster, <em>The Negro People in American History</em>, International Publishers,
New York, 1954, p. 331.</b></p>

<p>     164 Chapter Seven</p>

<p>     struggle in the North and largely hastened the shift to the right in
politics and the drawing closer of bourgeois parties on a mutually
acceptable basis. The initiative to reconciliation came from the
ranks of the ruling party. Faced with serious domestic difficulties,
the Republican leadership was increasingly less inclined to carry
through the Reconstruction of the South. With the tacit
acquiescence of the Grant Administration the military dictatorship
established to keep all power in the hands of the Northern bourgeoisie
collapsed. The change in the balance of power on the political scene
became obvious during the congressional elections in 1874 when
the Democrats managed to get a majority in the House of
Representatives for the first time since the Civil War. Prominent
Confederates such as Alexander Stephens of Georgia, John Reagan of Texas,
Roger Mills of Texas, George Harris of Virginia and others were
elected. The absence of support from the federal government and mass
denial of suffrage to the blacks contributed to a legal overthrow of
the rule of radical Republicans in a number of Southern legislatures.
The Democrats re-emerged as real rivals of the Republicans in the
Midwest and the Northeast. They led the electorate of such
disputable states as Indiana, New York, New Jersey and Ohio. Even
states formerly in the Republican domain (Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Wisconsin and Nevada) gave preference to the
Democrats. In 12 out of the 17 states where elections were held
Democrats were elected to the post of governor.</p>

<p>     In the 1876 election campaign the Democrats threatened the
domination of the Republicans. Their presidential candidate,
Samuel Tilden, received 254,235 more votes than the Republican
candidate Rutherford Hayes.^^1^^ Only the Tilden-Hayes deal of 1876-
1877, on the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, enabled
the GOP to remain in the White House. The Great Compromise
united the formerly hostile parties into one mechanism and
recreated the two-party system. The leading part in the political process
was retained by the Republican Party which ruled the country for
half a century (excluding the Cleveland Administration in 1885-1889
and 1893-1897 and the Wilson Administration in 1913-1921). The
Democrats had to put up with the role of a junior partner.</p>

8

<p>     <b>FROM RECONSTRUCTION</b></p>

<p>     <b>TO BIG BUSINESS:</b></p>

<p>     <b>PRINCIPAL TRENDS IN</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE EVOLUTION OF THE</b></p>

<p>     <b>TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE LATE 1870s AND 1880s</b></p>

<p>     The new two-party system was established during the
concluding stage in Reconstruction. In the first fifteen years of its existence
it was an extremely conservative political mechanism. Essentially it
reflected the logical decline of the second American revolution of
1865-1877 and the desire of the ruling circles to suppress the social
activity of the popular masses. The combined forces of the
bourgeoisie and the former planters came out against the farmers in
the North and the black Americans fighting for their rights in the
South.</p>

<p>     As the acute ideological debates of the time of Reconstruction
receded into the past, the bourgeois parties were increasingly
turning into servants of Big Business. The Gilden Age, as Mark Twain
called the period of the country's postwar development, was
unrivalled in frankly cynical subordination of the two-party system to
the interests of the rising monopoly capital.</p>

<p>     The set of relations between bourgeois parties on the national
scene was marked by functional unity. The interparty consensus
based on the idea that corporate prosperity meant the nation's
prosperity involved creating optimal conditions for monopoly growth.
The bourgeois parties helped transfer enormous expanses of public
land to private hands and grant concessions and subsidies for
construction of enterprises, awarding lucrative contracts and tax rebates. The
protectionist policy intended to defend national industry from foreign
competition favored the strengthening of corporate capital's
positions on the domestic market. Extensive railroad construction
contributed to stepped-up development of big industry. At the same
time, a common social nature did not mean that the bourgeois
parties used the same methods and means to achieve their final goal.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections</em>, p. 275.</p>

<p>     166 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 167</p>

<p>     in the 1870s, when the interparty consensus was only emerging, the
margin, as estimated by American analysts, ranged from 5 to 11.9
percent.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The interparty consensus was founded on compromise, on
avoiding the most pressing issues of the time. Ideological differences
were reduced to a minimum. The party platforms of the
Republicans and the Democrats virtually repeated each other.</p>

<p>     The last thirty years of the 19th century were marked by a high
degree of electorate mobilization by the parties. On an average,
three-fourths (in some years up to 95 percent) of the eligible voters
took part in elections. Since then the electorate has never given its
votes to the bourgeois parties so actively. The main reason for the
development was that the second American revolution of 1861-1877
involved hundreds of thousands of people in political life. The
increase in the number of voters was also due to the 14th and 15th
amendments to the Constitution. With their enactment the entire
male adult population (white and black) became eligible to vote.
Support of the parties by the electorate was also promoted by the
activities of the party machines in the cities. The rapid growth of
these machines at the end of the 19th century was a consequence of
a firm alliance between professional politicians and members of
Big Business, which required a modification of all the parts of the
party machinery. The party machines set themselves the goal of
controlling voter behavior and fulfilled an important task in the
eyes of the ruling class: channeling the social activity of the masses
into the two-party system.</p>

<p>     The bourgeois parties derived huge political dividends from
skilfully manipulating ethnocultural values. Playing on the contra
dictions between members of different nations who had emigrated
to the United States from the European continent at various times,
politicians sought to create the impression among voters that the
Republican and Democratic parties differed on matters of principle
and represented Protestant and Catholic ideas respectively. In terms
of political struggle, however, differences in the bourgeois parties'
approach to solving ethnocultural problems were as a rule
displayed at the local level. Only one issue---temperance---assumed a
national dimension and was the chief plank of the Prohibition</p>

<p>     Morton Keller, <em>Affairs of State. Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America</em>,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977, p. 545.</p>

<p>     Republicans and Democrats differed on questions of tactics.</p>

<p>     Neither did they have the same social base. Republicans were
regarded to a larger extent as a party of Big Business. Their positions
were the strongest in New England, the section which was most
developed in terms of industry. The Grand Old Party relied on the
financiers of Wall Street and owners of industrial and railroad
corporations. That business circles exerted major influence on the
machinery of the Republican Party was seen in numerous appointments
of their members to the highest party posts. At the same time the
Republican leadership managed to secure the support of the urban
petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, workers and
farmers in the Northeast and Midwest.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party's social base presented a more motley
picture due to the greater difficulties it had in adapting to the social
and economic realities of postwar development. It still relied on the
former plantation owners who were rapidly turning into bourgeois.
Gravitating toward them were the industrialists of the Northeastern
states engaged in processing agricultural produce and also part of
the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the Midwest who had
trade ties with the Southern sections. The Democratic leadership
maintained contacts with the Morgan banking empire, the Hearst
newspaper corporation and other leaders of the business world. The
white farmers of the South, the Southwest and the Far West
supported the Democratic Party. Mass support was provided by the
urban lower strata, mostly the immigrants.</p>

<p>     Changes in mass support were accompanied by the formation of
new groups within the parties. In the Democratic Party the interests
of industrial companies in the Northeast and South were expressed
by conservative Democrats; the agrarian sections of the South,
Southwest and Far West were represented by moderate Democrats.
In the Republican Party the conservative faction relied on the rising
monopoly capital of the Northeast and the Middle West, and the
moderate group on the farmers of the Middle and Far West.</p>

<p>     The specific feature in the functioning of the two-party system
in the 1870s and 1880s consisted in maintaining a balance of power
between its components. The era of party equilibrium (1876-1892)
was a period of acute interparty rivalry when neither of the chief
parties was able to win an absolute majority of the votes. The
Republicans won three presidential elections and the Democrats two.
But the margin in the popular vote was less than one percent. Yet,</p>

<p>     168 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 169</p>

<p>     Party platform in the 1872 election.</p>

<p>     Tradition and economic interests played an important part in
forming stable groups of the electorate. Having received voting
rights during the period of Reconstruction, black Americans, for
example, supported the Republicans. Workers born in the United
States feared competition from foreigners and approved the policy
of the GOP to restrict the coming into the country of settlers from
other continents. The immigrant workers supported the Democrats.
Farmers in the Northeast and Midwest, who supplied the cities with
food and raw materials, voted for the Republicans who protected
the domestic market by high tariffs. The farmers of the Far West
and the South produced agricultural produce for export and were
thus interested in the policy of the Democrats who demanded low
prices on industrial goods and liberalization of foreign trade. The
interests of the working people were in direct contradiction to
the policy of the ruling class; however, due to an undeveloped class
awareness, the contingents of the antimonopoly movement----
workers and farmers---acted within the framework of the bourgeois
parties controlled by monopoly capital.</p>

<p>     At the same time, having exacerbated contradictions between
labor and capital, unfettered development of capitalism contributed
to a growth in the struggle waged by the working class and the
farmers and the appearance of social protest movements which advanced
antimonopoly slogans. Dissatisfaction with the ruling circles'
policy resulted in alienation of some workers and farmers who set
out to create independent political organizations. The Greenback
Party was founded in 1875 becoming one of the first mass political
organizations of farmers. The Working-Men's Party of the United
States operating since 1876 was renamed the Socialist Labor Party a
year after it was founded. The working people waged an active and
militant struggle against growing capitalist exploitation. This
resulted in bitter strikes which dispelled the myth of the United States
being a society of social harmony. The class battles of the American
workers such as the famous strike of May 1,1886, were among the
major political actions of the international working-class movement.
The American workers' actions inspired the proletarians in other
countries to fight their exploiters, and served to strengthen
international proletarian solidarity. This&quot; was why, at the First Congress of
the Second International (1889), it was decided to annually hold
worker manifestations on May 1 so as to show international soli-</p>

<p>     darity between workers in all countries.</p>

<p>     The outflow of the working people from the GOP and the
success of the Democrats in the elections of the 1870s forced the
Republican leadership to search for new allies and bring into the orbit
of Republican influence new social groups which could be relied on
in the struggle for power. Politicians turned to the South. The motley
social and ethnic base of the Democrats could, in their view, serve
as a source for reviving Republican majority on new lines. In
forming a stable coalition the main stake was not on the blacks, as it had
been in the years of Reconstruction, but on white major property
owners or, to use President Hayes' words, &quot;good men of the South 
---late rebels.''^^1^^ The purpose was served by the policy of patronage,
allocations for internal improvements, and the appointment of
David Key, former Confederate army general, as Postmaster General.
A change in the party-political orientation was reflected in the
Republican platform of 1876 which pledged to secure &quot;the permanent
pacification of the Southern section of the Union and the complete
protection of all its citizens in the free enjoyment of all their
rights.''^^2^^ Despite declarations on the need to observe the interests
of both races, the platform contained no specific proposals on the
fate of recent allies in Reconstruction. The problem of the blacks
was hushed up.</p>

<p>     The policy of pacification of the South required the
Republicans to modernize their ideological principles to some extent. The
ideas of consensus were extended to the sphere of bourgeois parties'
political interests, and most fully this was manifested in respect to
the black Americans. Following the Democrats the politicians of
the GOP proclaimed that the black population was not completely
ready for suffrage. The Republicans acknowledged their ``delusion''
in the years the main Reconstruction measures were adopted
when they had hoped that the population of the South &quot;so far
behind in many of the attributes of enlightened improvement and
civilization&quot; could be &quot;transformed into our model of Northern
communities.&quot; Most of them agreed with the conclusion of William
A.Wheeler, the Vice-President in the Hayes Administration, that
that could &quot;only come through a long course of patient waiting to</p>

<p>     ' <em>Hayes. The Diary of a President. 1875-1881</em>, p. 74.
<em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 53.</p>

<p>     170 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 17!</p>

<p>     which no one can now set certain bounds.''^^1^^ The idea even
appeared among the Republicans on the possibility of a &quot;middle
ground&quot; between slavery and equal citizenship where the black
American would be regarded as formally free but would not have
the right to vote. The fate of the former allies was put in the hands
of the Democrats.</p>

<p>     The Republicans hoped that the pacification policy would lead
to the revival of Republicanism in the Southern states. However,
the new strategic line failed during the midterm elections of 1878.
The attempt to expand the party's electorate by relying chiefly on
the well-to-do and conservative-minded white Southerners resulted
in a sharp reduction in the proportion of traditional voter groups.
The Republican parties in the South continued to decline. The
congressional elections confirmed that the GOP was losing electoral
support: 155 Democrats were elected to the House against 137
Republicans. Moreover, all Republican candidates for state governors
were defeated. In the 1880 election the South voted solidly for the
Democratic Party.</p>

<p>     Despite the failure of Hayes' Southern strategy, the Republicans
did not give up the idea of setting up a party coalition with the
participation of the Southerners. Now the Republicans sought to
restore their influence in the section by relying on other strata of the
white population (the petty and middle bourgeoisie in town and
countryside) whose class interests clashed with the policy of the
Democratic ruling elite known as the Bourbons. At the turn of the
1880s these strata formed the bulk of the movement for
independent political action. The Independent Democrats, for their part,
mostly sought to reduce state debts remaining from the Civil War.
But their platform had other planks as well: granting all citizens,
including the blacks, the real right to vote, abolition of racial
discrimination and the voting tax, setting up free public schools, etc.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Republican leadership decided that it was necessary to
collaborate with the Independents. As a minimum it was planned, with
their help, to gain a majority in the House of Representatives which
had been in the Democratic hands since 1875. &quot;If we lose the next
House we can hardly hope to carry the presidential elections... We</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Official Proceedings of the National Republican Conventions 1868, 1872, 1876 and
1880</em>, Minneapolis, 1903, p. 336.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Autobiography of John Massey</em>, edited by E. H. Hancock, The Neale Publishing
Co., New York, 1909, pp. 185-189.</p>

<p>     cannot save House without fostering the independent Democratic
and coalition movements in the Southern States,&quot;^^1^^ wrote one of
the authors of the Southern strategy William Chandler to a
prominent Republican James G. Blaine. To achieve this federal posts were
generously distributed among loyal citizens. The Republicans
actively supported election of Independents to state legislatures.
Senator Simon Cameron initiated a campaign in the North to collect
money to pay the voting tax for the poorest sections in a number of
Southern states. The close contacts of the Garfield and the Arthur
administrations with the Independents were seen not only in the
latter's copying of the GOP platform but also in the fact that they
were renamed Republicans.</p>

<p>     The congressional elections of 1882 became a test of the
effectiveness of the new coalition. Their results gave rise to profound
disappointment among the leaders of the Republican Party, because
they failed to win a majority of seats in the House to which only 16
Independents and Republicans were elected from the South. The
hope to launch an opposition movement fell through. The problem
of a ``united'' South became a political reality. Hence the
Republicans were forced to rely on the electorate mostly in the Eastern and
Western states.</p>

<p>     However, the growing popularity of third parties in the
Northeast and Midwest had a destabilizing effect on the Republicans'
positions in these sections. The Republicans' traditional political
appeals based on demagogic references to the war years came into
increasing contradiction with the rapidly advancing class
polarization of society. The need arose for the ruling Republican Party to
work out a new strategic line aimed at neutralizing popular masses.
At the turn of the 1880s power passed into the hands of those
of its leaders who favored altering the ideological orientation by
transferring the emphasis on problems closer to, and more easily
understood by, the voters. The party leadership chose
protectionism.</p>

<p>     High tariffs had secured an independent position for American
industry in the world by the early 1880s. Nevertheless, having
used protectionist tariffs to occupy leading positions on the market
of the goods they produced, the pools, and subsequently the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;W. Chandler to J. Blaine, Oct. 2, 1882&quot;, <em>William E. Chandler Papers</em>, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Container 56.</p>

<p>     172 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 173</p>

<p>     trusts, refused to give up the monopoly exploitation of the country.
They demanded that the government firmly close the doors of
the domestic market to create the most favorable conditions
for a growth of their production. Fulfilling the order, the
Republican Party turned the policy of high tariffs into a major means of
strengthening monopoly capital on the domestic market. As distinct
from the classical model, the protectionism of the late 19th century
was not aimed at shielding industry as a whole, but at
safeguarding those of its sectors where the monopoly element was the
strongest. In the words of Frederick Engels, tariffs protected &quot;the
producer not from the foreign importer but from the domestic
consumer.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Attaching top priority to the tariff issue caused a split in the
Democratic Party which was in the opposition. The faction of
conservative Democrats representing the interests of the industrial
bourgeoisie in the Northeast approved of protectionism. Lack of a
coherent stand was typical of the moderate faction which relied on
the agrarian sections in the Western and Southern states who
demanded a cut in protective tariffs. High tariffs were opposed by
both advocates of free trade and those who favored retaining part
of the duties as a source of the federal budget. Members of the
second trend made up the bulk of the Democratic Party. The demand
that &quot;a tariff for revenue only&quot; was written down in party papers
of the 1870s and the 1880 platform, although it was not specified
how this was to be achieved. The Democratic leadership was
displeased that the Republicans had put the tariff problem on the
agenda. Seeking to smooth out differences between the various
factions it decided not to draw attention to the dangerous issue. On
the whole, the 1884 election platform of the Democratic Party
approved the revision of tariffs, but at the same time it did not oppose
protectionism in principle: &quot;In making reduction in taxes, it is not
proposed to injure any domestic industries, but rather to promote
their healthy growth.'&quot;</p>

<p>     Factional strife in the bourgeois parties grew more acute in the
course of the election campaign. The party lost control of the
Independent Republicans. They refused to support the official candi-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ F. Engels, &quot;Schutzzoll und Freihandel&quot;, in: Marx/Engels, <em>Werke</em>, Bd. 21, Dietz
Verlag, Berlin, 1973, p. 373.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 66.</p>

<p>     dates of their party (James Elaine and John Logan) who, in their eyes,
epitomized the bribery and corruption of the party machines
existing in the country. As opposed to the official protectionist course,
the Independents supported the idea of free trade popular among
the Democrats. As they saw it, the tariff reform was to become an
important step on the way to ridding politics of corrupt officials
following the adoption of the 1883 civil service law which
prohibited the appointment of civil servants on the basis of partisan
considerations and introduced a system of competitive tests to qualify
for office. The protectionist Democrats had not gone so far as the
Independent Republicans who had opted for separating from their
own party and supported the Democratic candidate Grover
Cleveland. However, the adherence of the protectionist Democrats to the
policy of high tariffs was regarded as betrayal of the Democratic
Party's interests. Hence the emergence of organizations blocking
their election to high offices.</p>

<p>     In the 1884 elections the Democratic Party scored a victory
over the Republicans for the first time after the Civil War. Apart
from the Southern states, Cleveland managed to gain the support of
a number of Northern states, which gave him 219 electoral votes
against 182 received by Elaine. In the popular vote, however,
Cleveland won by a margin of only 25,685 votes,^^1^^ with most of these
votes belonging to the Independents who had strong positions in
the Northeastern states.</p>

<p>     The very first steps taken by the President showed the
Democratic Party's complete loyalty to the Union and the interests of Big
Business which they promoted as zealously as the Republicans. The
traditional calls of the Democrats for decentralization, restricting
government activities in the social and economic sphere, defense of
states and individual rights contained more rhetoric and demagogy
than desire to undermine the positions of Big Business. The
Democratic leadership adopted a pro-monopoly stand during the debates
imposed on them by the Republicans concerning high tariff rates.
Yet, the fear of losing the votes of anti-protectionists made them to
some extent dissociate themselves ideologically from the
Republicans.</p>

<p>     In December 1887 Cleveland delivered an annual message to
Congress devoted entirely to the tariff reform. Referring to the fact</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections</em>, p.</p>

<p>     277.</p>

<p>     174 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 175</p>

<p>     that considerable funds had accumulated in the treasury he urged to
reduce tariffs on raw materials and put wool, sugar, cotton and
other agricultural goods on the free list. Cleveland's proposals were
a far cry from the radicalism of free trade advocates and actually
quite moderate. Protectionist tariffs were to be continued &quot;as the
source of the Government's income.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Cleveland's message marked the start of the Great Debates---an
acute ideological dispute between the bourgeois parties. That tariff
problem acquired top priority was due to the growing conflict
between numerous noncorporate sections of the bourgeoisie and its
monopoly elite.</p>

<p>     The bourgeois parties skilfully harped on the tariff issue, taking
advantage of disagreement in the views of businessmen. In spring
1888, Roger Mills of Texas submitted to the House a bill which
would put the President's ideas into practice. It was intended to
reduce duties by seven percent and include some raw materials in the
duty-free list. The proposed measures did not threaten
protectionism, but the Republicans called the bill a free trade manifesto. The
GOP took an uncompromising stand in defense of the high tariff.
Thus, insignificant differences appearing in the bourgeois parties'
approach to tariff rates were used by party strategists to create the
impression among voters that their positions offered an alternative.
The Democrats were proclaimed the free trade party, although there
were no such planks in its platform, and the Republicans were passed
off as guardians of protectionism. While the platforms of the
Republicans and the Democrats were extremely similar, advocacy of or
antipathy for high tariffs was a yardstick for determining party
affiliation. As contemporaries put it, tariffs were successfully used &quot;as
a trap to catch votes.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Republicans came to power in 1889. In fulfilment of the
promises they had made, they hurried to adopt a new tariff which
was a logical outcome of their program. To satisfy the New England
capitalists the 1890 act introduced higher tariffs on some industrial
goods competing with American products. The duties rose to an
unprecedented level, on an average up to 50 percent on imported</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897</em>, Vol. 8,
p. 585.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ &quot;An Extract from a Letter of W. Endicott, enclosed in a Letter of J. Folger to
W. Chandler, Oct. 27, 1882&quot;, <em>William E. Chandler Papers</em>, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Container 64.</p>

<p>     goods. An important development was the granting of preferential
terms of trade to Latin American countries through bilateral
reductions or even elimination of tariffs. While the overall line to
continually raising the tariff barrier was retained, introduction into the
act of provisions on duty-free import and export of certain goods
solved tactically important problems: it disarmed the Democrats by
snatching away from them their proposal on liberalization of
import and neutralized the Republican advocates of lower protective
duties who represented the interests of the Western states' agrarian
sections.</p>

<p>     The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, adopted by the Democrats in
1894, put an end to the demagogic assertions by the bourgeois
parties on the existence of fundamental differences between them on
the tariff issue. In effect, it hardly differed from the previous one.
The average rate was 39.64 percent, i.e. the taxation of most of the
goods was reduced insignificantly, while the rate on wood and sugar
was even raised. &quot;The commodities on the free list were changed,
but the principle of protection was accepted by both great parties,&quot;
wrote a participant in the debates Richard F. Pettigrew.^^1^^ Thus, the
alternative in the policies of the bourgeois parties concerned only
particular issues and not fundamental matters. The interparty
consensus was not considerably disturbed. The tariffs adopted by the
Republicans and the Democrats did not change the essential
meaning of the customs duty system. The average tariff rate remained
between 40 and 50 percent, and under the Dingley Tariff it reached
57 percent.</p>

<p>     Active promotion of the interests of Big Business by the
bourgeois parties led to a change in their methods of procuring finances.
If in the 1870s their funds were largely made up of membership
dues, in the 1880s the lion's share of their money came from
donations by monopoly associations. As a rule, generous contributions by
industrial tycoons had many strings attached. As is clear from the
correspondence between the secretary of the American Iron and
Steel Association, James M. Swank and William Allison, Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, who presided over preparation of
the tariff bills in the 1880s, the donation of 80,000 dollars to the
National Republican Committee was payment for the decision to</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Richard F. Pettigrew, <em>The Triumphant Plutocracy. The Story of American Public
Life from 1870 to 1920</em>, The Academy Press, New York City, 1922, p. 57.</p>

<p>     176 Chapter Eight</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Late 1870s and 1880s 177</p>

<p>     raise tariff rates on steel rails and so on.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The bourgeois ideology of the late 19th century---social
Darwinism---answered the interests of Big Business. It proclaimed individual
freedom, unrestricted competition and the survival of the fittest to
be laws of social development. In the pre-monopoly period social
Darwinism served to justify free competition and with the
transition to imperialism it turned into a defender of the monopolies'
omnipotence.</p>

<p>     At the same time the fact that the bourgeois parties ignored the
most important social and economic problems provoked a growth
of social dissatisfaction among the working people whose chief
demand was to fight the arbitrary actions of the monopolies. The
Republican and Democratic administrations alike refused to solve these
problems, resorting only to propaganda and demagogic half--
measures adopted under the slogans of fighting big capital. Such was the
case in 1887 when Congress passed Interstate Commerce Act
formally prohibiting railroad pools. The reluctance of the bourgeois
parties to resist the growth of the monopolies was even more
strongly apparent in the course of debates on the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890 which ostensibly prohibited the trusts to take action
restricting trade. Even the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890,
which was adopted under pressure from broad sections of the
population and which required the treasury to purchase 4.5 million
ounces of the cheap metal every month, hardly infringed on the
financial interests of Wall Street tycoons.</p>

<p>     Yet the strong upsurge in the antimonopoly movement
sweeping through America in the late 1880s and early 1890s made it
imperative for the bourgeois politicians to make wider use of social
maneuvering for the sake of preserving the domination of the ruling
class. The importance of actively using reformist strategy was
realized at an early date by a small group of bourgeois reformers who
initiated the search for more flexible ways of fighting social protest
movements. A liberal two-party bloc including part of the
Democrats and Republicans of the South and West emerged in Congress
at the end of the 1880s. Its appearance reflected the considerable
differences in views held by the noncorporate bourgeoisie and by</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;J. Swank to W. Allison, Sept. 26, 1888&quot;, in: A. T. Volwiler, &quot;Documents: Tariff
Strategy and Propaganda in the United States, 1887-1888&quot;, <em>The American Historical
Review</em>, October, 1930, pp. 95-96.</p>

<p>     spokesmen for monopoly capital. It should be kept in mind that the
position of the left wing in the Democratic Party was stronger than
among the Republicans. This was due to the specific mass base of
the Democrats and their closer relations with the agrarian strata in
the Western and Southern states.</p>

<p>     The two-party bloc first made itself felt during the 1887 debates
on the interstate commerce bill when, relying on the support of
broad sections of the population, the left-wing Democrats and
Republicans managed to get a bill on government control of railroads
adopted. And they submitted the most radical wording of the bill.
Thus, Democrat John Reagan offered a plan to make it illegal to set
up pools and associations of railroad companies to distribute joint
profits according to agreed shares. An idea that was widespread
among the masses to dissolve the monopolies and restore the
traditional elements of free enterprise came to the forefront. It was only
natural that for a number of politicians support of the popular
demand was no more than a tactical step, a social maneuver. The fear
of losing control over the electorate compelled many &quot;chosen
representatives of the people&quot; to speak out against the monopolies.
Popular demands were indirectly reflected in the left-wing proposal to
fine the corporations, to ban watering down stock in railroad
construction, to introduce rigorous legislation raising the responsibility
of persons for dishonest competition, to work out a definition of
corporation in order to effectively fight corporate capital and so on.</p>

<p>     The rise of the bourgeois-reformist trend indicated that the
internal conflict between noncorporate sections of the bourgeoisie
and its monopoly elite had grown deeper. The differences between
factions of the ruling class concerned the question on how to
neutralize the scope of the class struggle with the least effort and
determine the extent of possible concessions to the working people. The
emergence of the two-party liberal bloc was one of the first
symptoms showing the importance of restructuring bourgeois parties in
order to adapt them to the social consequences of monopolization.
The difficulty of blunting the acuteness of class conflict, on the one
hand, and the requirements of the development of monopoly
capitalism, on the other, persistently demanded a renewal of the facade
of the political system so as to keep the ideological and political
grip on the broad masses of the population.</p>

<p>     12-749</p>

9

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM AGAINST</b></p>

<p>     <b>THE ANTIMONOPOLY</b></p>

<p>     <b>MOVEMENTS</b></p>

<p>     <b>OF THE 1890s</b></p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 179</p>

<p>     The situation only began to change in the second half of the
1880s. The famous May 1 manifestations of 1886 in Chicago, major
strikes by miners in the West and steelworkers in Pennsylvania,
armed clashes at the Pullman factories were of truly national scope.
In 1893 a convention of the leading labor organization, the
American Federation of Labor, adopted the well-known Political Program
whose point 10 called for &quot;the collective ownership by the people
of all means of production and distribution.&quot; Founded in 1876, the
Socialist Labor Party failed to enter the national political scene, but
the authority of socialist ideas in American social thinking increased
significantly. By the time the most important works by Karl Marx
and Frederick Engels had been well known in the United States.
Marx's <em>Capital</em> was among the most widely read books, and in 1889
several hundred thousand copies of the book were sold in the
country.^^1^^ The brilliant pamphlets of Daniel De Leon and later
Eugene Debs found a broad audience.</p>

<p>     The concentration of economic power and the most
important means of political domination in the hands of the monopoly
bourgeoisie infringed not only upon the interests of the
workers but also on those of the broadest social strata: farmers, small
owners in the cities, and most of the intellectuals. Popular
discontent developed into a broad democratic antimonopoly movement
which swept the United States in the last twenty five years of the
19th century. The farmers were its chief social base. Capitalism
was particularly hard on them. Oppression by the railroad,
banking and wholesale corporations triggered off a desperate struggle
against the Robber Barons.</p>

<p>     The Populist Party founded in 1892 brought together the
principal antimonopoly forces, becoming the first antimonopoly
coalition in American history.^^2^^ Adopted by the Populist Party
on July 4, 1892, the Omaha Platform summed up the ideological
and political experience of the farmer movements: the Grangers,
the first to wage a struggle against the railroad corporations; the
Greenbackers with their idea of ``cheap'' money; and the fol-</p>

<p>     The growing oppression by the monopolies at the end of the
19th century and the political course of the two leading parties
which ignored acute social contradictions gave rise to increasing
dissatisfaction in the country. This was reflected in an upsurge
of mass social protest movements and the growing urge for
independent political action. The chief demand was to fight the
arbitrary rule of the trusts. The two-party system focussed on
safeguarding the existing social system and channeling the class
struggle into venues which were safe for the ruling circles.</p>

<p>     Although it was not 100 percent crisis proof, the two-party
system had had relatively firm control over the electorate until
the beginning of the 1890s: the election battles were noisy and
voter participation was high, even though the two leading bourgeois
parties had little to divide them in terms of ideology. On the one
hand, this was due to traditional party attachments, the cementing
role of the party machines, and the low level of political culture
of American voters; on the other, this stemmed from the fact that
political movements for a national antimonopoly party were
hardly developed until the mid-1880s. There also persisted a
number of factors holding back the development of the working-class
and socialist movements, and specific features in the rise of the
American proletariat---availability of free lands, sectional, religious
and intergroup divisions, national cleavages and the like. As Lenin
put it: &quot;For the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the
proletariat displayed <em>almost no</em> political independence either in
Britain or America.&quot; <SUP>!</SUP></p>

<p>~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Preface to the Russian Translation of Letters by Johannes Becker,
Joseph Deitzgen, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx, and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others,&quot;
<em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 12, p. 373.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Frank Luther Mott, <em>Golden Multitudes. The Story of Best Sellers in the United
States</em>, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, p. 323.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ For further detail see: G. P. Kuropyatnik, <em>The Farmer Movement in the USA: from
the Grangers to the People's Party 1867-1896</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1971 (in
Russian).</p>

<p>     12*</p>

<p>     180 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 181</p>

<p>     lowers of Henry George who believed that all problems could
best be solved by a single tax upon landholders. They were joined
by the left-wing antimonopoly critics Henry D. Lloyd and Edward
Bellamy who appealed chiefly to the urban petty-bourgeois strata.</p>

<p>     The Omaha Platform and statements by the Populist leaders
Ignatius Donnelly, Thomas Watson, Mary Lease, William Peffer, Jerry
Simpson and others pointed out the link between Populist
principles and the democratic tradition going back to Jefferson and his
hostility to special privileges for and concentration of economic
power in the hands of the few. Although the Populists appealed to
the political rights and liberties set down in the Declaration of
Independence and the US Constitution, in effect they filled these
concepts with new social meaning. &quot;What is liberty worth to the
man who is dying of hunger? Can you keep a room warm, next
winter, with the thermometer 30&deg; below zero, by reciting the
Declaration of Independence?''^^1^^ wondered the principal author of
the Omaha Platform Ignatius Donnelly.</p>

<p>     Antimonopolism was the cornerstone of all the farmer
movements becoming increasingly radical as it developed from the
old semimedieval understanding of monopoly as a special
privilege sought by owners of large fortunes to an uncompromising
denunciation in a Populist manifesto of &quot;the allied hosts of
monopolies, the money power, great trusts and railroad corporations,
who seek the enactment of laws to benefit them and impoverish the
people.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The chief antimonopoly demands included: turning means of
transportation, above all railroads, and also telephone, and
telegraph communications into government property; a struggle
against land monopoly, return to the public domain of all lands
held by railroads and other corporations &quot;in excess of their actual
needs.''^^3^^ Significantly, the Populist Platform added that if these
measures were to be ineffective &quot;the power of government---in
other words, of the people---should be expanded.''^^4^^ Two years
later, at the 1893 antimonopoly rally in Chicago, Donnelly who</p>

<p>     * <em>St. Paule Representative</em>, September 13, 1893.</p>

<p>     Richard Hofstadter, <em>The Age of Reform. From Bryan to F.D.R.</em>, Alfred A. Knopf,
New York, 1956, p. 64.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 91.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 90.</p>

<p>     had proposed the measure suggested &quot;the enactment of laws to
confiscate the real and personal property of all trusts and
combinations&quot; should all other measures fail.^^1^^ The Populists called for
a progressive income tax.</p>

<p>     The Populists were also aware of the link between the
government and Big Business. &quot;It is no longer a government of the people,
by the people and for the people, but a government of Wall-Street,
by Wall-Street and for Wall-Street,&quot;^^2^^ exclaimed Mary Lease of
Kansas. The Omaha Platform sharply criticized many elements in
the American political system, exposing bribery and corruption in
state legislatures, Congress and the courts. The Populists built their
model of government responsible to the people. They advanced a
program of direct democracy as an important correction of the
political system existing in the country. The program included
popular initiative and a referendum on the most important issues,
secret ballot, and election of senators, the Vice-President and
President by direct vote.</p>

<p>     One of the most remarkable ideas put forward by the
Populists was that of unity of interests and the alliance between rural
and urban working people. The idea was derived from life itself,
the common antimonopoly struggle. It found its expression in the
rise of the Greenback Labor Party, in joint actions by the farmers
and the Noble Order of Knights of Labor (the idea of government
control over railroad companies, telegraphs and telephones up to
and including their nationalization, set down in the Order's
Declaration of Principles,^^3^^ was similar to the farmers' demands). At an early
stage the AFL also supported the farmer movement.</p>

<p>     The Populists proclaimed that their party was a &quot;union of the
labor forces of the United States&quot; which &quot;shall be permanent and
perpetual,&quot; and that farmers and workers had the same interests
and identical enemies; a grim warning was sounded: &quot;Wealth belongs
to him who creates it, and every dollar taken from industry without
an equivalent is robbery. 'If any will not work, neither shall he
eat'.' Of course, the radicalism of the Populist rhetoric should not
be exaggerated. Profoundly sympathizing with the plight of the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ John D. Hicks, <em>The Populist Revolt. A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the
People's Party</em>, The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1931, p. 291.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 160.</p>

<p>     T. V. Powderly, <em>Thirty Years of Labor, 1859 to 1889</em>, Excelsior Publishing House,
Columbus, Ohio, 1889, pp. 389-391.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 91.</p>

<p>     <b>182 Chapter Nine</b></p>

<p>     Two-Party Systjsm</p>

<p>     vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s</p>

<p>     workers the same Donnelly regarded a proletarian revolution as a
kind of apocalypse, a destructive catastrophy for all human
civilization. But there is no doubt that the Populists sought joint action
with the workers. The Omaha Platform demanded an 8-hour work
day at government enterprises and a ban on use of Pinkertons
against striking workers.^^1^^ A major step forward in the popular
movement was the setting up in Illinois in 1894 of a
workerpopulist bloc which approved the 1893 AFL program of
socialization of means of production.</p>

<p>     The antimonopoly movement in the United States was
complex and contradictory. Fighting monopoly oppression, its members,
as a rule, still remained defenders of the capitalist system and
regarded the program for restricting monopolies and implementing
democratic reforms as a means to strengthen small private
property, i.e. democratization of capitalism and, therefore, as a kind
of alternative to revolutionary socialist transformation. But the
very fact that they proposed to ban the activities of certain
monopolies questioned the sacred principles of laissez-faire. Instead
of the idea of weakening central power, popular during the times
of Jefferson and Jackson, they advocated the idea of the
government's responsibility for the people's overall well-being. The
system of government antimonopoly measures proposed by the
Populists actually meant a departure from principles of free
competition, and the proclaiming of regulated competition went beyond
the framework of classical bourgeois beliefs.</p>

<p>     Despite all the sharp criticism, Populist action was marked by
considerable weaknesses. Believing that relations of exploitation
were established in the circulation and exchange of goods, the
Populists proclaimed money to be the key to the mechanism of
market relations. The theory of ``cheap'' money flowing from this
view explained the plight of the farmers by the insufficient amount
of money in circulation and promised to raise prices on agricultural
produce and secure debt payment. The 1860s call for free
circulation of paper greenbacks was replaced in the 1880s and 1890s by
the demand for free coinage of silver. It was an erroneous but
popular plank of the Populist platform.^^2^^</p>

<p>     Such were the basic features of the Populist platform which,</p>

<p>~^^1^^ John D. Hicks, <em>The Populist Revolt</em>, p. 444.
<em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 91.</p>

<p>     no doubt, was a left-wing alternative to the two main parties on
the basic social and political issues. The Populists were the first
to produce a broad antimonopoly platform and propose an in-depth
reform of American social structure which might have resulted in a
certain weakening of the monopolies' position, in bringing their
activities under bourgeois-democratic government regulation and in
the democratization of the country's political life. All this was a
real threat to the two-party system. The Populists did not conceal
their intentions: a resolution was adopted at the convention in
Omaha which sharply criticized the activities of the Republican and
the Democratic parties and prohibited government officials from
being members of the Populist Party.</p>

<p>     It was no easy task to weaken the two-party system. Behind
it was tradition. It had at its disposal the economic power of the
ruling class, and thousands of public organizations were tuned to
the leading parties, giving vent to the energy of the masses and
leading them away from third parties which went in their demands
beyond the narrow scope of the two-party system's alternative.
Such a tried and tested device as bribery was used against the
radical parties, and their activities were distorted in the press.^^1^^ One
cannot help but agree with that brilliant scholar of the history of
American parties Richard Hofstadter who remarked that the
two-party system in the United States was closely linked to the
&quot;constitutional and legal system. Our entire electoral arrangements,
the absence of proportional representation, the exorbitant cost of
political campaigns, the legal difficulties in getting on and staying
on the ballot in many states, even the quasi-official role of the
majority parties as supervisors of elections---all these things work
against the rise of minor parties... The method of electing a
president with the winner-take-all system in the electoral college, the
very leadership function of the Presidency itself, work to keep
power in the hands of the two major parties.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Populists were yet to experience the full impact of this
press, but their first steps were successful. They won more than a
million votes in the elections of 1892 and received 13 seats in the
Congress (ten in the House and three in the Senate). In fulfilment</p>

<p>~^^1^^ See: A.S. Manykin and Y.E. Yazkov, &quot;The Role of Third Parties in the Party--
Political System of the USA&quot;, in: <em>Voprosy istorii</em>, No.2, 1981, p. 56.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Comparative Approach to American History</em>, edited by C. Vann Woodward,
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1968, p. 210.</p>

<p>     <b>184 Chapter</b> Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Annmonopoly Movements in 1890s 185</p>

<p>     of the conventions resolutions, the Populists worked energetically
in Congress to pass the relevant bills. They demanded
nationalization of the railroads, telegraphs and telephones;^^1^^ introduction
of a graduated income tax;^^2^^ democratization of political life
(election of the president, senators and the federal judiciary by
direct vote, limiting the office of President to one term for each
incumbent, women's suffrage and so on);^^3^^ they came out for
workers' rights (an 8-hour work day at government enterprises,
the right of workers to unionize, government assistance to the
unemployed, banning of the Pinkerton Detective Agency and use
of the federal army against striking workers);^^4^^ proposed to solve
the monetary problem in the fanners' favor: free coinage of silver,
government loans for farmers at low interest and a system of
government banking.^^5^^</p>

<p>     All the social contradictions the Populists were justly
clamoring about aggravated in the 1890s. The economic crisis of 1893-
1896, the most profound crisis of the last century, displayed these
contradictions particularly clearly. Thousands of factories and
workshops were closed, the number of unemployed, according to
different estimates, ranged from one to four million. The year
1894 saw the Pullman strike, left forces gaining control over the
AFL, the first march of the unemployed in US history---the 10,000-
strong Coxey's Army advance on Washington---and a new upsurge in
the Populist movement. Even the cautious AFL Chairman, Samuel
Gompers, said: &quot;Those responsible for these conditions should take
warning. They are sleeping in false security.''^^6^^</p>

<p>     The powerful protest movement showed the leading parties</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume XXIII, Part IV, p. 3114; Volume XXVI, Part I,
p. 11: Volume XXVI, Part X, Appendix, pp. 1413-1414; Volume XXVII, Part II, p. 979.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume XXIII, Part I, pp. 598-599; Volume XXVI, Part II,
p. 1664, 1666; Part IX, Appendix, pp. 506-507, 610.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume XXIII, Part I, p. 598; Volume XXIV, Part I,
pp. 592-593; Volume XXVII, Part II, p. 976; Volume XXVII, Part III, p. 2011; Volume
XXVIII, Part IV, p. 3374.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume XXIII, Part I, p. 429; Part III, pp. 3001-3002;
Part V, p. 4225; Part VI, p. 5731; Volume XXVI, Part I, pp. 385-388; Volume XXVI,
Part IV, pp. 3842-3844; Part V, pp. 4059-4060; Part VII, pp. 7236-7237.</p>

<p>     <em><SUP>s</SUP> Congressional Record</em>, Volume XXIII, Part I, pp. 598-599; Part II, p. 1578; Part V,
p. 4211; Part VI, pp. 5241-5242, 5455-5456; Part VIII, Appendix, pp. 610-611,618, 620;
Volume XXV, Part I, p. 1201; Part II, p. 1887, 1978; Volume XXVII, Part II, p. 1093;
Volume XXVIII, Part IV, p. 3218.</p>

<p>     <em>Report of the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Convention of the American
Federation of Labor Held at Chicago, III., December llth to 19th, 1893</em>, p. 9.</p>

<p>     that they could no longer avoid the urgent problems of the times
without risking to lose control of the political process. The astute
British political scholar James Bryce, describing the Republican
and the Democratic parties at the end of the 1880s as lacking
&quot;any principles, any distinctive tenets&quot; and only seeking to
obtain lucrative government posts, predicted the downfall of the
parties: &quot;Probably it will happen in the long run in America also,
unless the parties adapt themselves to the new issues, just as the
Whig party fell in 1852-1857 because it failed to face the problem
of slavery.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Republican Party, the main party of Big Business, was
hardly able to adapt in this period. The American business elite
was flushed with the Grundyism of the Gilden Age and firmly
believed in the ideas of classical individualism and social
Darwinism. The Republican Party managed to retain the support of a
broad range of voters. Referring to the Civil War, the Republicans
reminded the farmers that Lincoln's party had given them the
homestead and the blacks that the GOP had freed them from
slavery. They sought to attract workers, not without success, by
the slogan &quot;High Tariffs Mean High Wages.''</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party took a more flexible approach. By
this time it had turned from a party defending slavery into a party
of the new bourgeoisie in the South, with support coming also
from the industrial and financial circles of the Northeastern states.
Nevertheless, for a long time the Democrats remained the junior
partner in the two-party system. The Democrats lacked the luster
of Lincoln's party; on the contrary, they were haunted by the
tarnished image of a lost cause (defenders of slavery), and in the
course of 52 years, from 1860 to 1912, their candidate occupied
the presidential seat only twice, and unsuccessfully at that.
Cleveland's conservative policy (1893-1897) completely discredited
the Democratic Party. Only a new reformist policy taking into
account mass demands could save the party from total collapse.
Steps in this direction were also prompted by the Democrats'
specific electorate most of whom consisted of agrarians in the
South and the West. As distinct from the Republican Party, where
Protestants prevailed, the Democrats displayed a certain religious
tolerance and could rely on the Catholics who made up the bulk of</p>

<p>     James Bryce, <em>The American Commonwealth</em>, The Macmillan Company, New York,
Vol.11, 1898, pp. 21,29.</p>

<p>     186 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 187</p>

<p>     the immense flow of immigrants at the end of the 19th century.</p>

<p>     However, even in this context it was difficult to change the
party orientation. The government of President Cleveland, a
creature of business circles in the Northeast, had come to power
under the slogan of no government paternalism. Nothing was done to
counter the economic crisis, but force was used against the
participants in the hungry march to Washington and federal troops were
sent to put down the Pullman strike. The Sherman Anti-Trust
Act of 1890 was applied against the labor unions.</p>

<p>     Under the economic crisis, the problem of cheap money
acquired even greater popularity than before, and many began to regard
it as a panacea to solve the country's major social and economic
problems.^^1^^ Meanwhile, under pressure from the financial and
industrial circles demanding the upholding of hard currency, the
Cleveland Administration decided to repeal even the compromise
act of 1890 which provided for coinage of not only gold but also
silver (not more than 4.5 million ounces of silver a
month). The President convened a special session of Congress. As
a result the ``gold'' Democrats supported by the Republicans
managed to repeal the act limiting silver coinage. The
conservative circles and a considerable part of the press declared that the
most important cause of the crisis had been removed. But the next
year the crisis came to rage with renewed force.</p>

<p>     The victory of the advocates of the gold standard revived acute
factional differences within the Democratic Party which had been
temporarily smoothed over during the presidential elections of 1892.
The struggle in the party around the money issue divided the party
not only in terms of organization. In a situation when the American
people suffered from the results of the economic crisis and
expected effective measures to be undertaken by the Administration
and Congress, the policy of the ``gold'' Democrats deprived the
party of popular slogans and impoverished the already scant
election platform still further. The results were not long in coming. The
Democrats suffered a shattering defeat in the 1894 elections losing
113 seats in the House. There were serious losses even in the party's
traditional bastions---in the Far West and the South.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ On this subject, see: A.Y.Salamatin, &quot;The Problem of Silver Money and the Crisis
of the Democratic Party in the Mid-1890s&quot;, in: <em>Problems of Modern and Contemporary
History</em>, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1982, pp. 34-48 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     Victory in the congressional elections went to the
Republicans, but the Populist Party scored a major success too. It
brought in a total of nearly 1,500,000 votes and sent seven of
its members to the House and six to the Senate, not counting
the several hundred candidates elected to various offices in the
states. That the Populist Party's mass base swelled at the expense
of the Democrats was seen in the fact that in 1896, 75 percent
of all Populists in Indiana had previously been Democrats.^^1^^ On the
other hand, it is significant that the largest increment in the number
of votes cast for the Populist Party was achieved in the industrial
states.^^2^^ The <em>Arena</em> journal noted: &quot;So long as the two old parties
cling to their present policy there will be a People's Party
movement in Chicago---or a propaganda for the advancement of the
principles of the People's Party under some other name.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Following the social clashes of 1894 a shift to the left also
occurred in the Democratic Party. The silver panacea was now
supported not only by farmers but also by many Democrat
workers. The argument that inevitable inflation would raise prices on
necessary goods no longer convinced the workers. They believed
that free coinage of silver would rid society of the crisis and
unemployment associated with it.^^4^^ The demand for cheap money was
also widespread among the Republican electorate.^^5^^</p>

<p>     The number of supporters of silver also grew in the
Democratic Party: the moderate Democrats did not want to pay for the
mistakes of Cleveland and the conservatives and hurried not only
to dissociate themselves from their unpopular policy but also led
a struggle to gain control over the party. Clubs of silver supporters
began to be set up in spring 1895, and silver conventions were held
in some states.^^6^^</p>

<p>~^^1^^ A.G. Bochkarev, &quot;The Democratic Party at the Turn of the 20th Century&quot;, in: <em>
Political Parties of the USA in Modern Times</em>, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1981,
p. 187 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Philip S. Foner</em>, History of the Labor Movement in the United States. From the
<em>Founding of the American Federation of Labor to the Emergence of American
Imperialism</em>, International Publishers, New York, Vol. II, 1955, p. 326.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Willis I. Abbot, &quot;The Chicago Populist Campaign&quot;, in: <em>The Arena</em>, ed. by B.O.
Flower, Vol. XI, No. LXIII, February, 1895, Published by Arena Publishing Co., Boston,
Mass., 1895, p. 336.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ Philip S. Foner, <em>History of the Labor Movement in the United States</em>, p. 314.</p>

<p>     <em>^^5^^</em> A.Y. Salamatin, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 45.
<em>Ibid.</em>, p. 43.</p>

<p>     188 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 189</p>

<p>     Immense popularity was enjoyed by William Harvey's
pamphlet <em>Coin's Financial School</em> written in the form of a discussion
between a supporter of silver, the boy Coin, and advocates of the
gold standard, Chicago bankers. Finally, in February-March 1895
the manifesto by 31 Democratic congressmen was widely
distributed; calling for free coinage of silver, its authors pointed out that
they now held a majority in the Democratic Party and could take
power into their hands.^^1^^ That an acute political situation was
taking shape in the United States was noted, in particular, in
dispatches from the Russian ambassador E. K. Kotsebu who
reported to St Petersburg: &quot;On the one hand, there are capitalists with
enormous means to attract supporters; on the other, workingmen of
all kinds, bitter and indebted to such an extent that it proves
impossible to bribe them... It would seem to me that all the
questions on mono- and bi-metalism here do not concern the monetary
system at all, and the gold refers to the capitalist with his enormous
social power, and the silver to the popular small fry seeking means
to overthrow that power and hoping that in destroying it something
would be coming their way. The extent of the stage on which the
struggle is being waged among 70 million civilized people lends that
struggle major importance.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Yet the participants in the movement for free coinage of silver
pursued very different aims. For the Populists unlimited coinage of
silver was a measure aimed at improving the condition of the
farmers and a plank in the broad antimonopoly platform. The
owners of silver mines, who set up the American Bimetallic League
in 1889, hoped to profit from the rising prices of silver. For the
leaders of moderate Democrats the demand for cheap money was
not a panacea but rather a tactical move. Supporting the silver
slogans, they not only met the farmers, who formed a considerable
part of the Democratic electorate, halfway, but also focussed
attention on a weak and rudimentary plank in the Populist platform
and rejected its truly radical demands. The party officials attempted
both to retain their old electorate and draw to their side the Populist
voters, meanwhile destroying a dangerous radical rival.</p>

<p>     The presidential election campaign confirmed this. The Sil-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 44,42.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Archives of the External Policy of Russia, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Chancellery</em>, d. 173,1. 164 &quot;Kotsebu to Lobanov-Rostovsky, July 2, 1896&quot; (in Russian).</p>

<p>     ver Democrats prevailed at the Democratic Party convention which
opened on July 7, 1896, in Chicago (30 states favored free coinage
of silver and 14 were for the gold standard). A majority rejected the
resolution supporting the Cleveland Administration. The tone was
set by a speech delivered by William Bryan, a young lawyer and
journalist who represented the interests of agrarian America to
some extent. Seeking to be nominated presidential candidate from
the Democratic Party, he built his platform taking into account the
farmers' dissatisfaction with the power of the railroad companies
and banks and made his political capital by criticizing the trusts.
When Bryan exclaimed: &quot;You shall not press down upon the brow
of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold,&quot;^^1^^ he was merely rejecting the gold standard, but the
sentence electrified listeners. For all of capitalist America gold was
a symbol of prosperity, and millions of desperate, debt-burdened
farmers believed their plight was due to shortcomings in money
circulation. In any case, America's acute problems were reduced to
the silver issue.</p>

<p>     The same idea keynoted the platform adopted by the
Democratic Party, and subsequently became the main theme of the
election campaign. The tariff issue had been the principal subject of
debate between Democrats and Republicans for decades. Presently,
in the election platform it was pushed to the background, and
prominence was given to the question of free and unlimited coinage
of silver at the ratio of 16:1 to the gold standard. The latter, the
chief objective of the Cleveland Administration, was described as
un-American.</p>

<p>     At the same time a number of Populist demands were
included in the Democratic Party platform, albeit in an utterly
distorted form. While the Populists called for nationalization of railroads,
telephones and telegraphs, the Democratic platform contained a
vague reference to &quot;stricter control by the Federal Government&quot; of
trusts and pools,^^2^^ and the Interstate Commerce Commission, which
had already shown its inability, was pushed to the forefront of
control over railroad companies.</p>

<p>     Seeking to democratize political life, the Populists called for</p>

<p>~^^1^^ William J. Bryan, <em>The First Battle. A Story of the Campaign of 1896</em>, W.B. Conkey
Company, Chicago, 1896, p. 206.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 99.</p>

<p>     190 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     election of the President, the senators and the federal judiciary by
direct vote, the holding of referenda and so on. In the platform
of the Democrats, it degenerated to a ban on a third term of the
presidential office.^^1^^ (In fact, the political tradition existing in the
United States since the time of George Washington had already
enforced this custom.)</p>

<p>     Instead of a progressive graduated income tax proposed by
Populists in the Congress (reaching 5 or even 10 percent on incomes
exceeding 100,000 dollars a year),^^2^^ the Democrats called for a
2-percent tax on capital (the Income and Property Tax Law).</p>

<p>     In a bid to attract the workers, the Democrats urged a ban on
court injunctions in labor conflicts and protested against
federal interference in local affairs (this referred primarily to the use
of federal troops by President Cleveland to suppress the Pullman
strike). They were also in favor of the attribution of differences
between employers and employees.^^3^^ On the whole, however, there
was little left from the broad positive Populist platform on the
labor question (8-hour work day at government enterprises,
government assistance to the unemployed and so on).</p>

<p>     The Democrats' tactic of taking certain Populist demands and
incorporating them into their platform, obviously aimed at
swallowing the Populist Party. The Populists were faced with dilemma. As
Henry Lloyd, a member of the Populist radical wing, put it: &quot;If we
fuse, we are sunk, if we don't fuse, all the silver men will leave us
for the more powerful Democrats.''^^4^^ At the beginning of the
elections the struggle between trends in the Populist Party^^5^^ reached
a climax. The radical wing led by Henry Lloyd, Thomas Watson and
Ignatius Donnelly intensified its criticism of the trusts and was
inclined to form a worker-Populist bloc with Eugene Debs as their
presidential candidate. The moderate trend headed by James B.
Weaver, Herman E. Taubeneck and William Allen pinned all its
hopes on the silver panacea. The moderate wing emerged victorious</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>ibid., p</em>. 100.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Volume XXVI, Part II, Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1894, p. 1666.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 99.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ Stanley L. Jones, <em>The Presidential Election of 1896</em>, The University of Wisconsin
Press, Madison, 1964, p. 245.</p>

<p>~^^5^^ See: L. Goodwin, <em>Democratic Promise. The Populist Movement in America</em>,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1970; B. Palmer, &quot;Man Over Money&quot;: the Southern
Populist Critique of American Capitalism, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1980.</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 19i</p>

<p>     at the Populist Party convention in St. Louis in July 1896. The
silver magic played its part here as well. William Bryan was
nominated presidential candidate. The Populists had merged with the
Democrats in most states by the time of the elections in November.
The decline of the Populist Party continued for 12 more years, but
as a leading political force it disappeared after the elections of 1896
in which the Republicans won.</p>

<p>     There were various reasons for the fall of the Populist Party.
The Populists were never a monolith. From the very outset there
was a struggle in the party between the moderate and the radical
wing, and serious differences existed between Southern and Western
Populists. Some farmers were suspicious of and even hostile to the
workers. The policy of the leading parties, however, also played a
major role.</p>

<p>     Having borrowed a number of Populist ideas which they filled
with much more moderate meaning, the Democrats contributed
to the downfall of the Populist Party. Despite their defeat in the
elections of 1896, the Democrats at the same time managed to
overcome the crisis in the party, and played an important part in
bolstering the entire two-party system. Extension and radicalization
of the electorate led to a certain transformation of the Democratic
Party. Elements of bourgeois reformism appeared in its platform as
an echo of radical antimonopoly criticism.</p>

<p>     In its turn, the Republican Party played the stabilizing role in
the two-party system preventing the reformism of the Democrats
from swinging too far to the left. In the 1896 elections the
campaign of threats against adherents to the ``un-American'' principles
of the Populists waged by the Republican bosses and the
promise to sustain a worthy standard of living for workers by means
of high tariffs^^1^^ played their part in splitting the worker-farmer
bloc.</p>

<p>     Some time passed and another left wing of the opposition
movement broke against the two-party system in 1900. The
Spanish-American War, in Lenin's definition the first imperialist war of
the Modern Age,^^2^^ and the subsequent colonial war in the
Philippines gave rise to a broad antiwar and anticolonial movement led by</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 107.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ See: V. I. Lenin, &quot;Imperialism and the Split in Socialism&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>,
Vol. 23, 1981, p. 106.</p>

<p>     192 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     the anti-imperialist leagues.^^1^^ A leading part in these leagues was
played by the liberal intellectuals of New England and, partly, by
persons close to the Populist opposition (for example Richard
Pettigrew). The anti-imperialists had experienced political leaders,
chiefly from among the Republicans of the older generation who
had taken part in the struggle against slavery---George Boutwell,
Moorfield Storey, Carl Schurz and others. Participants in the
movement were represented in various government bodies from the
US Congress to the reformist, pacifist and remaining Populist
organizations. The voice of protest was raised in many university
halls and in Catholic churches. Part of the press was attracted to the
side of the anti-imperialist movement thanks to the efforts of
prominent journalists. The <em>Nation</em> published by Edwin Godkin and
<em>The Anti-Imperialist</em> edited by Edward Atkinson became very close
to the American Anti-Imperialist League. Imperialist expansion was
unanimously denounced by Frank Norris, Henry Fuller, Henry
James, Thomas Aldrich and other American authors. The largest
response was drawn by Mark Twain's remarks, his pamphlet <em>To the
Person Sitting in Darkness</em> was published by the Anti-Imperialist
League in 125,000 copies. Mark Twain proposed to slightly change
the US flag: &quot;We can have just our usual flag, with the white
stripes painted black and the stars replaced by the skull and
crossbones.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Anti-Imperialist League collaborated with labor unions
in the AFL, and the Order of Knights of Labor (Gompers was a
Vice-President of the American Anti-Imperialist League). The
AntiImperialists were joined by numerous fellow travellers---social and
political circles, remote from liberal opposition to colonial
acquisitions, who attempted to use the movement in their own interests.
But the movement was sufficiently large even without the latter. In
summer 1898 the Russian ambassador reported to St Petersburg,
perhaps exaggerating somewhat, that &quot;no less than half of all Ame-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire. <em>The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900</em>,
MacGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1968;E. B. Tompkins, <em>Anti-Imperialism in the
United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920</em>, Philadelphia, 1970; Daniel B. Schirmer, <em>
Republic or Empire. American Resistance to the Philippine War</em>, Schenkman Publishing
Company, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1972; Igor Dementyev, <em>USA: Imperialists and Anti--
Imperialists. The Great Foreign Policy Debate at the Turn of the Century</em>, Moscow, Progress
Publishers, 1979.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Mark Twain on the Damned Human Race</em>, edited by Janet Smith, Hill and Wang,
New York, 1963, p. 21.</p>

<p>     ricans do not approve of the road taken by the government.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     In criticizing US foreign policy, the Anti-Imperialists relied on
democratic traditions going back to the revolutionary War of
Independence; they referred to the theory of natural rights and
popular sovereignty. &quot;All men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with Certain inalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,&quot;
&quot;Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed&quot;---these excerpts from the
Declaration of Independence were quoted in the documents of the
Anti-Imperialist League. Proceeding from these principles the
Chicago platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League described
US government policies on the Philippines as criminal aggression
and demanded that the Philippines be granted independence.^^2^^ The
Anti-Imperialists pointed out the detrimental influence of
aggression on the domestic situation in the United States: militarization,
an increase in the tax burden, and the threat of establishment of
despotic rule.</p>

<p>     Several attempts to set up an influential political party that
would resist expansion were undertaken as the anti-imperialist
league movement developed. However, the movement proved
unable to break the grip of the two-party system. A special part in
this was played by the Democratic Party.</p>

<p>     Before the Spanish-American War problems of foreign policy
were of little interest to the leaders of the Democratic Party. When
the war started, they, as true patriots, did not remain on the
sidelines: Bryan commanded the First Nebraska Volunteers, George
Dewey, Bryan's chief rival in presidential nomination from the
Democratic Party, became a hero of a naval battle in the Manila
harbor. The yellow journalism close to the Democratic Party---
Joseph Pulitzer's <em>New York World</em> and Hearst's <em>New York Journal---</em>
whipped up the war hysteria. Subsequently, Bryan played the
decisive role in concluding the annexationist Paris Treaty which
ended the Spanish-American War: he secured the support of
Democrat senators.</p>

<p>     It was only later, on the eve of the elections of 1900, that the</p>

<p>     <em>Archives of the External Policy of Russia, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Chancellery</em>, d. 114,1. 201, &quot;Kassini to Muravyov, June 21, 1898''.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ W. A. Croffut, <em>Papers. Platform of the American Anti-Imperialist League. 1899</em>,
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.</p>

<p>     13-749</p>

<p>     194 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 195</p>

<p>     Democratic Party leaders because the silver currency issue on which
the election of 1896 had been founded to a large degree lost its
viability. The gold standard had already become a fact, the relevant
act had been approved by the Republican majority in March 1900.
Anyway, the leader of the Democratic Party, William Bryan, had
not decided yet which problem would highlight the election
campaign of 1900. A month before the Democratic Party convention he
wrote an article in <em>The North American Review</em> about the three
main issues of the coming elections: currency, trusts and
imperialism. Indicating the tactical nature of Bryan's statement, the
Russian ambassador in Washington wrote: &quot;Taking advantage of the
present administration's setback in the Philippines, Bryan advised
his followers to put anti-imperialism and the fight against the trusts
in the forefront of their platform in the coming presidential
campaign.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The platform of the Democratic Party adopted in July 1900 at
the convention in Kansas City extended the range of democratic
demands: regulation of railroad companies' operations, election of
senators by direct vote, and setting up a Labor Department. On
Bryan's insistence the silver currency plank was again included in
the platform. But the imperialist issue was proclaimed &quot;the
paramount question&quot; in the election campaign, and, unprecedentedly,
most of the election platform was devoted to foreign policy!</p>

<p>     Like the documents of the anti-imperialists the platform of the
Democratic Party began with an expression of fidelity to the
principles of the Founding Fathers: &quot;We declare again that all
governments instituted among men derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed; that any government not based upon
the consent of the governed is a tyranny... We assert that no nation
can long endure half republic and half empire, and we warn the
American people that imperialism abroad will lead quickly and
inevitably to despotism at home.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     If the election platform of the Republican Party approved
the results of the Spanish-American War and US actions in the
Philippines and Cuba,^^3^^ the platform of the Democrats denounced
&quot;imperialism growing out of the Spanish War&quot; and involving &quot;the</p>

<p>     <em>Archives of the External Policy of Russia, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Chancellery</em>, d. 110,1. 254, &quot;Kotsebu to Muravyov, August 6, 1899&quot;. 
~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 112.
<em>Ibid., p</em>. 124.</p>

<p>     Democrat leaders gradually went over to opposition to colonial
policy. There were compelling reasons for this tactical move. To
begin with, one reason was the extension and radicalization of the
party's electorate after the 1896 elections. Making up the bulk of
the Silver Democrats, working people in town and country mostly
continued to believe in bourgeois-democratic ideals. The
chauvinistic frenzy passed quickly because the US war in the Philippines
was too similar to the practice of the colonial empires of the Old
World.</p>

<p>     Influential agrarian circles in the American South were also in
opposition to colonial expansion. Their attitude to territorial
acquisitions was determined chiefly by the fear of competition
from cheap colonial raw materials and agricultural products. Owners
of sugar cane, cotton and tobacco plantations were particularly
concerned. The main sphere of activity for the Southern
opposition, traditionally belonging to the Democratic Party, was the US
Congress. Ratification of the Paris Treaty was particularly actively
opposed by Senators John McLaurin, Donelson Caffery, Benjamin
Tillman, Samuel McEnery, Augustus Bacon and Hernando Money.
They pointed out that the annexation policy contradicted the US
Constitution and the Monroe Doctrine. But frequently arguments
were voiced that revealed their true motives. For example, Senator
Augustus O. Bacon of Georgia said: &quot;With that tropical climate and
cheap Asiatic labor ... it would be impossible for the American
sugar producer to compete with Philippine sugar... Their
development will doubtless enrich the syndicates and trusts that will
invest their capital there for that purpose.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Finally, Gold Democrats, closely associated with Big Business
in the Northeast, disagreed with the ruling party over forms and
methods of expansion. They feared that colonial expansion would lead
to conflict with major European jsowers in the course of which the
military weakness of the United States would be displayed. Relying
on American economic power, they rejected the expansionists'
assertion that trade follows the flag and proposed a dollar
expansion whose model had been already offered by the Open Door
Policy in China (for example a millionaire Andrew Carnegie).</p>

<p>     The problem of anti-imperialism also attracted the attention of</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st Session</em>, Vol. 33, Part 2,
pp. 1309-1310.</p>

<p>     196 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
vs Antimonopoly Movements in 1890s 197</p>

<p>     very existence of the Republic.''^^1^^ The Democrats condemned the
colonial war in the Philippines. However, the element of
propaganda and, to a large extent, the demagogy in the party's foreign
policy platform were clearly displayed in practical suggestions. If
the American Anti-Imperialist League called for immediate
independence of the Philippines, the Democrats in effect proposed to
make the Philippines a US protectorate for an indefinite period
of time: &quot;First, a stable form of government; second,
independence, and third, protection from outside interference, such as
has been given for nearly a century to the Republics of Central
and South America.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     After the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, the American
protectorate which was in effect established over Cuba, for whose
freedom the United States allegedly waged the war against Spain,
acquired the form of an occupation regime. That was why many
Americans spoke out for Cuba's independence. The Democratic
platform urged: &quot;We demand the prompt and honest fulfilment of
our pledge to the Cuban people and the world that the United
States has no disposition nor intention to exercise sovereignty
jurisdiction, or control over the Island of Cuba,&quot; but an important
reservation was added: &quot;except for its pacification.''^^3^^ It may be assumed
that the reference was to the radical national liberation movement.</p>

<p>     The Democrat platform proclaimed isolationism to be its
basic principle alluding to Jefferson's behests.^^4^^ Yet the Democrats
insisted on supporting the Monroe Doctrine which had been
interpreted in a new way by the US Secretary of State Richard Olney
as early as the Anglo-Venezuelan conflict of 1895 and proclaimed
the legitimacy of establishing US hegemony in the Western
hemisphere. Only a few years later President Theodore Roosevelt
came forward with the Big Stick policy in the countries of Latin
America.</p>

<p>     Finally, the platform of the Democrats harshly criticized
militarism: &quot;It will impose upon our peace loving people a large
standing army and unnecessary burden of taxation, and will be a
constant menace to their liberties.''^^5^^ At the same time it favored</p>

<p>     J <em>Ibid., p</em>. 113.</p>

<p>     3 <em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 113.</p>

<p>     <em>Ibid., p</em>. 115. 
~^^1^^ <em>Ibid., p</em>. 113.</p>

<p>     ``trade expansion by every peaceful and legitimate means,&quot;^^1^^ i.e.
affirmed the profits of commercial and economic expansion.</p>

<p>     The political platform of the Democratic Party on questions
of foreign policy put the Anti-Imperialists in an extremely
difficult position. Not only financial power and tradition were behind
the Democratic Party. As had been the case in their struggle against
the Populists, the Democrats now borrowed the slogans of the
Anti-Imperialists lending them much more moderate meaning.</p>

<p>     The question of the American Anti-Imperialist League's
position in the elections was finally settled at the convention in
Indianapolis which opened on August 14, 1900. The Anti-Imperialists
did not trust Bryan; they could not forgive him for approving the
US war against Spain in 1898 and his vote for ratification of the
Paris Peace Treaty in February 1899. Besides, most of the
AntiImperialist leaders belonged to the Republican Party and approved
of the gold standard. Loud voices were raised for a separate
AntiImperialist ticket in the elections. The founding of a new party was
favored by such influential persons as the prominent Liberal Carl
Schurz and outstanding pacifist from New England Moorfield
Storey. A leaflet entitled the <em>Third Ticket Movement</em> said: &quot;The
Democratic Party is conducting a direct attack upon the institutions
of our country. It advocates dishonest money and threatens an
integrity of the judiciary. The Republican Party is conducting an
indirect attack upon the institutions of our country ... abroad, it
wages a wicked war of conquest in violation of the principles of the
Declaration of Independence.''^^2^^ But most of the convention
delegates decided that the third ticket candidates had little chance
of winning and chose the lesser evil. The resolution they adopted
urged voting for the candidates to Congress who opposed the policy
of territorial seizures, and also for Bryan, regarding this as the most
effective way of crushing imperialism.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     This was the beginning of the end. After the Republican victory
in the 1900 elections, the Anti-Imperialist League movement ceased
being a significant force. Though the leagues were yet to do much
in making public the cruelties perpetrated by the American military
in the Philippines, their collapse was inevitable. The President of the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>M. Storey Papers. Leaflet of Third Ticket Movement</em>. Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Literary Digest</em>, August 25, 1900, p. 215.</p>

<p>     198 Chapter Nine</p>

<p>     American Anti-Imperialist League Moorfield Storey wrote a few
years later to the League secretary Erwing Winslow: &quot;The truth is
that if we come down to facts, you and I are substantially the
Anti-Imperialist League.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The reason for the downfall of the anti-imperialist movement
lay primarily in its contradictory principles and social
heterogeneity, but the two-party system also played a major role in its
collapse, just as it had done in the case of the Populist Party.</p>

<p>     The antimonopoly movements suffered defeats, but they did
not disappear without a trace. They forced the two leading
bourgeois parties to adopt a number of positive reformist demands.
The Democratic Party was the first to incorporate in its platforms
such planks as prohibition of the use of court injunctions in labor
conflicts, and income tax on Big Business, election of senators
by direct vote and so on. Subsequently, these demands, as well
as the principle of dollar instead of colonial expansion, were also
adopted by the Republican Party and were implemented in the
momentous reforms of the early 20th century.</p>

<p>     At the same time, the smoothly functioning two-party
system fulfilled its major role of safeguarding the social and political
foundations of the capitalist system. The locomotive of the US
political mechanism, rolling along the two-party track, crushed
the radical social movements of the coming epoch of monopoly
capitalism---the Populist Party and then the anti-imperialist
movement.</p>

10

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM IN THE</b></p>

<p>     <b>PROGRESSIVE ERA</b></p>

<p>     The United States' entry upon the stage of imperialism at the
turn of the century was accompanied by in-depth social, economic
and political processes in American society. The monopolies were
firmly established in the leading industries and became the
decisive factor in the country's economic development. A total of 82
trusts with an aggregate capital of over 4 billion dollars were formed
in 1899-1902.^^1^^ Intensive concentration of production was attended
by a merging of industrial capital with finance capital. Two major
monopoly combinations---John Morgan's group and John
Rockefeller's group---controlled most of the fixed capital and bank deposits.
Corporate relations with politics became increasingly close. By
making large contribution to both the Republican and the
Democratic parties and by directly bribing politicians, various monopoly
combinations sought to make use of the government machinery for
their own ends.</p>

<p>     The first years of the new century were marked by a new wave
of social protest in the United States. Despite a certain decline in
the farmer movement at the turn of the century, largely due to the
split in the Populist Party, the movement still had real force.
However, the social and political movement for progressive reform
in the states was increasingly coming to the forefront; it involved
chiefly urban strata of society: the working class, part of the petty
and middle bourgeoisie, and liberal circles of the intellectuals. The
beginning of the 20th century also saw such actions by American
workers as the long strike of 1902 in the anthracite mines of
Pennsylvania, the Colorado War waged by miners in the Rocky</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Volume XXXVI, GPO, Washington, 1903, p. 1788.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Quoted from: M. C. Lanzar, &quot;The Anti-Imperialist League&quot;, <em>Philippine Social
Science Review, July</em> 1933, pp. 226-227.</p>

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<p>     200 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era <b>201</b></p>

<p>     Mountains from summer 1903 to September 1904 and others.</p>

<p>     A campaign was launched in Wisconsin, Michigan, Oregon,
California, and Iowa for democratizing the election system (direct
election of senators, holding referenda, and legislative initiative,
registering lobbyists), paying compensation to workers in case of
accident, providing equality for women, reforming the fiscal system,
and restricting arbitrary actions by the railroad managers.</p>

<p>     Bourgeois reformists in states were supported by the
muckrakers---authors and journalists exposing the predatory ways in
which the corporations grew rich and the bribery and corruption in
ruling quarters.^^1^^ The mass opposition democratic movement was
highlighted by the struggle against monopoly domination of the
country's economic and political life because, as Lenin indicated,
imperialism meant that &quot;the yoke of a few monopolists on the rest
of the population becomes a hundred times heavier, more
burdensome and intolerable.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The intensity of democratic protest and the real opportunity
for the appearance and growth of new, third antimonopoly parties,
on the one hand, and the objective need to stabilize and strengthen
the big bourgeoisie's political positions and the capitalist order as a
whole, on the other, faced the two-party system with the task of
developing principles of the rulling class's social and political
maneuvering and realigning political forces in view of the need to
carry out a series of reforms. In American historical studies the
period in US history from 1900 to 1916 is known as the Progressive
Era.</p>

<p>     This transition period in the rise of the principles of bourgeois
reformism proved to be complicated and harrowing for the
twoparty system. Fierce clashes between the old but still persisting
individualistic ideas and the new but still vague tendencies toward
social maneuvering had a two-pronged result. To a certain extent
slowing down the party-political realignment, the struggle, at the
same time, contributed to the emergence of new watersheds in the
two major bourgeois parties. A considerable impact on the rise of
reformist trends in the two-party mechanism was exerted by the</p>

<p>     The muckraker movement is specially analyzed in the following monograph:
LA. Belyavskaya, <em>Bourgeois Reformism in the USA (1900-1914)</em> Nauka Publishers,
Moscow, 1968, pp. 47-73 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ V. I. Lenin, &quot;Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>,
Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 205.</p>

<p>     newly emerging ideological and political current, Bryanism, named
after the chief ideologist and acknowledged leader of the
Democratic Party in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, William
Jennings Bryan. A combination of incipient moderate bourgeois
reformism and echoes of Populist antimopoly critique in the
mid-1890s clearly reflected the new tendencies both in the
Republican and the Democratic parties and served as an ideological
catalyst for the party-political realignment in the two-party system.</p>

<p>     The first symptom of this process was the disappearance from
the political scene of the Silver and Gold Democrats as well as the
Silver Bug Republicans. After the act on the gold standard was
adopted in 1900, these alignments no longer conformed to the
objective tasks of the party-political struggle. This was confirmed,
for example, by congressional debates in 1902 concerning the use
of silver on a par with gold in the currency of the Philippines. The
overwhelming majority of Silver Democrats and Silver Bug
Republicans, who only recently would have invariably supported such a
measure, on this occasion either opposed the bill or declined from
taking part in debates.</p>

<p>     The anti-trust theme which, in the 1890s, had been channelled
primarily into the struggle for silver, came to the forefront of the
political struggle in view of stepped-up monopolization in the early
1900s and indicated the rise of new political groups in the
twoparty system. Progressive factions began to emerge on the left wing
of the Republican and the Democratic parties, and their members,
despite their small numbers, spoke out against the absolute power
of the corporations. The backbone of the factions consisted of
former Silver Bug Republicans and Silver Democrats. As a rule,
members of the progressive groups actively displayed their
opposition to the trusts and reflected the interests of mostly small and
middle agrarians in the West and South, and also of the radically
minded petty-bourgeois intelligentsia who still hoped to do away
with the hated power of the monopolies and return to the times of
free enterprise.</p>

<p>     The ideology and politics of the rising factions were largely
influenced by the ideas of William Bryan who insisted that the
federal government should ban corporations controlling production
and prices. He regarded trusts as the result of ``bad'' legislation and
of political and legal rather than economic factors. Therefore,
Bryan associated their abolition with adoption of a series of anti-</p>

<p>     202 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era 203</p>

<p>     trust acts. This would restore the principles of free enterprise whose
existence, he believed, was incompatible with trusts. The
government was assigned an insignificant role: to maintain laissez faire,
such was its basic regulating function in Bryan's view.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Having adopted Bryan's idea of breaking up the trusts, its
advocates launched a campaign in the Congress to strengthen
anti-trust legislation at the turn of 1902, soon after the Republican
President Theodore Roosevelt had come to power. In the
Republican Party these positions were held by congressmen Charles
Littlefield, Louis McComas, Knute Nelson, and Moses Clapp, in the
Democratic Party by congressmen John Shafroth, Ashton
Shallenberger, and Francis Newlands elected to the Senate in 1903, and
senators Thomas Patterson, Joseph Rawlings, Alexander Clay and
others. It was the amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890, submitted to the House in 1901 by progressive Republican Little
field and envisaging imprisonment for activities violating it, that
served as an impulse for political debates in the highest legislative body
on the problem of trusts. Democrats from among Bryan's supporters
also made specific proposals to extend the jurisdiction of the act to
entrepreneurial companies &quot;tending to create a monopoly,&quot; to have
businessmen present accounts on their companies to government
bodies, and lift the jurisdiction of the act from labor unions.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The struggle to strengthen the Sherman Act intensified in the
57th Congress when Republican Senator McComas of Maryland
proposed to extend its jurisdiction to the shipyards in January
1902. The amendment was then supported by 24 Democrats and 7
Republicans. Finally, in 1903 Littlefield submitted an anti-trust bill
obliging the newly emerged corporations engaged in interstate
commerce to present annual reports on deposits, employees,
organization and management to the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The progressive-minded Democrats went even further
proposing to extend the operation of the bill to existing
corporations with a total capital of more than one million dollars.</p>

<p>     William Jennings Bryan, <em>Under Other Flags. Travels, Lectures, Speeches</em>, 1905,
The Woodruff-Collins Printing Co., Lincoln, Nebraska, pp. 75, 269; <em>Speeches of
William Jennings Bryan</em>, in two volumes, Vol. II, Funk &amp; Wagnalls Company, New York,
1909, pp. 87-88.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Volume XXXIII, Part 7, GPO, Washington, 1900, pp. 6495-
6496, 6500, 6502.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Record. Fifty-Seventh Congress, Second Session</em>, Volume XXXVI,
pp. 1743. 1744.</p>

<p>     The proposals of the progressive Republicans and Democrats
were easily torpedoed by members of influential conservative
groups in both parties chiefly expressing the interests of major
industrialists and bankers in the Northeast. The conservatives on the
right wing of the political spectrum strongly adhered to the
individualistic doctrine, firmly resisted any reforms aimed at restricting
the activities of the trusts and sought to set up a reliable legal
barrier against federal interference.</p>

<p>     In the early 1900s prominent party boss and chairman of the
National Committee Marcus Hanna was the acknowledged leader of
the conservative faction in the Republican Party. The Republican
Old Guard in Congress was led by Senator Nelson Aldrich and
Speaker of the House of Representatives Joseph Cannon. In the
Democratic Party the backbone of the conservative group consisted
of former Gold Democrats such as senators John Smith, Thomas
Martin and Congressman Joseph Williams. Their ranks were joined
by staunch conservatives such as David Hill, William Cockran and a
number of others who, in protest against the possible nomination of
Bryan as presidential candidate, had left the party in 1896, and
later, under the impact of anti-imperialist rhetoric, returned to the
bosom of the Democratic Party during the Spanish-American War.
With the break-up of the faction of Silver Democrats, the group was
joined by the faction's former members headed by Josephus Daniels
and many Southern advocates of the doctrine of individual
liberalism---senators Donelson Caffery, William Smith, congressmen John
Maddox, Dudley Wooten and others. They associated Bryanism
exclusively with the monetary problem which had been consigned
to oblivion now. In the final count, this was instrumental in their
return to conservative faction. Members of the conservative groups
sought not only to keep their parties on the right wing of the
political spectrum but also to destroy Bryanism as an ideological
and political trend in the two-party mechanism as a whole. &quot;It
becomes our duty ... to unite all elements of opposition to
radicalism,&quot;^^1^^ wrote the ex-governor of New York David Hill in February
1901.</p>

<p>     However, despite their real strength in both parties, conservative
ranks thinned gradually. As the problem of trusts moved to the fo-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;D. Hill to R. Hipp. February 21, 1901&quot;, <em>David B. Hill Papers</em>, Albany, N. Y., New
York State Library, Manuscript Division, Box 7, folder 13.</p>

<p>     204 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive <em>Era</em> <b>205</b></p>

<p>     refront, a complex process got underway in both parties: the
supporters of moderate reforms began to dissociate themselves from
conservative groups of Republicans and Democrats and establish
independent factions. Members of these factions expressed the
interests of liberal circles of the big and middle bourgeoisie and
intelligentsia who saw the need for reforms in society which was
shaken by profound social conflicts. There were trends of different
hues in the groups. On the whole, however, they sought to resist not
so much the supporters of individualistic principles, with whom they
often found common grounds, but rather the progressive factions in
order to hold back the rising wave of political radicalism in the
parties and defuse the explosive situation in the country by raising
the social role of the federal government and carrying through a
series of bourgeois liberal measures.</p>

<p>     Theodore Roosevelt could be justly regarded the leader of the
moderate reformist group in the Republican Party: he had risen to
the office of the chief executive in September 1901 following the
assassination of President William McKinley. Roosevelt was just the
man America needed at the time: his political aspirations were in
line with the contemporary requirements. A realist in politics
Roosevelt realized that a bourgeois party should adapt the
machinery of government to the general needs of Big Business and
tone down the antimonopoly movement. The President's position
was clearly evident in his attitude to the problem of the trusts.
Roosevelt believed that the trusts were an inevitable result of
development and laid emphasis on their economic efficiency. At the
same time he proposed to raise certain obstacles to
supercapitalization which threatened the operation of the competition and free
enterprise system and put an end to the most notorious methods of
trust business activity. As a top priority objective, the President
suggested introduction of publicity in trust operations, i. e. some
measure of federal control over the growth and activity of
corporations. The idea of government regulation was included in the
political arsenal of the Republicans in the first years of the
Roosevelt Administration and became a focal point of interparty rivalry.</p>

<p>     Such congressmen and senators as Jacob Gallinger, George
Hoar, William Mason, and George Perkins grouped around the
President. In the motley crowd of reformist Democrats more
moderate views were held by congressmen William Sulzer, Henry
Clayton, senators Joseph Blackburn, Augustus Bacon and others. It</p>

<p>     was through their efforts that the Sherman Act was watered down
by means of the so-called anti-trust legislation of 1903, in effect
only a shadow of the afore-mentioned bills and amendments
submitted by progressively minded Republicans and Democrats.</p>

<p>     The rise of groups identical in ideological and political
appearance was not simultaneous in the Republican and the
Democratic parties. If the coming to power of Theodore Roosevelt, who
based his domestic policies on bourgeois reformism, largely
hastened the forming of new factions among the Republicans, the
position of the minority party in the Congress, the inconsistency of
and blind adherence by Bryan and some of his fellowers to the
silver panacea somewhat retarded the political realignment in the
Democratic Party. The presidential nomination of a bleak politician
and rabid conservative, Alton B. Parker, in 1904, while the wave of
social protest was sweeping through the country, made the
Democrats' chances for success slight indeed.</p>

<p>     The Republicans won a landslide victory. The electorate
supported Roosevelt because his administration pursued a flexible
reformist course, while the protectionist statements he made during
the campaign rehabilitated him in the eyes of the industrial
corporations. Following Parker's telegram to the Democratic National
Convention in which he said he would withdraw his candidacy were
the gold standard plank not included in the party platform, the
Western states (which had voted for Bryan in 1896 and 1900, and
most of whose population consisted of farmers and the urban petty
bourgeoisie) gave preference to the President. As a result, Roosevelt
received 7,600,000 votes and the Democrat candidate slightly over
5,000,000 votes (about 38 percent). Parker was successful only in
13 states in the South, the traditional domain of the Democrats.
The Republicans gained a sizable majority in the House receiving
250 seats, while the Democrats had only 136. The balance of forces
in the Senate was: 57 Republicans against 33 Democrats.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The election campaign of 1904 demonstrated the growing
influence of the Socialist Party. The Socialists' political platform set
forward some of the working class' demands: to reduce the work
day and raise wages, introduce insurance in case of an accident,
nationalize transport and communications, outlaw child labor,</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970</em>, Partll.U.S.G.P.O.,
Washington, 1975, p. 1083.</p>

<p>     206 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era 207</p>

<p>     impose a tax on incomes, inheritance and land ownership, grant
legislative initiative and municipal self-government. The Republican
and Democratic parties, the platform pointed out, &quot;alike struggle
for power to maintain and profit by an industrial system which can
be preserved only by the complete overthrow of such liberties as we
already have, and by the still further enslavement and degradation
of labor.''^^1^^ Despite the fact that the Socialist Party took part in
elections only for the second time, lacked large funds and fully
worked-out tactics of the election campaign, its candidate Eugene
Debs got 402,000 votes. The Socialists were supported by the most
radically minded (in terms of reforms) members of the Democratic
Party's former electorate, chiefly from among the urban and rural
petty bourgeoisie in the Western states, who protested in this
way against the candidacy of Parker. Some of those who used to
vote Democratic also went over to the Populists who received
114,000 votes or twice as many as in 1900.^^2^^</p>

<p>     About 260,000 votes went to the petty-bourgeois Prohibition
Party which,in addition to temperance, advanced such demands as
an income and inheritance tax, legislative initiative and referenda,
government regulation of trust activity, and a standing tariff
committee, a ban on child labor, election of senators by direct vote and
conservation of natural resources.^^3^^ The tendency for third parties
to become more popular in a context of growing reformist moods
in the country's political structure indicated that the masses were
more actively searching for their own, radical alternative to the
course of the Republicans and Democrats.</p>

<p>     Theodore Roosevelt's second term was marked by a broader
program of bourgeois reforms. The need for reforms was spelled out
above all by the rising public anti-trust discontent in the country.
&quot;Millions of men were out of work. Those fortunate enough to have
jobs were dared to form unions. Courts enjoined them, police
busted their heads, their leaders were jailed (and new men took
their jobs),&quot;^^4^^ wrote E. L. Doctorow in his best selling novel <em>
Ragtime</em> which drew a broad picture of American society in the early
20th century. The strike movement of the working class had indeed
assumed a large scope at the time. Many of the strikes in those years</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 140.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Historical Statistics</em>, Pt. II, p. 1073.</p>

<p>     <em>Historical Statistics</em>, Pt. II, p. 1073; <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 136-137. 
~^^4^^ E. L. Doctorow, <em>Ragtime</em>, Bantam Books, Toronto, 1976, p. 44.</p>

<p>     were led directly by a new militant working class organization
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies as they were
known) founded in 1905. Its appearance heralded the rise of a left
center in the labor movement. The Wobblies immediately began a
struggle against the policy of collaboration between employers and
employees pursued by the leadership of the American Federation of
Labor headed by Gompers. Rejecting the old principles of trade
unionism the IWW leaders pointed out the need to unionize workers
according to industrial principle, which enabled them to involve the
broad masses of unskilled workers.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The growth in the influence of the Socialist Party reflected the
declining faith of ordinary Americans in the leading bourgeois
parties. Major replenishments for the Socialist Party were
supplied not by the workers, but rather by petty-bourgeois elements
who also felt the full brunt of monopoly oppression.
Propaganda of socialist ideas was largely carried on by left-wing
Socialists. The movement for progressive reforms in the states was
growing deeper and involving broad sections of farmers and the
urban petty and middle non-corporate bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     In December 1904, without waiting for his official
inauguration, Theodore Roosevelt sent a long message to Congress
containing specific proposals to extend programs of social and economic
change. In essence, the demands boiled down to the need for
stronger federal control over the trusts, extending the jurisdiction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office on
Corporate Affairs, moderate railroad rates on freight, measures to improve
working conditions for certain categories of workers, legalization of
labor unions, and the conservation policy in natural resources.</p>

<p>     The cornerstone of the new reform program proposed by the
President was the issue of federal regulation of activities of railroad
companies and functions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission set up in 1887 to control freight rates on railroads.
Congressional debates on the problem started in 1905-1906 when
William Hepburn proposed a bill confirming the right of the
Interstate Commerce. Commission to control business operations of
railroad companies and fix their freight rates. The commission's</p>

<p>~^^1^^ For further detail, see: L. I. Zubok, <em>Essays on the History of the Labor Movement
in the United States: 1865-1918</em>, Sotsekgiz Publishers, Moscow, 1962, pp. 382-383 (in
Russian).</p>

<p>     208 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     1. The signing of the Constitution</p>

<p>     (1787) prepared the ground for the</p>

<p>     struggle between parties</p>

<p>     membership was expanded and the salaries of members raised. At
the same time the bill set up a court of transportation consisting of
five circuit judges for the entrepreneurs to appeal against the
commission.</p>

<p>     The latter watered down the already moderate bill. Nevertheless,
it was sharply criticized by the conservatives of both parties whose
objections boiled down to two arguments. First, they asserted,
federal interference contradicted the law of economic development
and led to nationalization and socialism. Second, government
control, as they saw it, was contrary to the US Constitution. Also
unconstitutional was the setting up of the Interstate Commerce
Commission which combined legislative and judicial powers without
any reason for it. In their interpretation, railroad companies should
operate according to state acts and rulings by district courts.</p>

<p>     Debates on the Hepburn Bill accelerated divisions in the
Democrats' motley reform camp and strengthened progressive moods in
the Republican Party. While in the course of discussions of the
1902-1903 anti-trust legislation the Democrat supporters of reforms
on the whole acted as one bloc despite certain differences, now the
picture began to change: representing mostly the states of the Far
and Middle West, advocates of railroad nationalization, led by
senators Henry Teller of Colorado, Francis Newlands and
William Stone of Nevada, rejected the bill on the grounds
that its sole purpose was to achieve a compromise with
conservative Republicans. The bill was denounced from the same
positions by progressive Republicans Thomas Carter of Montana,
Francis Warren of Wyoming, Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa, and Knute
Nelson of Minnesota. Robert La Follette (Rep., Wisconsin) was
elected to the Senate in 1905. He submitted several amendments to
the bill restoring the penalty of imprisonment for violations of the
interstate commerce law, fixing a differential, and prescribing both
a maximum and a minimum rate, and relief of railroad employees.<SUP>1
</SUP>This compelled the supporters of nationalization to soften their
hard line on the Hepburn Bill. However, La Toilette's defeat
provoked a new wave of indignation among them and was decisive in the
outcome of the voting for most progressives.</p>

<p>     The passing of the Hepburn Act showed that the Democratic
Party was more interested in the problem than the Republican</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume 40, Part 8, p. 7083.</p>

<IMG src="299-1.jpg" alt="299-1.jpg" style=" width:369.6pt; height:442.6pt;">

<IMG src="299-2.jpg" alt="299-2.jpg" style=" width:385.4pt; height:538.1pt;">

<p>     <em>t</em>. mat was occasionally now me federalists and
the Republicans settled their counts in Congress</p>

<p>     5. The Anglo-American War (1812-1815) undermined the positions of the Federalist Party</p>

<p>     who least of all wanted that war. The unfortunate Hartford Convention enabled the</p>

<p>     Federalists' adversaries to accuse them virtually of treason</p>

<IMG src="299-3.jpg" alt="299-3.jpg" style=" width:351.4pt; height:447.8pt;">

<IMG src="299-4.jpg" alt="299-4.jpg" style=" width:767.0pt; height:537.6pt;">

<p>     7. Daniel Webster, a prominent politician
and eloquent public speaker, advocated
the interests of the Northeastern
bourgeoisie</p>

<p>     8. The Webster-Hayne debate, the first
sign of the coming conflict</p>

<IMG src="299-5.jpg" alt="299-5.jpg" style=" width:169.4pt; height:209.8pt;">

<p>     9. John Calhoun, a politician&quot; who</p>

<p>     began with advocacy of strong</p>

<p>     federal government and ended with</p>

<p>     the nullification doctrine, was a</p>

<p>     long-time spokesman for the</p>

<p>     Southern interests</p>

<IMG src="299-6.jpg" alt="299-6.jpg" style=" width:184.3pt; height:210.2pt;">

<p>     10. Despite the CiviJ War the political struggle continued in the North, albeit in a
strongly modified form</p>

<p>     11. South Carolina announces secession</p>

<p>     12. Henry Clay, the father of the American System,</p>

<p>     speaks in the House of Representatives</p>

<p>     13. The Northerners' idea of the South and the war against Mexico</p>

<p>     <em>Mm</em></p>

<p>     <b>UNION</b></p>

<IMG src="299-7.jpg" alt="299-7.jpg" style=" width:325.9pt; height:444.5pt;">

<IMG src="299-8.jpg" alt="299-8.jpg" style=" width:126.2pt; height:78.2pt;">

<p>     MERCURY</p>

<p>     EXTRA:</p>

<p>     Ka</p>

<p>     <b>JI&gt; &gt;O
<u>&#8226;tolly</u></b></p>

<p>     F08 PfflBT f THE <em>MM</em> STATES</p>

<p>     <b>ABWUNCOLN</b></p>

<p>     <b>UNION</b></p>

<p>     *&amp;*HrMH<SUP>&gt;MWt</SUP> -*t&quot;ffT1t TtnTT &quot;&quot; t HtgTI njat <b>&#8226;! Hill. I M</b> MH1I &#8226;'*^ll&raquo;l</p>

<IMG src="299-9.jpg" alt="299-9.jpg" style=" width:357.6pt; height:300.5pt;">

<p>     14. A Republican view of
President Andrew Johnson's
behavior</p>

<p>     15. The Lincoln-Douglas debate :
a realignment is under way---
new parties and new leaders
come to the fore</p>

<p>     16. That was how Reconstruction
was imagined by radical
Republicans who wanted to involve
former slaves into political life</p>

<p>     17. In 1877 troops were called
out against the railroad
workers on strike. A new mass
political force appears in the
country---the working class</p>

<IMG src="299-10.jpg" alt="299-10.jpg" style=" width:345.8pt; height:464.6pt;">

<IMG src="299-11.jpg" alt="299-11.jpg" style=" width:361.4pt; height:471.4pt;">

<p>     18. William Tweed, a typical boss of the
party machine in big cities</p>

<p>     19. The Senate at the end of the 1880s</p>

<IMG src="299-12.jpg" alt="299-12.jpg" style=" width:322.6pt; height:479.5pt;">

<p>     20. Coxey's Army marches on</p>

<p>     Washington. The 1890s were a time of</p>

<p>     broad democratic movements</p>

<p>     '- j_ j</p>

<p>     21. The problem of the big cities became part
and parcel of the country's political life</p>

<p>     22. Socialist candidate Eugene Debs campaigning</p>

<p>     23. Robert La Follette, one of the first</p>

<p>     Progressives</p>

<p>     <em>if-</em></p>

1

<p>     24. The presidential campaign of 1916</p>

<IMG src="299-13.jpg" alt="299-13.jpg" style=" width:320.2pt; height:467.5pt;">

<p>     21.</p>

<p>     25. William Bryan's style of
electioneering</p>

<p>     26. The 1920s brought not
only prosperity but a revival of
reactionary organizations of
the Ku Klux Klan type</p>

<p>     27. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the most outstanding
American politician of the 20th century</p>

<p>     28. One of FDR's adversaries, Huey Long, a demagogue and reactionary politician
29. The end of prosperity. The crisis shook not only
the country's economy but also the political system</p>

<IMG src="299-14.jpg" alt="299-14.jpg" style=" width:355.7pt; height:483.8pt;">

<IMG src="299-15.jpg" alt="299-15.jpg" style=" width:320.2pt; height:443.0pt;">

<p>     30. Little Rock was the first crack in the
consensus of the 1950s</p>

<p>     31. Martin Luther King, leader of the</p>

<p>     black Americans' civil rights campaign</p>

<p>     in the 1960s</p>

<IMG src="299-16.jpg" alt="299-16.jpg" style=" width:322.1pt; height:447.4pt;">

<IMG src="299-17.jpg" alt="299-17.jpg" style=" width:366.2pt; height:441.6pt;">

<p>     32. 33.The democratic movements of
the 1960s hit the two-party system</p>

<IMG src="299-18.jpg" alt="299-18.jpg" style=" width:323.0pt; height:362.9pt;">

<IMG src="299-19.jpg" alt="299-19.jpg" style=" width:346.3pt; height:433.0pt;">

<p>     34. Local activists remain vitally
important for the operation of political
parties</p>

<IMG src="299-20.jpg" alt="299-20.jpg" style=" width:382.6pt; height:537.6pt;">

<IMG src="299-21.jpg" alt="299-21.jpg" style=" width:354.2pt; height:414.2pt;">

<p>     34.</p>

<p>     36. The New Hampshire primaries mark the start of the election campaign</p>

<p>     37. That is how political opponents saw Ronald Reagan during the 1984 election campaign
(cartoon from the <em>Miami News</em>, 1984)</p>

<IMG src="299-22.jpg" alt="299-22.jpg" style=" width:367.7pt; height:457.9pt;">

<p>     Party. The results of voting in the Senate on the bill and all the
amendments discussed showed that they were supported by 78
percent of the Democrats and only 33 percent of the
Republicans. This was largely due to the fact that the shattering defeat of
1904 had accelerated the separation of advocates of moderate
reforms from the conservatives in the opposition party.
Roosevelt's victory, on the other hand, had temporarily consolidated
the ranks of conservative Republicans in Congress still further and
strengthened their resistance to reforms. That was why the
reformist Democrats played a major, often decisive part in
implementing the program of change outlined by the President.</p>

<p>     The 1908 presidential election was another landmark in the
evolution of the two-party system during the Progressive Era. The
country's ideological and political development in the first years of
the 20th century showed that, despite a large number of actions in
the parties, the policy of reforms had on the whole become the
decisive factor in shaping the quality of Republicans and
Democrats. An analysis of the contemporary political platforms of both
major parties demonstrates that they were on the whole written in
the same reformist spirit, although the Democrats put forward
broader demands and their election rhetoric often sounded more
radical (for example, the urge to do away with the monopolies).
Having listed the ``achievements'' of the Roosevelt Administration
in the election platform (Roosevelt was quite popular among the
liberal bourgeois public), the Republicans confirmed their readiness
to carry on changes aimed at ending the abuses by the trusts,
extending the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
adopting a series of measures in labor legislation (the 8-hour work
day at government enterprises, insurance in case of an accident and
a ban on child labor), improving working conditions for farmers,
intensifying the policy of conserving natural resources and so
forth.</p>

<p>     The Democrats' platform hardly differed from the above,
also promising Americans to extend anti-trust legislation and
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
reorganize the banking system by setting up national banks,
introduce an income tax and other measures in a reformist vein.
Bryan's victory at the Democratic National Convention, wrote
the reformist press in those days, really reflected the situation in
the opposition party where a turn to conservatism became impos-</p>

<p>     15-749</p>

<p>     210 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era 211</p>

<p>     sible after the disaster of 1904.<em>^^1^^</em></p>

<p>     The Republican candidate William Howard Taft won the 1908
presidential election primarily as the successor to Theodore
Roosevelt's program of moderate change. At the same time the results of
the election campaign confirmed that, despite defeat, the
Democratic Party would offer stiff competition to the Republicans in
vying for political power in the nearest future. The Democrat
leadership's reformist strategy, and the effort to overcome the
party's sectional, agrarian bias (previously the party's mass base was
in the Western and Southern states) began to yield the first fruit.
There was evidence of this in the growing sympathy of the
electorate for the Democrats in a number of urbanized states in the
Northeast and Midwest. Bryan won in 69 counties of the states which
gave preference to the Republican candidate. Particularly significant
in this respect was a certain increase in the Democratic vote in
Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and Iowa where the
party traditionally did not enjoy the voters' support. Democrats
managed to have their governors elected in six states where Taft had
been ahead---Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Illinois and
New York. The Democratic faction in the House was reinforced by
8 new members from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio. The balance of
power was as follows: 219 Republicans and 172 Democrats in the
House and 61 Republicans and 32 Democrats in the Senate.^^2^^ The
party's turn to the increasingly urgent labor question served to
extend its sphere of influence in geographical terms. The Democrats
also put forward demands aimed at introducing the rudiments of
labor legislation (restriction of the use of injunctions in labor
disputes, an 8-hour work day at government enterprises,
establishment of a labor department, recognition of the workers' right to
unionize and restriction of immigration). These and other demands
were previously made by the labor union leadership in the widely
known bill of grievances in 1906. All of this served to bring them
closer to the American Federation of Labor headed by Samuel
Gompers. While gradually drawing the labor unions into the orbit of
its influence, the Democratic Party, at the same time, overlooked
a large army of nonunionized workers most of whom continued
to support the Republicans by tradition.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Outlook</em>, July 18, 1908, p. 583; <em>The Arena</em>, August-September 1908, p. 151.
<em>Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections</em>, pp. 707, 709.</p>

<p>     The drawing closer of Republicans and Democrats on
matters of principle in domestic policy within the two-party system
in the early 1900s was accompanied by a further polarization of
forces in each of the two major parties, which, to a large extent,
determined the specific and the general features of the
partypolitical struggle in this period. So, the struggle between parties
gave way to the struggle between individual factions on various
aspects of domestic policy. Under the circumstances the activity
of the factions constituting a more important element in the
organizational structure of the American bourgeois parties, acquired
a relatively independent significance. A favorable situation was
created for the rise of interparty coalitions. Objectively, interparty
blocs strengthened the minority party, i.e. the Democrats, and
undermined the positions of the Republicans. The process was
particularly apparent in 1909-1910 when both Republican and
Democrat advocates of reform waged a joint struggle in Congress
against usurpation of power by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives Joseph Cannon and during the discussion of the
Elkins anti-trust bill.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party managed to somewhat rehabilitate
itself in the eyes of the voters and even strengthen its influence
despite its four defeats by supporting the Republican left wing---
the progressives, by resolutely voting at the decisive moment on
the Cannon removal, by adding numerous amendments to the
Elkins bill which actually eliminated the articles contradicting
the 1890 Sherman Act, and extending the operation of the 1906
Hepburn Act. Congress in this period saw some elements of the
Democrats' independent alternative approach to reforms which
had been laid down in the party's 1896 platform (trusts, taxation,
banking reform, tariffs and democratization of political life).
This was largely prepared by the growth of the Democratic
reformist camp dominated by the advocates of moderate liberal change.
That also showed that the opposition party was gradually
abandoning its line of following in the wake of the ruling party's
policy. After a long break (since 1892) the Democrats won the
1910 congressional elections and restored their majority in the
House (228 Democrats against 161 Republicans).^^1^^ Once the op-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970</em>, Part 2, U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1975, p. 1083.</p>

<p>     15*</p>

<p>     212 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Kra 213</p>

<p>     portunity to directly rather than indirectly influence the legislative
process was in their hands, the Democrats became less inclined to
continue a dialogue with the Republicans.</p>

<p>     The interparty struggle in 1909-1910 had serious consequences
for the Republicans as well. The growth of factionalism in the party
during its long stay in power was a major symptom that a profound
inner crisis was in the offing. Under President Theodore Roosevelt
the process was to some extent held in check by the reformist
course which helped retain a delicate balance between the
progressive and conservative forces. When Taft came to power in 1909 the
balance was finally upset. Many advocates of progressive change
increasingly went over to open conformism with the conservatives,
which gradually eroded the moderate reformist faction. As the tide
of social discontent was rising high in the country, the President's
policy of gradually curtailing reform demonstrated its total
untenability and contributed to a further strengthening of the left-wing
progressive group whose members refused to follow the
conservatives' lead more and more frequently. Taft and his followers refused
to compromise with the progressives and even regarded them as
more dangerous than the Democrats, urging their expulsion from
the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     Another sign of the erosion which was eating away at both
the Republican Party and the entire two-party mechanism was the
formation in 1911 of the National Progressive Republican League
on the basis of which the Progressive Party was subsequently
founded during the presidential elections of 1912. Among its most
active members were Robert La Follette, Frank Norris, Ray Baker,
William White, Hiram Johnson, and Amos and Gifford Pinchot.
Most of the league's demands, i.e. control of the trusts and railroad
companies, bank reform, conservation of natural resources,
introduction of a system of primaries, direct election of senators,
legislative initiative and referenda in effect merely repeated the
platforms of the progressives in many states. Nevertheless,
organizational establishment of the new league, whose activities were
directed by the progressive left-wingers of the Republican Party,
served as an impulse for a further shift to the right of the political
course pursued by the Taft Administration. Conservative trends
became even more pronounced in the party at the beginning of
1912 when it became obvious that the leadership of the league
which had by right belonged to the progressive Senator from</p>

<p>     Wisconsin Robert La Follette could be contested by Theodore
Roosevelt, an active advocate of moderate reformism. The
popularity of the ex-President was still so high that soon the league was
joined by many Republicans, supporters of New Nationalism, a
reformist doctrine proclaimed by Theodore Roosevelt back in 1910
and based on the postulates of political philosopher Herbert Croly
proposed a year earlier: rejection of democratic government and
establishment of strong central government (the latter principle,
incidentally, was promoted by Alexander Hamilton). Essentially,
New Nationalism did not go beyond the program of political and,
to some extent, economic development implemented in the last
years of Roosevelt's presidency.</p>

<p>     Several remarks should be made in describing the two-party
system in 1912. The growing centrifugal tendencies in the
Republican Party led to a certain shift of the two-party tandem
toward conservatism. At the same time, in view of the internal
political realignment and evolution of the Republicans, the
Democrats became the chief carriers of reformist ideas in the two-party
system. The split in the Republican Party at the height of the
election campaign, and the emergence from its ranks of an independent
Progressive Party which opposed its broad program of liberal
reforms to the conservative course of the Taft Administration,
contributed to a certain decline of interfactional fighting and a
temporary prevalence of partisan principles within the Democratic
Party. This laid the ground for leaving the opposition benches,
while the moderate reformist group became a kind of connecting
link between factions in the Democratic Party. Adherence to
partisan principles on the eve of the presidential elections, with all
interfactional differences, as a rule, receding to the background, may not
be regarded as a sign of the cohesion of party ranks. Nevertheless,
under the circumstances, it proved impossible to set up new and
recreate old interparty blocs of the Republicans-Democrats type.
Finally, the establishment and operation of the Progressive Party reflected
the deep-going political crisis at the root of which lay the
contradictions of capitalist society and the growth of the working-class
movement. Lenin wrote: &quot;The new party is a product of the present epoch,
which raises the issue of the very existence of capitalism.''^^1^^ More</p>

<p>     V. I. Lenin, &quot;The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections&quot;, <em>
Collected Works</em>, Vol. 18, p. 403.</p>

<p>     214 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era 215</p>

<p>     than four million people voted for the Progressives in 1912, while
3,400,000 voted for the Republican candidate William Taft.</p>

<p>     A major success was scored by the Socialist Party in the
elections. This party included a wide range of democratic demands in
the election platform: nationalization of transport, communications,
banks, land, overcoming unemployment, improving conditions of
work, introducing government insurance, freedom of speech, the
press and assembly, direct election of the President and elimination
of his veto right, abolition of the Senate, abrupt curtailment of the
Supreme Court's functions, equal rights for women, etc. About a
million votes were cast for the Socialist candidate Eugene Debs in
1912.<SUP>J</SUP> Thus, a considerable part of American voters supporting
social reforms were released from the grip <SUB>O</SUB>f the two-party system.
The credibility crisis of Americans in respect to the two major
bourgeois parties was also reflected in growing absenteeism: only
58.8 percent of US citizens eligible to vote went to the polls in
1912.</p>

<p>     In 1912 the Democratic Party worked out a broad reformist
political program which favorably contrasted with the verbose
and vague election platform of the Republicans. Seeking to strength en
the party by attracting advocates of progressive reforms, the
Democrats included in its platform such demands as an income tax,
direct election of senators, and only one term in office for the
President. The platform also contained many socialist demands: an
8-hour work day at government enterprises, a department of labor
and recognition of labor unions.^^2^^ This was obviously intended to
win the votes of radical workers and petty-bourgeois urban sections.
The strongly worded anti-trust plank, i.e. the demand to disband
the trusts inherited from Bryan which Woodrow Wilson
subsequently adopted as the basis of his New Freedom program,^^3^^
enabled the Democrats to dissociate themselves in the election campaign</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 168, 188-191; <em>Historical Statistics</em>, Part II,
p. 1073.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 168-173.</p>

<p>     Differences between Bryan and Wilson in interpreting the trust problem became
apparent later: although both of them regarded monopoly as the absolute opposite of
competition, Wilson did not deny the objective character of the process of production
concentration and believed that the policy of &quot;disbanding the trusts would not infringe upon
the interests of Big Business. (Woodrow Wilson, <em>The New Freedom. A call for the
Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People</em>, Doubleday, Page &amp; Company, New York,
1914, pp. 165,180.)</p>

<p>     from the Progressive Party and its political motto, the New
Nationalism of Theodore Roosevelt who still advocated federal
regulation of corporate activity. Elimination of monopolies or their
regulation by government---such was the general scheme of
interparty polemics until the day the president was elected. &quot;Millions of
capital which he (Theodore Roosevelt---<em>Ed</em>.) proposes to regulate
will as certainly seize the Government as the slave-holding oligarchy
seized the government,&quot;^^1^^ wrote <em>the New York World</em>.</p>

<p>     The idea of breaking up the trusts was developed by Wilson
too. The ghost writer of his election speeches was the prominent
lawyer Louis D. Brandeis who subsequently became the chief
architect of the New Freedom program and exerted a tangible
impact on the government's domestic policy-making, particularly in
the economic field. &quot;The Democratic Party insists that competition
can be and should be maintained in every branch of private industry;
that competition can be and should be restored in those branches of
industry in which it has been suppressed by the trusts... We believe
that no methods of regulation ever have been or can be devised to
remove the menace inherent in private monopoly and overweening
commercial power.''^^2^^ &quot;Those who wish to support these
monopolies by adopting them under the regulation of the government of
the United States are the very men who cry out that competition is
destructive... What has created these monopolies? Unregulated
competition. It has permitted these men to do anything that they
chose to do to squeeze their rivals out and to crush their rivals to
the earth. We can prevent those processes by remedial legislation,
and that remedial legislation will so restrict the wrong use of
competition that the right use of competition will destroy
monopoly,&quot; Wilson echoed Brandeis.^^3^^ Proceeding from this assumption the
future President attempted to discredit the entire reform program
proposed by the Progressive Party, including its demands in labor
legislation, the introduction of which, and here he closely followed
Brandeis' doctrine, was a top-priority problem, but the task could
not be fulfilled if the monopolies held sway.</p>

<p>     Wilson's election campaign relied on the sufficiently stable
financial support of Big Business in the Northeast. First place in this</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>New York World</em>, October 30, 1912.</p>

<p>     <em>Letters of Louis D. Brandeis</em>, Ed. by Urofsky M. and Levy D., in <em>5</em> volumes, Vol. II,
State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1972, p. 688.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>A Crossroads of Freedom. The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson</em>,
edited by John Wells Davidson, Gale University Press, New Haven, 1956, p. 79.</p>

<p>     215 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Kra 217</p>

<p>     zation of the two-party system, but failed to eliminate its roots
linked to the unfinished process of political realignment on a
reformist foundation. The reasons why the process was not
completed stemmed from a number of objective and subjective factors.
First, the relatively stable functioning of the economy which had
not yet gone through the unprecedented crisis of 1929-1933
prevented the firm establishment of statist principles in the two-party
mechanism. That was why the ideological and political doctrine of
bourgeois reformism remained undeveloped leaving an imprint only
on some, mostly domestic, economic and not social problems of the
United States in the 1900s. Second, the final realignment of the
two-party system along the lines of reformist policy was hindered
by the limited scope of means and methods for bourgeois social
maneuvering. Measures to restrict the abuses of the trusts and
railroad companies, democratization of the political order (
primaries, direct election of senators, etc.), and conservation of natural
resources coexisted with direct suppression of worker strikes, with
the growing tax burden on the working people by means of tariff
policy, and finally, with overt racism shown by a number of
reformist politicians in the South who urged the repeal of 15th
amendment to the Constitution which gave Afro-Americans the right to
vote. Third, the rise and activity of the Socialist Party, the
Progressive Party, and small bourgeois parties somewhat hastened the
process of ideological and political reorientation of the Republicans
and the Democrats releasing from their influence broad sections of
the electorate supporting social reforms, and thereby prevented
integration of sufficiently broad groups of the electorate within the
two-party system. Finally, the ideological principles of classical
liberalism had deep roots in the two-party system. The conservatives in
both parties were capable of offering firm resistance to the reformist
course, particularly since the advocates of moderate change, most
of whom adhered to regulated individualism, frequently followed
their lead.</p>

<p>     The party-political realignment along reformist lines received
a fresh impulse in the years of Woodrow Wilson's first term (1913-
1917). The new President wanted to play down social tensions in
the country by politically adapting to the process of social and
economic development. He saw his chief task in combining the
advantages of the new economic organization and traditional
postulates of classical liberalism and in uniting classes by means of</p>

<p>     respect by right belonged to New York: according to the estimates
of Rolla Wells, treasurer of the National Democratic Committee,
individual contributions to the party fund had exceeded 400,000
dollars by the end of October. The total election fund of the
Democratic Party was 1,135,000 dollars, i.e. was nearly twice as
large as in 1908.* &quot;It is the only campaign in 40 years in which a
considerable majority of all the newspapers in America have
supported the Democratic ticket,&quot;^^2^^ a prominent Democrat from North
Carolina Joseph Daniels wrote a few days before the elections. In a
situation when the Republican Party was split and strong
antimonopoly moods prevailed among the petty bourgeoisie, middle
classes and the liberal intelligentsia, this undoubtedly influenced the
outcome of the elections.</p>

<p>     Wilson won without polling a majority of votes (41.8 percent).
As compared with 1908 he was ahead of Bryan in New England and
some states in the South, but fell short of Bryan's performance in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska and
Kansas, i.e. in the states where the Progressives and the Socialists
had a strong influence in 1912. This meant that they managed to
lure part of the electorate away from the Democrats, as a result of
which Wilson won while having lost the support of about 116,000
voters who had been for Bryan four years earlier.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Wilson's victory was largely facilitated by a split in the
Republican party. However, it would be an exaggeration to think that a
simple sum of votes cast for Taft and Roosevelt, which exceeded
the Democratic total by 1,400,000 votes, could have changed the
outcome. The success of the Democratic Party was quite natural.
Many years in the opposition contributed to its gradual
restructuring along bourgeois-reformist lines and rallied it to the search for an
alternative to the ruling party's domestic political course and helped
extend its social base. Wilson's New Freedom was the logical
outcome of the process. Having absorbed the reformist ideas of
Bryanism, the party lent them a more moderate ring, thereby
adapting them to the long-term needs of monopoly capital.</p>

<p>     The Democrats' coming to power toned down the destabili-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Historical Statistics</em>, Part II, p. 1081.</p>

<p>~^^2^^&quot;J. Daniels to E. Webb, October 31, 1912&quot;, <em>E. Webb Papers</em>, Library of North
Carolina State University, Chapel Hill, Southern Historical Collection, Manuscript
Division, box I, folder 59.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Historical Statistics</em>, Part II, p. 1073.</p>

<p>     218 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     Two-Party System
in the Progressive Era 219</p>

<p>     mutual adaptation and common interests. As a bourgeois-reformist
doctrine, a cornerstone of the ruling Democratic Party's domestic
policy at the time, Wilsonism absorbed a number of Bryanist
demands: break-up of trusts, a bank reform, improvement of the
fiscal system, a ban on court injunctions, introduction of elements
of labor legislation, direct election of senators, etc. At the same
time, the President opposed the idea of extended authority of
executive power to the fear Bryan and his followers had of an
energetic central government. As Wilson saw it, domination of free
enterprise while the government played a passive role, on the one
hand, led to the rise of plutocracy, and on the other, provided a
powerful impetus for the socialist movement. The President's
flexible political course of making concessions to the working
masses so as to preserve the power of the monopolists, reflected the
overall trend in the ruling class toward effecting social, economic
and political reforms. This trend was aptly described by Lenin:
&quot;Not liberalism versus socialism, but reformism versus socialist
revolution---is the formula of the modern `advanced', educated
bourgeoisie.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Democrats' idea to implement reforms in order to tone
down the contradictions of capitalism was realized in the
progressive legislation of 1913-1916. In the economic field this was
reflected above all in reforms such as the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, the
Underwood Tariff Act, measures to improve the taxation system
and provide credit for farmers. In the social field the New Freedom
policy secured legal recognition of labor unions, an 8-hour
workday on railroads and regulation of seamen's labor. However, the fact
that the Wilson Administration's political course to some extent
answered the interests of the masses did not change its overall social
tendency---to defend the interests of Big Business, in particular from
active regulation by the government which was reduced to the role
of a business advisor. The promonopoly spirit permeated the basic
act of New Freedom, the Federal Reserve Act, which boiled down
to centralization and concentration of the monetary system in the
hands of the finance oligarchy. The measures taken in the labor
sphere were, in the final count, also aimed at stabilizing and
strengthening the position of the monopolists. In the New Freedom</p>

<p>     doctrine the main contradiction of the capitalist system---the
contradiction between labor and capital---was overshadowed by
conflict between the monopoly and non-monopoly bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     The dominating positions in the Democratic Party were still
held by the moderate reformist group which was the President's
chief support in implementing the political program and which
secured for a number of years the balance between progressive and
conservative forces in the party. The most prominent members of
that group were Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo,
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Postmaster General Albert
Burleson, and the President's advisors Edward House and Louis
Brandeis.</p>

<p>     Gripped by a prolonged political crisis, the Republicans at the
time could not produce a program for active struggle against the
reformist platform of the Democrats. Such attempts boiled down to
individual proposals by progressive Republicans, but on the whole
they failed to go beyond the framework of the Democrats' social
and economic legislation. Hence more frequent attempts by
progressive Republicans to start an interparty dialogue with them.
However, the heyday in the progressive movement had passed and
the conservatives who had finally seized the commanding heights in
the Republican camp after 1912 succeeded in neutralizing their
influence in the party by 1914. Thus, the Republicans remained
faithful to the course aimed at curtailing the program of bourgeois
reforms adopted back in 1909 by President Taft. In the past, when
there was a strong antimonopoly movement in the country, the
position adopted by the party leaders in effect made their claims to
political power groundless. Now the situation began to change.</p>

<p>     The beginning of World War I in 1914 brought foreign policy
to the forefront just as it had happened during the
SpanishAmerican War. The Republicans lost no time in taking advantage of
this turn of events and in the election campaign of 1916 directed a
stream of severe criticism at Wilson's neutrality policy. In addition,
the leadership of the opposition party skilfully made use of the fact
that with the beginning of the war the bourgeoisie increasingly
rallied together before the danger of a new outbreak of political
discontent in the country, while many members of the moderate
reformist wing of the Democrats believed the reform program had
been completed. Having risen to the Republican bait, the
Democrats used the neutrality slogan to unite the party in which dif-</p>

<p>     V. I. Lenin, &quot;Reformism in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement&quot;, <em>Collected
Works</em>, Vol. 17, 1974, p. 229.</p>

<p>     220 Chapter Ten</p>

<p>     ferences concerning Wilson's socio-reformist legislation had grown
stronger after 1914. The tactical move undertaken by the
Democrats proved correct and they managed to retain the party's
political supremacy: as compared to 1912 the number of votes cast
for Wilson increased by 3,000,000. Once again, as in 1912, the
Democratic platform showed that the party adhered to bourgeois
reformism. Moreover, if four years earlier the platform did not go
beyond the framework of regulated individualism and demanded
government interference only to maintain the necessary conditions
for the spontaneous operation of production and the market, in
1916 it favored, albeit in general terms, government regulation of
production and private property relations as a whole.</p>

<p>     The 1916 elections marked the beginning of the Democrats'
retreat from the policy of reforms. Now the policy of reforms had
exhausted itself in the eyes of Big Business, and this development
gave unheard-of advantages to the Republicans who managed during
the 1916 election to win back most of the votes in the Northeast
where the monopoly bourgeoisie and financiers were particularly
influential. Preparations for war forced the administration to go
further in regulation than the majority of the bourgeoisie had
expected. That was why the regulation of the economy and social
relations along war lines met with the almost unanimous
disapproval of the Democrats of all trends. It was also one of the reasons
for the subsequent political defeats suffered by the Democratic
Party and largely paved the way for the Republican return to power
in 1921.</p>

11

<p>     <b>THE TWO-PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>SYSTEM: FROM</b></p>

<p>     <b>WORLD WAR I TO THE</b></p>

<p>     <b>GREAT DEPRESSION</b></p>

<p>     World War I and its social and economic consequences once
again aggravated the crisis tendencies in the development of the
two-party system which had been dampened somewhat by
liberalbourgeois reformism in the Progressive Era. The war tremendously
enriched the monopoly bourgeoisie. It abruptly increased the US
share in the world economy and turned America, formerly a debtor
of European countries, into the leading international creditor. The
economic upsurge caused by the war stepped up the concentration
of production and capital still further. By the early 1920s more
than 50 percent of industrial workers and over 66 percent of
industrial output in the United States were in the hands of the
largest monopolies.</p>

<p>     Further concentration and monopolization of economic activity
resulted in intensified exploitation of the working people and
glaring inequality in the distribution of national wealth. In 1918, in
the &quot;Letter to American Workers,&quot; Lenin painted a vivid picture of
gross social contrasts in imperialist America: &quot;America has taken
first place among the free and educated nations in level of
development of the productive forces of collective human endeavour, in the
utilisation of machinery and of all the wonders of modern
engineering. At the same time, America has become one of the foremost
countries in regard to the depth of the abyss which lies between the
handful of arrogant multimillionaires who wallow in filth and
luxury, and the millions of working people who constantly live on
the verge of pauperism.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The country's rapid industrial development, the enormously</p>

<p>~^^1^^ V. I. Lenin, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 28, p. 62.</p>

<p>     222 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 223</p>

<p>     increased power of the financial oligarchy, and intensified
monopoly exploitation---all this led to an exacerbation of social
contradictions and raised the class struggle to a higher level.</p>

<p>     The impact of these domestic factors was supplemented by the
strong ideological influence of the Great October Socialist
Revolution in Russia. The working people of America saw that Soviet
Russia was undertaking to solve the country's most urgent social,
economic and political problems.</p>

<p>     The political consciousness of the US working class had grown
under the impact of major changes in the life of American society
and the ideas of the October Revolution. This was seen first of all in
the founding of the Communist Party of the USA. The party
constituted a force on the political scene which challenged the
bourgeois two-party system and put forward a revolutionary
program for socialist transformation of society.</p>

<p>     The mass working-class movement also made a major step
forward in its development. The workers put forward not only the
demands that had become traditional for the proletariat in the
developed capitalist countries (an 8-hour workday, the right to
unionize and collective bargaining) but also radical slogans such as
nationalization of certain key industries and transport. Even the
American Federation of Labor could not remain indifferent to this
militant program. The 1920 AFL Convention adopted a resolution
demanding &quot;Government ownership and democratic operation of
the railroad systems.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The struggle of democratic forces for independent political
action also entered a new phase. A major landmark in the
development of this movement was that the working class began to play a
more active and independent part in it than ever before. In
November 1918 the Chicago Federation of Labor urged the workers of the
whole country to stop supporting both bourgeois parties and to
form an independent working-class party. The Federation's
leadership drew up a program of profound social and political
transformations aimed at restricting the domination of the monopolies. The
program was to underpin the party's future platform. The most
important planks were: nationalization of railroads, hydropower
plants and some other industries and transportation systems; higher</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The American Labor Year Book 1921-1922</em>, edited by Alexander Trachtenberg and
Benjamin Glassberg, Vol. IV, The Rand School of Social Science, New York, 1922, p. 133.</p>

<p>     taxes on Big business; legislation establishing an 8-hour workday
and minimal wages; the right to unionize and to collective
bargaining; a government system of social insurance; democratization of
the US political system, and an end to the intervention against
Soviet Russia.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The movement to set up an independent working-class party
sprang up on the basis of this anti-monopoly platform. The
National Labor Party was constituted in November 1919 at a
convention of left-wing groups in Chicago. It was transformed into the
Farmer Labor Party in July 1920 after several radical groups of
farmers and progressive intellectuals had joined it.</p>

<p>     In addition to the left wing, a more moderate trend existed in
the democratic movement. Its ideologists also came out against the
domination of the monopolies, put forward a program of
progressive reforms and sought independent political action which, however,
they preferred to undertake within the framework of the bourgeois
parties. Using the system of primaries, they nominated their own
candidates independent of the party bosses on the Democratic or
Republican ticket and sought to secure their election to Congress or
local government bodies. Edward Keating, editor of <em>Labor</em>, the
railroad unions' weekly, argued: &quot;We have something in America
that they have in no other country in the world, and that is the
primary... The primary law renders the formation of new parties
unnecessary for the reason that whenever the people wish to
renovate one or both of the old parties they may do so by the
simple expedient of taking advantage of the primary.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The unions of railroad workers played the leading part in the
moderate wing of the democratic movement. They were supported
by some of the farmers, the urban petty and middle bourgeoisie and
progressive intellectuals. The tactical line they adopted rested on
the experience gained by the Non-Partisan League, a radical farmer
organization set up in 1915 in North Dakota. The Non-Partisan
League scored a major victory in the elections of 1918. Having
entered their candidates into the Republican Party ticket, the
League won all the main administrative offices in North Dakota and</p>

<p>~^^1^^ See: <em>The American Labor Year Book 1919-1920</em>, edited by Alexander
Trachtenberg, Vol. Ill, The Rand School of Social Science, New York, 1920, pp. 200-201, 438-
439.</p>

<p>     Nathan Fine, <em>Labor and Farmer Parties in the United States. 1828-1928</em>, Russell &amp;
Russell, New York, 1961, p. 371.</p>

<p>     224 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 225</p>

<p>     secured an absolute majority in both chambers of the state
legislative assembly.</p>

<p>     A series of important democratic reforms was carried through
in North Dakota in 1919-1920. State government set to building
public grain elevators and flour mills to exclude monopoly
intermediaries. Workers and farmers were granted loans to buy homes on
easy terms. Railroad tariffs as well as interest rates on debts were
reduced, a minimum wage was fixed and a law passed to compensate
workers for on-the-job accidents.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Non-partisan League met with the fierce resistance of
monopoly capital. Nevertheless, the League's popularity spread far
beyond the borders of North Dakota and by early 1920 its branches
had sprung up in 15 Western states and its membership exceeded
1,000,000.</p>

<p>     The moderate wing of the democratic movement was also
joined by various groups known as progressives. An active role
among them was played by the Committee of Forty-Eight, a group
of former members of the Progressive Party of 1912 which had
broken up by then, staff members of <em>The Nation</em> and <em>The New
Republic</em>, and also a group of left-wing Republicans headed by
Robert La Follette.</p>

<p>     The radical farmer groups and the petty-bourgeois progressives
came out actively for united actions by workers and farmers to do
away with monopoly domination. A leader of radical farmer circles
in the Far West, William Bouck, who was closely linked to the
unions, said in 1920: &quot;The policy of the Washington State Grange is
friendly relations with and between all those who toil... Our
members are looking forward to that time when our country and state
shall be emancipated politically from the monopolistic regime of
the present ... and we look forward confidently to the near future
when the worker who produces all the useful things of the world
shall come into complete control of our State and Nation.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The new political situation urged the ruling circles to
consolidate the class domination of Big Business. Mass and vigorous action by
the workers, the broader demands they made, the growing impact</p>

<p>     <em>The New Day in North Dakota. Some of the Principal Laws Enacted by the
Sixteenth Legislative Assembly. 1919</em>, Industrial Commission of North Dakota, Bismarck,
N.D., 1919.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Journal of Proceedings of the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry</em>,
FiftyFourth Annual Session, Boston, Mass., 1920, Springfield, Mass., 1920, pp. 83-84.</p>

<p>     of socialist ideas, the revival and rapid development of the
movement for independent political actions by the working people---all
this made it imperative for the ideologists of the two-party system
to produce an alternative both to the ideas of the October
Revolution in Russia and to the platform of the working class and
democratic movement in America itself. However, this required a major
party realignment: the two-party system had to break with the
theory and practice of rugged individualism, to extend the
government's role and pass over to the methods of bourgeois reformism as
a liberal version of state-monopoly regulation of the economy and
social relations.</p>

<p>     The tendency toward a party realignment along these lines was
apparent back in the Progressive Era in certain liberal-reformist
measures carried out under the Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson administrations. In the extraordinary conditions of World
War I, the United States made another step along the road of
state-monopoly development. When America entered the war, the
War Industries Board and several military economic boards for
particular industries, which controlled all the basic branches of the
economy, were set up. In December 1917 the Wilson
Administration decided to put railroads under temporary government control.</p>

<p>     Government intervention in social relations also increased in the
war years. The War Labor Board consisting of representatives of
employers and unionists was set up in 1918. It aimed primarily at
preventing strikes and establishing collaboration between labor and
capital.</p>

<p>     State-monopoly capitalism continued to develop in the United
States after the end of the war as well. Although the Wilson
Administration began gradually to dismantle the federal agencies for war
regulation, government control remained in a number of important
industries and transportation systems, and federal expenditures
were maintained at the high level of the war years.</p>

<p>     As state-monopoly capitalism was taking root, it produced
corresponding forms of bourgeois ideology. The Wilson
Administration still attempted to operate in line with the ideology of
neoliberalism providing for active government interference in the
economy and partial liberal reforms in the social sphere. In a
context of growing class struggle caused by the general crisis of
capitalism and the ideological impact of the October Revolution,
the policy of liberal-bourgeois reformism was particularly necessary</p>

<p>     226 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party SystL':r
World War I to Great Depress;&#8226;&#8226;'. ^i.''^^1^^&quot;</p>

<p>     Wilson in late 1919-early 1920. A tight-knit group of delegates from
employer associations blocked the approval of proposals by union
delegates to legalize labor unions and collective bargaining.
Following prolonged debates, the conference ended practically without
any results.</p>

<p>     Wilson's statements in favor of liberal legislation evoked a
hostile response in Congress where a stable majority was won by the
Republicans after the midterm elections of 1918. Reflecting the
views of the leading groups of monopoly bourgeoisie, the
Republican faction in Congress demanded that the President's powers be
restricted, government control over the economy eliminated at an
early date and no experiments in the New Freedom spirit allowed in
the future. In 1919 the Republican Party inflicted another blow
against the Democrats rejecting Wilson's foreign policy program.
Refusal of the Senate to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty meant a
victory for the isolationist foreign policy proposed by the
Republicans. Its main principles were US rejection of military and
political alliances with European countries and vigorous foreign
economic expansion.</p>

<p>     Faced with the direct challenge, Wilson adopted an extremely
inconsistent position. On the one hand, he stubbornly defended his
program of international cooperation within the framework of the
League of Nations and rejected the foreign policy of isolationists
who opposed any military and political alliances with European
countries. On the other hand, he failed to propose a specific program
of social reform to counter the Republicans' reactionary domestic
policy and only made a few liberal gestures.</p>

<p>     The faltering and inconsistency of the Democratic political
course in the first postwar years were not accidental. Wilson's
speeches reflected the real class essence of neoliberalist statism
aimed primarily at strengthening the capitalist system. The head of
the White House unequivocally declared that any liberal reforms in
a democratic society should be accomplished only &quot;through the
orderly processes of representative government&quot; and those who
attempt to go beyond that framework and resort to revolutionary
methods of struggle are &quot;enemies of this country&quot; whose
suppression is the prime duty of the government.^^1^^</p>

<p>     <em>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents of the United States 1790-
1966</em>, Volume III, p. 2608.</p>

<p>     for consolidating the hold of Big Business, and President Woodrow
Wilson was well aware of the importance of skilful social
maneuvering. In a message to Congress in December 1919 he said: &quot;The
great unrest throughout the world, out of which has emerged a
demand for an immediate consideration of the difficulties between
capital and labor, bids us put our own house in order. Frankly,
there can be no permanent and lasting settlements between capital
and labor which do not recognize the fundamental concepts for
which labor has been struggling through the years.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     So, Wilson repeatedly urged the Congress to legalize unions and
collective bargaining, reject interpretations of the anti-trust
legislation which infringed upon the interests of labor unions, and
recognize the right of workers to strike. Otherwise, in the President's
words, &quot;capital and labor are to continue to be antagonistic instead
of being partners.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Thus the tendency, which had emerged in the Progressive Era,
toward a party realignment and adoption by the bourgeois parties
of the ideology and practice of state-monopoly capitalism
continued to exist in the war years and immediately after it. However, it
soon became obvious that the tendency was on the decline, bringing
another crisis in the development of the two-party system ever
nearer.</p>

<p>     The objective basis for this was the growing strength of the
United States in the world economy and tremendous enrichment of
monopoly tycoons. Having gained strength and confidence during
the war, the leading groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie once again
resorted to the dogmas of rugged individualism they cherished and
prepared for a decisive attack against the working people's rights
seeking to deprive them of all their gains. Under the circumstances,
Wilson's liberal statements on the so-called equal partnership
between labor and capital and recognition of the working people's
elementary rights encountered the unconcealed resentment of the
most important bourgeois groups.</p>

<p>     Resistance by Big Business was the chief reason for the failure
of the National Industrial Conference twice convened by President</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents 1790-1966</em>, Editor: Fred L.
Israel, Volume III, <em>1905-1966</em>, Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1967, p. 2605.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. War and Peace. Presidential Messages,
Addresses, and Public Papers (1917-1924)</em>, edited by Standard Baker and William E. Dodd,
in two volumes, Vol. I, Harper Brothers Publishers, New York, 1927, p. 487.</p>

<p>     228 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 224</p>

<p>     In line with that social and political philosophy, the Wilson
Administration cracked down on the &quot;dangerous radicals&quot; in the
working-class and democratic movement. It accused them of
sympathizing with revolutionary Russia and seeking to transfer the
principles of Bolshevism hated by the bourgeoisie to the United
States. The ballyhoo around the &quot;red danger&quot; reached its highest
point in early 1920 when police raids against the radicals ordered
by Attorney General Mitchell Palmer swept the country.</p>

<p>     It was in this context that pogroms were initiated by such
ultrareactionary organizations as the American Legion, the Ku Klux
Klan and fundamentalist groups of the Protestant Church. Acting
under a false slogan of &quot;defending Americanism,&quot; the jingoists
severely persecuted everyone who dared to cast even the slightest
doubt on the official dogmas of the American way of life.</p>

<p>     Tougher domestic policies and the climate of intolerance to all
manifestations of radicalism had an extremely unfavorable effect on
prospects of liberal social legislation the need for which was pointed
out by Wilson. Virtually the only step taken by his administration
along these lines was adoption of the 19th amendment to the
Constitution giving women the right to vote. On the whole, an
obvious shift to the right occurred in the administration's social and
economic policy in 1919-1920. This was demonstrated with
particular force in the 1920 law discontinuing government control over
railroads, returning them to their former private owners and
guaranteeing the railroad companies high profits.</p>

<p>     The political situation in the country changed significantly due
to the shift by the leading groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie to a
reactionary political course, refusal of the Republican majority in
Congress to enact any liberal reforms, and the gradual retreat of the
Democratic Administration from the policy of bourgeois reformism.
These changes were already in evidence during the 1920 election
campaign. True, the election platform of the Democratic Party still
featured the rhetoric of the Progressive Era. It laid emphasis on the
role of government regulation and praised the social and economic
policy of the Wilson Administration.^^1^^ Nevertheless, the Democrats'
shift to the right resulted in the growing unpopularity of the
President and his party in the eyes of voters. When the economic
crisis broke out in summer 1920 bringing new calamities to the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ See: <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 215.</p>

<p>     **</p>

1

<p>     working people, the position of the Democrats became utterly
hopeless. The Republicans skilfully took advantage of the situation.</p>

<p>     The strong traditions of individualism also played a major
role in the outcome of the election campaign. The government
regulation the Wilson Administration had resorted to in the
extraordinary conditions of the war, was more often regarded as a
temporary deviation from the natural course of development.
That was why the Republican slogan of Back to Normalcy proved
to be very popular among voters in 1920.</p>

<p>     It was under these circumstances that the Republican Party
won the elections. The new administration of President Harding
included members of Republican conservative groups. The most
important role among them was played by Secretary of the
Treasury Andrew Mellon and Secretary of Trade Herbert Hoover who
expressed the interests of Big Business. No wonder the political
course of the new administration proved to be so conservative.
The administration firmly opposed the policy of government
regulation. In his First Annual Message to Congress in December
1921 President Harding declared that it was absolutely
impermissible to allow &quot;excessive grants of authority and an extraordinary
concentration of powers in the chief Executive.''^^1^^ The Republicans
demanded an early return to the truly American principles of
rugged individualism. These ideas were most clearly expressed by a
prominent Republican Henry Cabot Lodge. In a speech in the
Senate on July 21, 1921, he said: &quot;I think at this time the more
we take the United States out of business and the less we put it
in the better.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     According to the above precepts the Harding Administration
in a short period of time completed the elimination of wartime
government regulation agencies started by the Wilson
Administration. The federal agencies controlling the most important sectors of
the economy were closed. The government actively supported the
anti-union efforts of the employers. Attorney-General Harry
Daugherty declared: &quot;I will use the power of the government to prevent
the labor unions of the country from destroying the open shop.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     The new policy had extremely unfavorable consequences for</p>

<p>     <em>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents</em>, Vol. Ill, pp. 2616-2617.
<em>Congressional Record</em>, Volume 61, Part 4, GPO, Washington, 1921, p. 4156. 
~^^3^^ William E. Leuchtenburg, <em>The Perils of Prosperity 1914-1932</em>, The University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, p. 99.</p>

<p>     <b>230</b> Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     &#8222;, ...</p><p>
Two-Party System:</p>

<p>     World War 1 to Great Depression 231</p>

<p>     workers and farmers, because it deprived them of any hope for
government aid. As to the monopoly bourgeoisie, despite the
curtailing of the government's social and economic functions, it gained
unlimited opportunities to receive federal subsidies. A generous
gift made by the administration to the monopolies was the tax
act of 1921 which slashed the maximal rate of the excess-profit
tax on the very rich. The super-protectionist Fordney-McCumber
Tariff Act of 1922 was also passed in the interests of the
monopolies. The monopolists obtained all kinds of privileges through
their contacts in the Establishment. They did not even stop at
violating the law and embezzling government funds. It had been a
long time since Washington witnessed such an unbridled orgy of
bribery and embezzlement.</p>

<p>     The Republican administration's domestic policy remained
the same under Calvin Coolidge who succeeded Harding as
president. In the First Annual Message in December 1923 Coolidge
firmly defended the principle of &quot;personal responsibility&quot; of each
American for the results of his or her actions. The implementing
of this principle was combined with unqualified vindication of the
monopolies. &quot;The business of America is business,&quot; is how the
President described the basic principle of his policy. The Coolidge
Administration perceived its basic purpose in serving the interests
of business and unconditionally fulfilling all its desires.</p>

<p>     The policy of the Republican Administration was shaped
exclusively in the interests of monopoly capital. It took no account
of the needs of the working class, farmers, and urban petty
bourgeoisie. It was natural that the masses of ordinary Americans were
appalled at the Republican reactionary course. In summer 1921
a resident of Chicago wrote to President Harding: &quot;If Mellon or
Hoover swore on a stack of Bibles that they were working for the
good of the populace, I would not believe them. Certainly your
cabinet has not the confidence of the people and you are losing it
also. Do not consider this as an idle threat. If Big Business does not
get out of the intimate affairs of government there is going to be
trouble from the people of America.''^^1^^ Such moods were
widespread at the time. This was why the mass popular movement
sweeping through the United States after the end of the war continued at</p>

<p>~^^1^^ National Archives, Washington, D.C., <em>Records of the Office of the Secretary
of Agriculture</em>, Record Group No. 16, &quot;N. Crosby to Warren Harding, July 6, 1921''.</p>

<p>     I</p>

<p>     the beginning of the 1920s as well.</p>

<p>     An attempt was made in the early 1920s to unite the
antimonopoly forces on a national scale by further broadening the
social base of the democratic movement and promoting the trend
toward independent political action. In February 1922 a national
federation of different trends in the democratic movement was
set up under the name Conference for Progressive Political Action
(CPPA). It was headed by the leaders of the railroad workers
unions, but it also included the Farmer Labor Party and other
leftwing groups.</p>

<p>     The CPPA platform provided for nationalization of railroads,
public control over coal mines and hydropower resources,
higher taxes on Big Business, direct election of the President, and
restriction of the Supreme Court's powers. At the same time the
leadership of the CPPA rejected the left-wing proposal to set up an
independent mass party of the working people and sought to
channel the mass drive for independent political action into
supporting the progressive candidates on the tickets of the two
bourgeois parties.</p>

<p>     In the course of the 1922 elections the leaders of the CPPA
managed to achieve some measure of success in pursuing their
tactical line. Several prominent progressives (Robert La Follette,
Lynn Frazier, Smith Brookhart and Burton Wheeler) were elected
to the Senate on the Republican and Democratic tickets. The CPPA
leadership proclaimed the results of the elections a triumph of
progressivism. They managed to weaken the positions of the
advocates of a mass third party and win over the majority in the
democratic movement.</p>

<p>     In the 1924 elections the CPPA intended to pursue the same
tactical line. However, the hopes that at least one of the two
candidates from the main bourgeois parties would be acceptable
were dashed. The election platforms of both the Republicans and
the Democrats, and their presidential nominees---Calvin Coolidge
and John Davis---proved to be extremely reactionary. That was
why an independent convention of the CPPA was held in Cleveland
in July 1924.</p>

<p>     Many delegates to the convention were very radically inclined.
Senator Lynn J. Frazier of North Dakota said: &quot;Farmers and
laborers have in the past been kept out of politics while the big
business interests went in. I am glad to see the people are waking</p>

<p>     232 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 233</p>

<p>     up, and hope they will kick out the grafting politicians.''^^1^^
Congressman Fiorello La Guardia continued in the same vein saying that
he had come &quot;to let you know there are other streets and other
attitudes in New York besides Wall Street.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     These speeches were hailed by the delegates. However, the
political awareness of most of them was insufficient. For that
reason the leaders of the CPPA managed to avoid discussing at
the convention the issue of founding an independent third party
and pushed through a resolution to nominate Senator La Follette
for the presidency on a platform he himself submitted.</p>

<p>     La Follette's platform in the 1924 elections was a progressive
document. It provided for nationalization of railroads and
hydropower projects, higher taxes on Big Business, legalization of unions
and collective bargaining, a ban on court interference in labor
conflicts, public works for the unemployed, cheap credit for
farmers, wide democratization of the US political system, and
rejection of imperialist policies and militarism.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Nomination of Senator La Follette and his radical platform
were supported by many labor organizations. Leaders of the
railroad brotherhoods launched a money raising campaign in the
unions for his election. For the first time in its history, the AFL
leadership officially supported an independent candidate for the
presidency. The movement in support of La Follette also involved
a considerable part of farmers in the West and groups of
pettybourgeois intellectuals in the big cities of the Northeast.</p>

<p>     The call for united action by the working class and farmers
in the struggle against the monopolies underlay La Follette's
campaign. In a radio broadcast in September 1924 he said: &quot;I do
not claim that the interests of the farmers and the industrial
workers are always identical. But I do maintain that their
prosperity, happiness and economic freedom are menaced by a common
foe, and that they must take common political action to meet
it.''^^4^^</p>

<p>     Thus, an important step forward in developing the anti--
monopoly struggle in the United States was made in 1924. The La
Follette movement indicated some progress in overcoming the tradition-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The New York Times</em>, July 6, 1924.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>New York Herald Tribune, July</em> 5, 1924.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^ National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 252-253.
<em>La Follette's Magazine</em>, September, 1924, p. 134.</p>

<p>     al disunity of workers and farmers. Industrial workers played a
more important part in the democratic movement than ever before.</p>

<p>     The election campaign of an independent candidate of the
democratic forces pointed to the growing crisis in the two-party
system. A considerable part of the voters was getting out of its
reach. For that reason both the Republicans and the Democrats
attacked the common political enemy. They distorted La Follette's
views, called him a red and violator of American institutions.
They put strong pressure on voters. La Follette's followers were
unable to withstand such an onslaught. Their financial resources
were extremely limited, and the refusal to set up a third party
deprived them of the opportunity to develop an independent party
structure which would, at least to some extent, rival the smoothly
running machinery of the Republicans and Democrats. Even under
these extremely unfavorable conditions La Follette polled about
4,800,000 votes. But he won a majority only in Wisconsin, which
gave him only 13 electoral votes. The Republicans won the election.
This was a major setback for the democratic forces.</p>

<p>     The response of the two-party system to another attempt
at independent political action in 1924 was very unusual. This
time both leading parties did not even try to borrow at least some
of the ideas proposed by the independent candidate, to say nothing
of advancing a constructive alternative to his platform. They
completely ignored all the problems raised by La Follette. Never
before had the two-party system in the United States been so
inflexible in respect to movements outside its framework.</p>

<p>     The anomalous behavior of the two-party mechanism was
rooted in the fact that upon coming to power the Republicans
completely extinguished the tendency toward a party realignment which
had been on the decline since the end of the war. The growing
power of the monopoly bourgeoisie strengthened the positions
of the politicians who promoted the individualist approach to
the solution of social and economic problems. These positions
became even stronger after the country had entered a period of
prosperity. It was at this point that illusions concerning the
constructive role of Big Business and its alleged ability to solve all
problems facing society without government interference came
firmly into vogue.</p>

<p>     The ideological precepts of rugged individualism were
advocated with particular zeal by the ruling Republican Party. The</p>

<p>     234 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 235</p>

<p>     1924 election platform, for example, read: &quot;The prosperity of the
American nation rests on the vigor of private initiative which has
bred a spirit of independence and self-reliance. The Republican
Party stands now, as always against all attempts to put the
government into business.''^^1^^ The domestic policy of the Republican
Administration was based on that principle. In his Annual Message
to Congress in December 1926 President Coolidge stated: &quot;The
whole theory of our institutions is based on the liberty and
independence of the individual. He is dependent on himself for support
and therefore entitled to the rewards of his own industry. He is
not to be deprived of what he earns... What he saves through his
private effort is not to be wasted by Government extravagance.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Accordingly, Coolidge, Mellon and the other leaders of the
reactionary Republican Old Guard sought to reduce to a minimum
the economic and social functions of the government, which was
only to contribute to the most favorable conditions for
uncontrolled activities by business, rejecting all attempts at government
regulation of its operations.</p>

<p>     Another trend within the leading promonopoly wing of the
Republican Party sought to modernize the individualist doctrine
to some extent. Herbert Hoover was the ideologist of that trend.
In a pamphlet published in 1922 he indicated the need &quot;to apply
the new tools of social, economic, and intellectual progress&quot; to
reduce &quot;the great wastes of overreckless competition in production
and distribution.''^^3^^ It was to eliminate these evils that Hoover
advertized his system of American individualism which also rejected
the idea of government regulation but proposed instead the
principles of cooperative action by business. Unlike Coolidge and Mellon,
who adhered to dogmas of traditional individualism and spontaneous
economic development, Hoover repeatedly said that the laissez
faire ideology had grown obsolete and that the United States had
entered a period of decisive economic transformation highlighted
by the transition from individualism to associative action.</p>

<p>     In order to create this specific system of self-regulation of Big
Business, the Department of Commerce sponsored numerous
trade associations and other employers' organizations which, as</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 263.</p>

<p>     <em>The State of the Union Message of the Presidents</em>, Volume III, p. 2691.
Herbert Hoover, <em>American Individualism</em>, Garland Publishing, Inc. New York
1979, pp. 44, 46.</p>

<p>     Hoover saw it, would foster the spirit of social responsibility among
business circles under government supervision. This gave rise to
certain contradictions between Hoover's group and the Old Guard
of the Republican Party. But for all their differences, both groups
of the party's promonopoly wing were unanimous in their firm
opposition to government regulation. Having been nominated the
Republican candidate for the 1928 presidential election, Hoover
said that in his view the most important accomplishment of the
Republican Administration was that &quot;it restored the government
to its position as an umpire instead of a player in the economic
game.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The openly promonopoly course of the Republican leadership
was opposed by the progressive Republicans. After La Toilette's
death, Senator George Norris acted as their spokesman most
frequently. As before, the left-wing Republicans directed their chief
efforts at restricting monopoly domination and establishing
effective public control over monopoly operations. But as La Follette's
election campaign showed, the seeds of new ideas became
increasingly visible in their attitudes, the ideas which were the embryo of
a democratic alternative to the bourgeois parties' social and
economic course.</p>

<p>     Another opposition group in the party---the agrarian
conservative Republicans---primarily defended the interests of the
agricultural bourgeoisie of the West. They disagreed with the Republican
leadership only on agricultural issues, actively campaigning for the
McNary-Haugen Bill and the program of equality for agriculture it
contained. In this, they frequently acted hand in glove with the
Southern Democrats. On all other issues, as a rule, they supported
the official course of the Republican leadership.</p>

<p>     In the latter half of the 1920s the positions of both opposition
groups, particularly those of the progressive Republicans, grew
considerably weaker. The economic prosperity and the resultant
growth in the social prestige of Big Business enhanced the
popularity of the individualist doctrine not only among the petty
bourgeoisie but also among a large part of the working class. Hence the
growing influence of the reactionary Old Guard and other members
of the promonopoly wing in the Republican Party.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Documents of American History</em>, edited by Henry Steele Commager, Volume II,
<em>Since 1898</em>, Appleton-Century Grofts, New York, 1968, p. 223.</p>

<p>     236 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     Two-Party System:
World War I to Great Depression 237</p>

<p>     and made no attempts to really modernize the ideological stand
of the Democratic Party, bring it into conformity with the emerging
needs of social development, and put forward a program of
government regulation. Under the circumstances, it proved impossible to
produce a constructive alternative to the Republican political
course. It is no accident therefore that the struggle between the
Democrats and the Republicans in the second half of the 1920s
focussed on ethnocultural, religious and ethical, rather than social
and economic problems. This was extremely unfavorable for the
Democrats, because such issues as immigration laws, prohibition,
the attitude to the Ku Klux Klan, and militant religious
fundamentalism provoked acute differences between the party's agrarian and
urban factions, widening the split in the party's ranks.</p>

<p>     The stronger urban faction gained the upper hand over the
weakened agrarian wing. As a result, Al Smith was nominated
for the 1928 presidential election despite his being of immigrant
stock, a Catholic and a wet. It was quite legitimately pointed out
in the Democratic election platform that the depressed state of
many sectors of the economy gave no grounds for advertizing
prosperity and that the economic policy of the Coolidge
Administration benefitted multimillionaires at the expense of ordinary
taxpayers. But the Democrats failed to propose an alternative to this
reactionary course. As the press saw it, their 1928 platform hardly
differed from that of the Republicans. Smith and other Democrats
wanted to prove that they could promote the interests of business
circles as well as the Republicans did.</p>

<p>     Thus the election campaign of 1928 demonstrated that
elements of instability in the two-party system were apparent even in
the period of prosperity. There was absolutely no alternative in
the platforms and specific actions of the Republicans and
Democrats and consensus prevailed on the most important
questions of economics and politics. Neither of the parties went beyond
the bounds of traditional individualism. Both Hoover and Smith as
a rule avoided discussing irksome social and economic problems
reflecting the instability of prosperity such as the depressed state of
agriculture and some other sectors of the economy, the plight of
the low-income groups of the population, and so forth. The entire
interparty struggle in 1928 boiled down to an actue debate
concerning prohibition and the religious affiliation of the Democratic
candidate.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party also failed to offer a real alternative
to the Republican course. In the 1920s it was torn by an acute
factional struggle between the two main sectional groups. One of
these was the agrarian wing led by big landowners of the South
and part of the rural bourgeoisie of the West supported by broad
farmer masses in these areas. William McAdoo and William Bryan
were the most influential leaders of the agrarian faction. The other
group united round the party locals in the Northeastern states acted
under the leadership of the monopoly circles of New York, Boston,
Chicago and other industrial centers. Its mass base consisted of the
petty-bourgeois strata of big cities in the North and the Northeast
and part of the working class, chiefly immigrant workers. The
governor of New York, Al Smith, emerged as the leader of this
urban faction.</p>

<p>     The organizational disunity of the Democratic Party and
constant quarrels between McAdoo's followers and Smith's people
on the national committee almost completely paralyzed its practical
activities. The 1924 Democratic convention nominated its
presidential candidate only after two weeks of acute rivalry between the
two factions on the 103rd ballot.^^1^^ The situation provoked the
concern of many Democrats. However, attempts undertaken in
1924-1925 by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and others to
strengthen the party organizationally met with the stubborn
resistance of the local party bosses concerned primarily with their
personal gain.</p>

<p>     In the 1920s the social base of the Democratic Party was
enlarged by the mass of immigrants who had come to America in
the prewar years and settled mostly in the big cities of the
Northeast. This led to a gradual urbanization of the party and a
strengthening of its Northeastern faction. The change in the Democratic
electorate, however, failed to be adequately reflected in the party's
ideology and politics. The Democrats made timid attempts to
produce an alternative to the Republican course in some issues bearing
on social spheres where capitalist stabilization proved to be most
precarious (labor policy, agriculture, development of hydropower
engineering). Nevertheless, until the late 1920s the party leaders
were unable to go beyond the traditional doctrines of individualism</p>

<p>     Robert K. Murray, <em>The 103rd Ballot. Democrats and the Disaster in Madison
Square Garden</em>, Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, New York, 1976.</p>

<p>     I.</p>

<p>     238 Chapter Eleven</p>

<p>     <b>THE PARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>REALIGNMENT</b></p>

<p>     IN THE YEARS</p>

<p>     <b>OF THE NEW DEAL:</b></p>

<p>     <b>SPECIFICS</b></p>

<p>     <b>AND CONSEQUENCES</b></p>

<p>     In the period of prosperity the Republicans' chances were
much higher. Hoover won a landslide victory in the 1928
elections. The Republicans also strengthened their positions in both
chambers of the Congress. Having won the elections, they looked
forward with optimism. In December 1928, in his last annual
message to the Congress, preparing to hand over power to his
successor, President Coolidge proclaimed proudly: &quot;The country can
regard the present with satisfaction and anticipate the future with
optimism.'</p>

<p>     A year had not passed since the day these words were
pronounced when a devastating economic crisis hit America
dispelling all illusions about a never-ending prosperity. A fresh
exacerbation of all capitalist contradictions compounded the crisis of the
two-party system and faced it with the threat of complete
breakdown.</p>

12

<p>     The economic crisis of 1929-1933 completely disrupted the
operation of the US economic mechanism. In 1932 industrial
output dropped by nearly 50 percent as compared with 1929.
Farmers' cash incomes dropped from 11,312 million dollars in 1929
to 4,748 million dollars in 1933. By early March 1933 the banking
system had in effect collapsed, ruining millions of small
depositors. Unemployment reached unprecedented dimensions: even
according to official statistics 13 million people were out of work in
1933.^^1^^ Many ordinary Americans were on the verge of starvation.
Prominent American historian Robert Kelley has written: &quot;The
result was a massive loss of confidence----in the system, in the
nation's leaders, and in the American dream. The optimism of the
1920s disappeared under a tidal wave of pessimism.</p>

<p>     The situation in the country grew more tense with every passing
day. Bewilderment and disappointment gave way to discontent and
protest. The more farsighted members of the bourgeoisie watched
the growing radicalization of ordinary Americans with concern.
&quot;The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever,&quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>Franklin D. Roosevelt warned the Establishment. However, the
people in power at the height of the crisis were not inclined to heed
either warnings or the voice of protest or even common sense. The
Hoover Administration tried to retain the air of optimism, while the</p>

<p>     <em>Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957</em>, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1960, pp. 73, 283, 409.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Robert Kelley, <em>The Shaping of the American Past</em>, Vol. 2, Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, p. 586.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Russell &amp; Russell,
Vol. 1, New York, 1938, p. 646.</p>

<p>     <em>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents of the United States</em>, Volume III,
p. 2727.</p>

<p>     240 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 241</p>

<p>     Great Engineer (as Hoover was respectfully called in pre-crisis years)
himself reassured his fellow-citizens that prosperity was just round
the corner. As subsequent events convincingly showed, the
numerous impressive statements by the Chief Executive concealed the
total lack of recipes to deal with the profound crisis which hit
American society.</p>

<p>     It could not have been otherwise, because the Republican
Administration's political platform was based on rugged individualism.
Its ideologists believed that business was the main motive force of
social progress and could solve the most difficult social and
economic problems on its own, and that free market competition was
the only tool which could successfully sustain the stability of
American System. However, at the turn of the 1930s American
capitalism had reached a point when it could no longer function as a
selfregulated system. <em>The World Tomorrow</em> magazine was quite right
when it wrote: &quot;To continue building upon the foundations of
individualism is to guarantee the collapse of our civilization.''^^1^^ The
fact that the administration's fundamental precepts failed to
conform to the real state of affairs in the economy resulted in the US
government ship drifting helplessly among the enormous waves
raised by the crisis.</p>

<p>     That the US administration had demonstrated its inability to
develop a series of effective anticrisis measures significantly
enhanced the part played by the two main bourgeois parties in
stabilizing the whole political mechanism of the country. However, the
Republican-Democrat party system, which had emerged as a result
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, coped very poorly with its
political functions during this period. As the crisis grew deeper, it
became increasingly obvious that the two-party combination could
not keep events under its control if it did not give up its
traditional principles of individualism. But it was impossible to abandon
the fundamental ideological and political postulates followed by the
leaders of both parties for many years without a serious party
realignment.</p>

<p>     While the US economy was sufficiently stable, the ruling circles
of the country saw no need at all to introduce changes into the
practice of government or the platforms of leading political parties.
However, profound internal contradictions existed objectively in</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The World Tomorrow</em>, January 25, 1933, p. 77.</p>

<p>     American society even in the 1920s and were bound to surface
sooner or later. It was only after the US bourgeoisie and its political
leaders had gone through the crash of 1929 and absorbed the
negative experience of Hoover's rule, that they realized the need for
serious reform which could not be implemented without an abrupt
expansion of powers of the federal government and a certain
regulation of private enterprise. One would tend to agree with the
American scholars who, in studying the realignment of the two-party
system at the turn of the 1930s, point out that &quot;importance must be
assigned to events after 1932---and particularly to vigorous New
Deal policy action.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Having put forward the popular slogan of a New Deal implying
a change to the better, the Democrats led by Franclin Delano
Roosevelt (FDR) managed to achieve success at all levels. It did not prove
difficult to defeat Hoover's party. As Senator Hiram Johnson
aptly put it, Hoover was &quot;more unpopular than Judas Iscariot.&quot;<SUP>2
</SUP>It was a much more formidable task to produce a program relying
on which it would be possible to conduct national affairs, gain
control over spontaneous economic forces undermining the
edifice of American capitalism and assemble round the new
Democratic leadership the broad but extremely amorphous election
coalition which began to form at the time.</p>

<p>     In the 1932 election campaign the Democrats still lacked a clear
alternative to the Republican Administration's course. Their
election platform contained extremely contradictory statements. For
example, it said that the Democrats were prepared to effect &quot;a
drastic change in economic governmental policies.&quot; At the same time,
in a traditional individualist spirit, the Democrats came out for
a balanced budget and promised &quot;the removal of government from
all fields of private enterprise&quot; and &quot;an immediate and drastic
reduction of governmental expenditures.''^^3^^ No wonder two months
after the Roosevelt Administration had come to power <em>The
Baltimore Sun</em> wrote: &quot;When the entire program is grasped it is an
astounding picture, one which no man visualized two months ago,</p>

<p>     Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, Nancy H. Zingale, <em>Partisan Realignment.
Voters, Parties and Government in American History</em>, Sage Publications, London 1980
p. 259.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ George H. Mayer, <em>The Republican Party 1854-1964</em>, Oxford University Press New
York, 1964, p. 421.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 331, 332.</p>

<p>     17-7&laquo;</p>

<p>     242 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Rsalignment
Under the New Deal 243</p>

<p>     and of which there was scarcely a hint in either the Democratic
platform or the Democratic campaign.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     From his very first days in office the new Democratic leader got
down to actively constructing an alternative program adequate to
the problems facing the Democrats. Essentially that program boiled
down to radically invigorating the role of government in the social
and economic sphere while retaining its overall liberal-reformist
thrust. Relying on liberal-statist ideas the Democratic Party
managed to set up a ramified mechanism of government regulation of
the economy and create a complex social infrastructure in a short
period of time (1933-1936).</p>

<p>     There are important methodological differences in the approach
to the New Deal between Soviet and most American scholars.
American historians tend to ignore the objective fact that statist
processes underlay FDR's reforms, and exaggerate the importance of
FDR himself while underestimating the working-class struggle for
progressive social reforms. Soviet historians regard the New Deal
as a fundamental change in the country's social advance rooted in
the development of American monopoly capitalism into
statemonopoly capitalism.^^2^^</p>

<p>     A set of important measures aimed at stabilizing the economy
was implemented in the first phase of the New Deal; these
measures may be tentatively divided into three groups. The first group
included legislation aimed at regulating and strengthening the
monetary and fiscal mechanism of the United States: abolition of
the gold standard; measures to restore the banking system,
refinance debts and provide government guarantees for deposits of less
than 5,000 dollars. In 1934, the dollar was devalued and the
Securities and Exchange Commission was set up to regulate operations
on the stock exchange in order to put an end to the runaway
speculation in watered stock typical of the 1920s.</p>

<p>     The second group of measures adopted in the first phase of the
New Deal involved agrarian legislation. The central place here was
taken by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration of 1933
directed at raising farmers' incomes by means of higher prices for</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Baltimore Sun, May</em> 11, 1933.</p>

<p>     For greater detail on the subject see: V. L. Malkov, <em>The New Deal in the USA.
Social Movements and Social Policy</em>. Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1973; N. N. Yakovlev,
<em>Franklin D. Roosevelt: the Man and the Politician</em>, Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya
Publishers, Moscow, 1965 (both in Russian).</p>

<p>     their products. The AAA set up a sophisticated government
machinery to reduce the output of staple agricultural produce. For
cutting down their output farmers received bonuses paid from a special
fund made up of revenues from a special new tax.</p>

<p>     The third, and probably the most important, part of legislation
in this period involved regulating industrial relations. The new
administration's policy was largely embodied in the National Industrial
Recovery Act adopted in summer 1933. It consisted of three main
parts: (1) streamlining conditions for industrial production; (2)
regulation of labor relations; (3) assistance to the unemployed.</p>

<p>     Under pressure from the democratic forces the administration
took even more deep-going reforms in 1935-1936. Appropriations
for public works were sharply increased, the Social Security Act
was adopted providing for old age pensions and unemployment
insurance, and assistance to farmers was increased, not only to the
well-to-do farmers but also to some extent to the low-income
groups of the rural population. FDR made a cautious attempt to
change the tax system somewhat by a certain increase in the share
of persons with high incomes and corporations in total tax
receipts. The activities of holding companies were slightly restricted
in the sphere of communal services. Finally, in 1935, the
National Labor Relations Act was passed providing for collective
bargaining by the labor unions.</p>

<p>     Thanks to the intense reformist activities, the Democratic Party
managed to offset the most negative consequences of the crisis. It
also convincingly showed that it had turned into a force better
suited to run government affairs because ist rival---the Republican
Party---remained on positions of reactionary individualism until the
end of the 1930s. Hence the Democrats were the chief motive
force behind the party realignment determining its course and many
specific features.</p>

<p>     The exceptionally rapid, explosive nature of the party
realignment was one of its most important specific features. Indeed,
having started in 1932, it had been on the whole completed by
1938-1940. Of course, some problems having to do chiefly with the
lag in the realignment of the Republican Party still remained, but
the outlines of the new Democrat-Republican two-party
combination had been shaped quite clearly. In some six to eight years
important changes had occurred in the party ideology, balance of
power within the parties and between them, the sphere of their sec-</p>

<p>     17*</p>

<p>     244 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Heal</p>

<p>     tional influence and their electorate. These changes had happened
particularly rapidly in the Democratic Party.</p>

<p>     ``Government itself is, of necessity, more complex because all
life is more complex,&quot;^^1^^ said FDR. These words could serve as the
epigraph to any New Deal legislation and any official national
party document approved after 1932. A study of the state and
prospects of the two-party system made soon after World War II by a
committee of the American Political Science Association
concluded: &quot;The Democratic Party is today almost a new creation,
produced since 1932. &quot;^^2^^</p>

<p>     It is safe to say that in the first three months of the new
administration's term in office the social and economic structure of
the United States underwent more changes than in the entire
preceding decade. The economic crisis of 1929-1933 and aggravation
of class conflicts in the country ``radicalized'' the political thinking
of the bourgeois liberals^^3^^ and prompted them to undertake quite
daring and large-scale social and political experiments.</p>

<p>     The changes occurring in American society under the impact
of the New Deal reforms were felt even at the time, on the spur of
the moment. The journal <em>Nation's Business</em> wrote in May 1933:
&quot;America, it seemed, had sharply altered its government viewpoint
toward economic matters, and had made swift strides in a new
direction. In the history books of later generations that change may
take on the significance of an American revolution or a civil war.&quot;
In the party-political aspect the main innovation was that the
Democrats firmly adopted the liberal-statist ideology, moved slightly
to the left of the center on the political continuum, incorporated
many demands of the masses in their policy-making documents
and turned into a broad coalition the leading role in which
belonged undoubtedly to the liberal bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     The New Dealers' liberal-statist approach to the solution of
basic social problems enabled their party to integrate into its struc-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt</em>, Vol. 5, Russell &amp; Russel,
New York, 1938, p. 258.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System</em>, Rinehart &amp; Company, Inc., New
York, 1950, p. 25.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ V. L. Malkov, &quot;Slightly to the Left of Center: the General and the Specific in
F. Roosevelt's Social Policy&quot;, in <em>American Yearbook, 1983</em>, Nauka Publishers, Moscow,
1983, p. 35 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Nation's Business</em>, May 1933, p. 13.</p>

<p>     ture new contingents of voters highly important from the
viewpoint of electoral strategy. The more pronounced multistratal
social base of US parties, as compared with the European bourgeois
parties, is a distinctive feature of the US two-party system. The
heterogeneity of the Democratic Party which was sharply increased
as a result of the realignment of the 1930s clearly demonstrated
that feature.</p>

<p>     The siding of a majority of workers with the Democrats was a
major change in the party's electorate. Unionized workers went
over to the Democrats more readily: in 1936, 85 percent of CIO
members and 80 percent of AFL members voted for Roosevelt.
Among non-unionized workers the figure was 72 percent. The
pattern was regularly repeated at subsequent elections.^^1^^ As a
result, major industrial cities of the Northeast became the Party's
reliable mainstays.</p>

<p>     The second most important change in electoral party
preferences was the about-face of black voters: they went from the
party of Lincoln to the party of Roosevelt. In 1936, 76 percent of
black Americans who were permitted to vote supported the
Democratic candidate.^^2^^ The ensuing situation was a paradox: for
some time blacks and Southern whites, who were intrinsically
racist, coexisted in one party. Up to the 1960s, despite occasional
acute clashes between the Southern Establishment and the national
leadership of the Democrats, the latter still managed to
simultaneously retain within their sphere of influence the bulk of Southern
whites and the black voters.</p>

<p>     The Jewish community formerly supporting the Republicans
became a major element of the FDR coalition. Not numerically
large, the group played an important part in intraparty life of the
Democrats securing reliable links with financial circles and the
media. Its support was due to a number of reasons. Jewish
financiers saw ample opportunities for manipulating capital in growing
government expenditures and the new banking policy. The Jewish
intellectuals were actively used by FDR to develop new ideas of
government. Members of the Jewish community played a significant
part in the US labor movement which had firmly linked itself to the</p>

<p>     205.</p>

<p>     <em>The Gallup Political Almanac for 1946</em>, The Clarke Press, Princeton, 1946, pp. 204,
<em>' Public Opinion Quarterly</em>, March 1941, p. 147.</p>

<p>     246 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 247</p>

<p>     New Dealers. Finally, the rising fascist threat made FDR's ''
internationalist&quot; foreign policy more acceptable to Jews than the
Republican isolationism. Since the 1930s the Democratic leadership
has greatly valued the support of Jewish voters. The Democratic
leaders were frequent visitors to many Zionist clubs. A prominent
New Dealer Senator James Murray in a speech to members of the
New York Jewish community said: &quot;I wish to assure you that you
have strong friends in Washington.''^^1^^ The alliance between these
two forces began to&quot; have a notable effect on the development of
the two-party system since the mid-1980s.</p>

<p>     New groups of the electorate joining the Democrats also
expanded the party's sphere of influence geographically. If before the
New Deal the Democrats had relied above all on the South and
partly on the agrarian states of the West, in the mid-193Os they came to
prevail in all the leading sections of the country. In 1932, for the
first time since 1912, they won the presidential election in
traditionally Republican states such as Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio and South Dakota. The preponderance became even
more obvious in 1936 when FDR received 53 percent of the votes
in New England, 59 percent in the central eastern states, 60 percent
in the Middle Atlantic states, 61 percent in the Midwest, 68 percent
in the West, and 76 percent in the South.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Democratic lead becomes even more impressive if we pass
from the sectional to the state level. In the presidential elections of
1936 (excluding the Southern states) FDR was ahead of his rival by
a margin of 10 percent (almost a landslide by American standards)
in 33 states, including New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan,
Illinois, Ohio, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, i.e. states with a
total of 212 votes in the electoral college; by over 20 percent in
19 states; by more than 30 percent in 11 states and by more than
40 percent in three states.^^3^^ The Democrats were also completely
predominant at the congressional and local elections.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party naturally underwent serious inner changes
after it had firmly established itself as a party of the majority
equipped with the ideology of statism. The first thing that meets
the eye is the decline in the role played by the Southern wing in</p>

<p>     ' <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 93, Part 12, p. A 3897.
See: <em>Public Opinion Quarterly</em>, September 1940.</p>

<p>     Derived from: Edgar Eugene Robinson, <em>They Voted For Roosevelt</em>, Stanford
University Press, Standford (Calif.), 1947.</p>

<p>     party affairs. The South still remained a mainstay of the
Democrats, but as they strengthened their positions in other sections of
the country the share of the Dixiecrats in the party structure fell.
In 1920-1928 the Southerners made up 56 to 82 percent of the
Democratic caucus in the House and 55 to 70 percent in the Senate.
As a result of the 1936 elections the corresponding figures were:
35 percent in the House and 34.2 percent in the Senate. When the
two-thirds majority rule was abolished the Southerners lost their
opportunity to control the nomination of the presidential
candidate from the Democratic Party. At the same time the proportion
of congressmen elected from urban electoral districts increased
sharply from 28.8 percent in 1930-1931 to 46.3 percent in 1937. It
was clear that such a situation provoked dissatisfaction among the
Southern politicians who were accustomed to playing virtually the
decisive role in party affairs. This introduced an element of
instability into the Democrats' party life. This was compounded by the
actions of a group of conservative Democrats from the Northeastern
states led by Alfred Smith, John Rascob, Jouett Shouse and John
Davis. Closely linked to the Morgan and Dupont financial empires,
these people refused to put up with social and economic statist
doctrines in their party. Alfred Smith once said: &quot;I will take off my
coat and fight to the end against any candidate who persists in the
demagogic appeal to the masses of the working people of this
country to destroy themselves by setting class against class and
rich against poor.''^^2^^ The conservative Democrats believed that
FDR's entourage was leading the country to an inevitable
downfall and revolution. The conflict reached such scope by 1934 that a
break became inevitable. As a result the Liberty League was formed
with the purpose of ridding the Democratic Party of the New
Dealers.</p>

<p>     The movement led by Huey Long was even more dangerous for
the stability of the Democratic Party. Being completely
unscrupulous he sought power at any price. By means of his demagogic
Share-the-Wealth platform Louisiana Senator managed to win
to his side the broad sections of poor whites in a number of
Southern states, and became an impressive menace for the party national</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Ralph M. Goldman, <em>Search for Consensus. The Story of the Democratic Party</em>,
Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1979, p. 173.</p>

<p>     * <em>History of U.S. Political Parties</em>, ed. by A. Schlesinger, Chelsea House Publishers,
Vol. 1, New York, 1973, p. Xliv.</p>

<p>     248 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 249</p>

<p>     leadership. Only his assassination in September 1935 removed that
problem for FDR.</p>

<p>     Erosion of the right wing was more than made up for by what
the Democrats acquired on the left wing. Strong support for the
Democrats was offered by the labor unions, black and youth
organizations. However, they were not directly represented on the
Democratic Party leadership, their proxies being left wing liberal
politicians (senators Robert Wagner, Huey Black, Elbert Thomas,
Edward Costigan, members of the administration Frances Perkins,
Harry Hopkins, former progressive Republicans Harold Ickes and
Henry Wallace, Governor of New York Herbert Lehman, a member
of the brain trust Rexford Tugwell, congressmen John Lesinski,
Henry Steagall, Emmanuel Celler, John Dingell and others). The
fact that the President himself relied on this faction (particularly in
the mid-193Os) lent it specific weight and provided it with broad
opportunities for influencing the party's policy-making.</p>

<p>     The main rivals of the left-wing liberal group in the struggle
for control in the party were the politicians of the moderate--
conservative trend---bosses of the city party machines (Frank Hague,
Ed Flynn and Edward Kelly), the leaders of the congressional
caucus (Joseph Robinson, William Bankhead, Key Pittman, James
Byrnes, Pat Harrison and Sam Ray burn), Vice-President John
Garner, and members of the administration Cordell Hull and
James Farley. Their attitude to the New Deal may be described in
FDR's own words: &quot;They [the leaders of the right center group---
<em>Ed. ]</em> are afraid there is going to be a new Democratic party which
they will not like. That's the basic fact in all these controversies and
that explains why I will have trouble with my own Democratic
party from this time or in trying to carry out further programs of
reform and recovery.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     As a result of a short but very intense restructuring, the
Democratic Party turned into the leading force in the two-party
system, remaining essentially a party of the monopoly bourgeoisie.
It acquired a new ideological and political image considerably
differing from the precrisis model in all respects.</p>

<p>     The second specific feature of this realignment was that the
components of the two-party system adapted to stepped-up devel-</p>

<p>     <em>Roosevelt</em> &amp; <em>Frankfurter. Their Correspondence 1928-1945</em>, The Bodley Head,
London, 1968, pp. 282-283.</p>

<p>     opment of state-monopoly processes at different rates. If the
Democrats adopted the statist methods of solving social and economic
problems quite quickly, sufficiently firmly and with relative ease,
which enabled them to assume the full responsibility for the fate of
capitalism in America, their opponents in the two-party system
presented a much more complicated picture.</p>

<p>     As a result of the crisis the Republican Party was reduced to
the status of a minority party. Initially, however, the leaders of
the GOP could not realize the fact, regarding the defeat in the 1932
elections merely as an unpleasant accident. Expressing the opinion
of his colleagues, Senator Lester Dickinson, for example, argued in
January 1934 that the most reasonable, natural and promising
course for the Republicans would be to staunchly follow the
traditional party dogmas which had brought the party guaranteed
success over many years. &quot;It is much safer to trust experience than
experiment,&quot;^^1^^ he maintaind. He was echoed by an influential
congressman Hamilton Fish: &quot;The quicker the Republican Party
gets back to the early principles of our party, as enunciated by
Abraham Lincoln, the sooner we will regain the confidence of the
American people.''^^2^^ Speeches by leaders of the opposition
abounded in such statements.</p>

<p>     It was clear that this approach made it impossible for them to
propose an effective alternative to the New Deal. The extent to
which the GOP was ideologically and politically helpless at this</p>

<p>     Eoint was vividly demonstrated by ex-President Hoover's book
pubshed in 1934 under the title <em>The Challenge to Liberty</em>. Outright
rejection of the New Deal and hysterical cries about an imminent
end to freedom, implying the private monopoly order, and about
the country's succumbing to dictatorship, figured prominently on
every page. As the only possible alternative to these appalling
tendencies the author suggested a return to the principles of true
Republicanism on the basis of rugged individualism, a reliable
foundation of all of America's epic achievements. Hoover maintained:
&quot;We might as well talk of abolishing the sun's rays if we would
secure our food, as to talk of abolishing individualism as a basis
of successful society.''^^3^^</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 78, Part I.January 11, 1934, p. 427.
<em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 78, Part 2, p. 2286.</p>

<p>     Herbert Hoover, <em>The Challenge to Liberty</em>, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,
1934, p. 27.</p>

<p>     250 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 25 1</p>

<p>     These ideas were strongly advocated by other members of the
Old Guard (Ogden Mills, David Reed, Simeon Fess, Arthur
Robinson, Henry Fletcher, Bertram Snell and others) who firmly held
all the reins of party power in their hands. Hoover's follower
Ogden Mills wrote: &quot;We believe that the promise of American life can
be fulfilled within the framework of existing institutions, without
the destruction of individual freedom, and in accordance with the
spirit and purpose of the founders of the Republic.''^^1^^ In line with
the above, the Republicans formulated the functions the party
would have to perform during what was regarded by their leaders
as a short term in the opposition; being in the opposition meant
simply rejecting all the administration's measures going beyond the
traditional framework. The Chairman of the Republican National
Committee Henry Fletcher asserted in 1935: &quot;All we need to do is
to apply to present-day problems and conditions the same
devotion to economic freedom and social progress which has
characterized the Republican Party through these years. &quot;^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Republicans' approach to the question of the opposition's
functions was one of the reasons why the party leadership was
continually accused of obstructionism and refusal to solve the
problems produced by the crisis in a constructive way. But that did
not bother them. Responding to such criticism Hoover said: &quot;I am
not entirely convinced of the fact that when a nation is about to
jump out of a window it is necessary to offer him a constructive
program. The main thing is to tell him to stop.''^^3^^ People of the
Hoover, Fess and Fletcher type had grown so rigid in their views
that in order to preserve them in an unaltered form they were
ready to reject the pragmatism typical of American politicians and
sacrifice the party's influence in certain strata of American society.
Fletcher said: &quot;A party cannot live without votes but it cannot
live for votes alone. &quot;^^4^^</p>

<p>     All these considerations stemmed from a simple failure to
understand that increased intervention by the federal government in
social and economic relations had become irreversible due to ob-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Ogden L. Mills, <em>What of Tomorrow?</em>, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1935,
pp. 119-120.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, Washington, Feb. 25, 1935, p. 350.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Gary Dean Best, <em>Herbert Hoover. The Presidential Years 1933-1944</em>, Vol. 1, Hoover
Institution Press, Standford (Calif.), 1983, p. 26.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, p. 352.</p>

<p>     jective laws governing capitalist development. As a result the
Republicans were in disarray, lagged behind their partners in the
twoparty system in adapting to the new conditions, and in a certain
sense, had excluded themselves from the political process.</p>

<p>     Naturally there is the question of the progressive Republicans
who had occupied a prominent place in the party since the early
20th century. With the coming of the economic crisis of 1929, it
seemed that this group would initiate the social and economic
reforms. The progressive Republicans fulfilled the mission to some
extent. The campaign conducted by Senator Norris for the Tennessee
Valley Authority, the progressive Norris-La Guardia Act to restrict
injunction in labor conflicts, active efforts by Senator La Follette
to secure government assistance for the unemployed---all this
pointed to the existence of an extensive positive capability of
the progressive Republicans. In the final count, however, they
gave up the initiative to the left-centrist wing of the Democratic
Party.</p>

<p>     A most important cause of this was that they lacked a broad
base in the urban centers which had become the principal source of
social and economic problems. Another reason was that
progressive Republicans often seemed to be overzealous advocates of
individualism, albeit in its democratic and petty-bourgeois version.
When they did propose programs of social and economic reform,
their statism proved to be excessively radical and antimonopoly to
fit into what was acceptable to most Republicans or even the New
Dealers. It was not by chance that Democratic Senator Key Pittman
warned FDR of &quot;a progressive Republican membership determined
upon going further to the left than you will go.''^^1^^ As years went
by there surfaced such a major negative aspect of the progressive
Republicans as isolationism which put them at loggerheads with
the most active antifascist groups. Of course, in the New Deal
years, the progressives largely contributed to reforms but only when
they broke with their party and sided with FDR or organized third
parties which were to the left of the New Dealers in some
Northwestern states. Their ability to influence the state of affairs in
their own party steadily declined because the conservative
leadership of the GOP held quite a different view of the organization's</p>

<p>     Joseph Boskin, <em>Politics of an Opposition Party: The Republican Party in the New
Deal Period, 1936-1940</em>, University Microfilms International, Inc., Ann Arbor (Michigan),
1959, p. 72.</p>

<p>     252 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under&quot; the New Deal 253</p>

<p>     political behavior.</p>

<p>     Hoover's followers did not come to their senses even after the
sensational defeat of the party in the midterm elections of 1934.
The party leadership regarded that defeat as an unfortunate
accident. Despite isolated and cautious appeals to revise traditional
party dogmas, no serious changes had occurred in the social thinking of
the Republican Party until the mid-193 Os. This is borne out by an
analysis of the behavior of the republican congressional caucus
in 1935-1936 and speeches of its leaders. A typical example
illustrating the situation in the party was the Declaration of Grievances
approved by a Grass Roots Conference in Springfield, Illinois, in the
summer of 1935. The Republican creed was defined as follows:
&quot;We believe in individualism ... as opposed to Communism,
Socialism, Fascism, Collectivism, or the New Deal.''^^1^^ Not one of the 18
points in the Declaration of Grievances so much as hinted that its
authors had changed their former position of rejecting the New
Deal. This aggressive document may be placed among the most
rabid examples of anti-FDR journalism.</p>

<p>     The same tendency was demonstrated clearly at the party
election convention in 1936. The keynote to the work of the entire
convention was set by the convention's acting chairman Frederick
Steiwer at the very beginning of his speech: &quot;Never until March
1933, has an Administration elected to preserve and develop the
American system tried, by the autocratic abuse of its executive
power, to abolish the very system that it had sworn to conserve.''<SUP>2
</SUP>These words from the speech became the convention's motto.
Convention delegates enthusiastically responded to Hoover's speech
entitled &quot;The New Deal and European Collectivism&quot; which
became a classic in the legacy of individualist ideology. Having in no
way revised their reactionary individualistic views, the
Republicans came out flatly against government regulation of the economy
and liberal social legislation. Their election platform promised
Americans to preserve &quot;their political liberty, their individual
opportunity and their character as free citizens, which today for the
first time are threatened by Government itself.''^^3^^ Nomination of</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Literary Digest, June</em> 22, 1935, p. 11.</p>

<p>     <em>Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty First Republican National
Convention Held in Cleveland, Ohio, June 9-12, 1936</em>, Washington, p. 33. 
~^^3^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 365.</p>

<p>     Alfred Landon who did not belong directly to the Old Guard
changed little. The party behaved as if the country had neither gone
through a monumental crisis nor experienced an enormous
upsurge in the labor and democratic movement or numerous New Deal
reforms.</p>

<p>     The complete failure to understand what was happening
naturally resulted in a catastrophic election defeat for the Republicans
and put the party into an extremely precarious situation. No
wonder the press then widely discussed whether the Republican Party
had any future under the circumstances.</p>

<p>     The situation was fraught with many dangers for the two--
party system because it could reliably fulfill its main mission---protect
the political rule of the monopoly bourgeoisie---only provided both
parties were politically sound. In the mid-1930s hardly anyone
(except for the Old Guard, of course) would venture to affirm
that the Republican Party was a politically sound body.</p>

<p>     This period saw a difference in the extent of each party's
influence which was unique in the history of the two-party system,
and, more importantly, an extreme polarization of their stands.
The political course of Democrats and Republicans was dominated
by a clear alternative, while the elements of consensus, highly
necessary to retain the system principle, had almost completely
disappeared from relations between the parties. As a result a
dangerous gap emerged in the center of the party-political continuum
threatening to undermine the further operation of Republicans and
Democrats within the two-party system. Such was the third
feature of the party realignment. Hence the most important task facing
the two leading parties: to restore the system principle. Its
realization constituted the essential meaning of the development of
the two-party combination in the second phase of the realignment
which began after the 1936 elections.</p>

<p>     The most important precondition for the realization of the
task was to introduce statism into the ideological and political
doctrines of the Republicans. This proved to be a very trying process.
Despite shattering defeats the people holding the reins of power
within the party still believed in traditional party imperatives. Thus,
commenting on the results of the elections Ogden Mills said: &quot;We
were on perfectly sound ground in pointing out the inevitable
results of the New Deal policies. But no one has yet actually felt
their consequences and people have to feel things before they are</p>

<p>     254 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 255</p>

<p>     actually influenced. &quot;* Landon himself explained his defeat in much
the same terms.^^2^^ The Republican leaders still thought that the
main task in domestic political life was &quot;the destruction of a
Roosevelt collectivism that threatens the United States of America.&quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>It was in this spirit that the Republican leader in the House of
Representatives B. Snell defined his action program for the caucus in
1938 directing the party toward dismantling the earlier created
state-monopoly mechanism.^^4^^ The National Committee urged the
party to do the same. In a speech on the occasion of the closing of
the first session of the 75th Congress in August 1937 Chairman of
the Republican National Committee John Hamilton said: &quot;I again
emphasize the central issue of our times, the issue of Republican
representative government against Rooseveltian personal
government. I hold that it cannot be emphasized too much.''^^5^^</p>

<p>     Despite the subjective rejection of statism in all its forms by the
Old Guard, in 1937-1938 the United States already had a ramified
state-monopoly infrastructure which affected all aspects of life in
American society, including the development of conservative
ideology. More and more frequently voices were heard in the
Republican Party urging, at least verbally, to take greater account of
realities in contemporary America. For example, Frank Knox, the 1936
Republican candidate for the vice-presidency, said at the beginning
of 1938 that while the party only indulged in accusing the New
Deal, it would be difficult for it to count on success in the fight
against FDR's Democrats. It could hope to restore its former
power only provided the &quot;Republican leadership address itself to the
formulation of progressive, forward-looking, economically sound
program. <em>&quot;^^6^^</em> Knox obviously tried to put a Republican label on
many of the New Deal measures---collective bargaining, social
insurance, aid to the unemployed---linking them to Republican traditions
while strongly modernizing the latter. While such statements did
not prevail yet, neither were they solitary. They were specific
instances of the rising ``me-too'' political philosophy, i.e. the inevi-</p>

<p>     Joseph Boskin, <em>Politics of an Opposition Party: The Republican Party in the New
Deal Period, 1936-1940</em>, p. 82.</p>

<p>     * <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 83, Part II, pp. 2511-2513.
<em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, Washington, September 15, 1937, p. 710.
<em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 83, Part 19, pp. 184-185.
<em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, Washington, September 15, 1937, p. 712.
<em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, Washington, February 1, 1938, p. 243.</p>

<p>     table adaptation of the Republican Party which lagged behind its
rival in terms of statist attitudes to the actions of the Democratic
Party which had forged ahead.</p>

<p>     Gradually, in the process of acute inter and intraparty strife,
the Republicans were groping for an alternative to the New Deal.
The essence of the new approach consisted in accepting to some
extent the reality of statism but freeing statist principles of what in
the eyes of the right-wing forces seemed an inadmissible influence
of popular demands and the radicalism and ``socialism'' of the New
Dealers. Conservative statism (neoconservatism) formed as a
rightcentrist version of state-monopoly ideology and politics which have
a common statist platform with neoliberalism but lay greater
emphasis on traditional individualist values. However, up to the 1938
midterm elections, these trends had made themselves felt to a
limited extent and chiefly on the ideological level. In politics, the
prevailing line was still obstruction and rejection of the legislative
initiatives of the ruling party. The Republicans had yet been unable
to transfer the rudiments of neoconservative ideology into the
sphere of specific proposals.</p>

<p>     The 1938 midterm elections brought a major success to the
Republicans: they increased the number of seats in the Senate from
16 to 23 and in the House from 89 to 164 and the number of
Republican governors grew from 5 to 18. Circumstances which
were independent of the Republicans played the chief role in this
outcome.</p>

<p>     In the fall of 1937 the country was hit by another economic
crisis which the Republicans immediately called the Roosevelt
recession. It is difficult to find another instance in American history
when a crisis would provoke such jubilation by the opposition.
&quot;This is solely our own depression. Its causes must be searched for
right here at home,&quot;^^1^^ Hoover concluded with glee. Such appraisals
of the reasons for the new crisis were widespread in the United
States. Summing up the changes in public awareness occurring
under the impact of the crisis, prominent political analyst Raymond
Clapper pointed out that these events exploded the myth that the
New Deal had guaranteed the country from a repetition of crises
and gave rise to the first serious disappointment in the possibili-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Herbert Hoover, <em>Addresses Upon the American Road 1933-1938</em>, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1938, p. 348.</p>

<p>     256 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 257</p>

<p>     While the Republicans were taking the first, tentative steps in
the neoconservative direction, the Democrats were laying the
foundations for the completion of the realignment by cooling the
reformist ardor, for a consensus based on statist principles was
inconceivable while the Democrats were seen by their rivals as still
excessively ``socialist''. Of course, the Democratic Party's shift to the
right was far from straightforward. However, since 1937, all
public opinion polls showed a steady increase in the percentage of
persons believing that the Democratic Party should follow a more
conservative line.^^1^^ The President was urged to do the same by
influential moderate-conservative politicians such as National Committee
Chairman James Farley, Speaker William Bankhead, and Senator
James Byrnes who maintained that &quot;the period of emergency has
gone&quot;^^2^^ and therefore, there was no need in further social and
political experiments.</p>

<p>     Seeking to beat back the onslaught of the conservative
elements, the liberal Democrats made a desperate attempt in 1938
to reverse the unfavorable trends. They managed to persuade FDR
to intervene in the primaries to defeat certain conservative
Democrats seeking renomination and, most important, to force those
who were hesitating to adhere to the administration's political
course. But the attempt at ``purging'' the Democratic Party in
effect failed completely. The <em>Philadelphia Inquirer</em> justly regarded
the results of the campaign as a slap in the face received by FDR
from his conservative party colleagues.^^3^^ The Roosevelt camp
proved to be totally &quot;confused over the next phase of the New
Deal&quot;^^4^^ and the President himself began to demonstrate his ``
moderation''^^5^^ in all ways trying to distance himself from his recent
allies. The results of the 1938 elections reinforced the
centrifugal force in the Democratic Party and provided additional
impulses for its further drift from the left-wing to the center and
even right of center. At the same time, serious changes in the
party's electorate which occurred in the first half of the 1930s
&quot;inevitably influenced its policy establishing new limits for its</p>

<p>     George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, <em>The Pulse of Democracy. The Public-Opinion
Poll and How It Works</em>, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1940, p. 295.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The New York Times</em>, May 4, 1937, p. 13.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Philadelphia Inquirer</em>, September 18, 1938.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Kansas City Times</em>, December 1, 1978.</p>

<p>     ties of government regulation among the electorate.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The major corporations attempted to take advantage of the
unfavorable business conditions to push the labor movement back
from the positions it had gained. Naturally, the unions, the CIO
above all, did not intend to remain on the sidelines. Sit-ins became
an effective form of struggle against the monopolies. Frequently
accompanied by bloody clashes with the police, these strikes had
a dual effect: on the one hand, under their impact virtually all
the major corporations were forced to make concessions to the
workers, on the other, a hostile attitude to labor unions skilfully
whipped up by the conservative press increased considerably among
the public.</p>

<p>     The crisis gave rise to another wave of polemics around deficit
spending which was the backbone of FDR's entire social and
economic policy. Increasingly often articles appeared in the press
affirming that the practice of deficit spending had not been justified
and not only failed to invigorate the economy but, on the
contrary, disrupted finances, sowing uncertainty among business circles,
and as a consequence, caused a new crisis. A massive campaign for
the economy of federal funds was no doubt favorable to the
Republicans because the issue had always been a central plank of
their platform.</p>

<p>     Finally, discernable splits appeared in the body of the
Democratic Party in the course of sharp political battles which raged in
the US Congress in 1937-1938 around such proposals as the reform
of the Supreme Court, a Fair Labor Standards Bill, reorganization
of executive bodies, the Housing Bill and punishment of officials
who had failed to take measures against lynching. The Dixiecrats
and some of the conservative Democrats from the Northern and
Western states joined the opposition to the New Dealers. This
opened the way for the setting up of a two-party conservative
coalition thanks to which the sharp disproportion in the balance of
power in the political process which had emerged in the previous
period was removed. <em>The Christian Science Monitor</em> wrote: &quot;In
state after state, the combination of conservative city groups with
the farmers appeared to nullify that balance of power which was
exercised two years ago.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     ^ <em>Current History</em>, April 1939, p. 19.
<em>Christian Science Monitor</em>, November 12, 1938.</p>

<p>     ' <em>Philadelphia Inquirer</em>, December 14, 1938.</p>

<p>     18-749</p>

<p>     258 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     possible return to conservatism.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     In the course of the election campaign of 1938, a strong blow
was inflicted upon third parties which had previously enjoyed
considerable influence in a number of states. From the very outset of
the New Deal most of the Democratic Party leaders felt insecure
due to the proximity, on the left, of progressive parties and
movements which supported many measures of the New Dealers.
However, FDR realized that until a certain time it was necessary to
put up with them so as not to drive them further to the left. That
was the object of his vigorous flirtation in 1934-1936 with the
leaders of the Farmer Labor Party of Minnesota and the Progressive
Party of Wisconsin. But as soon as he managed to tie them
sufficiently strongly to the Democratic bandwagon, he immediately
adopted a tougher line toward his allies on the left wing. As a
result of the 1938 elections the Progressives lost gubernatorial posts
in both states and the number of their seats in the House dropped
from thirteen to four. Commenting on this aspect of the elections,
the <em>Chicago Sunday Times</em> stated without concealing its
satisfaction: &quot;Once again the two-party system in this country has been
firmly entrenched. Threats of Third Party movements have
evaporated like the morning dew under the rising sun. &quot;^^2^^ In a private
letter FDR himself frankly admitted: &quot;We have on the positive side
eliminated Phil Lafollette and the Fanner Labor people in the
Northwest as a standing Third Party threat. &quot;^^3^^</p>

<p>     The 1938 elections recorded a certain realignment in the
highest echelons of the Republican Party. A new group of
Republican leaders had emerged by 1938. They were governors Harold
Stassen, Leverett Saltonstall, Raymond Baldwin, George Aiken,
and the young District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey who made a
good showing in the race for the governor's office in New York
although he did not win. Together with the earlier elected senators
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Henry Cabot Lodge, Styles Bridges, James
Davis and others, they made up the cohort of politicians which
gradually pushed the Hoover Old Guard to the background. The
strength of their positions and serious intentions in the struggle</p>

<p>~^^1^^ V. O. Pechatnov, <em>The Democratic Party of the United States: Voters and Politics</em>,
Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 29 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Chicago Sunday Times</em>, November 13, 1938.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-1945</em>, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Vol. II, New
York, 1950, p. 827.</p>

<p>     within the party were demonstrated, in particular, in the open
letter written by the Governor of Vermont George Aiken and
published at the end of 1937 in which he proposed &quot;a purge of
'reactionary and unfair elements' &quot; in the party who hindered
restoration of its influence. He pointed out that the years of the
New Deal had taught Americans many things and the party had
to become &quot;responsive to the enlightened opinion of the voters you
profess to serve.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The activity of the new Republican leaders created more
favorable conditions for the party to adopt neoconservatism. As
political analyst Ernest Lindley aptly remarked, the Republicans
passed from general attacks against the New Deal to &quot;highly
selective&quot; criticism.^^2^^ The Republicans began to advertise their
moderation. Senator Davis, who swapped the career of a union boss for a
post in the Republican Party, asserted: &quot;Radical ideas either in
government or industry will hurt the Nation. There is a great need
for moderation today.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     In addition to appeals for moderation the Republican leaders of
the new generation drummed it into the heads of voters that the
party was prepared to correct the mistakes and excesses of the New
Dealers. Congressman Bruce Barton conceded: &quot;The Democrats
have proved again and again that they can conceive high ideas and
enact far-reaching reforms. They have proved, perhaps, that they
have more ideas than we have.&quot; Such statements were adopted as
brainwashing cliches by GOP officials who were increasingly
rejecting the Old Guard's militant and uncompromising stand on the
New Deal policies. Less susceptible to statist principles in its
ideology, the Republican Party, nevertheless, approached the 1940
elections a different party than it had been in the mid-193Os.</p>

<p>     These changes were largely due to the fact that business, the
mainstay of the Republican Party, gradually came to take a more
favorable view on expanding the powers of government.
Supporting and promoting these tendencies the ideologists of
neoconservatism conducted an active propaganda campaign in business
quarters. One of them, Raymond Moley, a former member of FDR's
brain trust who had broken with the New Dealers when they shift-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Editorial Research Reports, January</em> 13, Washington, 1938, p. 23.</p>

<p>     <em>Current History</em>, February 1939, p. 15.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 83, Part 9, p. 628. 
~^^4^^ <em>Time, July</em> 11, 1938, p. 14.</p>

<p>     260 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Oenl 26i</p>

<p>     ed to the left, cautioned his listeners in a speech at the convention
of the National Association of Manufacturers: &quot;Business must
realize that, when we talk of a conservative drift, the word
conservative must be interpreted to mean a position distinctly to the left of
1929. Business can honestly hope for relief from some of the more
oppressive forms of regulation of the past three years, but it should
not hope for a reaction that will sweep away the earlier and sounder
reforms of the New Deal.''^^1^^ Business gradually absorbed these
truths facilitating the rise of New Republicanism which, in turn,
had a stabilizing effect on the operation of the two-party tandem. It
was not accidental that we used the word. Indeed, the 1930s
saw a growing similarity of the parties' positions, a levelling out
of consensus and alternative in their policies, although the
consensus-alternative principle was now based on state-monopoly
foundations.</p>

<p>     The ideological and political restructuring of the GOP which
began after 1937-1938 soon removed the question of its prospects
from the agenda. The mouthpiece of business circles, <em>Fortune</em>,
noted that Americans were witnessing &quot;perhaps the most exciting
phenomenon in contemporary politics: the reemergence of the
G.O.P. from apparent extinction to a functioning role in the
traditional two-party system.^^2^^ There was a change in the leadership of
the Republican faction in the House of Representatives in 1939.
Congressman Joseph Martin from Massachusetts became the
leader of the minority. In his memoirs he wrote that in 1939 &quot;there
was a far different brand of Republicans in the House from any
that the country had known since the Hoover administration.&quot;
Using more flexible tactics the Republicans offered more
effective resistance to the administration's plans in Congress and this,
in turn, forced FDR to seek ways to achieve reconciliation with
the conservative wing of his party. This weakened the polarization
of the electorate and widened the field for the application of
consensus-alternative methods by the components of the two-party
system that had changed places in terms of political weight but
managed to survive.</p>

<p>     The extent of change in the two main parties in 1937-1939</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, Washington, January 1, 1939, p. 179.
<em>Fortune</em>, August 1939, p. 35.</p>

<p>     Joe Martin, <em>My First Fifty Years in Politics</em>, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
New York, 1960, p. 82.</p>

<p>     is clearly illustrated by two documents: FDR's State of the Union
Message of January 1939 and the February 1940 report of the
Frank Committee &quot;A Program for a Dynamic America&quot;. The first
document laid down the Democratic Party's political line and
proclaimed: &quot;We have now passed the period of internal conflict in the
launching of our program of social reform. Our full energies may
now be released to invigorate the processes of recovery in order to
preserve our reforms.&quot; Such a candid statement by New Dealer
No. 1 was regarded by the leaders of the Democratic
moderateconservative group as the highest approval of their intention to play
down the reforms. The Speaker of the House Bankhead
immediately said that the &quot;New Deal's major objective&quot; had practically been
completed and there was no need for further reform.^^2^^ Under the
circumstances the liberal wing which had provided the chief impulse
for the party's ideological and political restructuring in the
mid193 Os in effect abandoned the effort to deepen reforms leaving the
initiative to the centrist group. The emphasis was now on
conserving the state-monopoly infrastructure set up earlier.</p>

<p>     The report of the Frank Committee prodded the Republican
Party to follow suit. In presenting the document to the National
Committee, Frank said: &quot;It has been prepared in the conviction
that, if common sense indicates that some obsolete national
tradition should be junked and a fundamental change of national
policy made, the responsible statesman will not hesitate to propose
the change even if somebody calls him radical for so doing. And
that, if, on the other hand, common sense indicates that some such
touted change could be resisted and the nation called back to the
living soundness of some great national tradition, the responsible
statesman will not hesitate to lift the banner of that tradition even
if somebody calls him reactionary for so doing.''^^3^^ Although there
were quite a few sharp criticisms of the New Deal in the report, the
authors at the same time admitted that many principles which the
New Dealers followed were rational. They wanted not to dismantle
the existing mechanism for government regulation of social and
economic processes but to lend it a more conservative tinge.
American historian Conrad Joyner pointed out: &quot;In essence the report</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966</em>, Vol. 3, Chelsea
House Publishers, New York, 1967, p. 2846.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ The New York Herald Tribune</em>, January 8, 1939.
<em>The New York Times</em>, February 19, 1940.</p>

<p>     262 Chapter Twelve</p>

<p>     accepted most of the New Deal, with but slight camouflage.&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>Although the report did not have the impact on the party election
platform that may have been expected, there is every reason to
refer to the neoconservative nature of the Republican platform^^2^^ of
1940. In other words, preliminary conditions had already emerged
by the end of the 1930s for the restoration on a new, state--
monopoly foundation of the system principles largely lost in the
mid193 Os. This meant that the party realignment had been completed
in general, and the outlines of the party combination existing with
certain modifications to this day were drawn up.</p>

<p>     Being a consequence of major social, economic, ideological
and political changes, the realignment, in turn, influenced the social
environment. It helped carry through in-depth reforms of a
statemonopoly nature and then slow them down, correcting the
leftward swing in the government course while retaining statism.
Thanks to the realignment, the crux of which was adapting the
twoparty system to the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism,
institutionalization of statist principles involved all spheres of the
superstructure. First having set the parties far apart and then having
brought them close together, the party realignment prepared the
ground for the rise of a dual center firmly relying on the state--
monopoly platform, which considerably strengthened the positions of
American capitalism. The existence of a stable dual center is highly
important in the purely functional respect as well. Such a center
abruptly narrows the opportunities for third parties to break out
onto the national political scene.</p>

<p>     The realignment of the two-party system essentially
coincided with the New Deal. However, certain anomalies still remained
in the two-party mechanism before World War II. Big Business was
still rather suspicious of FDR's party. It was repelled by the
extraordinary measures and innovative approach in how the
Democratic Party tackled social and economic problems. The captains of
industry were also troubled by the anti-monopoly rhetoric to which
the liberal Democrats often resorted. Finally, the ruling elite was
not firmly convinced yet that the various left radical groups
integrated into the structure of the Democratic Party in the New Deal</p>

<p>     Conrad Joyner, <em>The Republican Dilemma. Conservatism or Progressivism</em>, The
University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1963, p. 5.</p>

<p>     A. A. Kreder, &quot;The American Monopoly Bourgeoisie and Roosevelt's New Deal
(1932-1940)&quot;, in: <em>American Yearbook</em>, 1979, Moscow, 1979, p. 148 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     Party Realignment
Under the New Deal 263</p>

<p>     years were reliably bound to the liberal-statist course of FDR's
Administration.</p>

<p>     The Republicans also had unsolved problems of their own.
Certain circles in the party continued to display a strong
attachment to traditional reactionary individualist dogmas not only in
rhetoric but also in practical activities. Highly influential forces in
the top echelons of party leadership continued to identify any
manifestation of statism with socialism and did not lose hope that
they would be able to reverse the course of events and dismantle
at least a large part,if not all, of state-monopoly infrastructure.</p>

<p>     Summing up the results of the realignment, it is to be noted
that in the short term it undoubtedly strengthened the political
positions of the monopoly bourgeoisie. But the dialectic of the
realignment lay in the fact that, having removed a set of old
contradictions, it simultaneously gave rise to a series of new acute
problems the recipes for. solving which neither FDR nor the leaders of
the opposition could find. As subsequent events showed, these
contradictions proved to be inherent in the new two-party
tandem. The explosive potential intrinsic in these contradictions
regularly broke loose, thus giving rise to critical situations in the
development of the institution. These situations clearly show the failure
of government attempts to find effective ways of overcoming
profound internal contradictions existing in American society.</p>

13

<p>     <b>ON THE ROAD TO</b></p>

<p>     <b>AN INTERPARTY</b></p>

<p>     <b>BALANCE</b></p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 265</p>

<p>     fessed isolationism as its official foreign policy. Now the doctrine
did not fit into reality, and that prevented Republican leaders from
correctly assessing the situation and choosing relevant political
recipes.</p>

<p>     Lacking real solutions to the emergent problems, the
Republicans resorted to the usual tactic of obstructing the
administration's moves. &quot;We in this country are facing a choice between new
leadership and war,&quot;^^1^^ declared one of the claimants on the
presidential office Thomas Dewey. Such, probably, was the only
specific slogan the Republicans could offer the country in the sphere
which concerned all Americans. This shortsighted course could
throw the Republicans back from the positions they had gained
and sharply destabilize the entire two-party system.</p>

<p>     It is difficult to say how events would have developed further
were it not for France's military debacle which stunned the
American public. Commenting on the new international situation the
<em>Washington Post</em> wrote: &quot;If the Allies lose this war, it will prove to
be the worst catastrophe for the US in our whole history.''^^2^^ A
growing number of voters were becoming aware of this simple
truth, and it was also gaining ground among the ruling circles.</p>

<p>     It was on the crest of this wave that a new pretender to the
leadership of the GOP, Wendell Willkie, came to play the first fiddle
in the party. The Willkie boom had a contradictory effect on the
Republican Party. On the one hand, the onslaught by Willkie and
his followers contributed to a faster restructuring of the party's
ideological and political doctrines and their adaptation to the new
conditions associated with state-monopoly capitalism and the
beginning of World War II. This, no doubt, raised the party's
competitiveness in the struggle for power. On the other hand,
Willkie's extremism in the question of the extent of departure
from traditional party precepts troubled even many of the
advocates of New Republicanism who pinned their hopes on the more
reliable and trustworthy Dewey. A prominent Republican, Walter
Brown, summed up these moods: &quot;Under the leadership of
antiNew Deal Democrats there will be little to interest real
Republicans.''^^3^^ For its part, the right wing led by Robert Taft was ex-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The New York Times, June</em> 22, 1940.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Washington Post</em>, May 23, 1940.</p>

<p>     Gary Dean Best, <em>Herbert Hoover. The Presidential Years 1933-1964</em>, Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford (Calif.), Vol. 1, 1983, p. 165.</p>

<p>     The reemergence of the Republicans at the end of the 1930s
faced their leaders with two related questions: (1) what was the
basis for the party's revival; (2) what ideological and political course
was more advantageous in the struggle against the Democrats?</p>

<p>     The search for answers to these questions proved to be a rather
delicate affair because two approaches to these problems had
emerged in the top echelons of the Republican leadership at the
threshold of the 1940s. Should statism in social and economic
processes be regarded on the whole as an acceptable thing (provided
it is lent a more conservative hue) or should efforts be directed at
slowing down statism to the utmost and, wherever possible, at
dismantling the existing mechanism for regulating private
enterprise---such was the essence of the arguments which determined the
dynamics of the GOP since the late 1930s.</p>

<p>     However, until the beginning of the 1940 election campaign
debates on the subject had been toned down. The desire to close
forever the chapter in American history known as the New Deal
prompted the Republicans to be cautious and not let things leak out of the
party headquarters. But it was not easy to restrain passions.</p>

<p>     A new bout in the struggle within the party was not long in
coming. This time it was triggered off by events on the
international scene rather than by another major domestic political initiative of
FDR. On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland
thereby opening the first page in the history of World War II.
Foreign policy issues, which had long been in the background of
the US political process, swiftly moved to the forefront.</p>

<p>     The question of how to respond to the war caused confusion
in the Republican leadership. For a long time the party had pro-</p>

<p>     266 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 267</p>

<p>     tremely hostile to any attempts to reconstruct the GOP.</p>

<p>     Naturally, serious internal quarrels did not raise the
Republicans' chances in the coming struggle for the presidential office. The
Democrats proved to be better prepared for the situation ushered
in by the outbreak of World War II. They clearly realized the threat
to US national security presented by Nazi plans to establish a New
Order. It was not a matter of chance that on FDR's insistence the
State Department statement on Nazi Germany's attack against the
USSR included the following words: &quot;Hitler's armies are today the
chief dangers of Americas.&quot;' To a greater extent than their rivals
the Democrats were prepared to collaborate with Britain and France
and offer them moral and political support. The idea was even
reflected in the party's election platform of 1940,^^2^^ a document
which usually avoids mentioning controversial proposals. Since the
times of Woodrow Wilson it had been the Democratic party that
hatched plans to turn the United States into the leader of Western
civilization. With the outbreak of World War II, these plans began
to come into focus. In the sphere of foreign policy, the Democrats
caught on to the long-term interests of the American monopolies
sooner than their rivals and showed themselves to be the party
capable of fulfilling the strategic designs of the ruling elite. This
undoubtedly strengthened their leading positions in the two-party
system.</p>

<p>     The war was to the Democrats' advantage for a number of other
reasons. First, enormous military orders helped the administration
release the American economy from the bog of crisis and depression.
The net profits of the corporations also increased significantly from
3,300 million dollars in 1938 to 9,500 million dollars in 1941.
The economic boom which began in 1939 blunted many social
problems and this, in turn, helped the Democratic leadership
abandon with relative ease the struggle to extend social and economic
transformations started in the 1930s. The need to consolidate the
reforms came to the forefront, and this development was recorded
in the principal party and government documents adopted at the
time---the election platform and the President's State of the Union
Message which political analyst Ernest K. Lindley aptly described</p>

<p>     <em>Foreign Relations of the United States. 1941</em>, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 768.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, pp. 382-383.</p>

<p>     as &quot;gestures of appeasement&quot;^^1^^ toward the rivalling factions.</p>

<p>     Second, the economy's conversion to a wartime footing, which
had got underway and promised Big Business enormous profits,
largely reconciled the business circles with FDR's Administration
and its principle of economic regulation. For example, the
Statement approved by a Conference of the Midwest Chamber of
Commerce (representing nine states traditionally dominated by
opponents of the New Deal) this time displayed an unusually
reconciliatory attitude. The authors of the document wanted only one
thing from the administration: more military orders for their
states.^^2^^ Big Business leaders such as William Knudsen, Donald
Nelson, and Edward Stettinius gladly entered federal service to occupy
the leading posts in government agencies having to do with the war
economy, thus pushing the New Dealers away from the helm of the
nation. &quot;New Dealers now complain that President Roosevelt no
longer has an interest in them or in their ideas,&quot;^^3^^ the <em>US News</em>
magazine noted spitefully.</p>

<p>     Third, once foreign policy issues came to the forefront and the
party's orientations in domestic policy changed somewhat, FDR
managed to conclude peace with the conservative wing of his party.
&quot;The growing military threat in Europe ... forced Roosevelt to
abandon the idea of confrontation with the right-wing opposition
and even acknowledge that it was incorrect,&quot; noted the Soviet
scholar V. L. Malkov. This was born out by the appearance in the
White House at the end of September 1939, for the first time after
a long break, of one of the most avid critics of the New Deal
Senator Carter Glass who, in this occasion, peacefully discussed
foreign policy with the President.^^5^^</p>

<p>     If the above-mentioned developments were on the whole
favorable for the national leadership, such innovations had very
detrimental consequences for the left-wing liberal groups oriented
toward the Democratic Party. Weakened and disorganized as they
were, they found themselves linked to the national Democratic
leadership to an even greater extent and were forced to travel in the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Current History</em>, February 1939, p. 16.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 86, Part 10, p. 10628.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^ US News</em>, January 24, 1941 , p. 8.</p>

<p>     V. L. Malkov, &quot;Slightly to the Left of Center: the General and the Specific in
Roosevelt's Social Policy&quot;, in: <em>American Yearbook, 1983</em>, p. 59. 
~^^5^^ <em>Time</em>, October 9, 1939, p. 12.</p>

<p>     268 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     tailend of the government course.</p>

<p>     The prevailing situation determined the election tactics of the
Democrats. &quot;European developments compel the President to run
for a third term regardless of the wishes of himself, his friends or
his enemies,&quot;^^1^^ wrote Senator Norris. In this way the FDR
entourage justified the idea to vie for a third term. A break with the
previously firm tradition of two terms prevented an acute struggle
within the Democratic Party concerning FDR's successor and helped
rally the motley electorate in support of the popular leader. This
held another advantage: focussing attention on the outstanding
qualities of the President, the Democrats gained an opportunity to
avoid specifying their domestic policy objectives.</p>

<p>     This was graphically demonstrated by a resolution approved at
the convention of Mississippi Democrats which maintained a
total silence on the basic political problems and argued that FDR
should be reelected because he, &quot;by reason of his background,
training, experience, and ability, is the best qualified American to deal
with national and international problems in this dark hour and lead
this Nation during these critical times.''^^2^^ At election meetings
spokesmen for the Democrats as a rule made only general statements
to the effect that the party would remain true to the traditions of
the previous decade and would do its utmost to secure the natural
rights of the Americans subsequently called FDR's Four Freedoms,
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and
freedom from fear.</p>

<p>     These arguments proved to be effective enough in the election
polemic. FDR managed to win a third victory and retained the
presidential post. However, this time the interparty fight was much
more bitter than four years before, and FDR's success was not as
impressive as in 1936. He polled only five million more votes than
Willkie. It is important to point out that in most states (except for
the South, of course) the candidates for the presidency had run an
even race. The voting margin was more than 10 percent only in 12,
mostly border and Southwestern, states. In 1936 the figure was
33 states and included virtually all the largest industrial states.
Republican progress will seem even more impressive if we take the
voting by counties: in 1936 they won in only 457 counties, four</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ The New York Times</em>, May 12, 1940.
<em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 86, Part 16, p. 3953.</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 269</p>

<p>     years later in 1,141. This time FDR scored impressive victories only
in the South and in cities with a population exceeding 500,000.</p>

<p>     Republicans also progressed at other levels. They won three
additional governorships and the number of seats in the Senate
reached 28. The influence of the parties in the race for seats in the
House of Representatives proved to be more even. In 1936
Democratic candidates (not counting the South) managed to defeat
their rivals by more than 10 percent in 22 states (including
California, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania), in
1940 only in 10 (mostly border) states.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The results of the 1940 elections showed that the sharp
disproportion in the balance of power between the parties that had
arisen at the height of the realignment had now been overcome. A
considerable step forward had been made in restoring the
interparty balance of power. This does not mean, however, that all the
obstacles in the way had been eliminated. If the Democrats
managed to consolidate their ranks, strife had not subsided among
their opponents but rather grown more acute.</p>

<p>     Immediately after the elections, in a letter to Sullivan Hoover
declared that the party's defeat only confirmed his old idea that
the Democrats could be fought only by professing traditional
Republicanism and not by taking after the Democrats.^^2^^ The idea
was taken up by the leader of the GOP right wing Senator Taft who
argued that the Republicans would return to power only by
reacquiring their political countenance. In tactical terms the slogan was
used to remove Willkie's followers from party leadership. In terms
of strategy the activities of the Taft group which reflected the
interests of the most conservative part of the ruling class, were
aimed at dismantling the major parts of the social infrastructure,
eliminating all products of liberal statism, and roundly defeating
the liberal-democratic bloc. This line threatened to destroy the
emerging consensus and disrupt the entire system.</p>

<p>     The United States entered World War II in December 1941,
opening a new page in American history. Although hostilities took
place thousands of miles away from the shores of the country,
participation in the war had a complex impact on all aspects of life in</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Derived from: <em>The Gallup Political Almanac for 1946</em>, The Clarke Press, Princeton,
1946.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Gary Dean Best, <em>Herbert Hoover. The Postpresidential Years 1933-1964</em>, Vol. I,
<em>1933-1945</em>, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford (Calif.), 1983, p. 173.</p>

<p>     270 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 271</p>

<p>     unpopular words. One is capitalism which is hated in certain
quarters. I am nevertheless for it.''^^1^^ The magazine of the business
circles <em>Fortune</em> went even further associating such views with most
Americans. Summing up its seven-year-long public opinion research
the magazine affirmed that Americans came out of the war
adhering to the fundamental bourgeois values as never before.^^2^^</p>

<p>     It is obvious that this atmosphere had to have an impact on the
overall political climate and the stand of liberal politicians. Instead
of criticizing the captains of industry for greed, profit-seeking and
ignoring public interests, they began to propagate the idea of
national unity. Even such a brilliant and consistent critic of the
economic royalists as <em>The Nation</em> could not avoid the general mood:
&quot;Today we love each other and our country. We feel a happy sense
of union swelling in our hearts... We are one---all of us, read an
editorial published in the magazine. In a context of sharply
subsided antimonopoly moods, the slogan of national unity helped the
Democratic leadership eliminate another phenomenon dangerous
for the stability of the two-party system---the trend toward
independent political action. The Farmer Labor Party of Minnesota
had ceased to exist by 1944. Although the Progressive Party of
Wisconsin and the Nonpartisan League of North Dakota had not yet
been formally absorbed in the two-party system, they had in effect
lost all influence in their states' political life.</p>

<p>     The war factor also had a telling effect on the Republican
Party. The turning of the United States into a leading imperialist
power helped the leaders of the GOP revise foreign-policy doctrines
propagated by the strategists of that organization. This task was of
major importance for recreation of normally operating model of
the two-party system. Celebrated newspaper owner Henry Luce
insisted that &quot;until the Republican Party can develop a vital
philosophy and program for America's initiative and activity as a world
power, it will continue to cut itself off from any useful
participation in this hour of history.''^^4^^ The United States' entry into World
War II in effect put an end to debates on certain foreign policy
issues. As Senator Vandenberg put it, &quot;My convictions regarding</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 89, Part 9, pp. A404, A405.</p>

<p>     Fortune, January 1947, p. <em>5. 
~^^3^^ The Nation</em>, December 13, 1941, p. 599.</p>

<p>     Henry R. Luce, <em>The American Century</em>, Farrar &amp; Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1941,
p. 24.</p>

<p>     American society, including the two-party system. While laying
emphasis on continuity in the problems of the two-party system in
the 1930s and the 1940s, it is necessary to point out the
appearance in the course of the war of certain fundamentally new elements
in the functioning of the political mechanism caused by radical
changes in the social and economic situation in the United States
and shifts in the balance of class forces. This is why we single
out the 1941-1945 period as a specific phase in the history of the
two-party system and of the United States as a whole. Attempting
to sum up the essence of these changes we would venture the
following formula: a clear swing to the right of the entire
political pattern with a simultaneous strengthening of statism and
expansionism in American government practices and those of both
parties.</p>

<p>     For the two-party system the consequences of US participation
in the war consisted chiefly in either the complete elimination of
the abnormal phenomena which had emerged at the height of the
party realignment or a sharp reduction of their impact. This is
particularly true of the Democratic Party which had largely discarded
the ``social-democratic'' rhetoric typical of the party in the
mid19305. Even speeches by liberal Democrats, 100-percent New
Dealers such as Wagner, Murray, Mead, Pepper and Kilgore, rarely
featured themes critical of Big Business. On the contrary, Senator Wagner
made a point of saying: &quot;I have never been an old-fashioned trust
buster, because I believe that big business serves a useful purpose.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The reason for the metamorphosis should be sought in the fact
that, in the years of the war, business crawled out of the ``
doghouse''^^2^^ it had been driven into by the crisis of 1929 and was
vindicated in the eyes of the public. The manager of a major
corporation once again became a respected and prestigious figure for the
public: he competently ran war production making the weapons for
victory over the common enemy. The voices of business leaders
sounded loudly once again. President of the US Chamber of
Commerce Eric Johnson proclaimed: &quot;We [businessmen---<em>Ed. ]</em> fear that
the word `capitalism' is unpopular. So we take refuge in a nebulous
phrase and talk about the free enterprise system... There are two</p>

<p>     J. Joseph Huthmacher, <em>Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban
Liberalism</em>, Atheneum, New York, 1968, p. 287.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Eric Johnson, <em>America Unlimited</em>, Double-day, Doran and Company, Inc., Garden
City, 1944, p. 179.</p>

<p>     272 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 273</p>

<p>     anism for social control of production.''^^1^^ Pouring oil on the fire
of factional strife in the Republican Party, these different
appraisals of the processes occurring in the American economy prevented
the demise of the Republican right wing which opposed
introduction of statism into the party's ideological and political
doctrines.</p>

<p>     However, in the war years the balance in the factional struggle
was, on the whole, obviously tipped in favor of the supporters of
New Republicanism who firmly held the reins of power within the
party. The basic party documents of national scope---resolutions
approved at the 1942 Republican National Committee meeting in
Chicago, the 1943 Mackinac Island Conference and the party
election platform of 1944---were drawn up to a much greater extent in
accordance with New Republicanism than with the postulates of
right-wing Republicans. The keynote of all these documents was
that ``free'', unregulated capitalism was a thing of the past. The
idea of collaboration between the federal government and the
state authorities in solving social and economic problems,
recognition of the legitimacy of limited regulation of industrial relations
by the Washington administration, the avowal that certain
measures aimed at regulating competition to restrict its most
destructive aspects have a stimulating effect on business---all this was
quite firmly incorporated into the ideological and political arsenal
of the GOP.</p>

<p>     A weakening of abnormal trends in the two-party tandem
strengthened the system principle in relations between the two
main parties. From the very first days of the war their leaders
announced that from then on all party efforts would be directed to
fulfilling one basic mission---achieving victory. This approach set the
key of polemics between the parties, outlined the range of
problems to be solved by-both parties and defined the system of
priorities in the political struggle. Since the actual questions of
military strategy were not submitted to public discussion, debates
focussed on subjects having to do with US foreign policy-making and a
set of complicated problems involving the launching of war
production.</p>

<p>     It was in solving these pivotal problems that the parties
proceeded from a number of general assumptions while elaborating their</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, New York, May 15, 1944, p. 458.</p>

<p>     19-749</p>

<p>     international cooperation and collective security for peace took
firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack.''^^1^^ Of
course, relapses into isolationism were felt for a long time to
come. But on the whole we tend to agree with the conclusion
reached by prominent political analyst Karl Keyerleber who,
commenting on the results of the Mackinac Island conference of
Republican leaders in September 1943, wrote: &quot;Isolationism is not
dead, but it no longer rides herd on the old G.O.P. elephant.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Things were much more complicated when it came to
overcoming the survivals of the ideology of rugged individualism and
introduction of statism into traditional Republican views. On the
one hand, state-monopoly processes had made a large step forward
in the years of the war. The mainstay of the Republicans, Big
Business, increasingly realized that government intervention in
social and economic processes was irreversible and, under certain
circumstances, could bring considerable advantages. This
tendency was clearly reflected in the NAP Economic Principles
Commission report &quot;The American Individual Enterprise System&quot;:
&quot;All of our thinking for the future, therefore, must be based upon
the underlying thesis that our economy henceforth may continue
to be subject to more or less extensive governmental regulation. &quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>There was another important factor contributing to the
monopolies' statist enlightenment. Soviet scholars write that &quot;not having
yet entered the war, the ideologists of American imperialism
clamored for world leadership which did not at all tally with a
negative attitude to the role of the government.''^^4^^</p>

<p>     Yet at the same time, having already forgotten the Great
Scare provoked by the crisis of 1929, business circles grew
increasingly annoyed by the petty government regulation of private
enterprise and the large taxes necessary for the functioning of
Big Government. The undoubtable successes of the war economy
enabled the leaders of the business world to assert that &quot;
competition, not government control, has proven to be the best mech-</p>

<p>     <em>The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg</em>, ed. by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr.
Hough ton Miffin Company, Boston, 1952, p. 1. 
~^^2^^ <em>Current History</em>, November 1943, p. 220.</p>

<p>     <em>The American Individual Enterprise System Its Nature, Evolution and Future</em>,
Vol. II, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1946, p. 1028.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ N. V. Sivachev, Y. F. Yazkov, <em>Contemporary History of the USA</em>, Vysshaya Shkola
Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 145 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     274 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Ro.ui
to ;in In terp.'irt v U'-.!;in';:c-</p>

<p>     own approach. Thus, to a larger or lesser degree both parties had
adopted the doctrine of United States responsibility for the course
of international events in working out Washington's foreign--
policy strategy. American scholar Robert Divine indicated that &quot;the
most significant political development during the war was the
gradual emergence of a bipartisan approach to post-war foreign
policy.''^^1^^ Both parties believed that wartime required a bigger or
lesser reduction in expenditures on social needs. These were the
items of the budget, as historian Roland Young correctly observed,
most likely to be attacked by the legislators.^^2^^ Both Democrats
and Republicans emphasized: everything holding back the growth
of military output was to be eliminated. Hence a negative
attitude to strikes even on the part of &quot;union friends&quot; on Capitol Hill.
Paying tribute to the moods prevailing in Congress, Senator
Wagner, author of the law which bourgeois propaganda christened the
Magna Carta of American labor (National Labor Relations Act),
made a point of denouncing the assertion that it &quot;justifies or
approves an action undermining the war effort.''^^3^^ Obviously, both
Republicans and conservative Democrats took advantage of the
situation to the utmost to translate antilabor rhetoric into
antilabor legislation.</p>

<p>     Both the ruling and the opposition party unanimously
supported various measures of the federal government to regulate
different aspects in the war economy (controls over wages and working
conditions, rationing of the basic raw materials and so forth). This
unanimity, however, was largely due to the congressmen's belief
that wartime regulating agencies were temporary. Nevertheless,
wittingly or not, both party caucuses in Congress gave the green
light to government intervention in social and economic processes.
Finally, there was bipartisan support for the idea of broad
government outlays on military production, which inevitably led to a
growth in the government debt and taxes. The call for a balanced
budget and lower taxes and rejection of deficit funding---all these
most important attributes of the Republican prewar platform had
obviously been put away for the period. Although these ideas</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Robert A. Divine, <em>Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1940-1948, New
Viewpoints</em>, A Division of Franklin Watts, Inc., New York, 1974, p. 92.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Roland Young, <em>Congressional Politics in the Second World War</em>, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1956, p. 43.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 89, Part 4, p. 5257.</p>

<p>     were still dear to many Republican officials, they realized that it
was risky to come out with them under the circumstances.</p>

<p>     Of course, the above does not mean that both parties occupied
identical positions in the war years. Interparty rivalry remained. But
the ideological and political programs of both parties were now
based on a common set of fundamental values, and the argument
mainly concerned their interpretation. This is born out, in
particular, by a comparison of the parties' election platforms in 1944.
From the viewpoint of an alternative, they were clearly moderate.
The convergence of the parties' positions resulted in the erosion of
the customary stereotypes of both main parties and the emergence
of new ones which had more common features than differences.
No wonder public opinion polls conducted in the war years
recorded a growth in the number of voters who believed there was no
significant difference between the parties.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The swing to the right and growing conservative moods were
important conditions for the restoration of the balance of power.
The midterm elections of 1942 brought a marked success to the
Republicans. They won nine more seats in the Senate and 46 seats
in the House where they nearly caught up with the ruling party's
faction. Commenting on the results of the elections <em>The New York
Times</em> noted with satisfaction &quot;a swing back to a normal pattern
from a very abnormal pattern of one-party domination of the
American political scene.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The outcome of the elections was not accidental. A whole set
of varied factors was against the ruling party. Let us consider those
that were due to the activities of the parties themselves.</p>

<p>     The decline in the reformist urge of the New Dealers at the
end of the 1930s cast doubt on the effectiveness of neoliberalism
as a means for uniting the motley social elements supporting
FDR's party. The left liberal circles warned the national
leadership: &quot;A progressive party with a static program cannot win.&quot;<SUP>3
</SUP>Indeed, in the course of the 1940 election campaign, the CIO
unions, black and farmer organizations hesitated to some extent
in deciding which party to support. Since the Democrats could
not boast any major liberal reforms in the 1942 midterm elections,</p>

<p>     ' <em>Public Opinion Quarterly</em>, Fall 1944, pp. 339-340.
<em>The New York Times</em>, November 5, 1942.
<em>The New Republic</em>, November 16, 1942, p. 630.</p>

<p>     276 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 277</p>

<p>     the wavering was even more pronounced.</p>

<p>     The situation had not basically changed by the time of the
1944 elections, which promised major troubles for the Democrats.
Fortunately for the latter, the negative trends mentioned above
were weakened by a whole set of factors which made themselves
felt at the height of the election race. First, the imminent end to
the war brought to the fore the problem of postwar settlement. As
most of the American Establishment saw it, it was a much more
pressing issue than the problem of reconversion. Arthur
Sulzberger, publisher of the <em>Time</em>, said: &quot;We can survive another four years
of bad management on the home front but we can't survive another
war.''^^1^^ Therefore the task was to provide a political leadership
capable of solving the complex foreign policy problems emerging in
view of the defeat of the Axis Powers. FDR and his Democrats
who were firmly leading the country to victory over the
enemy and exerting tremendous efforts to affirm America's
hegemony in postwar international relations, naturally seemed more
attractive in the prevailing situation to the captains of American industry
and rank-and-file voters who believed that FDR would achieve
stability in the postwar world. The Democratic bosses were
perfectly aware of this. That was why the National Committee meeting in
January 1944 approved a resolution calling on President Roosevelt
to continue as &quot;our great world humanitarian leader.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Second, it was to the advantage of the Democrats that the
right-wing Republican group led by Senator Taft became more
active after the elections of 1942. The Senator from Ohio realized
that the decisive point would soon come in the argument not only
with the New Dealers but also with advocates of government
intervention in his own party. The outcome of that argument would
decide the direction in which bourgeois relations would develop in
the United States. &quot;The new administration will determine whether
these controls are permanent or whether the multiple freedoms
intended by our Constitution and Bill of Rights are restored to our
people as the basis of liberty.''^^3^^ said Taft.</p>

<p>     However, at a point when the US war effort had reached its</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Journals of David E. Lilienthal</em>, Vol. I., The TVA Years 1939-1945, Harper &amp;
Row, Publishers, New York, 1964, p. 653.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Newsweek</em>, January 31, 1944, p. 36.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Russel Kirk, James McClellan, <em>The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft</em>, Fleet
Press Corporation, New York, 1967, p. 66.</p>

<p>     peak, attempts by right-wing Republicans to revise cardinally the
basic tenets of the government course could spell catastrophic
consequences for the country. Perhaps influential statesman James
Byrnes was somewhat exaggerating when he maintained that &quot;the
defeat of Roosevelt would revive their [the Axis Powers.---<em>Ed.}</em>
fading hopes, stiffen their opposition, and delay the end of the
war.&quot; But a replacement of the administration under the
circumstances would no doubt result in serious problems for the country.
The people who carried weight in the capital's corridors of power
were clearly aware of this. To some extent Taft himself realized
this and decided to put off the struggle for control over the party
until the end of the war. Nevertheless, the militant outpourings of
his most rabid followers who abounded both in 1943 and in 1944
drove voters away from the GOP and, in the final count, helped the
Democrats.</p>

<p>     All the above inevitably told on the elections of 1944 the
results of which were far from unequivocal. On the one hand, the
Democrats retained their hold on executive and legislative power.
Most of the governorships remained in their hands. The liberals
managed to defeat some very conservative Republicans---Fish,
Danaher, Holman, Day, Maas, Clark and others. On the other
hand, a comparison of the 1940 and 1944 election results shows
the growing strength of the GOP. In the ensuing four years a
decisive step had been taken by the two-party system in restoring the
balance of power in the political process. In order to conclude that
the two-party mechanism had completely digested the
consequences of the party realignment in the 1930s, it remained to see
how it fulfilled one of its major functions---redistribution of power
within the ruling class.</p>

<p>     The problem was partially solved immediately after the war
when, as a result of the 1946 midterm elections, after a long break,
control over Congress passed to the Republicans' hands. The end
of the war became a major landmark in the history of American
society. The defeat of the Axis Powers sharply tipped the
balance of power on the international scene. Favorable prospects
emerged for socialism to spread beyond the bounds of one country
and for the world socialist system to be formed. That turn of events
was unexpected for the ruling circles of the United States who had</p>

<p>     R. A. Divine, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 161.</p>

<p>     278 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 279</p>

<p>     seriously hoped that, as the strongest imperialist power, their
country would dominate the system of postwar international relations.
During the New Deal and the war American capitalism had been
firmly established on a state-monopoly foundation. Serious changes
occurred in the two-party system in the first postwar years under
the impact of these processes, and attempts were immediately made
by the opposition party to take advantage of them in its interests.
The end of hostilities seemed to mark the conclusion of the
extraordinary period which had started in the years of the Great
Depression. The acute social and economic problems of those years
were receding into the past. There arose new problems stemming
from the United States' becoming a leading imperialist power and
the beginning reconversion. It is important to point out the
following: the ordinary voter tended to blame the Republicans for the
troubles of the 1930s, now, as the legacy of the previous decade
subsided, the prestige of the party was rising. Mindful of this
advantageous circumstance, the Republicans began to prepare for the
1946 midterm elections long ahead of time.</p>

<p>     The election strategy of the GOP was based on the Statement of
Principles, Policies and Objectives of Republican Members of
Congress approved by the caucus back in December 1945. The ideas
set down in this paper were developed in speeches by Republican
leaders in Congress and statements of principles approved by
conventions of some state party organizations. Taking advantage of
the serious difficulties the United States faced in the early period of
reconversion, they succeeded in persuading voters that their
program for solving the set of problems facing the country promised
a change for the better in the position of the average American
threatened by Big Government, Big Unions and &quot;Soviet
Imperialism.&quot; The first two threats had always featured prominently in the
list of anti-American institutions. Now a new component was
included in the list. The fact that a former ally of the United States in
the war was depicted as nearly the chief threat to the prosperity
and security of America showed that the tactics of the right wingers
had undergone a definite transformation. Having failed to discredit
the liberal-statist course by appealing to traditional conservative
values, they began to make more active use of anti-Sovietism as an
effective weapon in the onslaught against the antimonopoly
positions of their opponents. At the same time the whipping up of
antiSoviet hysterics laid the ground for realization of the ruling class's</p>

<p>     global foreign policy and helped establish the ``legitimacy'' of the
tough line in respect to the USSR. The right-wing Republicans
argued that their political course would secure a prosperous economy
and unrestricted opportunities for the Americans to build their
lives as they saw fit and not in line with what the federal
government directed. That paradise would be secured by private
enterprise and initiative freed of the shackles of government
regulation.^^1^^ The lure proved to be attractive. The right-wing alternative
received support from the voters in the elections.</p>

<p>     The Republican right-wingers believed the hour of their final
triumph was approaching. &quot;Expressing the interests of business
circles that had grown stronger during the war, the conservative camp
launched a powerful attack on the democratic achievements of the
New Deal,&quot; worte Soviet historian V. I. Borisyuk.^^2^^ However, in
order to count on success in the 1948 presidential elections, the
Republican congressional caucus had to show in practice how
successfully the party could manage government affairs. But it was this
task, so important for the destinies of the party, that the
Republican elite had obviously failed to cope with. The
Republicancontrolled 80th Congress went down in history as the do-nothing
Congress. Of course, this description made by the liberal Democrats
was an exaggeration to some extent (Congress approved the
reactionary Taft-Hartley Act, gave corporations major tax benefits,
and carried through measures to de-regulate the economy).
However, acute social and economic problems (inflation, civil
rights, modernization of the social security system and others) were
not solved. Despite the fact, leaders of the right-wing Republicans,
who were dizzy with success in the midterm elections, behaved
militantly not only toward the liberal Democrats but also toward
the like-minded people in their own party. Their attacks against the
``pseudo-Republicans'' reached such proportions that a leader of
New Republicanism Harold Stassen was compelled to warn his
colleagues that their actions could lead to a split. &quot;The Republican
Party should be big enough to have room within it for a divergence
of views. This is a vital part of the functioning of our two-party</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 91, Part 10, pp. A1231-A1233; Vol. 91, Part 12,
pp. A3913-A3914; Vol. 91, Part 13, pp. A4871-4872, A5329; Vol. 92, Part 9, pp. A131-
A132, A926-A927.</p>

<p>     * V. I. Borisyuk, <em>USA: at the Roots of the Modern Anti-Labor Policy</em>, Nauka
Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 129 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     280 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 281</p>

<p>     system,&quot;^^1^^ said the former governor of Minnesota.</p>

<p>     The concern shown by the moderate wing of the Republicans
was not unfounded. The political line pursued by the Old Guard
led to an early revival of the former Republican image which they
had taken such pains to get rid of---the image of an organization
lagging behind life and closely associated with Big Business. The
liberals skilfully took advantage of these miscalculations made by the
right-wing Republicans. The words and deeds of the Republican
Party was a favorite theme of the Democrats on the eve of the 1948
elections. Democratic Party officials harped on it in almost every
speech. As a result, differences on intraparty matters became so
serious that the two-party mechanism was threatened with
destabilization once again.</p>

<p>     In Democratic quarters, however, matters looked far from
promising. President Harry Truman, who succeeded FDR after his
death in 1945, was under fire both from the right wing and the
left wing. A favorite son of the liberals, Henry Wallace, accused the
President of pushing the country toward the abyss of a new world
war by his bungling in foreign affairs. He did not hide the fact that
if his planks were not incorporated in the Democratic election
platform a third party would be set up. The issue of civil rights for the
black population turned into a major problem for the Democratic
national leadership. Liberals of the Humphrey type insisted that
&quot;the time has arrived in America for the Democratic Party to get
out of the shadow of states rights and to walk forthrightly into the
bright sunshine of human rights.''^^2^^ Humphrey and his followers
believed &quot;that it was necessary to carry out some minor reforms
'from above' and thereby prevent an upsurge in the struggle waged
by the black masses.''^^3^^ The liberals' proposals could have been
simply ignored (as FDR had done on many occasions) were it not
for the growing black movement behind them which, despite
numerous promises by left-wing liberal circles, more and more firmly
demanded that black Americans really be granted the rights
provided for in the Constitution. But what civil rights could be discussed
with Southern politicians who refused to budge an inch from the</p>

<p>     <SUB>2</SUB> <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 92, Part 11, p. A25501.</p>

<p>     <em>Democracy at Work: The Official Report of the Democratic Convention</em>,
Philadelphia, 1948, p. 192.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^ I. A. Geyevsky, USA: The Black Problem. Washington's Policy Cm the Black
Question (1945-1972)</em>, p. 83.</p>

<p>     racist positions on which the entire social fabric of Dixieland
rested? The President was accused of being unable to restrain the
labor union bosses. The Jewish community expressed its strong
discontent with what it saw as Truman's insufficient support for the
idea of founding Israel. All this combined to cast doubt on the
further existence of the New Deal coalition.</p>

<p>     It was obvious that under the circumstances it was naive, to
say the least, to hope for success in fighting the Republicans only
by referring to their mistakes. That was why, after painful
hesitations, Truman finally decided to put forward a wide-scale
program of liberal reforms subsequently called the Fair Deal. The
program provided for a stepped up and broader intervention of the
federal government in solving social and economic problems. That
indicated that government regulation of social and economic
processes was growing at faster rates and the neoliberal doctrine was
being further improved. Truman vetoed the anti-labor Taft--
Hartley Act and proposed a plan to fight inflation and a series of
measures to take the edge off the racial question. In this way he managed,
in the words of historian Alonzo Hamby, to create &quot;a positive new
image&quot;^^1^^ in the eyes of the liberal voters. In addition to solving the
purely pragmatic problems of the struggle for power, the
President's actions had more long-term implications for the party.
This was pointed out by Soviet historian V. O. Pechatnov who
noted that the tactic enabled &quot;Truman to promote the
reformistdemocratic image of the party in the eyes of the public and
effectively confirm its affinity to FDR's party.''^^2^^ This, in turn,
was an important factor contributing to the stability of the entire
party-political system and stressed that the Democrats were a
force capable of political initiative.</p>

<p>     The maneuver of the liberal Democrats put their opponents
in a difficult position: it was risky to reject outright the proposals
which were popular among the broad sections of the electorate,
but to support them involved a conflict with their own
principles aimed at restricting and, in certain cases, putting an end
to activities carried on by the federal government, and
dismantling a considerable part of the social infrastructure of state-mo-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Alonzo L. Hamby, <em>Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American
Liberalism^</em> Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, p. 191.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ V. O. Pechatnov, <em>The Democratic Party of the USA: Voters and Politics</em>, p. 39.</p>

<p>     282 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 283</p>

<p>     nopoly capitalism (SMC).</p>

<p>     Simultaneously with a broad reformist maneuver in
domestic policy, the Democrats in 1947 finally embarked on the road of
confrontation with the USSR on the international scene, thus
initiating the Cold War. It is important to point out that US foreign
policy-makers lent their expansionist ideas a liberal and
humanitarian coloring. It was in this light that the White House's major
foreign policy actions were perceived by a larger part of the
Democratic electorate. This was particularly true of the Marshall
Plan which firmly linked West Europe to Washington's anti--
Soviet course and created a foundation for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) aimed according to the official
American view at holding back Soviet expansion. From the very
outset the Soviet Union has had all the grounds to regard NATO as
a real threat to its security. Unable to understand the true
motives of the Establishment, most ordinary Americans at the time
saw the foreign policy of the Truman Administration as an
extension of the New Deal to the sphere of international relations.
Under the specific conditions of the first postwar years, a
combination of the liberal domestic policy with expansionism in
foreign policy provided the Democrats with an effective weapon
which they skilfully used in the party-political struggle.
Nevertheless, Truman failed to prevent a split in the party. On its left wing
there appeared the Progressive Party headed by Henry Wallace who
opposed the policy of confrontation with the USSR and favored
a whole set of social reforms within the country. Another
political formation emerged on the right wing of the Democratic
Party: the States' Rights Party which sought to perpetuate the
principles of racial segregation. But the extent and consequences of the
split were much smaller than might have been expected. The
tactic chosen by the President's staff sharply slowed down the erosion
of the Democrats' electorate and showed both the ordinary voters
and the elite that the party was still a viable body capable of
solving complicated national problems.</p>

<p>     That determined the outcome of the elections in the final
count. &quot;Only a political miracle or extraordinary stupidity on the
part of the Republicans can save the Democratic Party, after 16
years in power, from a debacle in November,&quot;^^1^^ <em>Time</em> predicted con-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Time</em>, March 15, 1948, p. 26.</p>

<p>     fidently. Such was the viewpoint of the conservative press. But
the rank-and-file voters decided otherwise. In 1948 the
Republican renaissance did not, it would seem, reach its logical conclusion.
The conservatives failed to put an end to the Democratic era.
Moreover, they lost control of the Congress they had won two years
ago. A zigzag became apparent in the evolution of the two-party
system: the steady shift to the right of the two-party tandem since
the end of the 1930s was interrupted by an upsurge in the
neoliberals' activity who once again had come to set the tune in the
political process, albeit for a short time. They won an impressive
victory in the 1948 elections: nine new seats in the Senate, 75
in the House and seven additional governorships. Only in the early
1930s did the Republicans suffer worse defeats during the
period of current history.</p>

<p>     At the time, many political analysts thought that the trend for
the liberal model of state monopoly capitalism to be replaced by
the conservative one had been abruptly stopped. The mouthpiece
of business circles <em>Business Week</em> wrote: &quot;Stated in the broadest
terms, the effect of the election has been to remove any prospect
of immediate change in the general relation of government to
economic life in the United States.''^^1^^ As to the liberal Democrats, they
were in the highest of spirits following the elections. The <em>New
Republic</em> wrote: &quot;So now we have in the White House a man with the
most radical platform in presidential history.''^^2^^ They were
drawing up the most extensive plans and preparing to implement the
reforms laid down in the Fair Deal program.</p>

<p>     The Republicans, on the contrary, were in a state of complete
disarray. The rival factions heaped accusations upon each other. At
the National Committee meeting in January 1949 in Omaha,
Dewey's opponents openly accused the nominal party leader of
serious mistakes, irresponsible behavior and the like, as a result of
which victory was alleged to have been stolen from the party.<SUP>3
</SUP>The followers of the New York governor responded in kind.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. published an article in the <em>Saturday
Evening Post</em> in which he laid the blame for the defeat on Taft's
advocates who stuck to the past ideas and only discredited the par-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Business Week</em>, December 11, 1948, p. 61.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>New Republic</em>, November 15, 1948, p. 3.
<em>Newsweek</em>, February 7, pp. 10-11.</p>

<p>     284 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     ty in the eyes of the voters. *</p>

<p>     These debates seemed quite natural after the sensational defeat.
Republican leaders were indeed worried by the question: why had
the party lost? Analyzing the situation in the party following the
election defeat, <em>Newsweek</em> noted: 'Throughout 1949 they [
Republicans.---&pound;d.] had been numbed by a feeling of complete
hopelessness and helplessness... What nagged them most was the fear that
perhaps the country really wanted the welfare state after all.&quot;<SUP>2
</SUP>Such a course of events would indeed be a catastrophy for them,
because they would have nothing to oppose the Democrats with.
Previously they had resorted to all the conceivable combinations
of conservative ideas in the struggle against the liberal-statist
doctrines and had failed to gain any success. Such a long abstention
from power could prove fatal to the party. The social groups
supporting it could turn away from the party after losing hope that
their demands would be achieved with the help of the
Republicans. The GOP had to urgently find an antidote to the Fair Deal
program so as to neutralize the onslaught of the liberal
Democrats, discredit their doctrines and return the two-party system onto
the conservative road. Only then could they expect to put an end to
the Democratic era.</p>

<p>     At first the conservative Democrats helped the Republicans
repel the liberal Democrats. This enabled the opposition to
recover from the post-election shock. The bipartisan conservative
coalition was quite effective. As early as May 1949 political analyst
Ernest Lindley remarked: &quot;Mr. Truman does not control the 81st
Congress.''^^3^^ The coalition's efforts were decisive in thwarting
attempts to revise the Taft-Hartley Act, bloc the discussion of the
civil rights issue, reject the Brennan Plan providing for farmers'
incomes to be maintained at the average level of the previous
ten years, and some other measures making up the backbone of
the Fair Deal program. But if in achieving a balance of strength in
the political process the opponents of the government course
could rely on the conservative coalition, the Republicans had
little to gain from the coalition in the struggle for power, because
their partners---the Dixiecrats-as a rule remained loyal to their</p>

<p>     <SUB>2</SUB> <em>Saturday Evening Post, January</em> 27, 1949.
<em>Newsweek</em>, January 9, 1950, p. 6.
<em>Newsweek</em>, May 23, 1949, p. 12.</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 285</p>

<p>     own party in the elections. The Republicans had to rely solely
on their own resources in increasing the potential of. conservative
electorate groups to the utmost.</p>

<p>     A means to achieve this was found. Paradoxically, success came
to the Republicans not when they undertook intensive efforts
to elaborate a specific conservative alternative to the social and
economic course of the Democrats but when they actually
abandoned these efforts. In place of a specific conservative social and
economic program the Republicans adopted an obvious palliative in
which the emphasis was made on abstract expansion of individual
freedoms and protection of genuine American values from the
corroding effect of the anti-American ideas allegedly proposed
by the Democrats. A gross demagogy of this kind could be
effective only during the Cold War. It should be said that the
Democrats themselves contributed to a large extent to the atmosphere
in which these ideas flourished. The boundless and hysterical
antiSovietism of the Truman Administration undoubtedly whipped up
anti-Communist sentiment in the country. It was in this fashion
that the first link in the chain leading unexpectedly to the
complete discrediting of bourgeois reformism was forged.</p>

<p>     The mechanism of the process was relatively simple. By long
and stubborn efforts bourgeois propaganda managed to impose on
the public a stereotype of communism which was synonymous with
totalitarianism. But liberal-statist doctrines also provided for a
stronger regulating role of the government. Hence it was
concluded: those who advocate such views wittingly or unwittingly were
pushing society along the road to disaster and were, therefore,
enemies of the United States. Of course, the liberal Democrats had
no intention of forging the last links of the chain. But having laid
its beginning, they created a situation in which events could get out
of their control.</p>

<p>     And this was what happened in February 1950 when
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy made his notorious statement that
Russian spies had infiltrated the State Department. Almost
simultaneously with McCarthy's announcement, congressional
Republicans made public a document with the pretentious title <em>Liberty or
Socialism</em> which became the ideological and political manifesto of
the right-wing Republicans in the 1950s. Its authors did not offer
readers any particularly original ideas. The principal ``innovation''
was the document's tone, the unequivocal desire to stick a label</p>

<p>     286 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 287</p>

<p>     ness on an equal footing accepting that under certain conditions
both these forces could have a destabilizing effect on American
society; (3) the refusal to regard further expansion of federal
government interference as a panacea and an emphasis on the need
to stimulate private enterprise. It is obvious that this approach
deprived the Democrats, who had swung to the right, of many trump
cards that made them successful in the struggle against the
Republicans. The latter had firmly siezed the initiative and had no
intention of giving it up.</p>

<p>     The results of the elections consolidated the situation. Major
successes were scored by the conservative Republicans who were
firmly linked with McCarthyism. A special place was taken by
events in Ohio where the ultraconservative leader Robert Taft was
to run for reelection to the Senate. Taft did not think it necessary
to conceal his reactionary views and, despite desperate efforts by
labor unions and liberal public organizations, he won a convincing
victory over his rival liberal Democrat Joseph Ferguson with a
margin of over 400,000 votes or 15 percent. Taft called it a victory of
principle. It was indeed of fundamental importance. It turned out
that neoliberals were unable to defeat an avowed reactionary even
in an industrial state where the unions seemed to have sufficiently
strong positions. Taft's victory was regarded by conservative
America as a signal for the launching of a decisive attack against the
positions of the liberal democratic forces.</p>

<p>     The position of the ruling party was further undermined by the
unsuccessful intervention by US troops in Korea. The
Republican leaders, who had initially supported the American invasion of
Korea, gradually began to condemn the administration in an
increasingly harsh language for its inability to &quot;teach those Communists
a lesson.&quot; The setbacks in Korea which ordinary Americans could
not understand seemed to confirm the McCarthyite idea of
Democratic betrayal. Taft said that only a decisive Republican victory
in the 1952 elections could save the country from creeping
socialism. <em>^^1^^</em></p>

<p>     At the beginning of the new presidential race it was clear that
this time the Democrats' chances for success were low indeed.
Of course, the Republicans had their problems too. Despite
successes by right-wing Republicans in the struggle within the party,</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Reader's Digest</em>, November 1950, p. 154.</p>

<p>     of traitors on all those who did not agree with it and monopolize
the right to express the national spirit.</p>

<p>     The new approach to political problems enabled Republicans
to easily explain any issue and any difficulty faced by American
society. Everything turned out to be extremely simple: Russian
spies and their Democratic henchmen were to blame for all of
America's troubles. The absurdity of McCarthy's ideas was obvious to
any reasonable person, but in a context where even many left-wing
liberals not only shared but even promoted anti-Communist bias it
was not surprising that accusations coming from the right wing
found a sufficiently strong response among the voters most of
whom did not have a particularly high level of political awareness.
One tends to agree with the opinion of the chairman of the
Democratic Party's National Committee William Boyle, Jr. who said:
&quot;Their [the Republicans'.---<em>Ed. ]</em> motives are plain. They cannot
win on the issues, so they spread suspicion, stir up hatred, create
doubt.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     It was very easy to fight for power relying on such a platform:
the opposition no longer had to do the unpleasant chore of
drawing up their own positive plans for solving basic problems of
domestic and foreign policy. In the course of the 1950 midterm
elections the Republicans virtually^restored the positions they had lost
as a result of the 1948 defeat. Although formally control over
Congress remained in the Democrats' hands (they held a margin of two
seats in the Senate and 35 in the House), actually they had lost the
majority, because on the most important issues in domestic policy
their conservative wing voted with the Republicans. And that
meant the Fair Deal program was as good as buried.</p>

<p>     Having encountered the unexpected counter-assault of the
conservatives, the liberals themselves obviously lost heart. Instead
of invigorating the election coalition which brought them victory
in 1948 the Democrats engaged in a revision of the outdated, in
their view, tenets of neoliberalism. As a result, the ideological
postulates of the liberals were significantly transformed and in many
respects differed from the neoliberalism of the 1930s vintage. The
results of this revision may be reduced to three chief points: (1) a
sharply negative attitude to Communist ideology and the
achievements of socialist countries; (2) putting Big Unions and Big Busi-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 97, Part 13, p. A3186.</p>

<p>     288 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     On the Road
to an Interparty Balance 289</p>

<p>     their leader Taft could not feel secure. His opponents within the
party advocating New Republicanism had no intention of giving
up their positions without a fight. It was very important for them
to find a person to oppose the Senator from Ohio. Since 1950
they had more and more frequently turned to the popular war hero
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. After long negotiations they
succeeded in persuading him to run for the presidency. However,
Eisenhower's entering the election campaign immediately
worsened the situation in the opposition and threatened party unity at
a crucial point in its history.</p>

<p>     The question of how to reconcile the followers of New
Republicanism with the advocates of the Genuine Republicanism or, in
other words, Eisenhower's team with Taft's team became the
major concern of the GOP strategists. Party unity and success in
the fight against the Democrats depended on this. By the summer
of 1952 contradictions between the two factions had become
extremely acute. Even Eisenhower who tried by all means to avoid a
confrontation with Taft did not refrain from a rather sharp attack
against his rival. He said: &quot;I am running because Taft is an
isolationist. His election would be a disaster.''^^1^^ The right-wing
Republicans, always distinguished by greater militancy, responded in kind.
They showed no enthusiasm when Eisenhower was nominated as
the presidential candidate from the Republican Party. The Indiana
Republican leader said: &quot;Until Bob Taft blows the bugle, a lot of
us aren't going to fight in the army.''^^2^^ Eisenhower's crew sought to
achieve at least a temporary reconciliation between their chief and
Taft. The search for a compromise with right-wing Republicans
had an effect on the election platform. As compared with 1948,
it was a more conservative document. The platform was a sort of
businessmen's list of grievances against the activities of Big
Government. The authors firmly stated that &quot;The Republican Party
will end this hostility to initiative and enterprise. &quot;^^3^^ The document
contained a long list of specific measures supporting this
initiative. But this did not fully satisfy Taft's followers. The conflict was
abated for a while only during Eisenhower's personal meeting
with Taft in September 1952. The general, however, had to make</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The New York Times</em>, June 24, 1952.</p>

<p>     Robert A. Divine, <em>Foreign Policy and US Presidential Elections</em>, A Division of
Franklin Watts, Inc., Vol. 2, New York, 1974, p. 58.
<em>^^3^^ National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. I, p. 500.</p>

<p>     some serious concessions to the Senator. Yet the main aim---party
unity for the time of the election campaign---was achieved.</p>

<p>     As was expected, the elections brought victory to the
Republicans. After a twenty-year break they returned to the White House.
Congress was also controlled by the Republicans. They also held
most of the gubernatorial offices. Thus the mechanism of power
redistribution made a full turn. The Democratic era had come to
an end.</p>

<p>     These facts, however, did not signify that the two-party system
was finally and completely adjusted and perfomed its political
functions flawlessly. The future was hardly as promising as the ruling
circles would want it. Usually power was redistributed when the
opposition grasped the new requirements of the ruling class and
elaborated adequate recipes to implement them. This time the
Republicans did not have such a platform. Subsequent events showed
that the palliative program founded on McCarthyite demagogy
they used in the struggle for power was hardly appropriate for
governing the leading capitalist power. In order to justify the hopes
pinned on the party by the monopoly bourgeoisie, the
Republicans would have to solve a delicate problem: to tie the right wing of
the party to the consensus founded on state-monopoly doctrines.</p>

<p>     The position of the Democrats was no easier. For a long time
neoliberalism had been in effect the official party doctrine which
helped the Democratic leadership keep a motley coalition within
its orbit, solve the most important social and economic problems
relatively successfully and lend capitalist society certain dynamics.
Neoliberalism had underwent substantial transformation during the
20 years of its existence, losing some of its important features and
properties. In the new situation many neoliberals &quot;in their works
decided to play down critical notes in respect to the American
social and political system and capitalist relations as a whole,&quot; writes
Soviet historian K. S. Gajiyev. They &quot;began to relegate to the
background social and economic conflicts between different social
groups of the population and support those which, in their view,
united all Americans regardless of economic or other interests.&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>In other words, they repudiated the ``conflict'' theory of social
development which largely helped them in the 1930s to develop an</p>

<p>     K. S. Gajiyev, <em>Evolution of Basic Trends in American Bourgeois Ideology</em>, Nauka
Publishers, Moscow, 1982, pp. 42, 43.</p>

<p>     20-749</p>

<p>     290 Chapter Thirteen</p>

<p>     ideological and political platform which won the Democrats the
status of majority party. The above-mentioned transformation of
neoliberalism made it less effective in the party-political struggle.
As a result the Democrats lost the initiative in the political process
and were temporarily confused over which principles should
underlie their political course.</p>

<p>     The situation made the lull in the political process unstable and
relative. Despite the fact that in the mid-1950s &quot;statism prevailed
over the hysterics of the extreme individualists and lost the liberal
and social-democratic rhetoric of the New and Fair programs&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>which frightened the conservative circles in the ruling class so much,
the profound contradictions in the development of the component
parts of the two-party mechanism were not eliminated. On the
contrary, they were continually compounded by the new
problems arising from the rapidly developing scientific and technological
revolution and the democratic movement which emerged at the
end of the 1950s and provoked an acute social and political crisis
in the 1960s.</p>

14

<p>     EM SEARCH</p>

<p>     <b>OF A POLITICAL</b></p>

<p>     <b>IMAGE: DEMOCRATS</b></p>

<p>     <b>IN THE OPPOSITION</b></p>

<p>     (1953-1960)</p>

<p>     Historians studying contemporary bourgeois reformism in the
United States traditionally and quite naturally focus attention on
the 1930s, the 1940s and the 1960s when a state-monopoly
mechanism was set up and developed for regulating social and economic
processes as a result of different measures initiated by the
administrations of FDR, Harry Truman, John Kennedy and Lyndon
Johnson. The 1950s usually remain somewhat in the shade, which
is, perhaps, justified from the viewpoint of what public life was in
those years, but contradicts the ideological and political processes
occurring behind the conservative facade of Eisenhower's America.
In particular, the Democratic Party was a carrier of liberal--
reformist ideas bridging the gap between the New and Fair Deal
programs in the 1930s and the 1940s and concepts of the New Frontiers
and the Great Society of the 1960s.</p>

<p>     The late 1940s and early 1950s proved to be a precarious time
for the Democratic Party. The extremely modest results of the
widely advertised Fair Deal in domestic policy combined with
rampant McCarthyism and the increasingly dangerous involvement
of the United States in the highly unpopular war in Korea launched
by the Truman Administration in 1950 undermined the authority
of FDR's party in the eyes of the voters. In 1948 ideological
differences in the New Deal coalition developed into an acute conflict
within the party as a result of which the left-wing liberals headed by
Henry Wallace and the conservative Dixiecrats led by J. Strom
Thurmond waged an independent struggle for the White House.
Adlai Stevenson's defeat in the 1952 election was the result and
the highlight of those critical processes, and only contributed
to clashes within the party. The Democratic opposition forged
its ideological and political course in the context of struggle bet-</p>

<p>     N. V. Sivachev, &quot;State-Monopoly Capitalism in the US&quot;, <em>Voprosy istorii</em>, No. 7,
1977, p. 92.</p>

<p>     20*</p>

<p>     292 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the'Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 293</p>

<p>     ween the party's main factions.</p>

<p>     When a party controls the executive, it has, as a rule, one
national leader, the President. Relying on his authority and the mighty
government machinery, he usually determines that party's
policy. A party's defeat in the struggle for the presidency promotes
centrifugal trends: the party's caucus in Congress, governors and
mayors of the largest cities elected on the party's ticket, and
finally its official leading bodies, the National Committee above all,
tend to lay claim to domination in the party.</p>

<p>     The development of certain ideas is inevitably influenced by
various social and political processes which derive, in turn, from
society's economic life. Therefore, in examining the ideological and
political struggle and interparty clashes of the 1950s it must be kept
in mind that this was a time when the American economy grew
with a relative stability, the scientific and technological revolution
marched on confidently, the split in the labor union movement
was overcome on a trade-unionist basis and the 17,000,000=strong
AFL-CIO was formed, and a mass protest movement against
segregation of colored Americans came into being.</p>

<p>     After Harry Truman became a private citizen on January 20,
1953, and Eisenhower assumed the responsibilities of executive
power, the Democrats faced a dilemma usual for the party which
had yielded the helm to its rival in the two-party system: either
to support the other party's course on the whole or to advance its
own, independent slogans and attempt to get them embodied in
legislation. The choice depended on the balance of power in the
party. As to the Democrats in the period under consideration, their
liberal wing led by Adlai Stevenson was largely discredited by the
1952 defeat. In a context of the electorate's serious
disappointment in reformist promises, and the country's swing to the right,
the foremost positions in the party naturally came to be occupied
by moderate conservative and right-centrist politicians---Lyndon
Johnson and Sam Rayburn, both from Texas, who held the key
posts in the opposition party: the Senate minority leader and
the House minority leader, respectively.</p>

<p>     These experienced leaders were well aware that Eisenhower
had been elected not because of the election platform or slogans of
the Republican Party but rather because of his personal
popularity among the voters. Under the circumstances Lyndon Johnson felt
that to attack the new President would be &quot;like telling children</p>

<p>     that their father was a bad man.''^^1^^ On the other hand, seeking to
avoid the complications that had emerged in the Truman years
between the President and Congress, Eisenhower tried in all ways to
establish firm contacts with Capitol Hill and warned members of
his party against excesses in respect to the Democrats because their
assistance might be needed: the Republicans did not have a firm
majority in Congress on which the new executive chief could rely;
there were 48 Republicans in the Senate and 221 in the House
while the number of Democrats was 47 and 213, respectively.
Finally, at the party convention Eisenhower had been nominated
by a group of ``New'' or ``Modern'' Republicans who engaged in
a polemic with the Old Guard led by Taft, and favored a renewal
of the party's ideological doctrines. They rejected the
traditional assumptions of classical Republicanism of the 1920s and first
half of the 1930s and accepted some statist elements in the
ideological and political legacy of the New Deal. As a result, the
program Eisenhower submitted to Congress in 1953 was moderate:
retaining in principle many reforms of the 1930s which provided
for a stronger regulating role of the government in the country's
social and economic life, it lent them a more conservative ring.
Having carried through a rapid dismantling of the extraordinary
regulation system which emerged in the years of US aggression in
Korea, and having abolished Hoover's Reconstruction Finance
Corporation in a symbolic gesture, the Eisenhower Administration
proclaimed a deficit-free budget and a revision of the taxation
structure as the top social and economic priorities. Specifically this
meant a deflationary course (issue of long-term government bonds
with the aim of raising interest rates, which would make credits
less accessible), and introduction of new write-off benefits and
elimination of double taxing (since 1954 persons paying investment
taxes were exempted from income taxes on corporations into
whose assets these investments were included). At the same time
the Republican President refused to reduce corporate income taxes,
left the social welfare system intact, continued federal programs
providing subsidies for marketable agricultural produce, housing
and highway construction, and began reconstruction of the St.
Lawrence waterway, a program whose cost was comparable only to</p>

<p>     Doris Kearns, <em>Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream</em>, Harper &amp; Row
Publishers, New York, 1976, p. 155.</p>

<p>     294 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 295</p>

<p>     parties. Under the circumstances, the opposition's return to power
was highly improbable.</p>

<p>     The liberal wing of the Democratic Party could offer an
alternative to the Republican Administration's course and bring the party
out of the state of consensus. However, the party National
Committee was the only body fully controlled by the moderately liberal
Democrats and capable of serving as an ideological and
organizational center at the federal level. Aware of this, the leader of the
liberal Democrats, Adlai Stevenson, said following the 1952 defeat:
&quot;I hope we can make the Committee something really useful during
this interval in which we will have no access to the resources of the
Executive Departments and no patronage. After years it will be
quite a new concept and enterprise.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     In 1953 the Democratic National Committee was a body with
vague functions which had been disorganized by the incomplete
restructuring of 1951-1952. The reorganization continued in 1953-
1954 with the direct participation of Stevenson and under the
supervision of Chairman Mitchell. Two divisions were formed: one
in charge of party activities and the other---propaganda. In 1955-
1956, the new Chairman Paul Butler set up a TV-Radio and a
Registration Division. Thus the Democratic National Committee
in 1956 was quite a logically organized system of bodies
working mostly along two lines---organization and propaganda---and
better suited to the tasks facing it.</p>

<p>     In 1955-1956, on Butler's instructions, a whole network of
advisory committees was set up under the National Committee
to consider agricultural and labor policies, and problems of
small business and national resources. Each of these
committees collected material on and analyzed one range of problems
(environmental protection, farmer subsidies) and prepared the
relevant information for the National Committee.</p>

<p>     In 1953-1954 the National Committee had to deal with the
most important problem of eliminating its budget deficit. At first
this was done by traditional methods: selling tickets to dinner
parties and party gatherings, and a large cut in the staff (from 201
to 59 people).^^2^^ All these measures somewhat improved the finan-</p>

<p>     <em>The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson</em>, Vol. IV, <em>Let's Talk Sense to the American
People, 1952-1955</em>, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1974, p. 220.</p>

<p>     Hugh A. Bone, <em>Party Committees and National Politics</em>, University of Washington
Press, Seattle, 1958, pp. 42-44.</p>

<p>     FDR's TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority). On the whole, as
Soviet historian N. V. Sivachev aptly put it, Eisenhower proved to be
&quot;a conservative---no more and no less!''^^1^^ The state-monopoly
foundations of American society, which were laid by FDR's
Democrats in the 1930s, now had influential advocates within the party
that was more inclined to the individualistic course. This
inevitably made government statism in the 1950s more conservative
but did not change its essence.</p>

<p>     Naturally, the President's proposals did not provoke serious
criticism from most members of the Democratic congressional
faction adhering to positions similar to Eisenhower's. Explaining
the overall favorable approach to the President's initiatives, Ray burn
said that after the 1952 defeat his party should also recognize its
responsibility for the country's destiny and therefore Democrats on
Capitol Hill should not block Republican bills in Congress. Moreover,
a paradoxical situation took shape in 1953-1954: the Democrats
actively supported Republican President Eisenhower in Congress on
such issues as financial assistance for housing construction, education,
health, etc. On the whole, of 31 legislative successes scored by the
President 23 were supported by the Democrats.^^2^^</p>

<p>     This situation gave the opposition party certain tactical
advantages but involved a definite danger from the strategic viewpoint:
most of the President's programs constituted a continuation,
albeit in modified form, of the reforms originated by the
Democratic Administration, and the Democrat strategists were at a
loss having discovered that their party was left without any
alternative proposals. As a result of the similarity of the ideological
positions of the leading factions in the main bourgeois parties, a
consensus began to emerge in the country's two-party system on the
basis of acceptance in principle by both the Eisenhower
Republicans and the majority of Democrats of the ideas of moderate
government intervention in the economic and social processes. Such
a state of affairs was fraught with unpleasant consequences for the
two-party mechanism: the disappearance of an alternative in the
parties' positions led to weaker control over the electorate, which,
in turn, bred moods among the voters in favor of creating third</p>

<p>~^^1^^ N. V. Sivachev, Y. F. Yazkov, <em>Current History of the USA</em>, Moscow, 1980, p. 211
(in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Vol. 99, Part 12, July 2,1953, to August 28,1953, U.S.G.P.O.,
Washington, 1953, p. A4160.</p>

<p>     296 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 297</p>

<p>     publican course. Thus the Democratic National Committee's
activities in 1953-1956 may be described as the beginning of a search
for new methods of party work and an attempt to reorient the
committee machinery to serve the party while it was in opposition.</p>

<p>     In 1953-1954 changes occurred not only in the liberal
bastion, the National Committee. They also involved the work of
Democratic Party bodies on Capitol Hill. If previously Democratic
Party committees on congressional elections carried on their
activities chiefly during the campaigns, since the mid-1950s they
began to operate on a permanent basis, preparing for the next
elections immediately after the end of the previous ones. After the
midterms of 1958 Vice-President Nixon said: &quot;Our opponents deserve
the victory they have won because of their hard work and their
excellent organization... The great lesson of this election for both
Democrats and Republicans is that in these days campaigning is
a year-round business.&quot;<SUP>!</SUP></p>

<p>     The 1954 elections brought to the fore the problem of
establishing effective collaboration between the Republican President
and Democrat-controlled Congress. The role of intermediaries was
played by leaders of the Democratic caucus on Capitol Hill:
Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn were invited at least once a month
and occasionally more often to joint meetings with the Eisenhower
cabinet where they participated in working out particularly
important projects; they frequently had unofficial talks with the
President and exchanged opinions over the telephone.</p>

<p>     In the 84th Congress (1955-1956) the Democrats on the whole
approved the President's basic legislation, but the coming
presidential elections increasingly made themselves felt. The consensus
type of relations became a liability for the Democrats. An overall
strengthening of their positions in Congress coupled with more
vigorous action by the National Committee stimulated the moderate
liberals representing the Democratic Party on Capitol Hill.</p>

<p>     A small group of congressmen began to form back in 1953.
It included 17 liberal Democrats from New York (the leader of the
group Emanuel Celler, Abraham J. Multer, Adam Clayton Powell,
Isidore Dollinger, Leo- W. O'Brien and others) who voted
unanimously on all issues. They constituted the first cell of a future
association. In the upper chamber the moderate liberal wing of the</p>

<p>     cial situation, but preparations for the 1954 election campaign
demanded more and more funds on propaganda. This led to the
introduction of the quota system in the party. According to this
system each state Democratic committee had to collect a fixed
sum of money during the year to contribute to the National
Committee's treasury. Thanks to the quota system all the debts
incurred by the committee during the 1952 campaign had been paid
by the end of 1954.</p>

<p>     In 1953-1954 the National Committee still had no clearly
defined standpoint on the fundamental questions of political
struggle and abstained from stating its opinion. It was only after the
Democrats' success in the 1954 congressional elections that the
National Committee and its staff introduced changes in their work.
Only a few days after Butler took office in January 1955, he
publicly criticized Eisenhower's State of the Union Message referring
to the growth of unemployment in 1954 as compared with 1953
and the government procurement prices of agricultural produce
which were unfavorable for small farmers. This greatly irritated
Lyndon Johnson who stated in the press that the National
Committee and Butler had no business making such statements. In
reply the National Committee officially declared that it would
decide for itself what, how, when and why it would do.</p>

<p>     After this incident the Democratic National Committee
regularly criticized the Republican Administration. In September
1955 Butler committed a sacrilege in the eyes of the moderate
conservative Democrats: he made a personal attack against Eisenhower
saying that due to failing health and advanced age the President
was unable to govern the country effectively. The next serious
action by the National Committee was criticism of Democratic
governor of Ohio Frank Lausche for failing to help the state party
committee in its work and officially thanking Republican
Eisenhower for vetoing a Democratic congressmen's bill on farmer
subsidies.</p>

<p>     However, activization of the Democratic National Committee
in 1955-1956 was very superficial. While still remaining the party's
organizational body the committee did not offer any serious
positive programs which could serve as a real alternative to the
ReCornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy. <em>Politics without Power. The National
Party Committees</em>, Atherton Press, New York, 1964, p. 180.</p>

<p>     <em>Democratic Digest</em>, January-February 1959.</p>

<p>     298 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 299</p>

<p>     government in the economic and social processes was not rejected
but, on the contrary, regarded as normal. Such interference was
viewed not as an emergency measure but as a routine duty of the
US government.</p>

<p>     However, the real political image of the Republican
Administration in the 1956 elections was determined not by the ideology of
New Republicanism but rather by specific steps taken by
Eisenhower and his staff in the legislative field. These steps showed that
the GOP, as represented by its leading faction, had moved beyond
the framework of bourgeois-individualist political philosophy and,
on the whole, followed a state-monopoly course more adequate
to the world outlook of most Americans, refusing in practice to
adhere to the slogans of the advocates of the bankrupt laisser-faire
theories. In the final count this was why the Democratic
Party, armed only with the amorphous idea of New America and
lacking virtually any major independent legislative success or
initiative as its political asset, suffered a defeat in the 1956 presidential
elections---its presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson lost for the
second time to Eisenhower. At the same time, from the
viewpoint of the Democrats, the situation in 1956 seemed somewhat
better than in 1952. The victory of the Republican presidential
candidate was not backed up by any growth in the influence of the
GOP at the other levels of government: in both the Senate and the
House the Democrats retained the majority they had won from the
Republicans back in 1954.</p>

<p>     The situation was judged in different ways by the various
groups of Democrats depending on their ideological bias and
specific political plans for the coming four-year term.</p>

<p>     In late 1956 and early 1957 the moderate liberals initiated an
unprecedented innovation in the party: for the first time a purely
partisan body was set up to take charge of domestic and foreign
policy-making.</p>

<p>     The immediate impulse to its creation was provided by
Senator Humphrey's statement urging the Democratic Party which
had a majority in both chambers of Congress to push through the
highest legislature a number of specific bills flowing from its
election platform. Humphrey particularly stressed the need for school
desegregation. Johnson and Rayburn opposed the move indicating
that they were awaiting civil rights initiatives from the Republican
Administration.</p>

<p>     Democrats was represented by 18 senators---Hubert Humphrey (
Minnesota), Paul Douglas (Illinois), Patrick McNamara (Michigan),
John Kennedy (Massachusetts), Estes Kefauver (Tennessee),
Richard Neuberger (Oregon) and others---who acted in a concerted
way.</p>

<p>     In mid-1954 these New York Democrats proposed a
legislative program of the minority party. The program included 18
points and corresponded to the Democratic Party platform adopted
by the convention in 1952. The top priority measures were repeal
of the Taft-Hartley Act, elimination of discrimination against the
black population in getting jobs and joining labor unions, an increase
in unemployment benefits, an effective housing construction
program and others.^^1^^ However, no attempts were made to
implement the program up to the Second Session of the 83rd Congress
(1953-1954). Nevertheless, the document was highly important as
a declaration of principles and a program of action of the moderate
liberal wing for the subsequent two years.</p>

<p>     The regaining by the Democratic Party of majority in Congress
as a result of the 1954 elections prompted the Democrats to
advance their own programs more resolutely. Thus, following
Eisenhower's proposals on housing, civil rights, education, and labor
policy, the Democrats of New York made public their demands
which were to considerably enlarge the government programs. They
worked hard to get their demands adopted. However, as events
showed, the scattered forces of the liberals in Congress were unable
to overcome the resistance of the two-party center whose efforts
were aimed at achieving a compromise with the Republican
Administration.</p>

<p>     The leading moderate-conservative wing of the Republicans
entered the 1956 elections on a platform of New Republicanism,
which was claimed to be the golden mean betwen two
extremesbourgeois individualism (the 1896 ideology) and liberal statism
(the 1936 ideology). The meaning of New Republicanism, as it
was defined in Larson's book,^^2^^ was in asserting the intransient
fundamental value of private capitalist initiative in the social and
economic life of American society. Yet a certain interference by</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Vol. 110, Part 6, May 26,1954, to June 21,1954 U S G P O
Washington, 1954, p. 8395.</p><p>
......</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Arthur Larson, <em>A Republican Looks at His Party</em>, Harper &amp; Brothers, Publishers
New York, 1956.</p>

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<p>     300 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Two resolutions were approved on November 26, 1956, at a
sitting of the National Committee's executive: the first urged
congressional Democrats to vote for Humphrey's proposals and the
other directed Butler to set up an Advisory Committee to include
the most authoritative party leaders with the aim of studying,
discussing, and analyzing data on the political situation in the
country and issuing statements on behalf of the party for all those
supporting Democrats.</p>

<p>     Acting on the resolution, Butler announced on the next day
that the Advisory Committee would be set up and sent invitations
to some prominent Democrats. Butler's invitations were received
by Adlai Stevenson and all the Democratic leaders in the
SenateLyndon Johnson, Mike Mansfield and George Smathers---and in the
House---Sam Rayburn, John McCormack, Michael Kirwan and
Carl Albert---as well as the most prestigious governors and mayors---
Averell Harriman, G. Mennon Williams, Luther H. Hodges,
Raymond Tucker and David L. Lawrence. Leaders of the moderate
liberals Humphrey and Kefauver and veteran Democrats Harry
Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt were also invited.</p>

<p>     Johnson refused the invitation and persuaded Mansfield and
Smathers to do likewise. The Democratic majority leader in the
Senate believed that the Advisory Committee was &quot;completely
powerless to produce any votes&quot; yet &quot;completely capable of
deepening divisions within the Democratic Party.&quot; &quot;The idea that the
congressional Democrats have a responsibility for taking the
national Democratic platform and program and trying to push it
through the Congress is simply crazy.</p>

<p>     On behalf of the invited House Democrats, Rayburn also
refused to participate, explaining that they had reached the
unanimous opinion that it would be a mistake for the leaders of the
Democratic caucus to participate in any other committee outside it.
A few more politicians refused without explaining the reasons. As
a result the Advisory Committee included Adlai Stevenson, Harry
Truman, Hubert Humphrey, Estes Kefauver, G. Mennon Williams,
Raymond Tucker, Averell Harriman, and Paul Butler. At the first
meeting Butler was unanimously elected chairman.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party National Committee defined the functions
of the Advisory Committee as follows: to provide progressive and</p>

<p>     Doris Kearns, <em>Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream</em>, p. 1407.</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 301</p>

<p>     effective political leadership by continually studying problems arising
between conventions and advancing action programs to solve these
problems. In effect, this was declaration of war on the right-centrist
moderately conservative Democrats who relied on Congress. So the
refusal of the leaders of the party caucus on Capitol Hill to join the
Advisory Committee was in no way accidental.</p>

<p>     The first meeting of the Advisory Committee was set for
January 4, 1957. Lyndon Johnson, Sam Rayburn and Democratic
majority leader in the House John McCormack were invited. They
accepted the invitation: the committee had become a reality which
could not be ignored.</p>

<p>     The meeting adopted several statements one of which expressed
the collective opinion of the Democratic Party, particularly those
Democrats who were not represented in the Congress. Another
document---the First Day Statement---emphasized that &quot;The
Committee places the maximum strength of the Party behind its own
positive programs (and) affords our Party the means of
rallying national support and public opinion behind our programs or
against unwise programs of the Executive Branch.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     After the first meeting, a closed session was held by Johnson,
Rayburn and Butler precise information about which could not be
obtained even by the Washington correspondents of <em>The New York
Times</em>. It could be concluded from a vague report in the newspaper
of January 6 that Johnson and Rayburn were, apparently, impressed
by the adopted statements, and decided to avoid a direct
conflict which would inevitably lead to a party split. They agreed to
a certain compromise: congressional Democratic leaders officially
indicated that they would heed the opinions of the Advisory
Committee. The agreement was reflected in the new name of the
committee: it was renamed council to lay emphasis on its advisory nature
and its subordination to the National Committee. That is how the
Advisory Council of the Democratic Party National Committee
was born. It had a strong impact on all party activities in 1957-1960.</p>

<p>     Two basic trends could be singled out in the activities of the
Advisory Council. The first was to compile detailed policy
statements on the basis of data collected and processed for publication
as condensed press releases in <em>The New York Times</em>. The second
was to improve the organizational structure of the Council itself</p>

<p>     <em>Democratic Digest</em>, February 1957, p. 7.</p>

<p>     302 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 303</p>

<p>     of moderate liberals from the Council was in some way taken into
consideration in Congress. It was demonstrated, in particular, that
the Council had put forward the ideas underlying the legislation on
housing, highway construction bill, farm-produce prices
stabilization, unemployment compensation extension measure, depressed
area redevelopment bill which were discussed in Congress and
subsequently approved. *</p>

<p>     Seeking to raise the prestige of the moderate liberal wing and
demonstrate their independence of the congressional caucus
leadership to the whole party, the Council members sharply
exacerbated relations within the party in July-August 1959. They
officially expressed a number of ideas concerning the political line
of the congressional caucus. Some critical remarks contained in
the Council's statement were levelled personally at Johnson and
Rayburn and their tactics in Congress. As to the extreme right
wing (the Dixiecrats), Butler stated on national TV that the
Southerners could &quot;get out of the party&quot; if they did not revise their
stand on desegregation.^^2^^ In addition, the Council heard Butler's
report &quot;The Current Legislative Situation&quot; in July 1959 and
adopted a resolution approving certain bills pushed through the
Congress by the Democrats^^3^^ but at the same time indicating that the
Democratic majority in Congress should &quot;use its power and give
the nation a significant program of constructive legislation.&quot; The
Council recommended that Democrats in Congress concentrate on
the following goals: federal aid for education, revision of the
agricultural program under consideration in its committees, raising
minimal wages and extension of social insurance.^^4^^</p>

<p>     Speaking on TV after the resolution was adopted, Butler urged
the leaders of the Democratic caucus in Congress to be more active
and persistent in defending party policy, particularly school
desegregation,^^5^^ which exasperated Rayburn completely. Responding
sharply to the attempt to attack his authority the Speaker angrily
wrote in a letter to one of his friends: &quot;I think Paul Butler has
destroyed his usefulness because he has half or more of the Dem-</p>

<p>     * <em>Democratic Digest</em>, September 1958, pp. 10-11.
C. P. Cotter and B. C. Hennessy. <em>Politics without Power</em>, p. 222.
The bills in question involved housing, urban modernization, depressed area
assistance and revision of tax policy <em>(Democratic Digest</em>, September 1958, pp. 10-11.)</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Democratic Digest</em>, July 1959, p. 7.</p>

<p>~^^5^^ <em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     and set up special advisory committees subordinated to it and to
the National Committee.</p>

<p>     In early 1957, on Butler's initiative, the Council set up the first
two advisory committees: on Foreign Policy (chaired by former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson) and on Economic Policy (
chaired by prominent economist John K. Galbraith). A third
committee appeared in June 1958---the Advisory Committee on Labor
Policy headed by George M. Harrison, President of the Brotherhood
of Railway Clerks, executive committee member of the
AFLCIO and the Democratic National Committee. The growing role of
science in modern society was reflected in the founding of the
Advisory Committee on Science and Technology in April-May
1959 headed by a physicist of world renown Ernest C. Pollard.
Organization of a fifth committee had been completed by
September 1959: it was the Committee on Urban and Suburban Problems.
The mayor of New Haven (Connecticut) Richard C. Lee became the
chairman. The Committee on Farm Policy began to be constituted
at the same time. The Advisory Committee on Health Policy
under the chairmanship of Michael E. DeBakey was organized in
April-May 1960 not long before the Democratic Party convention
in Los Angeles.</p>

<p>     In one of its first statements the Council urged congressional
Democrats to vote for an amendment against the filibuster rule, but
the moderate conseratives refused to take heed and the amendment
was voted down by the joint efforts of the right centrist Democrats
and Dixiecrats allied with the right-wing Republicans.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Subsequently the Council's activities entered a more calm and
moderate phase: it approved policy statements prepared by its
committees which as a rule did not contain demands to take any
immediate actions. However, its members had no intention of
rejecting direct political action. In September 1957 the Council
repudiated Democratic governor Orval E. Faubus' stand on the
Little Rock incident of September 4, 1957. The Council declared that
the governor's actions did not conform to the Democratic Party's
views on civil rights.</p>

<p>     Attempting to demonstrate its influence on the Democratic
congressional caucus, from September 1958 the Council began to
publish materials in the <em>Democratic Digest</em> showing that the line</p>

<p>     <em>Democratic Digest</em>, February 1957, p. 7.</p>

<p>     304 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 305</p>

<p>     ocrats of the country utterly disgusted with him. Therefore, his
ability to serve the party has vanished to a great extent.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Johnson, Rayburn and Butler met in the latter half of August
to settle the conflict. An agreement was reached to retain the
former manner of relations between the bodies they led and, as a
result, the Council made no policy statements until December 1959,
and the Democrats displayed remarkable unanimity----
apparently the July move of the National Committee chairman had an
effect---in passing through Congress the Acts of Treaties: TVA
Self-Financing (House: 238 Democrats for and 31 against;
Senate 56 for and two against) and Public Works Appropriation
Bill (House: 266 for and four against; Senate: 55 for and one
against).^^2^^</p>

<p>     The activities pursued by the Advisory Council of the
Democratic Party National Committee did not undermine the prestige of
the National Committee and its machinery. On the contrary,
changes in the latter's structure and development of forms and
methods in organization and propaganda resulted in fundamentally
different phenomena in the committee's direction of party life.</p>

<p>     The National Committee staff began to pay more attention to
work with local party organizations, chiefly Democratic Party
Committees in the counties. Regional conferences had been held by
September 1957 with the participation of state and local
committees. These conferences discussed improvement of contacts in the
state-county system, and also propaganda during the 1958 and
1960 election campaigns.^^3^^ A standing seminar devoted to
organization of party work began operating under the National
Committee in November 1957. Two conferences were held in 1959 dealing
with organization of propaganda during the 1960 campaign at the
level of state party committees including the conference of state
committee chairman representing all the Democratic state locals
without exception.^^4^^ It was the first conference of its kind in the
history of the Democratic Party.</p>

<p>     After the serious financial difficulties of the 1956 campaign, the
National Committee introduced a number of innovations in party
finances, most interesting of which was subsidizing membership
introduced in 1957. This was how Butler described the
development: &quot;Democrats will be asked to contribute to the Party on a
regular basis---either by annual, semi-annual or monthly payments.
The sustaining member will receive a membership card and a year's
subscription to the <em>Democratic Digest</em>. He will also receive, from
time to time, bulletins of special interest and importance
concerning activities of the Democratic Party.''^^1^^ Thus, for the first time in
the history of the Democratic Party an attempt was made to
introduce permanent (voluntary) membership. Regular contributions
resembled membership dues, sustaining members had certain, albeit
not very important, moral rather than real, advantages compared to
those who supported the Democrats but did not contribute
financially.</p>

<p>     Changes in the fund-raising system enabled the National
Committee to improve its difficult financial position; in 1959-1960 it
received more than a million dollars a year.</p>

<p>     The growing influence of the moderate liberal wing in the
Democratic Party, which was actively promoted by the National
Committee and the Advisory Council, was bound to have an impact on
the party caucus in Congress. In early 1957, 80 liberal caucus
members formerly acting individually formed the bloc of Roosevelt
Democrats or Young Turks (70 were congressmen from the
Northwestern urban areas and 10 from the farmer Northwestern states) who
favored carrying on the New Deal-Fair Deal reforms.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The Young Turks developed their strategy approximately along
the same lines as the New York Democrats who joined the Young
Turks.</p>

<p>     On January 30, 1957, Thompson made public the program of
the Roosevelt Democrats---the Northern Manifesto---which
basically repeated the 1956 Democratic national platform^^3^^ and coincided</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Democratic Digest, July</em> 1957, p. 2.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 103, Part 6, May 16, 1957, to June 6,1957.U.S.G.P.O.,
Washington, 1957, pp. 7459-7460. The Roosevelt Democrats were headed by Eugene
McCarthy (Minnesota) and Frank Thompson (New York).</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 103, Part 1, January 3, 1957, to February 1, 1957,
pp. 1324-1326; Vol. 104, Part 15, August 21, 1958, to August 23, 1958, U.S.G.P.O.,
Washington, 1958, p. 197000.</p>

<p>     21-749</p>

<p>     <em>Speak, Mister Speaker</em>, compiled and edited by <b>H.G.</b> Dulaney and Edward Hake
Phillips, Sam Rayburn Foundation, Bonham, Texas, 1978, p. 379.</p>

<p>     Clinton Rossiter, <em>Parties and Politics in America</em>, A Signet Book, New York 1964
p. 132.</p>

<p>     3 <em>Democratic Digest July</em> 1957, p. 7;August 1957, p. 14;March 1958, pp. 8-9.</p>

<p>     <em>Democratic Digest</em>, May 1959, Second Cover; October 1959, pp. 11-12.</p>

<p>     <b>306</b> Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 307</p>

<p>     with the recommendations contained in the first policy statement
of the Advisory Council issued on January 4, 1957. Thus the
moderate liberals' struggle to implement the Northern Manifesto was an
attempt to raise the party's responsibility for carrying out its
election promises.</p>

<p>     The liberals' efforts were crownd by partial success in 1957-
1958: Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act (1957), the National
Defense Education Act (1958) providing for an increase in
government spending in the field, the Emergency Housing Bill (1958)
raising federal government expenditures on aid to states and local
organizations in urban renewal and some others.^^1^^ As a result of the 1958
elections the moderate liberal wing was reinforced by new
members, and that influenced the balance of power in the Congress.</p>

<p>     However, the situation on Capitol Hill as well as beyond was
marked not only by certain successes scored by the liberal
Democrats but also changes in the position of the ruling Republican
Party. The crisis of 1957-1958 and its consequences, particularly in
view of the Eisenhower Administration's return to deficit budget
planning, meant a major failure of economic policy based on New
Republicanism. The government's agrarian measures which ruined
small farmers deprived the administration of support in the
country's agricultural areas. In addition, the 1957 events in Little Rock
(Arkansas) when National Guardsmen prevented black children
from attending schools led to an aggravation of relations between
official Washington and the governments of the Southern states and
dashed Eisenhower's hopes that the authorities would solve the civil
rights problem constructively at a state level or at least keep the
situation under control without forcing the federal government to act
in this highly sensitive and potentially explosive field. The
discrediting of the conservative individualists from the Republican Party
which began in 1954 following the fall of Joseph McCarthy, had
significantly weakened the positions of the GOP right wing by 1958.
On the other hand, it was in the late 1950s that there was a certain
growth in the influence of the liberal Republicans headed by Nelson
Rockefeller and Harold Stassen, which, on a par with the above,
tipped the balance within the ruling party.</p>

<p>     <em>Congress and the Nation 1945-1964. A Review of Government and Politics in the
Postwar Years</em>, Congressional Quarterly Service, Vol. 1, Washington, 1965, pp. 490, 1208,
1621.</p>

<p>     In view of all this it was only natural that the conflict emerging
between Democratic moderate liberals and Eisenhower reached its
highest point during the 86th Congress (1959-1960) and its
participants from the opposition party behaved in such a way that it
would appear as a general clash between the Democrats and the
Republicans: the presidential elections were approaching, and this raised
the Democrats' hopes for success in view of divisions within the
ruling party and a general weakening of Republican positions.</p>

<p>     A typical example of that conflict was the argument concerning
housing construction in 1959 where the bone of contentions was
the size of federal subsidies to the states. The President vetoed two
variants of the bill submitted by moderate liberal Democrats, and
only the third, compromise version of the bill was signed by the
President.^^1^^ The issue of government expenditures was the principal
watershed in the parties'policies at the end of the 1950s. As opposed
to the Republicans who identified rising federal expenditures
with growing inflation, the Democrats had no intention of avoiding
urgent social problems and offered a quite specific method of
solving them---spending. They did not denounce the budget dificit
which they regarded simply as investment in a profitable business
promising large dividends in the future.</p>

<p>     Many of the bills incorporated in the program of the Roosevelt
Democrats as top-priority measures were blocked by the
conservatives. Thus the civil rights bill, the depressed area redevelopment
bill, the school aid bills and others advanced by the liberals in 1959
were schelved by the House Rules Committee and Judiciary
Committee where a majority was held by conservative politicians.^^2^^ One
of the biggest defeats suffered by the Young Turks was the adoption
of the anti-labor Landrum-Griffin Bill: the conservative coalition
not only successfully opposed the Young Turks but also initiated
reactionary legislative acts.</p>

<p>     All this made increasingly obvious the need to rally and improve
coordination of the moderate liberal wing of the Democratic Party.
It was decided with this purpose to set up an official organization
of liberal congressmen in the House. On September 5, 1959, an
assembly of liberal Democrats announced the ``birth'' of the
Democratic Study Group consisting of 125 members. The Study Group
had its political, executive and steering committees and staff</p>

<p>     <em>Congress and the Nation</em>, p. 493.
<em>Ibid., p</em>. 1208.</p>

<p>     308 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     preparing analytical studies. The Group was headed by Lee Metcalf
(Montana) assisted by six vice-chairmen, a secretary, a chief of the
staff and the senior whip with his assistants. A caucus of all the
group's members was the supreme body of the group.</p>

<p>     After the first session of the 86th Congress the leadership of the
Study Group got down to working out the strategy of the
Democratic moderate liberal wing in the House of Representatives for
1960. Particular attention was paid to defining top-priority
legislative measures which could find support among most congressmen
from the Northern and the Western states and also the tactic for
implementing them. As a result the following problems were singled
out: the racial problem, government aid for education, assistance to
depressed areas, higher minimum wages, housing construction,
extending social security and medical services to new sections of
industrial and office workers. Accordingly, seven problem groups
were formed headed by experienced bloc members.</p>

<p>     Thus, in 1960, the Democratic moderate liberal wing on Capitol
Hill was better organized and coordinated than four years earlier.
Links became stronger between its members in both chambers. Lee
Metcalf worked with Senator Eugene McCarthy; Frank Thompson,
Jr. with Senator Joseph Clark (Pennsylvania); John Moss (
California) with Senator Albert Gore (Tennessee) and so on.</p>

<p>     From the very first days of the second session of the 86th
Congress (1960) the Study Group and the liberal Democrats closely linked
to it began to implement their plans. In early 1960, in
accordance with the Democratic Party platform and recommendations
of the Advisory Council, bills were adopted expanding federal
housing construction program and government aid to education. On
January 6 the Democratic moderate liberals attempted to pass a bill
raising the minimum wage from 1 to 1.25 dollars an hour. However,
the bill was inevitably defeated in Congress by conservatives backed
by Eisenhower. The liberals managed to return the bill on
government aid to depressed areas from the committees and have it
approved by both chambers. Eisenhower vetoed the bill. The same fate
lay in store for the bills increasing federal expenditures on social
welfare, health, education and some others.</p>

<p>     In the context of the acute confrontation between the
Democrats and the President supported by an absolute majority of
Republicans in the legislature, the congressional wing of the opposition
party demonstrated an alternative to the Republican Administra-</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) <b>309</b></p>

<p>     tion's course.</p>

<p>     However, it would be a gross exaggeration to assert that in the
Democrats' party life the tone was set only by the moderate liberals
in the latter half of the 1950s.</p>

<p>     The Dixiecrats traditionally made up the right wing of the
Democratic party. On Capitol Hill the Southern wing of the Democrats
regularly opposed bills to increase the minimum wages, reduce the
workday, and adopt legislation acceptable to the labor unions. It
promoted ultrareactionary demands in the racial issue. Forming a
compact group, the Dixiecrats established a bloc with the
conservative wing of the Republicans in the country's highest legislative body.</p>

<p>     The history of the coalition goes back to 1937. During
Eisenhower's Presidency the coalition had a strong influence on the
legislative process opposing federal aid to immigrants consistently and
successfully, and sharply criticizing bills on government subsidies
for education, health care and housing. Thus the Dixiecrats in effect
blocked many of the measures on the basis of which the liberal
Democrats attempted to put forward an alternative to Republican
policy in the latter part of the 1950s. In 1959 the conservative forces
in Congress rallied to resist the liberals. Leaders of both
conservative groups---coalition partners---began to hold joint sessions
coordinating their activities in Congress. As a result, in 1959-1960, the
coalition acted as a united front against the Northern and Western
Democrats in 11 out of 87 House rollcall votes winning 10 of them
(91 percent). It is noteworthy that in 1957 it won on 81 percent
and in 1958 on 64 percent of the showdown votes on Capitol Hill.^^1^^</p>

<p>     On May 17, 1954, the US Supreme Court ruled that segregation
in public schools was unconstitutional. Subsequently, on April 23,
1956, it also ruled that segregation on interstate passenger bus lines
was unconstitutional. These rulings by the Supreme Court provoked
a wave of indignation among the Dixiecrats, including congressmen
from the Southern states.</p>

<p>     On March 12, 1956, 19 senators and 78 representatives elected
from the Southern states denounced the ruling of the Supreme
Court in a specially published <em>Declaration of Constitutional
Principles</em> and urged the colleagues to ignore it.^^2^^ The document was de-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 106, Part 2, January 21, 1960, to February 16, 1960,
U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1960, p. 1441.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 102, Part 4, March 8, 1956, to March 27, 1956,
U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1956, pp. 4515-4516.</p>

<p>     310 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 311</p>

<p>     clared open, but its immediate supporters were joined only by four
Southern Republicans: William C. Cramer (Florida), Charles R. Jonas
(North Carolina), Richard H. Poff and Joel T. Broyhill (both
from Virginia).</p>

<p>     The Southern wing of the Democrats was a difficult obstacle to
overcome on the way to solving the racial problem, a burning issue
both for the party and the country as a whole. A major part in
eliminating this obstacle was played by the centrist moderate
conservative group of Democrats.</p>

<p>     The centrists occupied an intermediary position in the party
between the conservatives and the liberals and responded sensitively
to changes in the political climate. It carried great weight in the
party and that weight tended to grow during all the years of the
Republican Administation. The moderates outnumbered the liberals and
the Dixiecrats,^^1^^ and they were led by the strong leaders Rayburn
and Johnson who had extensive experience of working in the highest
legislature and enjoyed vast powers under congressional rules.
Moreover, Jonhson managed to secure firm support in the Senate
by means of the political committee which consisted of members he
had handpicked. Under Jonhson's chairmanship the political
committee played an important stabilizing role when the Democratic
caucus was torn apart by serious contradictions and was the
instrument for achieving compromises.</p>

<p>     Sharp differences emerged in the Domocratic caucus on the
racial issue. As compared with the 1952 elections, the number of
blacks who voted Republican in the 1956 elections had risen. In
1952 Adlai Stevenson got 79 percent of the votes of the black
population and Eisenhower only 21 percent. In 1956, 64 percent of
black Americans voted for the Democratic candidate and 36
percent for Eisenhower.^^2^^ The tendency put the Democratic Party into
a difficult situation: it had to show that it championed the interests
of black Americans not to lose their support, while in the Senate,
for example, Southern Democrats stood more than four to one
against assuring blacks their full rights as citizens.^^3^^</p>

<p>     On January 10, 1957, President Eisenhower declared that he in-</p>

<p>     In the Senate the centrist group numbered about 25 members and in the House
about 100.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ U.S. News</em> &amp; <em>World Report</em>, March 29, 1957, p. 66.</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 103, Part 10, July 26, 1957, to August 8, 1957
U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1957, p. 13826.</p>

<p>     sisted on passing the bill extending the rights of the black
population. The bill envisaged setting up an executive-commission
intended to monitor observance of civil rights and guarantee that the
whites under the threat of fines and prison terms, would not
intimidate the blacks. Part III of the bill was particularly important since
it empowered the Assistant Attorney-General, appointed by the
President, to investigate cases of Afro-Americans being deprived of
the right to vote. On June 18 a majority of the House of
Representatives approved the bill. Only Democrats from the Southern states
and ultraconservative Republicans voted against the bill (it was
passed by 286 votes against 126, including 118 Democrats and 168
Republicans supporting it and only 107 opposition party members
together with 19 Republican congressmen voting against it).^^1^^</p>

<p>     In the Senate the Dixiecrats mostly attacked Part III of the bill
which they regarded as illegitimate interference by the federal
government in state affairs. A major part in securing passage of the bill
was played by Johnson who used his prestige and powers of Senate
Democratic majority leader to persuade Southerners not to
filibuster. He warned the latter that intransigence would only lead to more
rigorous demands by the liberals. At the same time, Johnson made
it known to the liberal bloc that the course of events would take
an unfavorable turn if Part III of the bill was not dropped.^^2^^ Fear
that the civil rights legislation would be defeated in Congress
controlled by the Democrats forced the liberals to make concessions.
As a result, the bill without Part III was approved by a majority of
votes in the Senate and, after differences with the wording adopted
by the House were eliminated, became law.</p>

<p>     On the eve of the 1960 elections the Democratic center put
forward its own program on the racial issue. As opposed to the liberals
who favored placing civil rights issues within the jurisdiction of the
federal government and thereby provoked the acute dissatisfaction
of the Southern Democrats, the centrists wanted the government
simply to register cases when black Americans were deprived of the
right to vote and initiate investigations. The moderates' proposals
failed to fully satisfy both the liberal wing and the Dixiecrats but
were not particularly denounced by either group, and formed the
basis of a bill passed by Congress in 1960. As a result, having made</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congress and the Nation 1945-1965</em>, p. 1621.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 1624-1625.</p>

<p>     312 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 313</p>

<p>     minor concessions, the Democrats managed to keep the black
population within their sphere of influence and, at the same time,
prevent a split in the party on the civil right issue.</p>

<p>     Since the times of the New Deal the Democratic Party had
traditionally attached major importance to the votes of organized
workers whose potential strength had grown after the establishment of
the AFL-CIO in December 1955. The results of the 1956 elections
showed that the workers as well as their families on the whole
supported the Democratic Party, but union support enjoyed by
Stevenson was weaker than in previous election campaigns: in 1948, 76
percent of union members voted for the Democrats, in 1952, 56
percent and in 1956, 52 percent.^^1^^</p>

<p>     In the course of debates on problems of labor policy in the
years of Eisenhower's second presidency, virtually all the basic
groups of Democrats in Congress proposed their variants to solve the
problem. Thus, John Kennedy and the liberal group supporting him
attempted to push through a bill which could be supported by the
AFL-CIO. In June 1958, members of the Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Subcommittee, John Kennedy and Irving M. Ives (
Republican from New York), submitted a bill establishing government
control over labor union insurance funds but at the same time
guaranteeing a minimun of democratic procedures in union elections.
In the eyes of the employers the Kennedy-Ives bill was excessively
``soft''. Through the efforts of a majority of Republicans and
Southern Democrats the bill was rejected during debates in the House.</p>

<p>     In 1959, according to the recommendations of the National
Committee's Advisory Council, senators Kennedy and Sam Ervin
(Democrats from North Carolina) submitted a bill practically
identical to the Kennedy-Ives bill. Fearing that the fate of the 1958 bill
would befall it, the centrists took upon themselves the mission of
making the new bill more acceptable to the whole party caucus on
Capitol Hill. In the course of debates the centrists introduced the
Rights of Labor bill proposed by Arkansas Democrat John McClellan
as an amendment. The Rights of Labor provided for the
introduction of freedom of speech and assembly into union charters,
acknowledgement of the workers' right to sue the union and have access
to union papers. Any union member dissatisfied by the actions or
decisions of the leadership could go to court. In enforcement of</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>U.S. News</em> &amp; <em>World Report</em>, March 29, 1957, p. 66.</p>

<p>     these rules the Department of Justice would execute police
functions in respect to the unions. The desire of the ruling circles to
strengthen government control over union organizations under the
pretext of protecting individual rights and oppose the rank and file
to the union leadership in order to split the working-class
movement corresponded to the basic principles of the consensus as it
emerged in the two-party system in the 1950s. No wonder the bill
was approved by 90 votes to one. The unanimity of the Senate is
explained by the fact that after numerous rollcalls (55) the
Kennedy-Ervin bill lost its excessively liberal nature.</p>

<p>     In the House of Representatives the liberal bill was edited even
more energetically: the Labor Committee submitted 102
amendments. Democrat Phil M. Landrum of Georgia and Republican
Robert P. Griffin of Michigan initiated 80 of them. The main idea of
these amendments was to make the labor legislation more repressive.
The liberals believed that &quot;the Landrum-Griffin bill, if enacted into
law, will turn the clock of labor's progress back a quarter of a
century&quot;^^1^^ establishing excessively rigorous framework and curtailing
long acknowledged union rights. In the course of the decisive voting
on August 13 the Landrum-Griffin bill was passed by 229 to 201
votes, the Democrats voting 95 to 184 and the Republicans 137 to
17. The fate of the bill was decided chiefly by the coalition of
conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats, although initially it
seemed that the supporters of more liberal legislation had some
chance of success. The paradox was very easily explained: when the
alternative arose either to adopt the Landrum-Griffin bill or to be
left with no legislation at all (the conservatives clearly indicated the
limits of the concessions they would make), the congressmen chose
to ignore the interests of certain groups of the bourgeoisie which
they defended so as to promote the interests of the capitalist class
as a whole and provided the bill with an obviously conservative
common denominator.</p>

<p>     However, the conservative coalition's resistance against
measures which had become urgent for the Democrats prompted their
opponents to take resolute actions.</p>

<p>     The lines along which the liberal Democrats advanced alternative
ideas to the Republican Administration's policies had been map-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>. Vol. 105, Pajrt 12, August 3, 1959, to August 17, 1959,
U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1959, pp. 15514-15515.</p>

<p>     <b>314</b> Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     Democrats in the Opposition</p>

<p>     (1953-1960) 315</p>

<p>     ped out by 1959. If formerly the centrists took either a neutral or a
negative stand on these ideas, now, on the threshold of the
presidential elections, they began to support the liberal proposals quite
consistently. The centrist program officially announced in 1959
generally repeated liberal demands in the field of education, health,
space exploration, and federal aid to depressed areas.</p>

<p>     At the same time the centrists backed up their words by
supporting, jointly with the moderate liberal wing, increased
government spending on education, health, redevelopment of depressed
areas, housing construction, introduction of higher minimum wages
and their extension to new sections of workers, and also some other
measures.^^1^^</p>

<p>     All this makes it possible to assert that leadership in the party
went to the moderate liberals as a result of a long, difficult, and not
always successful, struggle, and a certain ideological evolution of
the centrists toward the latter had a decisive influence on the party
political image on the eve of the 1960 elections.</p>

<p>     The 1960 elections ended in a Democratic victory. When asked
why Kennedy won the Campaign Director for Vice-President Nixon,
Robert H. Finch said: ''An excellent organization that was four
years in building ... and the pull of the Democratic Party, which
included state and city organizations in far greater abundance than we
had.''^^2^^ There is undoubtedly some exaggeration in this statement
because, despite the importance of various innovations in the
National Committee's organizational work, the role played both by the
Advisory Council and the Democratic congressional caucus in 1957-
1960 must be singled out.</p>

<p>     During the Council's existence it approved and issued more than
80 policy statements. As a result of the compiling and publication
of these documents the moderate liberal wing of the party went to
the 1960 convention with a detailed action program partly tested in
legislation. For example, the appeal for a dialogue with the socialist
countries contained in the foreign-policy section of the platform
appeared in virtually all the Council's foreign-policy statements. In
the section on armed forces the platform's authors pointed out the
importance of &quot;balanced conventional military forces''.</p>

<p>     The Cold War, accompanied by the arms race and impressive mil-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congress and the Nation, pp</em>. 491-493, 1139, 1208-1209.
<em>U.S. News</em> &amp; <em>World Report</em>, November 21, 1960, p. 73.</p>

<p>     itary expenditures, had negative consequences for the United
States. Many American politicians got convinced that this course
would make the United States even more vulnerable. All this made
the US government take a serious attitude to the Soviet Union's
disarmament proposals. Referring to the problem, the Advisory
Council suggested more active negotiations with the USSR on
strategic arms cuts and setting up a national arms control agency.
The authors of the platform focussed attention on these issues in
the disarmament section.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The section devoted to economic policy opened with the
promise to secure higher growth rates of industrial production (up to five
percent a year) to provide jobs for those who would be of age by
the early 1960s and also those who had lost their jobs during the
Republican Administration's term in office as a result of changing
conditions in the age of automation. In numerous statements the
Council had proposed the same things with only slight differences---
the production growth rate was to be at least 4.7 percent a year.
The Council regarded rejection of the gold standard as a condition
for activization of the country's economic life. Economic growth
would absorb unemployment, and on this point the authors of the
statements agreed with those of the platform. To repeal the ``
rightto-work'' laws was considered to be a top priority in labor
legislation both by the Advisory Council and the 1960 party convention.
Referring to the civil rights problem, authors of the platform
promised voters to consistently implement the desegregation acts and
delegate special powers to the Attorney-General, which conformed
to the Council's proposals as well.^^2^^</p>

<p>     Thus a far from complete comparative analysis of the Advisory
Council's policy statements and the 1960 Democratic platform
known as JFK's New Frontiers reveals underlying links between
them and shows that the Council seriously influenced subsequent
policy-making of the Democrats. In 1957-1960 the Council, first,
drew the electorate's attention to the moderate liberals' alternative
course to the Republican Administration's policy. Second, the
Advisory Council was the ideological and political center relying on
the Democratic Party's National Committee. The moderate liberal</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. 2, <em>1960-1976</em>, p. 576; <em>Democratic Digest</em>, March
1958, pp. 11-12; August 1958, pp. 11-12; December 1959, and January 1960, pp. 23-24.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. 2, pp. 582-584; 599; <em>Democratic Digest</em>, March
1958, p. 10-12; December 1959 and January I960, pp. 12-22.</p>

<p>     i</p>

<p>     316 Chapter Fourteen</p>

<p>     bloc of the Democratic Party rallied around the Council and the
policy statements it proposed. Third, the continual publication of
statements focussed the attention of Democratic Party supporters on
the program of the moderate liberals. And finally, fourth, the
Advisory Council developed Adlai Stevenson's New America program
and the 1956 Democratic Party platform based on it, adjusting the
new ideological and political propositions to actual events at home
and abroad.</p>

<p>     Thus, in 1953-1960, the Democratic Party showed what it was
after by practical action in the legislature and by publicizing its
national platform. Painstaking daily effort in the National Committee
and in Congress, at the state and local levels, yielded fruit: the party
rejected by the voters in 1952 regained control over Congress in the
1954 elections and sent its candidate to the White House in 1960.</p>

<p>     This success was not accidental. Except for the civil rights act,
all the most important bills on domestic issues were initiated by the
Democrats in the second half of the 1950s. Most of them were linked
with relevant Council statements and were reflected in the
Democratic Party platform for which a majority of the electorate voted.</p>

<p>     Power went to the JFK Administration which, as well as its
direct successor, the Johnson Administration undertook a number of
large-scale bourgeois-reformist social, economic and political
experiments most of which had been outlined by the Democrats at the
end of the 1950s.</p>

<p>     <b>CONSENSUS QUESTIONED:
THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM</b>
</p>

15

<p>     <b>vs. MASS DEMOCRATIC</b></p>

<p>     <b>MOVEMENTS
(1960-EARLY 1970s)</b></p>

<p>     The turn of the 1960s was undoubtedly a major watershed not
only in the political history of the United States but also in the life
of all American society. The country was entering a crucial decade
marked by acute social conflicts, political instability, and an upsurge
in the mass democratic movements which cast doubt on the
foundations of the American system that had only recently seemed
unshakable.</p>

<p>     The coming to power of John F. Kennedy's (JFK) Democratic
Administration marked a new stage in US bourgeois reformism. As
social contradictions in the country grew more acute, US ruling
circles increasingly realized the need for an early and radical solution
of social and economic problems and more liberal social policy.
Social reforms were also prompted by the successes the socialist
community scored in many fields: in a bid to respond to the challenge
of existing socialism, the US government had to treat the most
obvious social ills in the country.</p>

<p>     In addition, the economic principles implemented by the
Republicans in the 1950s did not fully satisfy the US ruling class. Over
the previous decade the US economy had developed at relatively
slow rates. America's competitiveness on foreign markets fell and its
share in the capitalist world's industrial output and foreign trade
decreased. The need to revise the principles of government
regulation became obvious. The United States'foreign policy also required
amendment. The apparent inconsistency of the doctrines of
Rolling Back Communism and Massive Retaliation which contradicted
the balance of power on the international scene that had shifted in
favor of the socialist countries, the United States' weakened
hegemony in the capitalist camp and deteriorating links with the Third</p>

<p>     318 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-earIy 1970s) 319</p>

<p>     The Republicans' overall criticism of JFK played into the hands
of the ultrarightists. Attacking the New Frontiers policy from
positions of free enterprise, all the Republicans, whether they wanted
to or not, brought grist to the mill of the ultraconservatives.
Rejecting the measures proposed by the Democrats, many of them more
than moderate, most of the Republican leaders abandoned even
many of the principles they had adhered to in the 1950s. Take the
problem of economic growth for instance. Having stated in their
1960 platform that they supported the idea of securing high growth
rates in principle, the Republicans in effect rejected the idea a year
later, to say nothing of the projects advanced by the Democrats
which really went beyond the tenets of Eisenhower's New
Republicanism. The Republicans firmly opposed all proposals to raise
government spending. An exception was made only for military
expenditures.</p>

<p>     Party discipline in Congress, which the Republican leadership
regarded as the chief condition for successful struggle against the
Democratic spendthrifts, reached an unusually high level for the
leading US bourgeois parties in 1961-1962. As the American
economy was crawling out of crisis, party unity blossomed forth, and
many Republican liberals who had formerly supported JFK's
program as an emergency anticrisis measure, were joining those who
criticized the government for dangerous innovations and financial
irresponsibility. However, liberal Republicans had never been firm
in supporting JFK. The White House staff member responsible for
relations with Congress, Charles Daly, described the liberal
Republicans in the following terms: &quot;The saying was 'That group will be
with us except when you need them'.'</p>

<p>     The Republicans found reliable allies in the congressional
rightwing Democrats from the Southern states. The Dixiecrats did not
like many social programs and JFK's platform on the sensitive black
issue which seemed too liberal for them. JFK did practically
everything he could to appease the Dixiecrats: during the first two years
in office neither he nor the liberals whom he cautioned against it
submitted any important civil rights bills; the Southerners were the
first to be awarded principal military contracts, subsidies to support
cotton prices and other government benefits. However, JFK's ap-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Transcript, Ch. Daly Oral History Interview, April 5, 1966</em>, John F. Kennedy
Library, pp. 59-60.</p>

<p>     World states, compelled the new Democratic leadership to revise the
US military and political strategy in respect to the socialist and
developing countries.</p>

<p>     JFK became president at a time when the economic crisis of
1960-1961 had not been overcome yet, and for that reason, the
government's initial domestic policy was presented as a series of
emergency antidepression measures. In the State of the Union Message
the President said: &quot;The present state of our economy is disturbing.
We take office in the wake of seven months of recession, three and
one-half years of slack, seven years of diminishing economic growth,
and nine years of falling farm income.''^^1^^ By June 1961, taking
advantage of the Democratic majority in Congress and referring to the
urgent need to fight the crisis by stimulating demand, the
administration had managed to have adopted bills extending payment of
unemployment benefits, providing aid for children in families of the
unemployed, supporting housing construction and a number of
other social programs. Credit and fiscal tools were also actively used
to stimulate the economy. The Democrats believed that high
growth rates would be attained by increasing government spending.</p>

<p>     From the outset, however, JFK's social and economic program
encountered serious resistance on the part of the Republican
faction in Congress. In the early 1960s, growing statism was perceived
by political right wingers as &quot;socialist degeneration&quot; of America,
providing a strong impulse for the revival of individualism in the
country, chiefly on the ultraconservative wing of the Republican
Party and in the social sections (the petty bourgeoisie, the &quot;new
money&quot; of the West and Southwest and others) it relied on. These
moods also afflicted the bulk of Republican conservatives and
centrists. Regarding the Democrats' policy as a direct attack on
privatecapitalist ideals, many of them began to shift to the right adopting
reactionary individualistic positions. If the policy of the Democratic
Party did influence the views of the former centrist leadership it
was only by pushing them further to the right. Eisenhower wrote:
&quot;If by opposing the excesses of the welfare state the Republican
Party gets the name of being `against' ... well, for one, I am proud
to be against things that I believe bad for America.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     <em>Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. John f. Kennedy. January 20
to December 31, 1961</em>. U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1962, p. 19. 
~^^2^^ <em>The Saturday Evening Post</em>, April 21, 1962, p. 19.</p>

<p>     320 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned</p>

<p>     (1960-early 1970s) <b>321</b></p>

<p>     peasement moves did not prevent the activization of the conservative
coalition---a bloc of Republicans and Dixiecrats in Congress.</p>

<p>     When they set about working out the New Frontiers policy,
JFK and his men took into account that the opposition and above
all its ultraconservative elements were gaining strength. Many
points in the administration's domestic policy were either
drastically curtailed or altogether rejected by the opposition: e.g. the
program to combat unemployment, the housing construction, and
medicare programs.</p>

<p>     In 1962 relations between JFK and Big Business markedly
deteriorated: the elite was primarily outraged by price-control
measures announced by the government. The Democratic leadership had
to improve relations with Big Business, overcome the resistance of
the conservative opposition and, at the same time, implement
measures to secure further economic growth and social stability. The
administration realized that it was impossible to sizably expand
government spending and secure a growth of general demand by
increasing government demand. So it decided to reduce taxes and,
thereby, expand private demand. The Republicans, who usually
supported tax cuts, on that occasion firmly opposed the proposal
referring chiefly to a consequent growth of the budget deficit and
national debt. They tried either to fully avoid or at least minimize
general tax cuts, and wanted to reduce only corporate taxes,
coupling such cuts with lower social spending. Debates on tax reforms
were held in 1962-1964, and the bill reducing taxes by 11,500
million dollars was signed only after JFK's death.</p>

<p>     In 1963 the congressional conservative coalition gained
unprecedented strength and managed to block many of JFK's legislative
proposals. That did not happen because the Republicans managed
to increase their influence. The real cause was the growing divisions
in the Democratic Party itself after the government had introduced
the civil rights bill in 1963. The need to keep spontaneous black
protest under the ruling class's control, in the final count, proved
more important for the President than maintaining unity in his
party. Desegregation Freedom Rides, police violence against black
Americans in Birmingham (Alabama) which drew the attention of
the entire nation, the national civil rights campaign in the summer
of 1963---all this forced the government to sharply change its
attitude to civil rights legislation. Legislators hurried to swamp the
Congress with dozens of bills. JFK knew better than many other</p>

<p>     politicians that discrimination against black Americans in public life
could lead to the black population losing its respect for American
political institutions. The President wrote: &quot;The right to vote in
Federal elections should not be denied or abridged... Participation is
inevitably accompanied by a strengthened sense of civil
responsibility.''^^1^^ The struggle for the civil rights bill which provided for a ban
on discrimination in most public places and in registering voters,
came upon a many-month-long filibustering campaign by Southern
Democrats and individual ultraright Republicans in the Senate. That
struggle dragged on during all of JFK's lifetime.</p>

<p>     In the 1960s and early 1970s, the major US parties were vastly
divided over foreign policy issues. Their approach reflected both
traditional differences in their views on international affairs in the
postwar years and the equivocal responses to individual events on
the world scene by members of the US ruling class. In the foreign
policy sphere, based since 1945 on a bipartisan foundation,
differences between parties were as a rule less clearly apparent than in
the approach to domestic problems. It must be noted, however,
that liberalism, more typical of the Democrats, involved a more
active, organizing attitude to social changes in the world and the desire
to direct them into a channel conforming to US interests with
the help of military or reformist measures. The Republican Party,
on the other hand, relied more on short-term pragmatism which was
regarded by Americans as isolationism and the desire to maintain
the status quo. During the 1960 election campaign Chester Bowles
wrote to JFK: &quot;We know that we cannot control the world or shape
its development to our tastes and interests. But it is important to
recognize the changes that are inevitable and to work to make their
effects as constructive as possible... Republican failures in foreign
affairs can be traced largely to the effort to freeze given situations
which are being pressured by powerful forces into new directions.&quot;<SUP>2
</SUP>The Democratic leadership was aware that it had become
impossible to implement the Pax Americana by old tools. This was also
true of the military-political doctrine: the threat or use of Dulles'
big stick of Massive Retaliation could not be considered as a
realistic military and political means.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;John F. Kennedy to S. Holland, March 6, 1962&quot;, White House Central File,
(WHCF), Box 692, John F. Kennedy Library.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ &quot;Ch. Bowles to John F. Kennedy, September 30, 1960&quot;, <em>Ch. Bowles Papers</em>, Box
210, Yale University Library.</p>

<p>     22-749</p>

<p>     322 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned</p>

<p>     (1960-early 1970s) 323</p>

<p>     In the late 1950s the Democrats started their search for a new
strategy along the lines of a more flexible use of the US armed forces
and &quot;limited use&quot; of military force. As a result, the JFK
Administration adopted the strategy of Flexible Response based on
extending the range of wars the United States would prepare for, on
backing up the ability to wage an all-out nuclear war by the
capability to conduct successfully all possible limited wars---nuclear and
conventional, large-scale and local, interstate and counterinsurgency
wars. In political terms, the new strategy meant a buildup of
military preparations at rates such as the Republican fathers of Massive
Retaliation had not even dreamed of.</p>

<p>     The Republicans' response to the change in the military and
political strategy was not unequivocal. There were quite a few
supporters of Flexible Response among them, but the Republican
ultras regarded the transition to the concept of limited use of
military force as an inadmissible restraint on the American military
establishment. In 1961-1962 the Republican Party still strongly felt the
inertia of thinking in terms of Massive Retaliation with its emphasis
on nuclear forces and saving on defense spending. It was not
accidental that in those years GOP senators were less likely to support
growth of military expenditures in Congress than the
Democratic senators.^^1^^</p>

<p>     In approaching the developing countries the JFK
Administration at first displayed a better understanding of the processes taking
place in these countries than the Republicans. The idea was to
undertake a reformist maneuver with the aim of eliminating the most
obvious social and economic contradictions so as not to let these
states evolve toward socialism.</p>

<p>     The Caribbean Crisis was a landmark in the foreign policy of the
Democratic Administration. It forced JFK to realize that military
confrontation with the USSR would lead to total destruction. In
1963 and early 1964 realism gained the upper hand in the
Democratic Administration's foreign policy; the ruling circles preferred not
to bring relations with the socialist world to such a dangerous point.</p>

<p>     However, even the first signs of an improvement in relations
with the USSR provoked a sharply negative response on the part of
the Republican Party where a departure from the excesses of the</p>

<p>     Barry B. Hughes, <em>The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy</em>, W.H.
Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1978, pp. 134-135, 141-142.</p>

<p>     Cold War gave rise to stronger anti-Communist feelings. Republican
leaders stepped up criticism of the ``passive'' JFK Government,
advocated the rolling back of communism in the rhetoric of the worst
days of the Cold War, and rejected the possibility of peaceful
coexistence in principle. In 1963, for the first time, Republicans
supported a growth of military expenditures more strongly than the
Democrats, something that would become the rule a bit later. The
GOP whipped up war hysteria in the country; having
unconditionally supported the President during the Caribbean Crisis, they
denounced the peaceful settlement of the crisis as &quot;national treason&quot;
by JFK. The utterance by the leading ultra Barry Goldwater &quot;
victory is our goal in the cold war---not just ending it&quot;^^1^^ became the
battlecry of the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     By the beginning of the 1964 election campaign, differences
between the parties both in domestic and foreign policies had gone far
beyond the framework of the interparty consensus.</p>

<p>     Lyndon B. Johnson's first years in office after JFK's tragic
death were marked by the flourishing of the Democratic Party's
neoliberal reformism. The Great Society program proclaimed by the
Johnson Administration in 1964 made the federal government
responsible for solving certain problems in health care and education,
for giving aid to depressed areas, launching urban renewal and the
war on poverty. Major social programs required a considerable
increase in government spending; by the end of the decade
government expenditures on social programs had reached about 40
percent in federal budget outlays.</p>

<p>     Many facts show that the motives behind Johnson's policy were
by no wears altruistic. The increase in social spending was chiefly the
result of the struggle waged by the working people and a major
consequence of the social protest movements sweeping through
America. America's ruling circles tried to incorporate millions of poor
people, both black and white, in industrial society. The interests of
the leading groups of the monopoly bourgeoisie also required a
transition to a policy that would raise the population's purchasing
power and help stimulate the economy. At the same time a shortage
of skilled manpower in a context of high structural unemployment
and favorable economic conditions required active interference by</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Congressional Record</em>, Vol. 109, Part 12, August 21, 1963, to September 12, 1963,
U.S.G.P.O., Washington, 1963, p. 16222.</p>

<p>     22*</p>

<p>     324 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 325</p>

<p>     ported by only 38.5 percent of the voters, 16 million votes behind
Johnson. A disproportion arose in the balance of power between
Democrats and Republicans, and the elastic equilibrium between
the parties most appropriate to the system's functioning was
disrupted. The right-wing alternative in the Republican Party's political
course went beyond the permissible framework, and the factional
strife assumed acute forms. Most liberal and moderate Republicans
turned their backs on the party candidate, and the GOP became a
refuge for all sorts of reactionaries, including members of the John
Birch Society. Even a larger part of Big Business supported the
Democrats for the first time in current history. <em>Business Week</em> lectured
the party: &quot;The lesson for responsible Republicans should be easy
to read: The American electorate will not respond to negative
appeals, to invitations to go backward.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Goldwater's Southern Strategy aimed at attracting the votes of
white Southerners and exploiting the racist views of voters in the
North, produced results that were of major importance for the
twoparty system. On the one hand, the Republicans were unable even
to retain the positions gained by the party in the South in the 1950s,
and Goldwater's campaign provoked an unprecedented upsurge in
the political participation of the black Americans who increasingly
swung toward the Democratic Party. On the other, he became the
first Republican presidential candidate in the 20th century to make
a better showing in the South than in the North, and his campaign
helped set up a ramified party machine in the Southern states which
continued to operate under the control of the right-wing
Republicans after the election. &quot;Goldwater brought out a new element in
politics in those areas that we were not working like Nashville, and
Jackson, Tennessee and Shelbyville and Murfreesboro. Goldwater
initiated people to work in politics that have never been involved
before,&quot;^^2^^ recalled Republican Senator from Tennessee William
Brock. Thus the Goldwater campaign became an important starting
point in the Republican conquest of the South at the level of
presidential elections.</p>

<p>     After the 1964 elections, it seemed that many things were in
favor of the Johnson government. The economy was on the rise;hav-</p>

<p>     the government in vocational training and use of manpower.</p>

<p>     The decisive step forward in neoliberalism once again resulted in
the Republican Party lagging behind the Democrats in the extent of
adoption of statist dogmas, and objectively faced the Republicans
with the task of producing an alternative policy which would help
adapt Eisenhower's New Republicanism to new conditions.
However, the Republican Party was headed in a totally opposite
direction---toward reactionary individualism and a rejection of all US
domestic policies since the time of FDR's New Deal. &quot;Zealots had
taken over key positions and they seemed to believe that it was
more important to nominate a candidate who was ideologically
pure than to find someone who could win an election,&quot;^^1^^ Gerald
Ford was to write later in his memoirs.</p>

<p>     Barry Goldwater took full advantage of the domestic political
climate of the early 1960s and the tangible swing to the right by the
Republican Party itself and managed to win the party nomination
in 1964 by relying on the organizational cohesion of the ultraright
forces and the support of the ``young'' monopoly groups in the
South and West which were not part of the monopoly elite and
refused to accept any social responsibility devolving on businessmen
and the government. The Senator from Arizona completely rejected
the doctrine of the government's social responsibility on which the
Great Society doctrine was based, regarding the latter as merely an
election gimmick used by the Democrats. Without proposing an
alternative to Great Society, the Republicans pointed out in their
platform that the war on poverty would &quot;dangerously centralize
Federal controls.''^^2^^ Prominently featuring racism and rabid
antiCommunism and in effect proposing to dismantle the welfare state,
Goldwater's platform evoked a negative response from most
Americans. And so did his superaggressive foreign policy. The advocate of
&quot;extremism in defense of liberty&quot; waved the nuclear big stick,
called for an offensive on all the fronts of the Cold War and urged
further escalation of intervention in Indochina. Johnson, on the
contrary, managed to produce the image of a peace candidate and
declared that he would not send soldiers to Vietnam.</p>

<p>     Seizure of control in the Republican Party by Goldwater's
followers led to a crisis in the two-party system. Goldwater was sup-</p>

<p>     <em>A Time to Heal. The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford</em>, Harper &amp; Row, Publishers,
New York, 1979, pp. 76-77.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. 2, p. 680.</p>

<p>     <em>Business Week</em>, November 14, 1964, p. 200.</p>

<p>     <em>Transcript, W. Brock Oral History Interview, February 1, 1974</em>, p. 9. The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.</p>

<p>     326 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 327</p>

<p>     As the democratic movements developed, members of all
factions in the Republican Party more and more resolutely accused the
Johnson Administration of appeasing the black and youth rebellions
and provoking them by making all sorts of promises which the
government would not or could not keep. Many Republicans regarded
mass actions as &quot;neglect of certain fundamental moral principles,&quot;
&quot;the decline in respect for public authority and the rule of law&quot; due
to &quot;indulgence of crime because of sympathy for the past
grievances of those who have become criminals.&quot; The conservative
Republicans harped in all ways on what they called &quot;a touch of red&quot;
behind the black movement. In conceptual terms, the leading place in
the ideological arsenal of the GOP was taken by the idea of &quot;black
capitalism&quot;, i.e. encouraging capitalist enterprise by black citizens.
Supporting black capitalism the leaders of the Republican Party
wanted to strengthen the bourgeois strata in the colored
population, keep the black movement within the existing system and
increase the influence of bourgeois ideology among black citizens.</p>

<p>     However, neither the measures of the Democratic administration
nor Republican plans could eliminate the underlying causes of racial
discrimination---social and economic inequality of racial and ethnic
minorities in the United States.</p>

<p>     In the latter half of the 1960s a serious potential danger to the
foundations of bourgeois society emerged in the shape of the
antiwar movement caused by widespread public discontent with the
administration's policy in Indochina.</p>

<p>     The system of priorities of the Johnson Administration which
had inherited the basic principles of the New Frontiers foreign
policy, steadily attached less and less importance to the reformist
element in the approach to the developing countries (due to what
Soviet historian V. O. Pechatnov called anti-Communist degradation of
liberalism) with greater emphasis on military strength in resisting
revolutionary processes in the world.</p>

<p>     The tremendous scope and persistence of the national liberation
struggle in South Vietnam, its close links with progress of socialism
in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, fraternal assistance coming
from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the fear of
losing the extensive strategic and diplomatic positions US imperialism</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Reader's Digest</em>, August 1967, p. 68; October 1967, p. 50; <em>The New Republic</em>,
August 5, 1967, p. 6.</p>

<p>     ing consolidated their positions in Congress as a result of the
election, the Democrats successfully implemented one measure of the
Great Society program after another; the Vietnam adventure did
not provoke public resistance yet; having rejected the program of
the ultras, the Republicans were left without a clear-cut alternative
platform and were healing the wounds received in the election by
implementing organizational reforms in the party. But that was a
lot of wishful thinking.</p>

<p>     To begin with there was the question of how to deal with social
protest movements. The mid-1960s initiated a new stage in mass
democratic movements, chiefly the black and antiwar movements,
marked by a more fierce struggle often going beyond non-violent
actions. The ruling class faced a dilemma: whether to respond to
the fresh democratic upsurge by harsher police and administrative
repressions against the participants or to make further concessions
securing <em>de jure</em> equality of black citizens and improving their living
conditions by extending social programs within the framework of
the Great Society. The Johnson Administration tended to resort to
both means. Not stopping at repressions against participants in the
protest movement, the administration attempted to integrate them
in the existing system.</p>

<p>     Two civil rights acts were enacted in 1964 and 1965. Attorney
General Clark said: &quot;There is immense pressure and insistence and
potential for friction and violence that caused us to face up to these
problems and do something about it.''^^1^^ The Republicans did not
take long to respond. If in 1964 most Republican leaders refused to
assume the responsibility for rejecting the bill because this could
lead to dangerous outbursts in the tense atmosphere of the black
ghettos, in 1965 the Republican Party as a whole adopted a negative
stand in respect to the bill.^^2^^ While the 1964 act was aimed
primarily against segregation in public places, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as American political scientist Merle Black correctly notes,
&quot;was to bring into the electorate participants who were much more
likely to vote for Democratic than for Republican candidates---one
likely reason for the lack of enthusiasm by northern Republicans.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     <em>Transcript, R. Clark Oral History Interview, February 11, 1969</em>, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ For further detail see: I.A. Geyevsky, <em>USA: the Black Problem</em>, Moscow, 1973.</p>

<p>     Merie Black, &quot;Regional and Partisan Bases of Congressional Support for the
Changing Agenda of Civil Rights Legislation&quot;, <em>The Journal of Politics, May</em> 1979, p. 671.</p>

<p>     328 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     had in Southeast Asia, and the illusion of omnipotence---all this
prompted US ruling circles to launch an aggressive war in Indochina
the ground for which had been prepared back in the 1950s.</p>

<p>     The Johnson Administration found the most zealous supporters
of its expansionist foreign policy among the Republicans. The
notorious Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which gave the green light to
unleashing a wide-scale aggression was approved virtually unanimously.
The GOP House leader Charles Halleck said on the occasion: The
President knows &quot;there is no partisanship among us&quot;.^^1^^ The
Republicans hailed the subsequent escalation of war in 1964-1966. If
some of them did express discontent with the Democratic
Administration's policy, it was criticism from the right, urging to step up
the bombing of the DRV and impose a complete naval blockade of
Vietnam. Bipartisan support of power politics was confirmed in
1965 during the US intervention in the Dominican Republic.</p>

<p>     However, that support quickly began to melt away as America's
aggressive plans crumbled in Vietnam, its international prestige
declined, and Washington's financial resources started to run out. All
this clearly pointed to a profound crisis of American imperialism's
global strategy. The war was eroding the internal setup which could
no longer be propped up by jingoism. It was becoming evident to
millions of Americans that aggravation of chronic social and
economic ills such as racial conflicts, growing crime, unemployment,
inflation, etc. was due largely to aggressive foreign policy.</p>

<p>     Senator Joseph Tydings said in 1967: &quot;The war costs as much
every week as the demonstration cities program will cost this entire
year. The war costs every day as much as Congress will vote the
whole year for hospital modernization, rat extermination, and
juvenile delinquency control... Urgent domestic priorities have been
ignored, deferred or pathetically under-funded.''^^2^^ Spokesmen for
Big Business began to be worried by the overstrained economy,
rising inflation and budget deficits resulting from spiralling military
expenditures, the upsurge in the antiwar movement in the country,
unrest on university campuses, and the growing criticism levelled at
Johnson by leading foreign statesmen, including those in allied
countries. The Vietnam syndrorne was gaining momentum in the country.</p>

<p>     <em>Notes Taken at Leadership Meeting on August 4, 1964</em>, &quot;Presidential
DecisionsGulf of Tonkin&quot;, Vol. 2, Tab. 21, NSC History, NSF, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ &quot;Address by Sen. J. Tydings at the Plenary Session of the National Student
Association, August 26, 1967,&quot; <em>Papers of]. Tydings</em>, Box 15, University of Maryland.</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 329</p>

<p>     Opposition to Johnson's policy in Congress mostly came from
the Democrats---Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield, senators
Eugene McCarthy, William Fulbright and others. The Republicans
also hurried to dissociate themselves from Johnson, criticizing him
both from the right (Tower, Ford, Nixon) and from the left (Hatfield,
Cooper, Javits, Case). However, even the proposals of the left-wing
critics favoring political settlement and opposing military escalation
invariably contained the obviously unacceptable demands to &quot;end
the aggression by North Vietnam,&quot; abolish the National Liberation
Front of South Vietnam, maintain the puppet regime in Saigon and
the American military presence in Indochina.</p>

<p>     Both principal approaches to the developing countries taken by
the Democrats---first the reformist (managing social changes in the
world) and then from positions of strength---were shattered by
the real course of events at the end of the 1960s. Having gotten
bogged down in the meaningless struggle against Communism in
Indochina, the Democratic Administration attempted to pursue a
more balanced and varied policy in the rest of the world. In 1966-
1968 the administration signed a number of agreements with the
USSR. The Johnson Administration, however, tried to link
normalization of bilateral relations with both the war in Vietnam and
more active efforts to undermine the socialist system through the
bridge-building policy.</p>

<p>     The change in the administration's policy was firmly opposed
by the Republicans. They unconditionally rejected the Democrats'
proposal to provide commercial credits to and expand trade
between the United States and most countries in East Europe, and
delayed ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for a
year. The Republican Party increasingly sought to link
improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
with the latter's ``behavior'' in the world (in view of Soviet support
for the DRV and the events in Czechoslovakia).</p>

<p>     By the beginning of the 1968 election campaign the policy of
the Johnson Administration had driven both opponents and many
supporters of liberal reform from the Democratic Party. The belief
that increased federal spending would be a panacea was declining.
Great Society program failed to secure social stability. The ongoing
upsurge in democratic movements made significant part of the big
bourgeoisie and conservatives of the South discontinue their support
for the Democratic Party's domestic reformism. At the same time</p>

<p>     330 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 331</p>

<p>     solve major domestic problems by transferring, in particular, a
number of manpower training programs to employers (Human
Investment Plan) and setting up a mixed government-private
corporation to finance part of the social programs (Economic
Opportunities Corporation). This turn in the party's ideology coincided with
changes in the views of the monopoly bourgeoisie itself which
showed an increasing desire to display social responsibility and heal
social ills. The reasons for this were explained by an editorial in
<em>Fortune</em>, a business circles magazine, urging Big Business to take
part in solving the problems of the ghettos while the urban crisis
could still be controlled in view of the little hope that city hall, the
welfare department, the local Democratic organization, the labor
unions, the churches and the schools could somehow combine to
prevent an even greater outburst of anger.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The Republicans also insisted on raising the role of state
government proposing the idea of revenue sharing which in general terms
boiled down to transferring some of the federal funds to the state
governments so as to make up for their narrow tax base, and
making the states administer a number of federal programs. Thus, the
Republicans entered the 1968 elections with a sufficiently detailed
domestic policy. Moreover, they had a very vulnerable target in the
form of the Democratic Administration whose chief had refused to
run for a second term in view of obvious political setbacks.</p>

<p>     The 1968 presidential campaign was the focal point of all the
United States burning issues and dramatic events of the late 1960s:
the Vietnam War, the unstable economy, the black movement at its
climax, youth unrest, and murder of outstanding politicians Martin
Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy. However, polarization of
society failed to bring about a polarization in the leading parties. On
the contrary, the election showed a high degree of consensus in the
two-party system. On the one hand, the Republican candidate
Richard Nixon continually emphasized his support for active use of
federal government in the course of the campaign. He said: &quot;The
days of a passive Presidency belong to a simpler past... The next
President must take an activist view of his office. He must articulate
the nation's values, define its goals and marshal its will.''^^2^^ At the
same time the Republican candidate spoke out firmly against</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Fortune, January 1968, p. 127.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ The New York Times</em>, September 20, 1968.</p>

<p>     the Democrats began to lose the support of the middle strata and
some sections of the working class who shouldered the brunt of the
tax burden and had been persuaded by the mass media that rising
taxes were due primarily to the growing number of persons
receiving government social benefits. The war in Vietnam also sapped
Democratic positions among the liberal forces, including progressive
labor unions and young people. Deep fissures appeared in the
Roosevelt coalition. Back in 1966 the President's assistant Clifton
Carter wrote to his boss: &quot;One observation that does bother me is an
apparent cooling between the ethnic groups, labor, and others who
have made up successful Democratic coalitions in recent elections.&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>Having taken three seats in the Senate and 47 in the House from the
ruling party in the 1966 midterm election, the Republicans
intensified their opposition to the Great Society and managed to block or
cut outlays for certain important measures proposed by the
administration in 1967-1968.</p>

<p>     At the time, largely under the influence of the protest
movements, the GOP was gradually overcoming the excesses of
Goldwater's reactionary individualism and strengthening the
enlightenedconservative approach to social and economic problems derived
from the Willkie, Dewey and Eisenhower tradition. The change in
the Republican views occurred along the lines of conservatism's
merging with Neo-Keynesian theory as presented in the Neo--
Keynesian New Economics Theory and also the doctrine of limited
social responsibility of the federal government. The policy-making
reports compiled by the Republican Coordinating Committee
provided for long-term stimulation of economic growth and rejected the
invariable dogma on the need for a balanced budget.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The leaders of the Republican Party no longer engaged in the
rhetoric on liberty, enterprise and the federal monster. They had
realized that a growth of the federal government was inevitable and
that people on the whole supported the programs which made their
lives at least a little better. As an alternative policy the Republicans
proposed a whole gamut of neoconservative doctrines. They believed
it was necessary to make use of the private sector's initiative to</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;C. Carter to the President, January 3, 1966&quot;, <em>Files of M. Watson</em>, Box 23,
Lyndon B.Johnson Library.</p>

<p>     <em>Choice for America. Republican Answers to the Challenge of Now. Reports of the
Republican Coordinating Committee 1965-1968</em>, Republican National Committee,
Washington, 1968.</p>

<p>     332 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned</p>

<p>     (1960-early 1970s) 333</p>

<p>     the Democrats.^^1^^ That was why the results of the election in which
Nixon polled 43.4 percent of the votes, Humphrey 42.7 percent
and Wallace about 13 percent were regarded by the GOP leaders as
highly promising in terms of setting up a New Republican majority
relying chiefly on the social forces which supported the American
Independent Party. One of the leading spokesmen for the New
Republican Majority, Kevin Phillips, argued: &quot;Although most of George
Wallace's votes came from Democrats rather than Republicans,
they were conservatives---Southerners, Borderers, German and Irish
Catholics---who had been trending Republican prior to 1968.''^^2^^ The
new majority was seen by the Republicans as a coalition of their
traditional supporters: disillusioned Democrats who were beginning
to regard personal freedom higher than the imperatives of the
welfare state; white Southerners who were moving further from the
Democratic Party under the influence of the black civil rights
movement; black businessmen and the silent center who regarded the
upsurge in social protest movements as undermining the foundations
of American society and supported the Republican call for law and
order. Widespread disillusionment in the liberal reforms widely
advertised by the Democratic Party in the 1960s was seen as a leading
precondition for the founding of the conservative coalition.</p>

<p>     For this reason the Nixon Administration in the first years in
office focussed on stimulating enterprise in the private sector,
decentralizing government regulation, reducing social spending,
stepping up repressions against participants in the democratic
movements, rejecting extension of civil rights legislation and shifting the
emphasis on black capitalism. However, the economic crisis of 1969-
1971 undermined the Republican strategy of reducing government
intervention in social and economic processes. Growing
disproportions in the capitalist economy and an intertwining of skyrocketing
inflation with high unemployment narrowed the possibilities for
using traditional methods of regulation, on the one hand, and
prompted the Republicans to search for a way out of the situation,</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, Authur C. Wolfe, &quot;
Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election&quot;, <em>The
American Political Science Review</em>, December, 1969, pp. 1083-1105; Herbert F. Weisberg</p>

<p>     and Jerrold G. Rusk, &quot;Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation&quot;, <em>The American Political
Science Review</em>, December, 1970, pp. 1167-1185.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Kevin P. Philips, <em>The Emerging Republican Majority</em>, Arlington House, New
Rochelle, N.Y., 1969, p. 462.</p>

<p>     ``promises unkept and unkeepable&quot; and against the Democratic
Party's extensive social reforms.</p>

<p>     On the other hand, disappointment in the results of the liberal
reforms also affected the Democratic Party. The Party platform
adopted at the turbulent convention in Chicago where the
authorities severely cracked down on the youth and antiwar movements,
contained more cautious promises to secure economic growth and
stable prices and do away with poverty in America than the 1964
platform. The Democrats proposed no new government social
programs. Priority was given to &quot;simplifying and streamlining the
processes of government, particularly in the management of the great
innovative programs enacted in the 1960s&quot;.^^1^^ A strong emphasis was
made on ideas cherished by any Republican to involve the private
sector, state and local governments in solving urgent problems of
American society.</p>

<p>     Both candidates offered almost identical foreign policies. Nixon
and Humphrey alike opposed an immediate end to hostilities and
favored gradual deescalation of American military efforts and
Vietnamization of the war. On the whole, however, the Democratic
platform was less ``hawkish'': as distinct from Nixon, Humphrey believed
that it was possible to begin withdrawal of US troops in 1969
and discontinue bombing of the DRV. That was why most voters
favoring an immediate end to the aggression supported the
Democratic candidate.</p>

<p>     The Vietnam syndrome, however, largely affected the
Republican Party as well. Its platform conformed to the cannons of
classical anti-Communism but also contained certain realistic
propositions: &quot;It is time to realize that not every international conflict is
susceptible of solution by American ground forces.''^^2^^ Hence the
Republican foreign policy better accorded to the changed balance
of power in the world.</p>

<p>     A certain influence on the course and outcome of the 1968
election campaign was exerted by a strong third party---the American
Independent Party headed by George Wallace who succeeded in
rallying a motley coalition which primarily advocated the system of
racial segregation. Authoritative American studies of public opinion
showed that Wallace's campaign hurt the Republicans more than</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Party Platforms</em>, Vol. 2, p. 740.
<em>* Ibid.</em>, p. 761.</p>

<p>     334 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 335</p>

<p>     Of course, not every measure taken by the Nixon
Administration met with Republican approval. The ultra-rightists displayed
growing discontent with the President's economic policy and also
with government measures in social security and education. In
addition, a widening gap emerged between the party leaders in the White
House and the other cogs of the party machine. This was a result
of obvious concentration of the policy-making process in the hands
of the government under the &quot;imperial presidency.&quot; Senator
William Brock said: &quot;I remember the frustration of the very early
years of the seventies when I first came into the Senate. The attitude
of some of those who surrounded the President was an attitude
of 'them against us.' There was almost a sense of paranoia in the
White House. There was a lack of willingness to trust people and to
allow others to participate in the decisions.''^^1^^ The President did not
even trust the party faction in the Senate, considering its leader
Hugh Scott too liberal.^^2^^</p>

<p>     Many moderate and liberal Republicans took advantage of every
possibility to criticize the administration for excessive conservatism,
for disregarding human rights, the Southern strategy, appointment
of rabid conservatives to the Supreme Court and the desire to do
away with the programs of aid to the poor and the hungry rather
than reorganize them. Liberals were equally concerned with the
administration's refusal to put an end to the military adventure in
Indochina, which resulted in serious economic difficulties and
further alienation of participants in the antiwar movement from the
ruling elite. Recalling the antiwar movement of 1969 Senator
Charles Goodell said: &quot;At that stage, things were almost completely out
of control of any `establishment' figures... Anybody who was
elected to an office that was a part of the `establishment' was an enemy.
Only through a process of very tough negotiations within the
antiwar groups did they accept George McGovern and me to march
down Pennsylvania Avenue.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     But the main burden of winning back the participants in the
antiwar movement and all forces in the new politics---young people,</p>

<p>     <em>Transcript, W. Brock Oral History Interview, February 13, 1979</em>, Library of
Congress, p. 45.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Transcript, H. Scott Oral History Interview, October 15, 1976</em>, Library of Congress,
p. 58</p>

<p>     <em>Transcript, Ch. Goodell Oral History Interview, June 6, 1973</em>, Library of Congress,
p. 40.</p>

<p>     on the other. At first, the crisis factor was ignored in Nixon's
economic policy. Attaching priority to anti-inflation measures, the
administration sought above all to reduce economic activity and
cool down the overheated economy. The Republicans tried to
present the decreased economic activity of the government as a
useful counterbalance to inflation, and growing unemployment as
an inevitable result of price control. The growing economic
difficulties, however, finally forced the Republican Administration to
adopt a more active economic policy. In 1971 a program of
extraordinary measures was announced to invigorate the economy which
included measures unprecedented for the Republicans such as
deliberate use of budget deficits to stimulate the economy, price
and wages control. The government welfare machinery set up by
the Democrats in the 1960s was not completely dismantled, and
there was a continued growth of social spending, which the
Republicans regarded as a tool to raise demand and lower social tensions.</p>

<p>     In the first term of the Nixon Administration, the President's
social and economic programs enjoyed sufficient although not
unconditional support in the party. Most Republicans regarded the
New Economic Policy as a temporary measure which could be
useful under extraordinary circumstances and even help (under a wage
freeze or control) launch an attack against labor-union and
workingclass rights. They also found much in common when it came to
implementing the doctrines worked out by the GOP in the 1960s:
plans of revenue sharing in the form of Nixon's New Federalism;
and ideas of a negative income tax (underlying many Republican
projects to reform social welfare). There was support in the party
for the conservative and even reactionary political course pursued
by the administration in respect to the labor unions and mass social
protest movements, which meant increasing repressions against their
participants, young people and black Americans above all. On the
racial issue the Republican Party supported the President's actions
aimed at promoting black capitalism. This slowed down the rate of
desegregation. Historian Milton Viorst wrote: &quot;The Nixon
Administration was not overtly racist. It simply made clear that the federal
government could no longer be counted on to promote the cause of
racial equality.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Milton Viorst, <em>Fire in the Streets, America in the 1960s</em>, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1979, p. 508.</p>

<p>     <b>336 Chapter</b> Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned</p>

<p>     (1960-early 1970s) 337</p>

<p>     blacks, ethnic minorities and the poor---fell to the lot not of the
Republicans but of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.</p>

<p>     After the 1968 elections which marked a profound crisis in the
Roosevelt coalition the Democrats were living through hard times.
Prominent political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau described the
situation quite aptly: &quot;The Republicans after 1964 only needed to
reformulate their philosophy, to retune their political machinery, to
unite behind a leader, and to watch the Democrats ruin the country---
and they look like unchallengeable winners four years later. The
Democrats cannot do after 1968 what the Republicans did after
1964, for the popular base of their political power has crumbled
under the impact of the Vietnam war and the racial crisis. The
disaffection of the intellectuals and students, as well as large sectors of
the lower middle class in the North and of virtually the whole party
apparatus in the South, has left the Democratic Party with a
drastically diminished population base.''^^1^^ In searching for a new
coalition the party had either to rely on the forces of New Politics and
reject the South and the conservative part of the middle class and
bluecollar workers or attempt to revive the traditional bloc of the
South, the urban party machines and labor unions.</p>

<p>     Most of the Democratic leaders (Humphrey, Muskie and others)
tended to take the second option, which in the language of practical
politics meant combining a neoliberal economic course with appeals
for a tougher attitude to social policy and racial and student unrest
(law and order). However, the practical policies of the Republican
Administration which implemented many of the Democrat's former
social and economic doctrines, deprived the latter of the
opportunity to play the part of constructive opposition in the spirit of
traditional neoliberalism. However, an adequate replacement to it could
not be found.</p>

<p>     The crisis of the old neoliberal course and the growing split
between the national leadership and the party's Southern wing created
conditions for an increase in the influence of the left-wing forces
which thought that the party could undergo a liberal regeneration
and be directed toward the forces of New Politics by ousting the
old coalition of union bureaucrats, Dixiecrats and party machine
bosses. The left-wing liberals (McGovern, Harris and others) intend-</p>

<p>     Hans J. Morgenthau, <em>Truth and Power. Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970</em>, Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 204.</p>

<p>     ed to combine the incorporation of protest movements in the party
with attracting the bulk of the middle class by advancing
neopopulist slogans of income redistribution via a reform of the fiscal system,
restriction of monopoly privileges and democratization of the
political process.</p>

<p>     The left-wing liberal course materialized in the reform of the
Democratic Party structure which was carried out by the
McGovernFraser Commission in 1969-1971. McGovern said in 1969: &quot;It's
going to be difficult to know what the young people will do. I think
they are suspicious of both parties at this point---many of them.
That is one of the reasons why the party reform effort is so
important.''^^1^^ More democratic rules for appointing delegates whose
consequences were originally underestimated by the centrists and the
rightists, increased the share of formerly under-represented sections of
the population. This largely predetermined McGovern's success in the
party infighting in 1972 despite the resistance of the party bosses.</p>

<p>     Issues of international policy assumed major importance in the
interparty struggle of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was a
turning point in US foreign policy marked by a transition from an era of
confrontation to an era of negotiations. Hence considerable changes
in the foreign-policy planks of both parties.</p>

<p>     The obvious failures of US foreign policy, acute domestic
problems, the Vietnam syndrome, and the mass protest movements
created a fundamentally new situation for the American leadership.
In the early 1970s the Republican Administration decided it would
be better to adapt American objectives to the surrounding reality,
and this required that more moderate aims be advanced in the sphere
of foreign policy. The gaining of absolute domination in the world
was no longer regarded as the overall purpose of US
militarypolitical strategy. Major emphasis was put on maintaining a
dynamic status quo through the balance of power. The Republican
leadership believed that a more flexible foreign policy would help it
adapt to the new international realities marked by a military--
strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, a
weakening of the United States' hegemony in the capitalist world and
of its positions in the developing countries. In a sense the Nixon
Administration played down the importance of ideology in foreign-</p>

<p>     <em>Transcript, G. McGovern Oral History Interview, April 30, 1969</em>, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, p. 31.</p>

<p>     23-749</p>

<p>     338 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) <b>339</b></p>

<p>     policy making, having reduced it to a pragmatic theory of national
interests and balance of power.</p>

<p>     At first departure from Cold War policies was regarded by the
US ruling circles as an objective necessity prompted by the
weakening of the material and moral base of interventionism, divisions in
society and growing differences in the foreign-policy establishment
itself. In the early 1970s the prestige of the hawks in society as a
whole and in the ruling class fell sharply.</p>

<p>     Implementing a policy of international detente the Nixon
Administration relied on a bipartisan coalition of centrist and liberal
forces in which Democratic centrists and left-wingers prevailed. A
crisis of Cold War policy made liberal Democrats seriously revise the
power politics on which they actively relied in the 1950s and most
of the 1960s because domestic reforms were growing increasingly
incompatible with interventionist foreign policy. An awareness of
the limits to American military power, the negative consequences of
the arms race which consumed resources needed to reduce domestic
tensions, and the deteriorated economic situation prompted the
liberals to opt for detente and reduced military spending and US
military presence abroad. It was in the early 1970s that liberal
domestic policies and criticism of the Cold War combined for the first
time. The foreign-policy plank of the 1972 Democratic platform
with its isolationist appeal &quot;Come home, America!&quot; was a reflection
of the new stand taken by the liberals and not only left-wing
liberals. Many traditionalists (Mansfield, Humphrey, Muskie and others)
also spoke aloud about the weakening of US positions in the world
and the need to attach top priority to domestic problems. But it
would be a gross exaggeration to say that centrist Democrats agreed
with McGovern's left liberal program both in foreign and domestic
policy. The social forces the left liberals hoped to rely on compelled
them to put forward such proposals as an immediate and
unconditional end to the Vietnam war, pardoning of draft dodgers, radical
cuts in the military budget and transfer of the funds released to
domestic needs, a guaranteed minimum income for every family,
expansion of public works programs, tougher anti-trust laws and a
breaking up of the monopolies.</p>

<p>     The platform caused a split in the Democratic Party because it
went far beyond the limits of usual Democratic liberalism and
represented a clear-cut alternative to the ruling party's stand. The
traditionalists believed that realization of the platform would relegate</p>

<p>     the United States to the position of a second-rate power in military
terms, called the plans for a guaranteed income &quot;reckless and
unpractical,&quot; and attacked McGovern's excessive liberalism in moral
and ethical questions. Even despite the fact that McGovern was forced
to moderate his platform in the course of the 1972 election
campaign, it was more leftist than was usual for American two--
party politics. The platform also broke with the neoliberal tradition
because it contained a strong element of democratic antistatism: it did
not urge an extension of the federal government's powers but
brought to the forefront protection of the individual and
democratic institutions from the government itself.</p>

<p>     The consequences of the Democratic swing to the left for the
two-party system can hardly be summed up in simple terms. On the
one hand, the party had once again proved its ability to dampen
protest movements by including part of its slogans in its political
platform and absorbing them in a set of ideas and recipes acceptable
to the system. McGovern had brought to the Democratic Party an
overwhelming majority of the participants in the antiwar and
student movements as well as members of other liberal and
radical forces in the women's lib, black and other movements, and
consolidated Democratic positions among the liberal intelligentsia.</p>

<p>     On the other hand, however, it must be noted that the left--
liberal rebellion in the Democratic Party coincided with a decline in the
social protest it was intended to bridle. The polarizing effect of the
Vietnam war, the black and youth movements had been weakened
by 1972, and McGovern's slogans no longer conformed to the
moods prevailing in society. This was one of the most important
reasons for his shattering defeat when only 37.5 percent of the voters
supported the Democratic candidate. Richard C. Wade wrote:
&quot;Somehow voters believed that the country had returned to '
normalcy.' To be sure, underneath were all the vexing questions---race,
injustice, war, and a new generation---but the daily upheavals of the
previous years had disappeared. The tide which had swelled in 1968
had receded and through the wreckage lay an uncomfortable view
across the beach, most Americans preferred to look beyond at a
more tranquil sea.''^^1^^ Once again the Democrats failed to win the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>History of U.S. Political Parties</em>, Vol. IV, <em>1945-1972</em>. The Politics of Change,
General Editor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1973,
p. 2856.</p>

<p>     23*</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned
(1960-early 1970s) 341</p>

<p>     340 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     votes of their electoral backbone---unionized workers, Southerners
and Catholics. As a result, the two-party balance which had emerged
in the post war years on a state-monopoly basis was no less
disrupted by the Democrats' sharp swing to the left than it was in
1964 when the Republicans moved far to the right. No wonder
works by political scientists, speeches delivered by politicians and
even the platform of the Republican Party were filled with
unconcealed concern for the fate of the two-party system.</p>

<p>     On the whole, however, violation of consensus relations
between the parties did not lead to a serious disruption of the system:
most Democrats remained on the usual neoliberal positions and
managed to retain a firm majority in both houses of Congress laying
the ground for a quick return to the status quo in the interparty
ballance. The emerging crisis in the two-party system (a fall in the
influence of the party organizations on the electoral process, weaker
impact of party machines on legislative and executive bodies,
alienation of voters from the party-political system and the growth of
an independent electorate) was to a much greater extent due to the
inability of the parties' leaders to find an adequate replacement for
the state-monopoly methods of regulation which had obviously
failed, while the left-liberal alternative remained unacceptable to
the US ruling circles. And the 1972 elections proved this beyond
any doubt. The parties' prestige was also undermined by the in-depth
moral and political crisis which began with the Watergate scandal
whose investigation revealed many until then hidden vices and
contradictions of political life in the United States.</p>

<p>     Watergate hit above all the ruling party leaving it only slim
chances for knocking together a new Republican Majority.
Chairman of the Republican National Committee George Bush, in a letter
to party leaders, expressed concern for the party's future: &quot;In
incidents like the Watergate affair, there are many personal tragedies.
But the real tragedy for our Party will come if we allow Watergate
to obscure the great record of not only the Administration, but of
Republicans in Congress and in state and local offices throughout
America.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     At the same time, the Watergate scandal also prevented the
Democrats from strengthening their positions among voters because</p>

<p>     ``G. Bush to Republican Leaders, May 9, 1973&quot;, <em>Ford Congressional Files</em>, Gerald
R. Ford Library, Box 184.</p>

<p>     the disclosure of abuses of power in the highest echelons of the
American leadership undermined the authority of the entire
partypolitical system. Democratic Senator Samuel Ervin wrote: &quot;I don't
believe that the Democratic Party can callously hope to profit from
the Watergate affair. The accusations that have been levelled and
the evidence of wrongdoing that has surfaced have cast a black
cloud of distrust over our entire society. Our society do not know
whom to believe and many of them have concluded that all the
processes of government have become so compromised that honest
governance has been rendered impossible.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The crisis in government regulation methods, the Watergate
scandals and the obvious vulnerability of the Nixon leadership
aggravated the ideological struggle in American society.
Disillusionment with liberal reforms which grew stronger as a result of the end
of the McGovern movement, increasingly often gave rise to
nostalgic appeals by bourgeois scholars, certain groups of American
businessmen, the petty bourgeoisie and middle strata to return to the
times of minimal government intervention. This outburst of
individualist ideology provided fertile soil for the revival of
ultraconservative forces in the country, and chiefly in the Republican Party.
During the 1970s, a considerable part of the US monopoly oligarchy
swung significantly to the right: they more resolutely accused the
government of creating unfavorable conditions for investment and
saw a way out of the economic difficulties which exacerbated in
1973-1975, in more obvious support of corporate interests, cuts in
government social spending, new tax benefits for business and an
onslaught against the rights of the labor unions and working people.</p>

<p>     The opposition to the Republican Administration's foreign
policy was gaining momentum as the process of detente was extended,
the left wing of the Democratic Party was weakened after the 1972
election and Nixon's leadership discredited by the Watergate
scandal. Critics of detente regarded it as a breathing spell in
confrontation with the Soviet Union and perceived a serious threat to their
economic, political and ideological interests in the results and,
particularly, prospects of that policy.</p>

<p>     The leading part in the opposition to detente was played by the
right-wing Republicans, Dixiecrats, and also individual traditional-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;S. Ervin to T. Gridley, June 14, 1974&quot;, <em>Papers of S. Ervin</em>, The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Box 384.</p>

<p>     342 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     Consensus Questioned</p>

<p>     (1960-early 1970s) 343</p>

<p>     ist Democrats who continued to advocate the Cold War liberalism.
They treated detente as a tactical move by the Soviet Union
allegedly intending to undermine the West's military-political alliances and
dominate the world. In order to end detente, its opponents raised
the human rights issue, thanks to which discriminatory measures in
trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union were adopted.</p>

<p>     The Nixon Administration was not particularly interested in
easing tensions: they combined lip service to the need of
maintaining Soviet-US strategic parity with an illusory hope that the Soviet
Union would change its ways and stop supporting the national
liberation movements. They sought to use detente to secure unilateral
advantages for the United States. Moreover the Republican
Administration had no intention to drop plans aimed at achieving
military and strategic superiority over the Soviet Union in the long term.
In his memoirs Henry Kissinger wrote: &quot;After the signature of
SALT I, our defense budget increased and the Nixon and Ford
administrations put through the strategic weapons (the MX missile,
B-l bomber, cruise missiles, Trident submarines, and more advanced
warheads) that even a decade later are the backbone of our defense
program and that had been stymied in the Congress <em>prior</em> to the
easing of our relations with Moscow.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The chorus of opponents of detente increasingly often included
the voices of Democrats who began to dissociate themselves from
the left liberals after 1972 and waged a struggle to expell them from
the party machine. Democratic leaders criticized Nixon's foreign
policy for its excessively defensive and static nature, for being aimed
at maintaining the status quo and increasingly out of line with US
objectives in the world. They believed that detente weakened the
United States' ties with West European allies and put forward the
concepts of mutual vulnerability or the balance of terror which
could not become a real basis for arms reductions. They were at one
with all the reactionary forces in denouncing Soviet actions in defense
of the gains of socialism and the national liberation movement.</p>

<p>     The ousting of the left liberals from leading posts in the
Democratic Party, abolition of McGovern-Frazer's most far-reaching
reforms, and criticism of the administration's involvement in the
Watergate affair---all this still could not secure the party's revival. It
was urgently necessary to develop new concepts of managing socie-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Henry Kissinger, <em>Years of Upheaval</em>, Little, Brown, Boston- Toronto, 1982, p. 237.</p>

<p>     ty, and this proved to be quite a difficult matter. In November
1972 a Coalition for a Democratic Majority was founded by party
centrists and conservatives and supported by the AFL-CIO and the
intellectual establishment oriented toward the Democrats. It issued
a Manifesto in December 1972 in effect proposing a return to the
discredited welfare state concept. New, more effective ways of
government interference in social and economic processes were
needed. But congressional Democrats failed to supply alternative
legislative programs. Note should be made, however, of the Health
Insurance Bill, suggestions to transform Nixon's new federalism by
transferring federal funds not to the states in whose legislatures
conservative elements often prevailed, but directly to the cities where acute
social problems demanded urgent solutions. The mass democratic
movements tended to decline after the end of the Vietnam war,
which stopped exerting its polarizing effect on society, and under
the impact of the administration's repression. This largely relieved
the Democrats of the need to produce new programs which might
attract the radical groups of the population. Besides, during the
Watergate affair public opinion was focussed on the setbacks of the
ruling party and not on the absence of a constructive Democratic
alternative. With a majority in both chambers of Congress and
relying on a high wave of resentment caused by Watergate, Democratic
leaders were in full control of the situation. Contradictions between
the President and the Democrats in Congress were sharply
exacerbated. Former advocates of broader executive powers, the
Democrats, now loudly called for a restriction of the White House's
powers, particularly in foreign policy, and achieved considerable
success. The struggle between executive government and the
Democratic majority on Capitol Hill did not subside but, on the contrary,
grew more fierce after Nixon's forced resignation in August 1974
and the coming to power of Gerald Ford. &quot;When Gerald R. Ford
took office as President, he faced a situation unprecedented in the
annals of American leadership: disillusionment, cynicism, and even
fears about our government at home; worldwide inflation, recession
and growing unemployment;uncertainty about the will of the
American people and the reliability of a politically-divided U.S.
Government to fulfil its commitments in the world.''^^1^^ That is how Vice-</p>

<p>     <em>Remarks of the Vice-President at Republican National Convention Special
Committee on Resolutions, August 9, 1976</em>, WHCF, Ford Library, Box PL 76.</p>

<p>     344 Chapter Fifteen</p>

<p>     President Nelson Rockefeller described the difficulties facing the
Ford Administration. The credibility gap and the coming to the
forefront of economic problems in 1973-1975 dismissed many of the
issues (racial, social, cultural and others) which had eroded the
Democratic coalition in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Democrats
managed to win an impressive victory at the 1974 midterm
elections (receiving 58 percent of the votes against the Republicans'
38.9 percent). And the Democratic Party retained the support of
young people and liberal circles it acquired in the early 1970s, and
won back the sympathies of the working class and the middle strata,
which provided it with hope for success in 1976.</p>

<p>     <b>THE ``ROLLING''
REALIGNMENT: DEMOCRATS</b></p>

<p>     <b>AND REPUBLICANS</b>
</p>

<IMG src="399-1.jpg" alt="399-1.jpg" style=" width:33.6pt; height:44.6pt;">

<p>     <b>IN CONSERVATIVE
TIMES (LATE 1970s
AND EARLY 1980s)</b></p>

<p>     The 1976 election campaign was held against a background of
the deep 1973-1975 stagflation and a Watergate-induced credibility
gap which had seriously discredited the ruling Republicans and,
thereby, raised the chances of the Democrats. There was certain logic
in the fact that the nomination, and then the Presidency, went to
Jimmy Carter, a little-known politician from the Southern
backwoods who was far away from the discredited Washington
Establishment and the rival Democrat groups and who had a reputation of a
competent administrator and a pastmaster in vague populist
rhetoric (he promised to make the government as good as the people).<SUP>1
</SUP>The Democrats were elated by a firm majority in both chambers of
Congress and in local government, the sorry state of their rivals and
the rallying of the party around a new promising leader after a long
period of divisions. But the favorable situation was more apparent
than real, concealing serious problems in store for the Democrats.</p>

<p>     Carter's victory over Ford did not mean that centrifugal trends
had been overcome within the party and the former Roosevelt
coalition restored as it seemed to many Democrats and observers.
Although Carter received 62 percent of the votes of union members
and their families, 83 percent of the black votes and 62 percent of
the votes of people with low incomes, he was still unable to fully
regain the vote of the white South, the bulk of non-unionized
workers and other former Democrats who had defected to the
Republicans in 1972. To heal the split in the party leadership was no easy
task either. Most importantly, the country's domestic and interna-</p>

<p>     Howard Norton &amp; Bob Slosser, <em>The Miracle of Jimmy Carter</em>, Logos International
Plainfield, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 51-52.</p>

<p>     346 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 347</p>

<p>     tional condition was changing in a critical direction gradually
undermining the social and economic policies which were the Democrats'
chief asset and which were based on stable economic growth rates
maintained thanks to US hegemony in the capitalist world's trade,
economy and politics, and an abundance of resources and markets.</p>

<p>     Over the 1970s conditions of reproduction sharply deteriorated
in the United States due to spiralling prices on basic raw materials
(energy resources above all), the ecological crisis, a narrowing of
markets, growing competition from the West European countries
and Japan, obsolete production assets in traditional US industries,
an increase in non-productive capital investments having to do with
extension of government regulation to new spheres (environmental
protection, labor safety, etc). As a result profits, labor productivity
and competitiveness of American industry were steadily declining.
Hence slower growth rates and a falling living standard of the late
1970s. Inflation was on an average 9.68 percent in 1976-1980,
unemployment---6.8 percent, productivity growth---only 0.33
percent. Real weekly incomes of nonagricultural workers in 1973-1980
declined by almost 13 percent and profit growth rates of industrial
corporations (as a percentage of stock capital) declined by 33.4
percent in comparison with 1956-1968.^^1^^</p>

<p>     All the above, and primarily simultaneous high rates of inflation
and unemployment, pointed to a serious crisis in traditional
NeoKeynesian macroeconomic regulation underlying the social and
economic policies of the Democrats and moderate Republicans.</p>

<p>     Economic difficulties combined with setbacks in US foreign
policy resulting from the Vietnam debacle, loss of military and
strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, victories won by the
national liberation movements in Africa, Iran and Central America,
growing economic dependence of the United States on raw-material
exporting developing countries, its sharply reduced ability to control
the situation in the Third World, and the growing political
independence of its NATO allies.</p>

<p>     The simultaneous and inter-related crisis in both the economy
and foreign policy was growing deeper. This changed the social
and political situation in the country and added urgency to the</p>

<p>     <em>Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress February 1983</em>,
GPO, Washington, 1983, pp. 206-207; <em>Survey of Current Business</em>. February 1981, pp. 58,
62.</p>

<p>     question of how US domestic and foreign policies should develop in
the near future. Society lost confidence in traditional state--
monopoly recipes for governing the country, it acutely felt that control
over the domestic and international situation had been lost and was
uncertain of the future. All this prepared a social and psychological
atmosphere for a revival of right-wing forces.</p>

<p>     Due to slower economic growth rates, the US ruling circles no
longer enjoyed freedom of maneuver. A decline in production
efficiency and profitability led to an &quot;accumulation crisis&quot; (an
expression coined by neo-Marxist sociologist James O'Connor),^^1^^ a way
out of which Big Business saw in restricted consumption and
government social spending. In other words the Keynesian synthesis
of capitalism and democracy in the shape of Welfare State was
breaking down. In foreign policy the question was: would the
United States follow a policy of realistically adapting to the
changed balance of power in the world initiated during the years of
detente or would it attempt to regain its former position in the
world by abruptly increasing its military power, resorting to
intervention and confrontation?</p>

<p>     Such was the domestic and foreign situation in which the
Democrats had to swiftly adapt themselves to the fundamentally new
conditions.</p>

<p>     Disunited from within and lacking the former tools of economic
regulation and freedom of maneuver, the Democrats tacked in vain
between a swing to the right, which was increasingly demanded by
the upper echelons of society and the party itself, and the views of
the democratic wing of its electorate whose demands were to some
extent reflected in the 1976 party platform. The platform provided
for a cut in defense spending, energetic measures to fight
unemployment, broader economic planning in the spirit of the
HumphreyHawkins bill, and &quot;a complete overhaul of the present tax system.&quot;
In the social field it promised to carry through a fundamental
reform of the welfare system, introduce comprehensive national health
insurance, and firmly support labor legislation, and socio-economic
equality for women and ethnic minorities.^^2^^</p>

<p>     However, material resources for fulfilling these far-reaching
promises were not listed in the platform, and that omission clearly</p>

<p>~^^1^^ James O'Connor, <em>Accumulation Crisis</em>, Basil Blackwell, New York, 1984, p. 102.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1976</em>, Washington, 1976, pp. 855-859.</p>

<p>     348 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 349</p>

<p>     showed that resources for continuing the traditional liberal-reformist
course were severely restricted. In a policy-making study the
Brookings Institution warned that the federal government had little
leeway left &quot;in the next five years to expand domestic programs or to
inaugurate large new ones. The leeway would be even less, indeed
would virtually disappear, if it were decided to expand the real level
of defense outlays modestly during the next several years.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     That is why the Carter Administration had a quite different
mandate from the monopoly elite and the conservative ideologists
of its own party who saw the way out of the dead end of liberalism
in limiting government social programs and reducing the working
people's participation in the political process and their demands
upon the federal government.</p>

<p>     In view of this the real policy of the Carter Administration
drifted increasingly toward conservatism. Novices in the national party
leadership and far removed from the unions and liberal
organizations, the President and his staff took the support of the democratic
wing for granted and set about winning the sympathies of
businessmen and the propertied and conservative sections of the
electorate, which implied a considerable revision of the party's liberal--
reformist tradition and the borrowing of some of the Republican
slogans and policies.^^2^^ The administration buried the idea of national
health insurance, passed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill in a strongly
downgraded form, easily put up with the defeat in Congress of the
key labor legislation bill, and gave the conservatives and rightists a
free hand in changing its own proposals on energy program and tax
reform in favor of the monopolies. The administration's conservative
bias was strengthened by the fact that the Democratic majority in
both chambers was hamstrung by the growing rift between the
liberal wing representing urban industrial centers in the Northeast and
the Midwest and the bloc of conservative Southerners and
Democrats from suburban electoral districts who demanded a cut in social
spending.</p>

<p>     As inflation and the federal budget deficit increased (due in part
to the growth of real military expenditures since 1978), the
administration gradually drifted from restricting to cutting social spending</p>

<p>     <em>Setting National Priorities. The Next Ten Years</em>, ed. by Henry Owen and Charles
L. Schultze, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1976, p. 356.</p>

<p>     See: the political strategy memorandum written by Carter's pollster Patrick Caddell,
for the new President, <em>The Washington Post</em>, May 4, 1977.</p>

<p>     and transferred the emphasis in its social and economic policy from
problems of unemployment to the fight against inflation and for a
balanced federal budget at the expense of &quot;the liberal wing of their
own party,&quot; as the US Conference of Mayors pointed out at the end
of 1977.^^1^^ Thereby, the President, in the words of <em>The New Republic</em>,
&quot;repealed the domestic half of the 1976 Democratic national
platform.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     This political reorientation was accompanied by corresponding
ideological outpourings the keynote of which were Carter's calls for
thrift and financial responsibility borrowed from the arsenal of the
conservatives and even anti-statist complaints on the impotency of
the government in solving basic national problems.</p>

<p>     A similar situation developed in foreign policy where the
Democrats, who had solemnly pledged in the 1976 party platform to
cut the military budget and achieve a sharp reduction in strategic
arms, bragged, four years later in a similar document, that they had
increased defense spending and strengthened the military potential
of the US and NATO (after the Republicans had allegedly been
inactive) by modernizing &quot;its strategic deterrent through the MX,
Trident, and cruise missile systems.''</p>

<p>     While these efforts proved insufficient for the administration to
gain active support from the right of center, they were quite
sufficient to progressively alienate the most loyal groups of the
Democrats' electoral base---unionized workers, liberal and democratic
organizations and the needy---from the party.</p>

<p>     The question of budget priorities naturally became the focus of
the conflict within the party, acquiring an increasingly clear-cut
organizational shape. In late 1977 left-centrist labor unions and a
number of liberal congressmen founded the Democratic Agenda, an
organization which sought to implement the 1976 Democratic
platform and prevent a further swing of the party to the right. The next
important step was the Detroit National Convention in October
1978 which set up the Progressive Alliance bringing together dozens
of labor unions, black, liberal, women's and religious organizations
favoring a renewal of the Democratic Party by intensifying the
pressure on the administration from the left.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Newsweek</em>, December 12, 1977, p. 37.</p>

<p>     <em>The New Republic</em>, November 11, 1978, p. 12.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>The 1980 Democratic National Platform</em>, Democratic National Committee,
Washington, p. 18.</p>

<p>     350 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s <b>351</b></p>

<p>     The first major open clash between the administration and
liberal opposition occurred at the 1978 Democratic Convention in
Memphis where the administration's envoys managed to have its
anti-inflation program passed only by a slim majority, having failed
to secure the whole party's support for its new course. The highlight
in the intraparty conflict was the 1980 election campaign when the
leader of the party liberal wing Senator Edward Kennedy openly
challenged Carter in his bid for the nomination. And although Carter
managed to win at great pains, the party split remained, which
inevitably weakened and demoralized the party's supporters. The
party's troubles were compounded by the economic slump in 1979-
1980, the first in many years to break out while the Democrats were
in office. This cast doubt on their economic competence and
further undermined confidence in Keynesian methods of regulating the
economy. As a result the crisis of liberalism was apparent not only in
ideology and politics; in organizational terms, it was evident in the
weakening of the left-centrist majority coalition traditionally rallying
around the Democratic Party. All this created favorable conditions
for an ideological and political advancement of the right-wing
alternative which was gaining momentum in the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     The main political change in the Republican Party during the
1970s was a sharp growth of the right wing. One of the reasons for
this was a rapid shift of the party's sectional base from the
Northeast, the traditional domain of the moderate Republicans, to the
Sun Belt, the bastion of the extreme rightists. They had grown
particularly active since the mid-1970s when the foundations were laid
for the organizational infrastructure of the New Right---the
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, the National Conservative
Political Action Committee, the Heritage Foundation, the
Conservative Caucus, and the Moral Majority. This development largely
reflected the growing financial and economic capabilities and political
greed of the aggressive new financial and industrial groups of the
South and West, the traditional supporters of the right-wing forces.
These groups, primarily the independent oil industrialists of Texas,
Louisiana and Oklahoma, played a decisive part in joining the
efforts of the Republican machinery and the extreme rightists, which
was confirmed by data on the close relationship between the
financial sources of both. At the beginning of the 1980s donations by
one and the same group of Southern oil industrialists made up over
a third of total contributions to the treasuries of extreme right-wing</p>

<p>     organizations and the Republican Party. As a result there was a
&quot;shift of the financial heartland of the GOP south from Wall Street
and from downtown Chicago to Houston, Dallas, and Tulsa,&quot;<SUP>1
</SUP>which largely shaped the balance of power in the party. In turn,
expansion of the Republican electorate in the Southwest through the
mechanism of state representation at party conventions provided
the rightists with additional leverage to influence the drawing up of
party platforms and the nomination of candidates. As a result the
short-lived post-Watergate domination of the party leadership by
the moderate-centrist bloc was challenged in 1976 by the
rightwingers led by Ronald Reagan, and the former managed to retain
their nominal leadership only with great difficulty and at the price
of serious concessions in the platform, mostly in foreign policy.
Having strengthened their positions in Congress and the party
machinery, the rightists gained control of the party convention and rallied
the party on a right-centrist basis in 1980.</p>

<p>     Political activization and the swing to the right by most
monopoly capitalists in the United States became an important external
factor in the growing strengthening of the right wing in the
Republican Party and the country as a whole. In 1975-1976 Big Business
launched a massive counterattack mustering enormous financial and
organizational resources: it set up an influential lobby---the Business
Round Table---and also hundreds of Political Action Committees
to pressure government agencies at all levels. Besides, the previously
existing employers' organizations stepped up their activity. In terms
of interparty struggle all this implied increased support for
conservative politicians (chiefly Republicans) competing against liberal
candidates and organizations.</p>

<p>     The rallying of the political efforts of Big Business, the extreme
right and the Republican Party itself was accompanied by better
coordination of actions, and among other things, provided the
Republicans with the enormous financial and organizational resources
which contributed to their victories in the 1978 and 1980 elections.
&quot;In gross terms the Republican national party raised $ 130.3 million in
1979-80; their Democratic counterparts mustered about $23 million. &quot;^^2^^</p>

<p>     Thomas Byrne Edsall, <em>The New Politics of Inequality</em>, W.W. Norton &amp; Company,
New York, 1984, p. 101.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ Money and Politics in the United States. Financing Elections in the 1980s</em>, ed. by
Michael J. Malbin, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington,
1984, p. 75.</p>

<p>     352 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Eariy 1980s 353</p>

<p>     There were other changes unfavorable to the Democrats in
demography, the social structure and political participation: the rapid
migration of population in the 1970s from the urban industrial
centers in the Northeast and Midwest---traditional Democratic areas---to
the politically more conservative Southern and Western states and
also the suburbs, a decline in the number of labor union members in
the overall number of employed, the ebb in the mass democratic
movements, and growing absenteeism of the needy and poor
sections of the population in the elections. As a result, the active
electorate of the 1980s (although not society as a whole) became more
conservative and pro-Republican, while the share of firm supporters
of the Democratic Party substantially shrank.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The political consolidation of the right-wing forces in the
Republican Party was accompanied by a notable change in its ideology
and policy, primarily in economics. The new economic platform
was a combination of several ideological and theoretical currents:
neoconservatism, focusing attention on problems and
contradictions of government intervention, monetarism, traditional
conservatism and particularly its new trend, supply side economics, closely
linked to the new right (Laffer, Vanniski and Gilder).</p>

<p>     While there was a difference in emphasis, the diagnosis of the
economic situation was common to all the trends: they linked the
extension of government intervention to economic decline, stressed
the advantages of market competition and free price-formation as
the chief regulators of capitalist production, and urged a return to
the neoclassical postulates of a &quot;self-regulating economy.''</p>

<p>     Considering capitalism chiefly as a system of incentives for
work and capital investment, the authors of the supply side
economics attached top priority to stimulating the accumulation process
and the profitability of capital investment in the private sector by
reducing taxes on employers and well-too-do sections of the
population and tax rebates on write-offs and other benefits. An opposite
set of incentives was proposed for the working people---rejection of
attempts to reduce the ``natural'' unemployment rate or alleviate
the position of the poor. The aim was to increase competition on the
labor market, discipline the work force by the threat of poverty and
in the final count to reduce its market cost for capital. A long-term
anti-inflation climate created by means of a tough credit-monetary</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Thomas Byrne Edsall, <em>The New Politics of Inequality</em>, pp. 181-191.</p>

<p>     policy according to the recipes of the monetarists was advanced as
another important condition for stable economic growth.</p>

<p>     A fresh impulse was given to the traditional conservative
demand to reduce government social spending which was now also
justified by the need to shift the emphasis from demand and
spending (the main source of which was the government) to supply and
savings accumulated in the private sector. The political aspect was
equally important: the conservatives sought to narrow the sphere of
the government's social activities and impose on the Americans the
idea, expressed by the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in the Reagan Administration, David Stockman, that
government did not have to provide every service that someone might
need^^1^^ in order to put an end to the escalation of demands made on
the government which, as the conservatives saw it, was the chief
source of the &quot;governability crisis.''</p>

<p>     New Federalism was part of the strategy of &quot;unloading the state&quot;
which developed Nixon's plan of revenue sharing. As distinct from
its historical predecessor, New Federalism provided for substantial
cuts in outlays on social programs, including by indirect methods of
transferring these programs to the states without federal regulation
of the allocated funds. There was also a much more far-reaching
purpose: to gradually remove the responsibility for solving acute
social problems from the federal government to the state
governments and private capital, thereby putting an end to the
federalization of social policy, a trend which had been developing since the
times of the New Deal. The dismantling of federal social programs
threatened to become irreversible if the sources of financing the
programs were also transferred to the states as was planned.</p>

<p>     Thus the modified social and economic platform of the
Republicans involved a serious revision of aims, methods and scope of
government regulation: instead of the relative autonomy of the
federal government, virtually total identification of its interests with
those of the monopolies on the basis of the old formula &quot;leave
business to itself and it will take care of you&quot;; instead of an anti-cyclic
economic stabilization policy, creation of the most favorable
conditions only for capital accumulation; instead of the reformist
ideology and policy of the Welfare State, a course aimed at reducing the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, <em>The Reagan Revolution</em>, E.P. Button, New
York, 1981, pp. 134-135.</p>

<p>     24-749</p>

<p>     354 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     government's social responsibility and extending society's social
differentiation regarded as an incentive to the population's
economic activity.</p>

<p>     In effect, it was a nostalgic attempt to revitalize capitalism on a
traditionalist basis, releasing its inner forces by freeing it of the
liberal-reformist restraints of the last decades. At the same time it was
an attempt by the rightists and conservatives to avenge the long
ideological and political domination of the liberals, and no wonder
the main attacking force here was the right wing of the Republican
Party which had refused to put up not only with Great Society but
even with the New Deal. Not accidentally the Reagan people
regarded Coolidge, Taft and Goldwater as their ideological predecessors.
The Republicans' ideological tenets relied on elements of
traditionalism in mass consciousness revived in a context of liberalism's
crisis---extreme bourgeois individualism and antistatism, a cult of
success in private enterprise, free competition and so on.</p>

<p>     The version of Republican social and economic program offered
to the ordinary voter was, of course, different from its real class
implications. The price that would have to be paid to invigorate the
economy was hushed up, and the emphasis was made on popular,
but not typically Republican, themes of economic growth, material
progress and tax cuts. These recipes provided by the advocates of
the supply side economics became increasingly widespread among
the Republicans. In 1977 the key law in the program, the
KempRoth Bill, reducing income tax rates, was adopted by the party
National Committee and then the entire Republican caucus in the
House. Tax cuts together with a bloated military budget to secure
a &quot;build-up of American strength&quot; became the keynote of the party
and its candidates in the 1978 election campaign.</p>

<p>     Approaching the 1980 elections, the Republicans focused on
economic issues in the interparty struggle. By skilfully taking
advantage of mass disappointment in liberalism, profound distrust of
government and growing discontent with rising taxes, they managed
to channel these negative moods against the Democrats whom
Republican propaganda identified with bureaucracy, economic
incompetence, wasteful spending and the tax burden. But they realized
that this was not sufficient for contemporary America, that it was
necessary to discard the economic conservatism which was typical
of the Republican Party with its thinly concealed disregard of the
working majority's needs and, at least in word, to make a bid for</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 355</p>

<p>     the support of wider sections of the population. A well-known
political adviser of the Republican right wing Arthur J. Finkelstein
argued: &quot;The key to conservative victory is in presenting
conservatism as a can-do philosophy, as the party of more, not less. We have
to convince the voters that the election of conservatives will
improve their situation. For too long, we have pushed an essentially
negative austerity approach.''^^1^^ In other words, as distinct from
Nixon's times, it was planned to make a &quot;turn to the masses&quot; not so
much on the social but rather on the economic front. And the
supply side economics was to play the part of a positive alternative
to the liberal statism of the Democrats.</p>

<p>     Reagan's 1980 election campaign was a graphic example of this
course in action.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The same themes prevailed in the party's 1980 platform. The
order of priorities typical of the Republicans was reversed and now
sounded as &quot;economic growth and full employment without
inflation.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     The renovated economic declarations of the Republicans seemed
more optimistic and promising than the policies pursued by the
Carter Administration in 1979-1980. As a result, for the first time
since the 1930s, the Republicans carried out a successful
counterattack under the most urgent for the ordinary American slogan of
bread and butter, which had been the Democrats' chief asset since
the times of FDR. This was borne out not only by the results of the
1980s elections but also by the inversion of the usual images of
both parties in the eyes of the voters: for the first time in many
years a Gallup Poll showed that Republicans had taken a lead over
the Democrats on the question of which party can &quot;do a better job
of keeping the country prosperous.''^^4^^</p>

<p>     The Republicans also retained the slogans of social and cultural
conservatism widespread in the country as a response to a
profound decay of traditional bourgeois morality in the 1960s and
1970s. Defending traditional values---the family, community, reli-</p>

<p>     Quoted from: James C. Roberts, <em>The Conservative Decade. Emerging Leaders of
the 1980s</em>, Arlington House Publishers, Westpoit, Conn., 1980, p. 312.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ See the admissions of the leaders of his election campaign in: <em>Party
Coalitions in the 1980s</em>, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San
Francisco, Calif., 1981, p. 240.</p>

<p>     ' <em>Congressional Quarterly Almanac---1980</em>, Washington, 1981, p. 58-B.
<em>Party Coalitions in the 1980s</em>, pp. 300-301.</p>

<p>     24*</p>

<p>     356 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 357</p>

<p>     program of historical optimism of sorts met with a certain response
among the population who, after many years of self-criticism, once
again wanted to see America a strong and confident power.</p>

<p>     However, from the very outset, it was doubtful that this
nostalgic program of &quot;conservative revival&quot; was realistic: could US
hegemony relying on military force be re-established in the
contemporary increasingly heterogeneous and democratic world? To what
extent could the long-time trend toward extension of the government's
regulating role and social functions be reversed in the United States
given the complexity of domestic problems and rising democratic
expectations of the people? In that sense the further fate of the
Republican Party became closely linked to the conservative
experiment carried out by the Reagan Administration. After the elections
the National Chairman Bill Brock said: &quot;We have brought together
the elements of a new coalition. The cementing of that coalition
depends on our performance in office.''^^1^^ The Republican leaders
wanted to further develop success at the 1982 midterm elections
and finally become a majority party after the 1984 elections,
hoping, as a leader of the new right, Congressman Jack F. Kemp put it,
&quot;to become the party of peace and prosperity and to stay in power
for two generations.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     The main challenge for the Republican Administration after the
1980 victorious election was to combine a swing to the right in
domestic and foreign policy with retaining a political base
sufficiently wide to stay in power. That was why the initial political
strategy of the Republicans was aimed at bringing together a new
pro-Republican majority coalition whose prototype was Reagan's
1980 election coalition. As distinct from the left-centrist coalition
of the Democrats, this was to be a right-centrist coalition which, in
addition to the usual supporters of the Republican Party, would
include the new right and the more conservative-minded and
wellto-do part of the white workers and urban middle strata who had
previously stayed with the Democrats. A strange mixture of
business conservatism, economic populism, militant chauvinism, and
moral and religious traditionalism in the renewed political posture
of the Republicans was to serve as the ideological basis for uniting
these forces.</p>

<p>     gion and the flag---became one of the main themes of the Reagan
campaign and the Republican platform which for the first time
openly supported such demands of the new right as a ban on
abortions, introduction of prayers at school, and rejection of the
amendment to the Constitution on equal rights for women.</p>

<p>     In foreign policy the Republican Party's course underwent a
substantial evolution from the policy of detente of the early 1970s
to a revival of Cold War with its open bid for military superiority,
buildup and use of military force, and rejection of the principles
of peaceful coexistence. Underlying this turn was the stubborn
reluctance of the aggressive circles of corporate and political elite to
continue bringing America's imperial ambitions into line with its
narrowing possibilities, the process that began in the period of
detente. As Caspar Weinberger was to say somewhat later, &quot;If the
movement from cold war to detente is progress, then let me say we
cannot afford much more progress.' Instead, it was proposed to
eliminate the growing gap between aims and means by extensively
building up US military might, that is, not only regaining
militarystrategic superiority over the USSR (which was the battlecry of the
Republican election campaign) but also overcoming the so-called
paralysis of will and, as Ronald Reagan put it, ridding &quot;ourselves of
the 'Vietnam Syndrome.' It has dominated our thinking for too
long.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     On the whole, the new Republican policy-making statements
featured one keynote---the promise to put a stop to &quot;the decline
of America,&quot; strengthen its economy and military capability and
&quot;move the nation&quot; again, this time not under the auspices of
modernizing state-monopoly capitalism (as the Democrats had promised
in 1960) but by returning to the basics and tapping the classical
sources of Americanism---private enterprise, free competition and
traditional moral values at home and assertive nationalism relying
on force beyond its borders. The Democrats were pictured as &quot;the
chief architects of our decline&quot; and the Republicans as the party of
national revival &quot;best able to arrest and reverse the decline.''^^3^^ This</p>

<p>~^^1^^ &quot;America and the World 1981&quot;, <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, No. 3 1981, p. 532.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Peace and Security in the 1980s. Address by Ronald Reagan to the Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations</em>, Chicago, 111., March 17, 1980.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Congressional Quarterly Almanac-1980</em>, Washington, 1981, p. 58-B, 59-B. See
also: Jack F. Kemp. <em>An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980's</em>, Harper &amp; Row,
New York, 1979.</p>

<p>     ; <em>The New York Times</em>, January 21, 1981.
' <em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     358 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1930s 359</p>

<p>     At the core of the Republican ideological appeal to the voters
was an attempt to rally well-to-do white middle-class America
round the promise to defend it from attacks by the needy (mostly
colored) and government that allegedly supported them. As former
President Ford said at the 1980 Republican Convention: &quot;We have
forged a giant government out of compassion for the needy. Now
we can trim government out of compassion for the taxpayers.''^^1^^ In
that sense, the half-hidden implication of Reaganomics (with its
extreme individualism, pathetic antistatism, and self-reliance) well
understood by successful America, was the revival of the social--
Darwinist assumption on the survival of the fittest backed up by the
veiled prospect of redistribution of national resources in favor of
the better off sections of the population. Successful
implementation of that strategy would turn the Democrats into a party of the
minorities and welfare-supported people driven into the decaying
industrial centers of the Northeast.</p>

<p>     However, attempts to implement these ideological and political
recipes led to their substantial transformation or even complete
rejection. This was true above all of the social and economic part of
the Republican platform. Practice failed to confirm the hopes of
the supply side economics that enormous hand-outs and benefits
for Big Business would result in an abrupt upsurge of business
activity. Economic stagnation combined with a sharp cut in taxes
substantially reduced the receipts of the federal budget. At the same
time, government spending continued to rise, and not only under
the impact of record military outlays: faced by a growing political
opposition in Congress and the country as a whole, the Reagan
Administration failed to reduce social and other government
programs as it intended (its plan of New Federalism encountered
particularly strong opposition). A natural outcome of all this was an
unprecedented rise in the federal budget deficit, which, in turn, not
only undercut the belt-tightening policy still further but also held
back economic growth due to more expensive credit. The budget
deficit thus became the focal point of all the principal
contradictions and failures of Reaganomics. The road was thereby paved for
adoption of Draconian measures to restrict government
expenditures under the Gramm-Rudman Amendment. However, inflation</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Hidden Election, Politics and Economics in the 1980Presidential Campaign</em>, ed.
by Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Pantheon Books, New York, 1981, p. 316.</p>

<p>     growth was reduced, which was important in psychological terms
(particularly for the wealthier voters), but at the high price of
economic slump and growing unemployment. Another consequence of the
tough credit and monetary policy was a drastic deterioration of the
country's balance of payments (the 1984 deficit reached 100 billion
dollars).</p>

<p>     The Republican political course considerably deepened
differences between the parties, tied the well-off sections of the
population to the Republican Party still closer and repelled the groups of
voters most vulnerable in economic terms---the poor, racial and ethnic
minorities, working and single women. According to extensive
polling data, the ideological and political polarization among the
supporters of both parties on issues of domestic and foreign policy
reached a record level in 1982-1983 unprecedented since the 1960s.^^1^^</p>

<p>     This naturally revived the usual image of the Republicans as a
party of Big Business and the rich, and substantially weakened its
positions in the electorate, primarily among the former Democrats
and independents who had voted Republican in 1980. This was
clearly borne out by the 1982 midterm congressional and local
elections as a result of which the Republicans lost 26 seats in the
House, two seats in the Senate and seven governorships.</p>

<p>     So, the Republican Administration approached its first
midterms in such a weakened state that even experienced observers who
sympathized with the conservatives, like Kevin P. Phillips began
predicting an erosion of Reaganism's social base, chiefly because broad
sections of the working people would turn their backs on it.^^2^^</p>

<p>     Faced with the danger that its political base might shrink even
further, the administration introduced certain changes into the
initial plans and ideological and political proposals despite criticism
from the new right. In 1982-1983 the administration actually put
up with higher social outlays, dropped the short-term objective of a
balanced budget and abandoned plans to reduce the share of the
federal budget in the Gross National Product to 19 percent (actually
that share rose from 22.9 to 25.3 percent in 1980-1983).^^3^^ More-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>National Journal</em>, October 29, 1983, p. <em>2210; Public Opinion</em>, October/November
1983, pp. 26-29.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Kevin P. Phillips, <em>Post-Conservative America. People, Politics and Ideology in a
Time of Crisis</em>, Random House, New York, 1982.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress</em>, Februrary 1985,
GPO, Washington, 1985, p. 66.</p>

<p>     360 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s <b>361</b></p>

<p>     over, it substantially increased indirect taxes to reduce the budget
deficit, and gave up attempts to push through Congress the program
of new federalism.</p>

<p>     The economic recovery which began in 1983 alleviated the
situation for the administration and for a while made it unnecessary
to introduce new changes into its economic policy. Although the
recovery and subsequent boom were cyclic in nature and had little
to do with government policy, the administration managed to turn
them to its own political advantage. As a result, in early 1984 the
voters once again regarded the Republicans as the party capable of
securing the country's progress, and the improved state of the
economy was the Republicans' chief trump in the election struggle.</p>

<p>     The social and cultural questions on which the Republicans
pinned large hopes proved to be a weapon that cut both ways. It
was one thing to play on discontent and appeal to traditional values
while in the opposition and quite another, after coming to power,
to assume responsibility for government interference in religious,
family and moral issues which could prove to be highly unpopular
among or, in any case, controversial for most Americans. Hence the
administration's reluctant and spiritless support for demands made
by the new right such as a ban on abortions, and adoption of a
constitutional amendment on religious lessons at school.</p>

<p>     From the very outset, the Republicans' most extremist
ambitions in the field of foreign policy were in glaring contradiction
with existing realities. Yet, despite the fact that there was no real
strengthening of US international positions, the deliberately tough
and aggressive foreign policy, coupled with a military buildup and
muscle showing (particularly the invasion of Grenada in 1983), to
some extent calmed down feelings of &quot;weakness and American
retreats&quot; existing in the country. But the economic and political costs
of this course turned out to be high indeed. The spiralling arms race
aggravated the country's economic and financial difficulties. The
aggressive course leading to a complete rejection of detente,
replacement of diplomacy by military force combined with new, more
dangerous doctrines of its use, provoked growing concern among
US allies and a sharp upsurge in the antinuclear movement in West
European countries and America itself.</p>

<p>     A natural political consequence of the Reagan Administration's
militarist course was a change in the attitude of American voters
to the Republican Party as a whole: in 1981-1984, for the first time</p>

<p>     in the entire postwar period (the 1964 election being the only
exception), it gained the stable reputation of being the war party less
capable of preventing the US from being involved in military
conflicts and curbing the arms race than the Democrats.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Seeking to conceal its weakest spot in the election struggle, the
Reagan Administration made desperate attempts to change its image,
temporarily abandoning, if only in words, the initial
assumptions concerning relations with the USSR and the possibility of
using nuclear weapons, and resuming talks with the USSR on
nuclear arms limitations. At the same time, the core of the
Republicans' foreign policy---rabid anti-Sovietism and hawkish
militarismremained unchanged, which was clearly shown by their election
platform adopted at the party convention in August 1984. Openly
confirming continuity with the &quot;policy of peace through strength&quot;
proclaimed by the rightists in 1980, the platform was based on
contrasting the Republicans to the Democrats, whom they called
the party of weakness and appeasement, and intended to create the
impression of the USSR's retreat in the face of growing American
power.^^2^^</p>

<p>     On the whole, the Republican Party entered the 1984
presidential elections retaining in essence, its basic ideological and political
guidelines, but at the same time tactically correcting them with due
account for the actual situation and the need to extend the party's
social base in the country. The Republicans sought to present
themselves as the party of peace and prosperity which, as the President
stated in the 1984 State of the Union Message and elsewhere, had
allegedly stopped &quot;a long decline that had drained this nation's
spirit and eroded its wealth&quot; and had received the voters' mandate to
&quot;finish our job.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     These Republican efforts would have been less successful were
it not for the low competitiveness of the Democrats who had failed
to recover from the heavy defeat of 1980. The poor showing in the
election was only the most striking part of the overall picture.
Ideological exhaustion, organizational and financial weakness, erosion ot
the electoral base and narrower sectional base combined with the
head-on attack by their rivals (as opposed to the situation in 1952</p>

<p>     <em>The Gallup Report</em>, No. 235, April 1985, p. 27.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report</em>, August 25, 1984, pp. 2111-2112.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Vital Speeches of the Day</em>, February 15, 1984, p. 258.</p>

<p>     362 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 363</p>

<p>     and 1968) on the legacy of the Democrats in domestic and foreign
policy---all this forced them to undertake urgent measures to secure
their political survival.</p>

<p>     Although the Democrats unanimously admitted that the
situation was really grave, they disagreed on specific recipes to overcome
the party crisis. They were almost at one on how to strengthen the
party organizationally and financially: the Democrats, particularly
since the election of a new National Chairman Charles T. Manatt,
had firmly taken the road of imitating the Republicans' experience.
It proved much more difficult to carry out an ideological and
political renewal because various groups in the party had different ideas
on that score.</p>

<p>     Objectively, the crisis of traditional liberalism provided
Democrats with an opportunity to revise it both from the left and from
the right. The swing to the right which had emerged in the late
1970s, now received a fresh impulse from the conservative--
Republican onslaught and quickly acquired an organizational form.
Founded by Democratic congressmen from the Southern and Southwestern
states immediately after the 1980 election, the Democratic
Conservative Forum openly voiced its solidarity with the Republicans'
social and economic policy and made a bid to strengthen the
influence of the conservatives in the party. And although the Southern
group known as the Boll Weevil Democrats won some loud
publicity and served as the decisive makeweight on the scales in passing
through Congress the basic economic measures of the
administration in 1981-1982, such frank identification with rivals, as most
Democratic leaders realized, implied not only a loss of face for the
party but also went contrary to the interests of most other groups.
Faced with the strong resistance offered by the main body of the
Democratic congressional caucus, the Boll Weevil Democrats proved
unable to strengthen their positions in the party leadership. This led
the most avid among them such as Philip Gramm from Texas to
break with the party and join the Republicans.</p>

<p>     The opposite trend was developing on the left wing of the party.
The main initiative here came from the grass roots, mass democratic
movements and organizations coming out against Reagan's policy of
cutting social spending, providing new privileges to the monopolies
and sustaining an unlimited arms race. On the theoretical plane, the
ideological search of left-wingers implied the evolution of liberalism
in the direction of European Social Democracy, the overcoming of</p>

<p>     its limitedness by extending zones of economic democracy (from
jobs to public control over investment decisions),
debureaucratization of social policy and a rejection of expansionism and militarism
in foreign policy.^^1^^ In the tactical respect the ideologists of the left
wing proposed a course aimed at invigorating the political
participation of the usually passive lower sections by urging them to defend
the Welfare State from the Reagan conservatives and further develop
it. In the final count it was intended to realign forces in the
twoparty system between the extreme right-wing Republican Party and
the Democrats transformed along Social Democratic lines.^^2^^</p>

<p>     However, despite all its inner logic, the left-wing alternative
evoked even less enthusiasm among the overwhelming majority of
the party leadership than the frank ``Me-tooism'' of the Boll Weevils.
That was only natural. Such an abrupt realignment threatened to
undermine the party's support among business circles, and the course
toward political polarization, particularly since there was no strong
organizational pressure from the left, contradicted the traditional
Democratic tactics of &quot;class harmony&quot; and their usual posture of
the party of the whole people. That was why the party's
moderate centrists tackled other questions: how to secure an optimal
combination of guns and butter during a period of economic
stagnation without weakening military power and, at the same time,
without provoking a dangerous social and political destabilization in
the country? How to retain their democratic image and the support of
the lower sections while abandoning high-costing reforms unwanted
by Big Business and the well-to-do? How to distance themselves
from the Republicans ideologically and politically without going
beyond the safe limits of centrism?</p>

<p>     Naturally, the Democrats sought to solve these questions
primarily by revising traditional liberalism from centrist positions (or</p>

<p>     Samuel Bowles et al, <em>Beyond the Wasteland: A Democratic Alternative to
Economic Decline</em>, Anchor Press, Doubleday, Garden City (N.Y.), <em>1983;Atternatives: Proposals
for America from the Democratic Left</em>, edited by Irving Howe, Pantheon Books, New
York, 1984; Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, <em>On Democracy: Toward a Transformation of
American Democracy</em>, Penguin Books, New York, 1983; Gar Alperovitz, Jeff Faux, <em>
Rebuilding America: A Blueprint for the New Economy</em>, Pantheon Books, New York, 1984.</p>

<p>     2 Richard Cloward, Frances Fox Piven, &quot;Toward a Class-Based Realignment of
American Politics: A Movement Strategy&quot;, <em>Social Policy</em>, Winter 1983; Joel Rogers, &quot;The
Politics of Voter Registration&quot;, <em>The Nation</em>, July 21-28, 1984, p. 46; James McGregor Burns,
<em>The Power to Lead. The Crisis of the American Presidency</em>, Simon and Schuster, New
York, 1984.</p>

<p>     364 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 365</p>

<p>     al industry, financing research and development, and finally, in
establishing closer coordination between employers and labor unions
in working out and implementing long-term economic policy. It was
not accidental that this &quot;trilateral partnership &quot; in its different shapes
became the basic organizational and institutional formula of the
entire neoliberal industrial policy. Reflecting the generic disposition
of liberal reformism toward social partnership, that policy was
called upon to dampen contradictions between classes which were
aggravated by the difficult and painful restructuring of the US
economy, and, above all,'to force the working class to make voluntary
sacrifices instead of the head-on confrontation in the spirit of
Reagan's labor policy.</p>

<p>     In the military field and foreign policy the neoliberals' chief
slogans were now a &quot;strong but lean defense&quot; involving
renunciation of certain supermodern weapons systems of questionable
efficiency, and greater emphasis on raising combat efficiency; reducing
US economic dependence (chiefly in raw materials) on the outside
world; and greater restraint in US relations with other countries,
particularly of the Third World.</p>

<p>     As Soviet analysts remark, the neoliberals, on the whole, made
a step forward in ideologically and theoretically adapting traditional
liberal statism to new economic realities.^^1^^</p>

<p>     At the same time, largely due to its eclectic nature this trend
had serious weaknesses substantially restricting its political
possibilities. The neoliberals failed to convincingly combine the need to
expand the role of government up to the level of national economic
planning (a need dictated by the nature of the new economic
problems) with the new cult of the market and their own sceptical
attitude to the effectiveness of government intervention, an attitude
prompted by the experience of the 1960s and 1970s. These inner
contradictions of industrial policy together with the deliberate
technicism and pragmatism of the neoliberal constructions deprived
the neoliberals of a clear and viable alternative needed to gain the
support of the rank-and-file voter. It was equally important that the
neoliberal social and economic platform which conformed to the
outlook of the well-off and educated middle sections, was a far cry
from the urgent needs of the working class, racial and ethnic mino-</p>

<p>     See: E.Ya. Batalov, B.V. Mikhailov, &quot;American Liberalism: A Search for New
Roads&quot;, <em>USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology</em>, No. 9, 1984, p. 21.</p>

<p>     looking for new &quot;third options between the left and the right,&quot;^^1^^ as
Senator Gary Hart put it). That revision was to take into account
specific new problems and lessons drawn from the experience of
conservative government.</p>

<p>     Initially relying on a small group of young congressmen and
ideologists seeking to say their new word in politics, this ideological
and political trend, christened neoliberalism,^^2^^ quickly turned into a
serious political force in the party.</p>

<p>     With all the different hues and the general vagueness of the
neoliberal credo, its principal features reflected in numerous speeches
and works by its advocates^^3^^ were sufficiently clear. As distinct
from the Democrats of the 1970s, the neoliberals transferred the
chief emphasis in domestic policy from social problems to
economic issues---raising productivity and US competitiveness on world
markets, restoring stable rates of economic growth which once
again, as in the 1950s and early 1960s, was regarded as the decisive
condition for solving domestic problems.</p>

<p>     Like the conservatives, the neoliberals attached top priority to
factors of supply, accumulation of capital and encouragement of
private enterprise and initiative above all, and agreed that there was
a need to stimulate private capitalist accumulation by relevant tax
benefits and relaxed regulation. The neoliberals took a much more
sceptical attitude than their predecessors---the statist liberals of the
1960s and 1970s---to direct government interference in economic
and social processes, at the same time laying emphasis on the
advantages of flexible use of market mechanisms. But contrary to the
Republican version of the supply side economics which assigned the
entire task of restructuring the American economy to private
capital and spontaneous market forces, the neoliberals believed that it
was impossible to solve the problem without the government's active
participation in investment policy, in expanding investment in
the economic infrastructure and human factor, in supporting nation-</p>

<p>     <em>Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report</em>, December 3, 1983, p. 2535.</p>

<p>     This current term should not be confused with the basic distinction between
neoconservatives and neoliberals adopted in the present work.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Gary Hart, <em>A New Democracy. A Democratic Vision for the 1980s</em>, Quill, New
York, 1983; Paul Tsongas, <em>The Road from Here. Liberalism and Realities in the 1980s</em>,
Random House, New York, 1982; Lester Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society, Basic Books,
New York, 1980; Robert Reich, <em>The Next American Frontier</em>, Times Books, New York,
1983; Randall Rothenberg, <em>The Neoliberals. Creating the New American Politics</em>, Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1984.</p>

<p>     366 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     rities, and the poor. Naturally, it was given a cold shoulder on the
left wing of the Democratic Party as &quot;Reaganism with a human
face.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Nevertheless, neoliberal ideas had a major impact on party
policy-making in view of the acute ideological hunger and thanks to
active support by most rising young Democrats.</p>

<p>     The Democratic Party Conference in June 1982 saw the first
serious attempt to draw up a single party-wide platform and
pointed to a substantial swing by the party in the relevant direction.
Sparing no effort to stir up public discontent with Reaganism and
ostentatious determination to do away with the &quot;narrow band of
extremists,&quot;^^2^^ the Democrats at the same time failed to propose a single
major social initiative and even did not want to do anything
substantial about the nine million unemployed, limiting themselves to
protests against the excessive cuts in social spending. Although
the keynote of the conference (and also of the 1982 election
campaign) was economic growth and justice, the former obviously
prevailed in the specific proposals formulated in the spirit of
industrial policy. In foreign policy, the Democrats pursued their
usual line of incorporating the demands of social protest
movements, attempted to associate themselves with the rapidly
growing antinuclear movement and supported, albeit cautiously,
proposals to freeze the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the
Soviet Union. All these efforts were underpinned by the Democrats'
desire to once again emerge as the vital center (combining &quot;fair
and generous social programs&quot; with &quot;fiscal prudence&quot; and &quot;arms
control&quot; with &quot;a strong national defense&quot;) and to depict the
Reagan Republicans as dangerous extremists reflecting the interests
of the minority.</p>

<p>     The same basic themes were offered in subsequent policy
documents of the Democrats: the Yellow Book of the Democratic
caucus in the House of Representatives (September 1982), the Blue
Book issued on the eve of the 1984 election campaign jointly by
the House caucus and other national leaders and then the party</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Nation, June 26</em>, 1982, p. 786.</p>

<p>     <em>Official Proceedings of the 1982 Democratic National Party Conference</em>,
Democratic National Committee, Washington, 1982, p. 82.</p>

<p>     From a speech by Chairman of the House Budget Committee James R. Jones at the
conference in Philadelphia, <em>Official Proceedings of the 1982 Democratic Party Conference</em>,
Democratic National Committee, Washington, 1982, p. 221.</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 367</p>

<p>     election platform of 1984.* The difference was only in the extent
of detalization and further development of the fiscal prudence theme
under the impact of the abruptly rising federal budget deficit.</p>

<p>     The swing toward new centrism was also obvious in the next
phase of the party reform which, according to recommendations of
the Hunt Commission, enhanced the role of the party elite in the
nominating process.</p>

<p>     Thus the ideological rearming of the Democratic Party was highly
tentative and incomplete; the party's practical capability was even at
a lower level. Initially, in 1981-1982, the Democrats in Congress were
so disunited and demoralized that they could not offer any serious
resistance to the passing of the Republican legislative program. The
situation changed somewhat following the 1982 elections which
lent the party strength and confidence. In 1983 and 1984 the
Democratic caucus in the House managed to draw up its own draft budget
and introduce substantial changes in the administration's budget
proposals. Democrats in both the Senate and House voted quite
unanimously for maintaining the system of social insurance and other
social programs bearing on problems of employment, education and
housing construction and in support of the bill on voting rights,
constitutional amendment on equal rights for women and against certain
weapon systems and the ``secret'' war in Nicaragua.^^2^^ At the same time,
due to serious differences between party groups, the Democratic
caucus split in voting on such major issues as freezing nuclear arsenals,
financing the MX ICBM, the B-l strategic bomber, building up
chemical weapons, adopting a constitutional amendment on a balanced
budget, a ban on abortions, and introducing prayers at schools.</p>

<p>     The disagreements among the Democrats in Congress pointed
once more to serious cleavages existing in the party which lacked
the element of cohesion. These cleavages became fully apparent
during the 1984 election campaign when, instead of the expected
joint struggle against the Republicans, the Democrats engaged in
internecine strife. Although they involved subjective and personal
elements, the clashes between Walter Mondale, Gary Hart and Jesse</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Rebuilding the Road to Opportunity: Turning Point for America's Economy</em>,
Democratic Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, September 1982; <em>
Renewing America's Promise. A Democratic Blueprint for Our Nation's Future</em>, The
National-House Democratic Caucus, Washington, January, 1984; <em>The 1984 Democratic
National Platform</em>, Democratic National Committee, Washington, 1984.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report</em>, November 3, 1984, pp. 2854-2863.</p>

<p>     368 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 369</p>

<p>     Jackson in their bid for the nomination reflected the objective
process of stratification in the Democratic coalition and the serious
conflict of interests between the forces it included. Walter Mondale,
an orthodox liberal of the old school, relied on the support of the
party elite, and also the leadership of labor unions, most black,
women's and other liberal organizations. Gary Hart, one of the
leaders of neoliberalism, personified the opposition to the traditional
party leadership and its policy on the part of the new generation
Democrats representing the well-to-do urban middle strata. And
finally, Jesse Jackson brilliantly expressed the protest of the most
needy and radicalized colored part of &quot;the other America&quot; directed
against not only Reaganism but also the conservative drifting of the
Democratic Party itself. As Jackson wrote in a letter to George
McGovern: &quot;Too many Democrats have gone along with
Republicans on every Reagan policy.''^^1^^ The social base of the three
contenders was manifest in the support each of them received in the
primaries. Most union members, ``strong'' Democrats, older and less
educated people voted for Mondale. Hart's supporters were mostly
younger, more educated, well-to-do and politically independent
Americans. Jackson polled 77 percent of the black votes and only
five percent of the white Democrats;^^2^^ his daring idea of an
interracial election coalition including all the colors of the rainbow (blacks,
Hispanics, women, youth, white poor and liberal activists) and
potentially capable of becoming the core of an independent left-wing
party failed largely due to the survival of racial antagonisms.^^3^^ It was
the Jackson platform, envisaging, albeit in an incipient form, the
radical revision of the system of national priorities in favor of social
problems, a complete break with the expansionist and militarist
tradition in foreign policy, that became the prototype of a real
alternative to the trends prevailing in politics and, not surprisingly,
provoked the anger of the Democratic Party's right wing. These
differences were also in evidence at the Democratic convention
controlled by the Mondale forces where Jackson's followers received
about a third of the votes on the platform planks he proposed and
which called on the United States to reject the first use of nuclear</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Quoted from: <em>National Journal</em>, July 14, 1984, p. 1348.</p>

<p>     See: <em>The Elections of 1984</em>, Edited by Michael Nelson, Congressional Quarterly
Inc., Washington, 1985, p. 67.</p>

<p>     A.N. Darchiyev, &quot;Jesse Jackson and Black Voters in the 1984 Election Campaign&quot;,
<em>USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology</em>, No. 2, 1985, pp. 68, 72-73.</p>

<p>     weapons and make major reductions in defense spending.^^1^^ The
nominal unity between the party groups achieved at the convention
did not mean that their mutual alienation had been overcome. As
the subsequent development of the election campaign and the
election results showed, about a third of Hart's followers voted for
Reagan and the black voter participation proved to be much lower
than expected.</p>

<p>     The cleavages within the Democratic Party were an important
but not the principal factor in their defeat. The overall situation in
the country in early summer 1984 was highly favorable for Reagan's
reelection. The boom psychology bred by the cyclic rise in the
economy, and a revival of jingoist moods, particularly after the ``
victories'' in Grenada and at the Olympics in Los Angeles, were skilfully
used by the Republican strategists to rally the country round the
President under the slogans of national unity and greatness, to
identify the President and the governing Republicans, in Reagan's
coinage &quot;America's party,&quot; with real Americanism and any opposition
to it with anti-Americanism, hostility to the flag, the family and
even religion.^^2^^</p>

<p>     All this highly complicated things for the Democrats. In order
to win the election Mondale, like Adlai Stevenson in 1956, had to
prove to the voters that the facade of Republican &quot;peace and
prosperity&quot; concealed serious problems which the Democrats could
solve better than the Republicans. And although the Democratic
arguments were largely justified, they failed either to dispell the
feeling of well-being widerspread among middle-class America or prove
the Democrats' better ability to effectively govern the country.</p>

<p>     The inner contradictions of the Democrats' political strategy
were also instrumental. On the one hand, they were perfectly aware
that in order to win the election it was necessary to fully mobilize
all the liberal-democratic forces as the basis of the anti-Reagan
coalition. Hence a campaign, unprecedented in scope since the 1960s,
to register and attract voters from the union members, women,
racial minorities and retired people. Hoping that the tendencies of the
1982 elections would develop, the leaders of the Democratic
National Committee did not hide the fact that they mostly intended not
so much to gain the sympathies of new groups of the electorate but</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July</em> 21, 1984, p. 1736.
<em>Newsweek</em>, November-December, 1984, p. 88.</p>

<p>     25-749</p>

<p>     370 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 371</p>

<p>     find a dominating theme for their platform favorably differing from
the Republican.^^1^^ If this were the case, the reason lay not with
Mondale 's personal shortcomings but rather with the fact that the
overall ideological and political crisis in the party had not been
overcome as it entered the 1980s.</p>

<p>     The elections showed the further development of the 1980s
tendency toward electoral polarization along class and property lines,
which was a natural outcome of the conservative policy of revenue
sharing reflecting the growing gap between the well-to-do and the
&quot;other America.&quot; The spread between the poorest and richest (10
percent of the population) supporters of Reagan was 43 points as
compared with 16 points in voting for Eisenhower in 1956 (
according to Martin P. Wattenberg from National Election Studies).^^2^^</p>

<p>     A similar trend was even more obvious at the level of party
identification where the spread between the same groups of voters
(favoring Democrats over Republicans) had grown from 40 points
to 69 points by 1984.^^3^^ Of course, these changes pointed not to the
growing popularity of Democrats among the lower strata in
American society but rather to their rejection of the Republicans. Neither
can the election results be regarded as reflecting the true proportion
between the victims of the conservative policy and those benefitted
by it in view of the unproportionately large role of the latter in the
US political process. It is clear, however, that under the existing
class pattern of political participation and the specific
circumstances of 1983-1984, the Republicans managed to knock together
a coalition of the privileged.</p>

<p>     It is quite another question whether the Reagan coalition would
prove to be stable enough to turn the Republican Party into a firm
majority party. In that sense the results of the 1984 elections were
far from clear-cut and did not fit into simplified schemes of either a
final realignment in favor of the Republicans (as their leaders hoped)<SUP>4
</SUP>or a personal victory for Reagan as some Democrats would have us
believe. A number of developments---the progressive weakening of
the Democrats in presidential elections since 1968, a rise in partisan
identification with the Republicans (particularly among the youth)</p>

<p>     rather to activize the existing potential supporters by increasing
participation, above all of female voters, taking advantage of the
&quot;gender gap.&quot; Mondale followed the same reasoning in his campaign,
which was dramatically demonstrated by his choosing Jeraldine
Ferraro as candidate for Vice-President (contrary to traditional
considerations of sectional balance) and focussing his main efforts on the
traditional bastions of the party---the industrial Northeast and
Midwest.</p>

<p>     At the same time, the Democratic leaders feared further
alienation of the more conservative-minded sections and the big
bourgeoisie which had rejected the party in the 1980 election. That was why
the left wing was rallied by purely technical, manipulative methods
without a real offensive program of action, which undoubtedly
reduced the effectiveness of that effort. It was hard to expect that the
appeals to reduce the federal budget deficit (in part by ``fairly''
cutting certain social programs and raising taxes) pervading the
Democratic platform and Mondale's speeches and abundantly sprinkled
by egalitarian rhetoric combined with an extremely vague version of
neoliberal &quot;industrial strategy&quot;, could rally the masses to the
struggle against Reaganism.</p>

<p>     The foreign policy plank of the Democratic platform offered a
more realistic alternative to the Republican course because it
included positive moves to relax international tensions and normalize
American-Soviet relations. But here too, seeking to pose as the
&quot;party of American strength&quot; capable of coping with the alleged
&quot;Soviet threat,&quot; better than the Republicans, the Democrats paid
tribute to militarism and anti-Sovietism. In sum, this dual strategy
resulted in an obvious decline of enthusiasm on the left without any
gains in the center and on the right, as was the case in Carter's
times. Mondale received a majority of votes only in a few groups
most loyal to the Democratic Party: union households (53 percent),
Jewish (66 percent), blacks (90 percent), unemployed (68 percent),
Hispanics (65 percent) and under 12,500 dollars in income (53
percent) (whose turnout remained traditionally low), while the outflow
from the Democratic Party of white Southerners, middle sections
and part of the working class, which began in the late 1960s,
continued unabated.^^1^^ Mondale himself acknowledged after the elections
that the chief trouble of the Democrats was that they had failed to</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The New York Times</em>, November 8, 1984.</p>

<p>     <em>The Washington Post National Weekly Edit ion</em> .January 6, 1986, p. 23.
<em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     See: George Bush, &quot;1984: The Year the Republicans Became the Majority Party
<em>The Brookings Review</em>, No. 2, Winter 1985, p. 4.</p>

<p>     372 Chapter Sixteen</p>

<p>     The ``Rolling'' Realignment:
Late 1970s and Early 1980s 373</p>

<p>     and in voter judgement of the party's ability to cope with the
country's basic problems^^1^^---pointed if not to a completed realignment of
forces then to the shaping of conditions for a more long-term
consolidation of Republican positions among the active electorate. At
the same time, what obviously meets the eye is the total lack of
depth in Republican victory which practically failed to touch the
other levels of interparty rivalry---congressional and local elections---
where the Democrats continued to prevail. The exception here was
the more extensive Republican offensive in the South, but this
constituted a delayed completion of the realignment of the New Deal
times rather than a fundamentally new development of the 1980s.
No wonder split ticket voting achieved a record level in 1984 over
the postwar period. It seemed that, instead of transferring full
power to the Republicans, the voters preferred to retain a strong
countervailing force in the shape of Democratic Congress.
According to public opinion polls, the same thing is indicated by the refusal
of most voters to regard the Republican Party as the country's
leading political force and also support by most of them of &quot;divided
government.''^^2^^ In this respect the Reagan landslide resembled not the
Democratic triumphs in 1936 which really consolidated the
realignment in the two-party system but rather Nixon's victory in
1972. As distinct from the 1972 campaign, the Republicans made
maximum use of the &quot;presidential coattails&quot; effect trying to turn
the election into a referendum on the President and his policy,
while the lion's share of the enormous political resources of the
Republicans, their allies and the President himself was mustered in
deliberate effort to develop the party's success in depth.</p>

<p>     All this contradicted the classical realignment model to such an
extent that even some sober-minded pro-Republican observers and
experts were forced to admit that it was, at best, &quot;a rolling
realignment&quot; which could move either way.^^3^^</p>

<p>     Thus, although it failed to solve many of the basic problems
(and created a number of new ones), the attempt to implement the
program of Reagan Republicans led to a temporary rallying round
the party of the right-wing conservative coalition and increased the
alternative element in the two-party system. Ironically, as the pro-</p>

<p>~^^1^^ See, for example: <em>The Gallup Report</em>, No. 235, April 1985, pp. 22-27.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Harris Survey</em>, December 2, 1985, p. 2.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Public Opinion</em>, December/January 1985, pp. 62, 63.</p>

<p>     -minent political scientist James McGregor Burns put it, in terms of
ideology, Republicans were mobilized &quot;behind one of the most
narrow, negative, and backward doctrines---market conservatism---any
major party had embraced in modern American history, and behind
a most dangerous foreign-policy doctrine of indiscriminate,
belligerent, hard-nosed anti-Communism.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     It was this negative attitude of contemporary American
ultraconservatism that in the final count determined the transient nature
of its political successes and the weakness of its social base.
Although the Republicans managed to take advantage of the crisis of
liberalism at the turn of the 1980s, the basic objective trends in the
development of contemporary American capitalism---growing
socialization of production, extension of the government's regulating
role, and the weakening of US formerly dominating positions in the
world---continued to operate, as a collective study by Soviet
Americanists concluded^^2^^, and were contrary to all the principal postulates
and the spirit of the latest version of Republican conservatism.</p>

<p>     The party realignment might have been more complete had the
Democrats responded to the offensive on the right by rallying
liberal-democratic forces on the basis of a new left liberal alternative.
As some American experts suggested, such a course of events could
result in a serious revitalization of the party-political struggle and
improvement of the political climate as a whole.^^3^^ But this proved
impossible due to the class nature of the leading political parties
and in view of the absence of strong pressure from the left. The
Democrats decided to adapt the liberal credo to the conservative
agenda, attempting to make the swing to the right in government policy
more acceptable to broad sections of American society and better
conform it to real capabilities of the United States. Once again, this
strengthened the element of consensus in relations between the
parties but failed to overcome the recent crisis of the two-party system
under which neither Democrats nor Republicans were able to find a
realistic program to solve the new national problems that could gain
the support of the bulk of the population in the country.</p>

<p>     James M. Burns, <em>The Power to Lead</em>, p. 70.</p>

<p>     <em>Contradictions of Modern American Capitalism and the Struggle of Ideas in the
United States</em>, ed. by Y. A. Zamoshkin, R. G. Bogdanov, E. Ya. Batalov, Nauka Publishers,
Moscow, 1984 pp. 410-411 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     Walter Dean Burnham, <em>American Politics in the 1980s: Development and Scenarios</em>,
(Mimeographed), 1984, pp. 19-20.</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 375</p>

<p>     <b>A TIME OF POLITICAL
DISILLUSIONMENT: THE
TWO-PARTY SYSTEM
AND VOTERS IN
THE 1970s- EARLY 1980s</b></p>

<p>     seriously threatened.^^1^^ Since all three components of the party are
closely linked to each other, a change in one gives rise to relevant
processes in the other components.</p>

<p>     These changes will be seen even if one takes a cursory glance at
the results of voter turnout in presidential elections and they are
compared with those of elections at other levels. But they will strike
the eye if one makes a more detailed analysis of voter party
affiliation, activities in support of party candidates, the evolution of
attitudes to parties and of general views of the social and political
system, and the principles and operation of bourgeois democracy in
the United States. Although this chapter deals chiefly with the
1970s and early 1980s when these processes were most clearly
evident, it is to be noted that they have been of long-term nature and
not confined to the framework of that period.</p>

<p>     Thus, voter absenteeism in the presidential elections has been a
stable trend for a number of years: 62.8 percent of eligible voters
participated in the 1960 election, 61.9 percent in 1964,60.9 percent
in 1968, 55.2 percent in 1972, 53.5 percent in 1976, and 52.6
percent in 1980.^^2^^</p>

<p>     These data show that the most substantial changes occurred
between 1968 and 1976 when participation was almost at its lowest
level in the 20th century (43.5 percent in the 1920 presidential
elections). In some states participation in presidential and midterm
elections at the turn of the 1970s plunged to 30-40 percent.^^3^^ If in the
1960s an absolute majority of Americans took part in the national
and local elections, in the subsequent period only half or even less
participated in the process.</p>

<p>     In 1984, despite the special efforts and enormous possibilities
of the Republican Party to register and rally voters, the number of
registered voters increased by four percent as compared to 1980
(from 70 to 74 percent), according to public opinion polls.
However, only 53 percent of those registered were absolutely certain that
they would vote in the elections. The preliminary returns of the elec-</p>

<p>     V. O. Key, Jr., <em>Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups</em>, Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
New York, 1944, pp. 243-272.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>The Gallup Report</em>, No. 230, November, 1984, p. 20.</p>

<p>     W. Burnham, &quot;American Politics in 1970's: Beyond Party?&quot; in: <em>American Party
System. Stages of Political Development</em>. Oxford University Press, New York, 1977,
p. 339; Dennis J. Palumbo, <em>American Politics</em>, Appleton-Century-Grofts, New York,
1973, p. 514.</p>

17

<p>     Instability of the political process and aggravation of the
negative phenomena, the symptoms of which were to some extent evident
in the US party-political system at an earlier date, made many
American bourgeois historians, sociologists and political scientists
describe these phenomena as a crisis, decline and degradation of the
main bourgeois political parties in the United States.^^1^^</p>

<p>     ``As instability has developed in the total society, political
constants too have declined,&quot;^^2^^ wrote Gerald M. Pomper. Another
prominent author, Paul Kleppner, emphasized that the &quot;disintegrative
process&quot; and &quot;the functional decline of the country's political
parties&quot; and their inability &quot;to mobilize a mass electorate&quot; resulted in
&quot;widespread disillusionment with electoral politics.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     The spread of political disillusionment and a decline in the
influence of the two-party system in the 1970s and early 1980s was
most obvious in the weaker control of the parties over the masses, a
fall in the prestige of the party leaders and the parties themselves,
and a narrowing of their base. As a result, what is regarded by
American political scientists as fundamental to the modern bourgeois
party---the threetier model consisting of the party electorate, party
organization, and party caucus in federal government bodies---was</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., <em>Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of
America's Political Parties</em>, W.W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., New York, 1978; A. Ranney, &quot;The
Political Parties: Reform and Decline&quot;, in: <em>The New American Political System</em>, edited by
A. Kyng, Washington, 1978; William J. Grotty, Gary C. Jacobson, <em>American Parties in
Decline</em>, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1980.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Gerald M. Pomper, <em>Voter's Choice. Varieties of American Electoral Behavior</em>,
Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, New York, 1975, p. 19.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Paul Kleppner, <em>Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout 1870-1980</em>,
Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 112.</p>

<p>     376 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 377</p>

<p>     tions showed that 92 million people voted for either Reagan or
Mondale, which was about 52.5 percent of all citizens eligible to vote.^^1^^</p>

<p>     It is very important to find out whose participation in the
elections has declined. The data show that absenteeism is not a new
phenomenon in American political life. Moreover, the ruling circles
even gained some advantages from the situation whereby poor
Americans withdrew from the political process and formed the bulk of
the inactive electorate.</p>

<p>     The US party-political elite was quite content with the
traditional apolitical attitudes, low level of information and ideological
conviction not only of the absentees but also the principal mass of
voters among whom the &quot;dependent voter&quot; prevailed until the early
1960s.</p>

<p>     The portrait of such a voter was vividly painted by the authors
of <em>The American Voter</em>, a monumental work which was published
in 1960s. The authors noted that although many voters responded
knowingly to problems on which legislative or administrative
actions might be taken, &quot;the citizenry is almost completely unable to
judge the rationality of government actions&quot;^^2^^ or what the parties
proposed.</p>

<p>     The result was that most of those regularly participating in
elections firmly affiliated themselves with one of the two bourgeois
parties and supported its platform and candidates for various elected
offices, including that of the President. Moreover, the party was
chosen on the basis of family, group, occupational or other
traditions.</p>

<p>     These specific features in the electorate's political behavior were
``scientifically'' substantiated in the concept of normal voting which
indicated that in any election the supporters of the Democratic
Party would vote for the Democratic candidates and the Republicans
for &quot;their own&quot; candidates.^^3^^</p>

<p>     The theory was marked by an arrogant and scornful attitude on
the part of the bourgeois ideologists to the ordinary American
citizens and their ability to find their bearings in the political situation
and make an independent choice. For example, a basic conclusion
of <em>The American Voter</em> was that &quot;knowing little of ... policies ... the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Derived from <em>The Gallup Report</em>, No. 230, November, 1984, pp. 20, 21.</p>

<p>     A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, D. Stokes, <em>The American Voter</em>, Wiley New
York, 1960, p. 543.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ Gerald M. Pomper, <em>Voter's Choice. Varieties of American Electoral Behavior</em>, p. 19.</p>

<p>     mass electorate is not able to appraise either its goals or the
appropriateness of the means chosen to serve these goals.''</p>

<p>     Of course, it would be naive to deny the apolitical attitudes
widespread in the United States or insufficient knowledge among the
voters. However, it would seem that the causes of such voter
behavior in the first postwar decades should be sought in deeper specific
features in the operation of the party-political system in the United
States at the time.</p>

<p>     First, with both bourgeois parties being integrated at the time in
the state-monopoly system, there was a temporary decline in the
polarization of political forces and an increase in the homogeneity
of the parties and the political elite in the 1950s.</p>

<p>     Another important feature of the period was the relatively
favorable economic situation and social and economic gains made by
the masses, which gave rise to an exaggeration of the achieved
results and an insufficiently critical attitude to bourgeois parties and
political institutions.</p>

<p>     This created particularly favorable conditions for the flourishing
of the simplified, market pattern of the political process when &quot;the
problem of political decision-making is reduced to a choice between
two salesmen of political merchandise, the differences between
whom are of secondary importance and only indirectly reflect the
interests of the bulk of the population.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     Under the circumstances it was difficult to expect a socially
grounded choice from the politically unsophisticated voter, and in view
of this, family, group and other voting traditions acquired increased
weight and importance, as did the inertia of political behavior.</p>

<p>     The postwar restructuring of the party-political system reflected
the ruling circles' adaptation to the new social, economic and
political situation in the United States highlighted by state-monopoly
capitalism's becoming the basis of American society. The aim of the
restructuring was to &quot;develop a mass base which would, on the one
hand, secure the stability of political institutions, and on the other,
would not affect them in a way detrimental to the power and
interests of bourgeois ruling circles.''^^2^^</p>

<p>~^^1^^ F. M. Burlatsky, A.A. Galkin, <em>The Modern Leviathan</em>, My si Publishers, Moscow,
1985, p. 112 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     <em>New Developments in the Mechanism of the Monopolies' Political Domination</em>,
Part I, the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International
Relations, Moscow, 1975, p. 42 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     378 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     . A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 379</p>

<p>     popularity of the Democratic Party began to decline, which was
largely linked to Johnson's policy in Southeast Asia; this was
accompanied by a decrease in the number of Republicans particularly after
the Watergate scandal involving Nixon's Republican
Administration.''^^1^^ As a result, by the end of the 1970s the share of both
parties' supporters had fallen to 60-65 percent, while the share of
independents had correspondingly risen to 35-40 percent.^^2^^</p>

<p>     The inner structure of groups of both parties' backers also
changed to the worse. American political experts divide the parties'
followers into ``strong'' and &quot;not strong&quot; and undecided. In 1964
both parties had an approximately equal number of ``strong'' and
&quot;not strong&quot; supporters (38 percent). Subsequently, while the
overall number of both tended to decline due to an increase in the
number of the independents, the number of ``strong'' supporters of
both parties was falling much more rapidly.</p>

<p>     Thus the public opinion surveys conducted by the National
Opinion Research Center of Chicago in 1972-1982 showed that the
``strong'' Democrats constituted 16 percent, &quot;not strong&quot; Democrats
25 percent, independent voters gravitating toward the Democrats
12 percent, simply independents 12 percent, independents
gravitating toward the Republicans 8 percent, &quot;not strong&quot; Republicans
14 percent and ``strong'' Republicans 7 percent. The sum of both
parties' ``strong'' backers was only 23 percent, while the overall
number of &quot;not strong&quot; supporters was 39 percent, and
independents 32 percent.^^3^^</p>

<p>     A similar picture was revealed by another survey conducted in
1980 on the eve of the elections. The pollsters asked different
questions to find out party affiliation, and the results were almost
identical. Asked to say whether they regarded themselves as supporters
of a political party, only 39.4 percent of the polices answered in the
affirmative and 58 percent negatively.^^4^^ Asked to say which party</p>

<p>     N.P. Popov, <em>Politicization of Public Awareness in the United States</em>, Nauka
Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 86 (in Russian).</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, <em>American National
Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978</em>, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
(Mass.), 1980, p. 81.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ See: <em>National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago. General
Social Surveys, 1972-1984</em>, Chicago, 1984.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>American National Election Study, 1980</em>, Vol. 1, <em>Pre- and Post Election Surveys,
Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan</em>, Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982, p. 189.</p>

<p>     However, this phenomenon had an acute inherent contradiction.
To retain their dominating positions the ruling minority did not have
to involve the broad masses in the political process. It is even
undesirable to do so. This explains why the American bourgeoisie had
consistently adhered to the market pattern in the two-party system
aimed at painlessly transferring power from one party to another
and, as a result, low participation and involvement in politics by the
citizens.</p>

<p>     At the same time, the bourgeoisie has a vested interest in
retaining its influence over the masses, and this requires reckoning with
their interest and involving them in the political process. In this sense
growing absenteeism has been a potentially dangerous
phenomenon for the American political system.</p>

<p>     What emerged in a concealed form in the 1950s came out into
the open as a result of the economic and political upheavals in the
1970s. Absenteeism not only grew in terms of quantity but also
changed in terms of quality. Virtually all the demographic
categories of the electorate were now represented in this group, including
the most educated voters and members of the middle class.</p>

<p>     Contemporary American political scientists point out that if the
above trend were to continue the question would inevitably arise as
to &quot;the stability and representativeness of American political
institutions.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The crisis in the two-party system in this period was not
exhausted by growing absenteeism. The decline in partisan loyalties was
also an important factor. It was seen in a continuously falling
number of supporters both of the Democrats and the Republicans and
an increase in ``independents'' supporting neither party.</p>

<p>     Until the mid-1960s the category of independent voters rose
only slightly, but the decisive trend was an increase in the number of
supporters of the party in power at the expense of the opposition
party. Such a redistribution of votes was the result of the parties'
rivalry for a mass base. This did not threaten the existence of the
two-party system, but, on the contrary, enabled it to keep an
overwhelming majority of the electorate (up to 85-89 percent) under its
political control.</p>

<p>     Since the mid-1960s, Soviet scholar N.P. Popov, wrote, &quot;the</p>

<p>     William J. Crotty, Gary C. Jacobson, <em>American Parties in Decline</em>, Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, 1980, p. 247.</p>

<p>     380 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 381</p>

<p>     advantage of the Republican Party but at the same time did not give
it a decisive lead over the Democrats. As a result, the term &quot;
majority party&quot;, applied to the Democrats since the 1930s, gradually
disappeared. Data of polls conducted during 1984 feature
differences in party identification depending on the time of the poll. This
is a new development. Thus a national telephone poll conducted
jointly by the CBS and <em>The New York Times</em> in mid-October 1984
showed a 14 percent lead by the Democrats, while a similar poll
conducted a month later indicated both parties' equal popularity
among the electorate. Particularly large fluctuations (up to 41
percent) in party identification were observed among the white
population in the Southern states and among younger voters,
although these changes affected all voter categories to some extent.
Prominent American political scientist Everett Ladd ponders
over the &quot;present-day meaning of party identification and its
constancy. We have long assumed that party identification reflected
deep loyalties---not easily changed. A group might vote for another
party in a given presidential election, even in a number of elections,
and still not abandon its ancestral party ties.''^^1^^ The author argues
that the meaning of changes in electoral behavior today lies in a
considerable part of the electorate refusing to show any party
preference, easily denying their vote to the candidate from ``their'' party
and making &quot;party identification a more casual matter than it ever
has been before.&quot; The contemporary voter has weaker party ties.
Mass political behavior does not tend &quot;to recreate the extent and
degree of stability in party ties that they displayed in the New Deal</p>

<p>     they supported, 15 percent said the Republican Party and 22
percent the Democrats (total 37 percent).</p>

<p>     At the same time when the question was put somewhat
differently: &quot;Do you ever think of yourself as a political independent or
not?&quot; 42 percent of the polices answered yes and 55 percent no.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Even if we take into account differences in responses and the
inaccuracy of the survey, there is every reason to believe that the
share of independent voters in 1980 did not tend to decline but, on
the contrary, increased.</p>

<p>     Political events in the United States between 1980 and 1984
and particularly the impressive victory scored by Reagan and Bush
over the candidates of the Democratic Party, Mondale and Ferraro,
gave rise to different appraisals and judgements concerning the
party loyalty of American voters. The most debated question was
whether there was a fundamental shift by the voters toward the
Republican Party.</p>

<p>     Public opinion polls do not provide a clear answer. Thus, Gallup
surveys showed that the number of Republican Party supporters
grew from 28 to 35 percent in 1984 and that of the Democratic
Party backers declined from 41 to 38 percent and of independents
from 31 to 27 percent.^^2^^</p>

<p>     At the same time the 1984 survey data of the Chicago National
Opinion Research Center showed only slight fluctuations in party
affiliation as compared with 1972-1982; ``strong'' Democrats from
16 to 17 percent; &quot;not strong&quot; Democrats from 25 to 19 percent;
independents gravitating toward the Democratic Party from 12 to
14 percent; independents from 12 to 11 percent; independents
gravitating toward the Republican Party from 8 to 10 percent; &quot;not
strong&quot; Republicans from 14 to 16 percent; and ``strong''
Republicans from 7 to 8 percent.^^3^^</p>

<p>     An analysis of data from other 1984 polls together with similar
1980 information enables us to conclude that the influence of the
Republican Party continued to grow slowly due to a decline in the
number of Democratic Party supporters, while the number of
independents remained the same or changed slightly both ways.
There was an evening out of the popularity level which was to the</p>

<p>     <em>^^1^^ ibid.</em>, p. 192.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ The Gallup Report</em>, No. 230, November, 1984, p. 25.</p>

<p>     <em>National Opinion Research Center (NORC), General Surveys 1972-1984</em>.</p>

<p>     era.</p>

<p>     The rise in the number of ``independents'' and &quot;not strong&quot;
supporters, and changes in party identification promoted &quot;issue
voting&quot; or &quot;ticket splitting.&quot; The implication is that the voter in an
election supports a candidate not because of his party identification
but on the basis of the candidate's stand on major domestic and
foreign policy issues. Thus, the voter supports candidates from
different parties in various elections, and it becomes difficult to predict
the outcome of an election.</p>

<p>     This phenomenon was not widespread in the 1950s. But during</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Everett Carl Ladd, &quot;On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential
Elections&quot;, in: <em>Political Science Quarterly</em>, Spring 1985, p. 22.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 23.</p>

<p>     382 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 383</p>

<p>     negative attitude.^^1^^ An overwhelming majority of voters (70
percent) said it was better to choose a candidate without paying
attention to his party affiliation. More than half of the polices (51
percent) agreed that &quot;parties do more to confuse the issues than to
provide a clear choice on issues.''^^2^^ Very serious ``anti-party''
attitudes were also apparent in the fact that 44 percent of the polices
agreed that &quot;it would be better if, in all elections, we put no party
labels on the ballot,&quot; and 22 percent agreed to a larger extent (and
another 7 percent to a lesser extent) with the statement that &quot;we
probably don't need political parties in America anymore.&quot; And 58
percent of those polled believed, while 35 percent disagreed, that
&quot;parties are only interested in people's votes but not in their
opinions.''^^3^^ That there is a stable credibility gap was also confirmed by
subsequent polls. In 1984, for example, most voters expressed
dissatisfaction with the election system. Thus, 53 percent (against 35
percent) favored a reform of the election system, 67 percent were
for abolishing party conventions and nominating presidential
candidates at national primaries. Voters wanted to vote not only for
candidates but also for issues and policy problems; they supported the
idea of abolishing the electoral college and introducing a direct
election of the President.</p>

<p>     In analyzing the reasons for the existing situation American
bourgeois political scientists referred to the most varied problems
which, in their opinion, negatively affected the functioning of the
two-party system. Most of them sought to explain the parties'
decline from the viewpoint of pluralism resorting to the principle of
multiple reasons. However, in the interpretation of bourgeois
authors this principle leads only to eclecticism and confusion of
various concepts, the objective and the subjective, and cause and
effect. The hierarchy of causes and an analysis of their essential
meaning are almost totally absent. As a result the explanation is
submerged in a host of causes from the enhanced role of the mass media,
electronic press, and the fall in the influence of party machines to
general social structural shifts occurring outside the parties.</p>

<p>     Almost all the authors mention changes lying on the surface of
the electorate's empirical features, in particular the fact that it had</p>

<p>     the September 1976 Gallup poll, 60 percent of the polices said that
the presidential candidate's stand on basic political issues was
foremost in their voting choice, 21 percent indicated personal qualities,
and only 12 percent mentioned the candidate's party identification.^^1^^</p>

<p>     A Gallup poll after the 1976 election showed that on the whole
56 percent voted for candidates from different parties and 41
percent for candidates of one party. The percentage of those who
voted for different parties was even higher (83 percent) among the
independents, whites (60 percent), voters with a college education
(67 percent) and voters from 25 to 29 years of age (77 percent).^^2^^</p>

<p>     In 1980, 60 percent of votes went for different parties and only
37 percent for the straight ticket. In the 1984 presidential election
a majority (54 percent) voted for different parties and a smaller
number (43 percent) for the straight ticket.^^3^^ As a result, even in the
states where Reagan had a 30-40 percent lead, Democrats could be
elected senators (Georgia, Nebraska, Oklahoma).</p>

<p>     On the basis of these trends, some American political scientists
advance the hypothesis of greater voter neutrality and cynicism in
respect to political institutions.</p>

<p>     However, data of the Michigan Center for Political Studies and
most works by leading political experts suggest a direct link
between a party's weaker influence on the electorate and growing
disillusionment in the activity of parties and critical judgements on
their abilities to represent the interests of ordinary voters.^^4^^</p>

<p>     Obvious disillusionment of voters in the two-party system was
seen in the low level of confidence in parties and critical judgements
concerning their activity. Political parties in the mid-1970s enjoyed
the lowest level of confidence (2 percent) as compared with the
Supreme Court (35 percent), the President (27 percent) and the
Congress (25 percent).^^5^^</p>

<p>     In 1980 only seven percent of the voters thought that the
parties were doing a very good or good job and 26 percent indicated a</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1972-1977</em>, SR Scholarly Resources Inc., Vol. 2,
Wilmington, 1979, p. 883.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 922-923.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>The Gallup Report</em>, No. 230, November, 1984, p. 11.</p>

<p>     Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, <em>American National
Election Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-1978</em>, p. 318;S. Craig, &quot;The Decline of
Partisanship in the United States: A Reexamination of the neutrality hypothesis in: <em>Political
Behavior</em>, No. 1, 1985.</p>

<p>     <em><SUP>s</SUP></em> See: <em>American National Election Study, 1976</em>.</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>American National Election Study, 1980</em>, Vol. 1.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ Ibid.</em>, pp. 197, 198.</p>

<p>     <em>^^3^^ Ibid.</em>, pp. 198,616.</p>

<p>     384 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     do&laquo;n ivo,u, 1980s) 385</p>

<p>     grown younger and better educated. It has been pointed out that
since the mid-1960s each consecutive generation of voters has been
growing more and more &quot;independent.&quot; In 1952 the share of
independents in the oldest (older than 66) and the youngest (21 to 25
years) age groups of the electorate was 20 and 25 percent,
respectively, whereas in 1974 the figures were 23 and 53 percent.^^1^^</p>

<p>     However, this fact in itself fails to answer the question why in
1952 most young people supported both parties, while twenty
years later a considerable number of them have become neutral or
taken a critical stand toward the two-party system. In addition, the
rise in the number of independents was typical of all age groups,
although not to the same extent.</p>

<p>     As to the fact that the electorate has become more educated, it
may be assumed theoretically that the result would be better
knowledge of political problems and more consistent action. But why
does the better knowledge and consistency turn against the
twoparty system? Does that mean that more knowing people do not see
much sense in political clashes between the parties?</p>

<p>     Bourgeois sociologists and political experts cannot just ignore
the questions. They seek to find answers to them in the fact that
party positions and activities have been inadequate to the realities
of society's life in the United States. Paul Kleppner writes: &quot;Party
politics proved irrelevant to the resolution of emerging tensions
because the sociopolitical conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s crosscut
the partisan cleavage lines that had originated in the Great
Depression.''^^2^^ Among these conflicts the author pinpoints &quot;race, Vietnam,
and quality-of-life issues.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Another prominent contemporary political scientist, Gerald
Pomper, also offers a similar system of arguments. He notes that
there was a &quot;redefinition of political disputes&quot; and conflicts
involving 'Very basic values rather than merely opposing interests.&quot; These
include patriotism, anti-Communism and the military intervention
problem aggravated by the US aggression in Vietnam, the way--
oflife issues brought about as a result of the generation gap, the more
heated polemics on equality in connection with racial conflicts,</p>

<p>     Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John R. Petrock, <em>The Changing American Voter</em>
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1977, p. 60.</p><p>
'</p>

<p>     Paul Kleppner, <em>Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout 1870-1980</em>
p. 136.</p>

<p>     <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 136-137.</p>

<p>     etc.^^1^^ All the above changes, as the author sees them, reflect political
modernization in the United States which determines changes in the
electorate's political behavior.</p>

<p>     Reiterating Samuel Huntington's ideas, Pomper believes that in
the past &quot;America's development has shown more of an economic
than political character.''^^2^^ As a result, the &quot;modernizing process is
evident in four trends: increased political participation, the loss of
traditional authority, national integration, and the growth of
ideology.&quot; In view of this &quot;the role of political leadership&quot; is
particularly critical. 'The electorate is capable of responsiveness, but the
parties and candidates must appropriate stimuli for creating a
response.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     The concepts presented above undoubtedly reflect certain
realities in contemporary American society. Both authors acknowledge
the existence of social and political contradictions and conflicts, the
widening gap between the political elite, bourgeois parties and
masses of voters, and politicization and ideologization of public
consciousness. In this sense, a certain step forward has been made as
compared with former consensus, structural-functional, and &quot;end
of ideology&quot; theoretical models of the political system, which
somewhat enriched the analysis of social and political problems
and helped accumulate theoretically useful analytical material.</p>

<p>     At the same time the extent to which bourgeois social science
has progressed should not be exaggerated. The meaning of the
concepts used and their ideological and methodological basis are
important in theory. Former concepts were modernized and renewed
because it was no longer possible to deny the existence of acute social
contradictions and conflicts. However, this does not change the
substance of the approach taken by bourgeois theoreticians to the
problems under consideration. That approach is still marked by
multidimensional analysis, a gap between the subjective and the
objective, politics and economics, socio-political conflicts and
underlying contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, and the
glossing over of class differentiation of American society.</p>

<p>     Paul Kleppner only vaguely refers to changes beyong the
twoparty system pointing to the rise in the United States of &quot;massive</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Gerald M. Pomper, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 15.</p>

<p>     <em>^^2^^ Ibid., p</em>. 13.</p>

<p>     <em>'Ibid.</em>, p. 15.</p>

<p>     26-749</p>

<p>     386 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     institutional systems&quot; (corporations, the machinery of government),
structural changes, and geographical mobility, without disclosing the
importance and essence of these concepts.^^1^^</p>

<p>     Pomper adheres to the theoretically highly dubious concept of
separate economic and political development. But the essence of
that concept lies in the desire to picture modern social and political
conflicts as extra economic, provide a psychological explanation of
these phenomena, and reduce everything to values, emotions and
willpower. As many other political experts, both authors believe
that previously the difference between the two bourgeois parties
was based on different socio-economic interests and views on the
role of government. But now, they claim, these issues have been
pushed to the background, while top priority has gone to values to
which the parties are unable to adapt. Therein lies the cause of the
electorate's disillusionment and a decline in the parties' influence.</p>

<p>     Attempting to prove the concept, Pomper embarks upon an
extensive analysis of the sources and roots of political behavior and
the shaping of the Democratic and Republican parties' mass base.
He writes that originally the behavior of voters was underpinned by
social-class factors such as income and occupation. Since then,
however, much has changed. Pomper argues: &quot;If social position
dictated political preference, most workers should be Democratic and
most of the middle class Republican, but such polarization has
never been evident.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Analyzing the makeup of the supporters of each party, he
concluded that their &quot;social-demographic variables&quot;^^3^^ had become
increasingly similar. Among such factors as parent partisanship,
occupation, class self-identification, education, religious affiliation, sex,
and age only the first, according to Pomper, has any relation to
party affiliation.^^4^^</p>

<p>     In analyzing the political behavior of voters in the 1970s, the
author assumes that class and other social-demographic variables do
not determine a predisposition to some party, and that party
affiliation of voters, in turn, no longer has a dominating effect on the
results of the voting. What, then, underlies political behavior?</p>

<p>     To answer this question Pomper divides the entire electorate</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Paul Kkppner, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 138, 139.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Gerald M. Pomper, <em>op. cit.</em>, p. 27.</p>

<p>~^^3^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 28.</p>

<p>~^^4^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 30.</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 387</p>

<p>     not into classes or large social groups but simply into two parts. He
calls members of one part &quot;dependent voters&quot; and the other &quot;
responsive voters.&quot; In the case of the &quot;dependent voter,&quot; in Pomper's
view, &quot;social class is a direct influence, permanent in its effects,
with little variation from one political context to another.&quot; In
making a political choice such a voter takes into account &quot;nonpolitical
characteristic,&quot; that is, his or her economic condition.^^1^^</p>

<p>     The same factors have a different effect on the &quot;responsive
voter.&quot; &quot;While his class affects his life, its political relevance is indirect,
and it becomes salient only when he considers issues and parties
which deal with economic matters. The relationship between status
and the ballot ... changes with ... the character of the election and
the policy views of the citizenry.''^^2^^</p>

<p>     Unable to completely deny the existence of classes in the
United States and their influence on political behavior, Pomper finds a
convenient way out by predicting two major trends of subsequent
development: either &quot;complete disappearance of status polarization&quot;
or retention of &quot;class differences&quot; as &quot;a potential basis for
American politics.''^^3^^</p>

<p>     Similar theories are widespread in American bourgeois political
science and political sociology.</p>

<p>     Contrary to such ideas Marxist-Leninist sociology lays emphasis
primarily on the objective, material, economic and class nature of
social and political activity including the behavior of individual
people and social groups. L.A. Nechiporenko, a Soviet expert on
sociology, writes: &quot;Of course, as the study of any form of social
interaction, investigation of social conflicts implies attention to the
emotional and willpower components. But only taking into account
the decisive part of material conditions in which people live and the
objective nature of contradictions as the basis for social clashes
enables us to correctly appraise the role of the subjective factor in
social conflicts.''^^4^^</p>

<p>     An analysis of events which have occurred in American society
in the 1970s and early 1980s shows that society have been racked
by the most serious economic and political upheavals since the</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 43.</p>

<p>     <em>Ibidem</em>. 
~^^3^^ <em>Ibid., p</em>. 64.</p>

<p>     L.A. Nechiporenko, <em>Bourgeois &quot;Conflict Sociology&quot;</em>, Politizdat Publishers,
Moscow, 1982, p. 47 (in Russian).</p>

<p>     388 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 389</p>

<p>     1930s. As a rule, bourgeois ideologists perceive them as isolated
incidents without linking them to the underlying contradictions of the
capitalist mode of production. The Marxist approach to these
problems implies a comprehensive analysis of their common roots.
From the Marxist standpoint, despite their variety and large number,
these critical phenomena are part and parcel of the general crisis of
capitalist society.</p>

<p>     The situation in the country has changed substantially since the
1960s when there was no shortage of various theories intended to
prove that capitalism was forever rid of economic crises and had
become a system with no poverty and social antagonisms. In the 1970s,
the United States came face to face with stagflation, chronic
unemployment, a decline in labor productivity, lower family incomes,
aggravation of tensions between labor and capital, an upsurge in the
strike movement, disfunctions in the currency and financial system,
the energy crisis, chronic fall of output in a number of industries,
environmental pollution, the urban crisis and many others. Finally,
mention must be made of the 1974-1975 cyclic crisis, deepest since
the 1930s, a crisis which the system of state-monopoly regulation
was unable to prevent.</p>

<p>     The scope and depth of the above phenomena were so great
that they inevitably had an impact on political life in the United
States. It is therein that one should look for the basic causes of the
stronger instability of the political process, major changes in the
functioning of the two-party system, the political behavior and
attitudes of the mass voter.</p>

<p>     Of course, the links between economics, relations of production
and concrete politics constitute a most complicated problem. The
links do not always lie on the surface and are usually difficult to
describe and study, as the bourgeois political experts would like it,
by using a purely empirical approach and a set of only a few
variables. This is particularly true because the data are gathered
according to a quite definite scientific and ideological approach, which
often determines the outcome of research.</p>

<p>     It is particularly difficult to discover the links if all phenomena
of public life are considered independently, in isolation from each
other, and the objective is mixed with the subjective. The argument
that economic problems had been pushed to the background in the
1970s and the politico-cultural values the parties were not used to
had come to the fore, does not hold water and is contrary to the</p>

<p>     realities of life and politics in the United States.</p>

<p>     It is quite another question that in the 1930s government
intervention in the economy really did give rise to acute ideological
struggle between parties. The leadership of the Democrats sought to
implement the principles of states-monopoly reforms, while the
Republican Party was in the opposition on this issue advocating the
conservative bourgeois-individualist approach.</p>

<p>     As time went by, two important circumstances emerged that
changed the situation the parties and voters were used to. First of
all, the Republican Party had finally adopted the state-monopoly
ideology, which removed the former acuteness of strife between
parties and changed the nature of their rivalry. Second, the
effectiveness of former methods of government regulation of the economy
and social processes had obviously declined, and a crisis and swing
to the right of neoliberalism had become clearly visible. Right-wing
statism was increasingly coming to the fore as the leading alternative
combining elements of conservatism and state-monopoly activism.</p>

<p>     That the parties addressed voters with the same rhetoric when
dealing with social and economic issues made the content, rather
than form, of the interparty struggle more important. Under the
circumstances party labels and other formal signs began to play a
relatively smaller role, and the voters visibly drifted toward the issue
approach and greater independence from the parties in voting.</p>

<p>     That tendency received a strong impulse as a result of the
deterioration in the material condition of the mass of voters who had
every reason to lay the blame for this on both Democrats and
Republicans in the 1970s. This was supplemented by widespread
disillusionment in the ruling circles' policies in view of the US debacle in
Vietnam, the blame for which lay with the Democrats, and the
Watergate scandals involving the Republican Party.</p>

<p>     It was also an incontestable fact that far from all the numerous
problems disturbing the voters fitted the Procrustean two-party
policy. Nor did both parties provide adequate answers to the questions
they dealt with in their activities. Spontaneous, uncontrollable
processes proved to be stronger in the United States at the time than
those which could be controlled by the bourgeois political system
and its institutions.</p>

<p>     In considering the political behavior of members of different US
classes in the 1970s and 1980s, it is necessary to point out that we
are concerned with the most widespread and at the same time the</p>

<p>     390 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-F.arly 1980s) 391</p>

<p>     simplest forms of political action---electoral behavior. This behavior
is manifested, first, in voters' response (positive or negative) to the
operation of the political system and its institutions, which, in
itself, does not suggest the polices' activeness, and second, in regular
participation in delegating authority (voting) in elections.</p>

<p>     The Marxist approach to the analysis of elementary forms of
political behavior has nothing in common with vulgar economic
determinism. From the standpoint of Marxist theory, the relationship
between material factors of life and social (including class) awareness
(and behavior) is a complicated, multifaceted dialectic process.
Objective conditions shape a definite political consciousness which
determines political behavior. Changes in objective conditions occur in
the course of specific political action and struggle. It is important to
understand that there is no automatism and rigid unilateral
determinism in these processes. Development and change in material
conditions does not happen by itself but as a result of specific actions
by people who take into account the actual objective conditions.</p>

<p>     Classes and social strata are an objective phenomenon of
capitalist society. But their nature and activity, the balance of power
between them and the level of class consciousness depend on numerous
historical conditions and specific features. Hence &quot;there is no direct
coincidence between the class status of an individual and his political,
including electoral, behavior, since the actual social position, its
perception by that individual, and the political conclusions made on
the basis of these perceptions and the subsequent political behavior
are linked to each other by a system of complicated relations which
are also subject to outside influence.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The social and class structure of capitalist society is a complex
phenomenon which cannot be reduced simply to income,
occupation or class self-identification. Lenin wrote: &quot;Classes are large
groups of people differing from each other by the place they
occupy in a historically determined system of social production ... by
their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by
the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose
and the mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of
which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different
places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.''^^2^^</p>

<p>~^^1^^ F.M. Burlatsky, A.A. Galkin, <em>op. cit.</em>, pp. 272-273.
V. I. Lenin, &quot;A Great Beginning&quot;, <em>Collected Works</em>, Vol. 29, p. 421.</p>

<p>     It should be taken into account that classes (for example, the
working class in the United States) consist of many social layers. In
addition, there are intermediary interclass social strata. That is why
it is such a complicated task to determine the political orientation
and electoral preferences of individual classes and strata. It cannot
be reduced to an analysis of one or two variables built on the basis
of subjective data obtained by polls and sociological surveys.</p>

<p>     In appraising the political behavior of American workers in the
period under consideration, we are dealing with a political process
which occurs only within the framework of the bourgeois
partypolitical structure controlled by two leading bourgeois parties. The
mass consciousness and political behavoir of American workers
are highlighted by strong and long-term domination by bourgeois
ideology and, as a result of this, their support for the two-party
system.</p>

<p>     In the course of the political process propositions and ideas
reflecting the class status and interests of the workers tend to combine
with ideas alien to these interests. That is why the class bias of the
workers' mass consciousness and political behavior do not emerge in
a pure form as an expression of class requirements and interests but
prove to be contradictory and distorted. This is particularly true
since the policies of the US bourgeois parties do not serve as
stimulators of working people's class interests but are aimed at eroding
them.</p>

<p>     The political monopoly of the two bourgeois parties, as well as
the growing homogeneity of their mass base, does not point to the
disappearance of classes in the United States. Moreover, the
abovementioned negative trends in the functioning of the two-party
system, politicization of the voters' mass consciousness, increasing
critical attitudes and the stable growth in the number of independents
indicate the aggravation of contradictions and intensification of
class struggles in the 1970s.</p>

<p>     Classes in the United States exist objectively and independently
of the two-party system. According to estimates made by Soviet
scholars on the basis of American national statistics, the US working
class numbered 76,600,000 at the end of the 1970s or 76.6
percent of the gainfully employed population.</p>

<p>     Taking not one election but a longer period as the basis, it is
quite safe to refer to identical processes occurring in the social
structure of society on the whole and in the electorate. The larger</p>

<p>     392 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Karly 1980s) 393</p>

<p>     is a chief cause why workers are unable to gain a true idea of their
class identity.</p>

<p>     However, even these indirect data and variables make it possible
to discover differences in the political behavior of workers and
other groups of the population.</p>

<p>     Let us, for example, take the problem of absenteeism. Most
analysts who considered the question indicated a clear-cut trend
toward polarization into the active and passive parts of the electorate.
Absenteeism is more widespread and grows at a faster rate among
the lower sections of society promoting changes in the social
makeup of absentees. At present, no one would deny that most of
those who do not vote in the United States (70-80 percent) &quot;fit the
stereotype of being less educated, less affluent, more urban, and less
often white.''^^1^^ It is not difficult to notice that these are
characteristic features of the social category of blue-collar and production
workers employed in industry, services, and government service
who make up the larger part of the working class.</p>

<p>     According to the data of surveys, people belonging to this
category have less hopes than the rest of the electorate to improve their
condition, show less confidence in basic political and economic
institutions and political leaders, and are more disillusioned with them.</p>

<p>     Data of this sort forced even some American political scientists
to conclude that the &quot;aggregate decline in turnover has been far
from neutral in terms of class.''^^2^^ The direct relation between
income, education, occupation and turnout shows that the poor tend
to increasingly drop out of the traditional political process.</p>

<p>     The question of class differences among those who come to
the polls gives rise to many more debates and disagreement than
an analysis of the problem of absenteeism. This is only natural.
Class delimitations in this field are glossed over by contradictory,
intersecting interests, judgements, hopes and purposes because the
political process of action and choice occurs in relation to two
parties which are homogeneous in social and class terms and
display agreement on basic problems (private property, the political
system, etc.).</p>

<p>     Voter turnout should therefore be regarded as a sign of loyalty</p>

<p>~^^1^^ Richard J. Jensen, <em>Grass Roots Politics, Parties, Issues, and Voters, 1854^1983</em>,
Greenwood Press, Westport (Conn.), 1983, pp. 144, 145.</p>

<p>~^^2^^ Thomas E. Cavanagh, &quot;Changes in American Voter Turnout, 1964-1976&quot;, in:
<em>Political Science Quarterly</em>, Spring 1981, p. 58.</p>

<p>     part of the electorate consists of the working class and the middle
sections, and the smaller part of the middle and big bourgeoisie.</p>

<p>     American sociologists and political scientists divide the social
structure into four classes (lower, working, middle and upper) or
five classes (lower, working, middle, upper middle, and upper).
According to a whole series of regular polls conducted by the
Chicago National Opinion Research Center in 1972-1984, 2.6
percent of the polices identified themselves with the upper class, 40
to 42 percent with the middle class, 42 to 44 percent with the
working class and 4.5 percent with the lower class.</p>

<p>     In 1982 a special poll was conducted among the black
population: 4.8 percent identified themselves with the upper class, 28
percent with the middle class, 57 percent with the working class and
2.8 percent with the lower class.</p>

<p>     Even according to this self-identification, about 60 percent of
the population belonged to the working class and lower sections,
although it is well known that such a classification is based on
income levels and not real class membership. Often, members of the
petty bourgeoisie or middle sections identify themselves as
belonging to the working class, while many workers attribute themselves
to the middle class.</p>

<p>     Nevertheless, class relations are reflected in the consciousness of
the working people when the concept of property, rather than
income, begins to appear in polls. When asked in 1984 whether
traditional differences between property owners and workers continued
to exist in the United States and whether a person's social status
depended on his belonging to the upper or lower class, 15.6 percent
of the polices strongly agreed, 50.9 percent somewhat agreed,
21.9 percent somewhat disagreed, and 6.2 percent strongly
disagreed.^^3^^</p>

<p>     It is difficult to discover trends in American workers' political
behavior also because available political data and surveys divide the
electorate into numerous groups according to income, occupation,
education, religion, membership in labor unions or other
organizations.</p>

<p>     As the classification of jobs, this classification of the electorate</p>

<p>     i</p>

<p>     <em>National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1984.
'&#8226; Ibidem</em>.
' <em>Ibidem</em>.</p>

<p>     394 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-Early 1980s) 395</p>

<p>     of part of the electorate to the political parties and other political
institutions, i.e. as a factor to some extent uniting different groups
of the population.</p>

<p>     Class differences are manifested among the active part of the
electorate only indirectly and to a limited extent. They operate via
contradictions within classes reflected in the activity of the two
bourgeois parties. Relations between the parties in each specific
historical period may or may not be marked by acute political conflict
and rivalry. In other words, they may express intra- and inter-class
contradictions or lead away from them. It is hardly easy for the
ordinary voter to find his bearings in these intricate contradictions
and understand whether the party he has favored in the past
advocates his real interests or not.</p>

<p>     The voter's response to possible changes in the parties' policies
is restricted to a definite set of actions: he can turn to another
party, take a neutral stand, vote for candidates from different parties
or refuse to take part in the political process altogether. The latter
case has already been briefly considered. It remains to be seen
whether class differences are disclosed in the voting and party
preferences.</p>

<p>     Over several decades since the 1930s, some presidential
elections (1936, 1948, 1964) have featured voting along class lines. This
occurred when class contradictions were clearly apparent in the
parties' policies. It was during this period that the Democrats became a
majority party. A stable stereotype has emerged showing the
Democratic Party as the working man's party, a party for everyone, while
the Republicans were made out to be a minority party reflecting
privileged money interests.</p>

<p>     However, since the mid-1960s the crisis phenomena mentioned
above have become evident. And the disintegration of parties and a
weakening of their links with the masses affected the Democratic
Party as the majority party to a greater degree than the Republicans.
But the substantial difference between the mass base of the
Democrats and the Republicans has remained. If we take the totals from
the data of the Chicago National Opinion Research Center for 1972-
1984 as a basis and bring together various occupational groups of
the electorate into two large groups, including independent
businessmen and managers in one (bourgeois) group, and all hire employees
and workers in the other, then we can gain an idea of class
differences in the parties' mass base (percent):</p>

<p>     Classes</p><p>
Strong Not strong Ind Ind Ind Not Strong Other</p>

<p>     Dem</p><p>
Dem</p><p>
Dem</p><p>
Rep Strong Rep parties</p>

<p>     Rep</p>

<p>     Bourgeoisie</p>

<p>     11.5</p>

21

<p>     14.7</p>

<p>     11.5</p>

11

<p>     17.6</p>

<p>     10.7</p>

2

<p>     Worki ng</p>

<p>     class</p>

<p>     19.1</p>

<p>     26.4</p>

<p>     12.9</p>

<p>     12.5</p>

<p>     7.2</p>

<p>     13.8</p>

<p>     6.1</p>

2

<p>     Derived from: <em>National Opinion Research Center. General Social
Survey, 1972-1984</em>.</p>

<p>     In calculating the figures in the upper row of the table, the
total number of persons belonging to the bourgeoisie and the middle
sections was taken as 100 percent; in the bottom the total number
in the lower categories of office and industrial workers. The table
shows that both parties have an almost equal share of supporters
among the upper and middle sections of society. The largest
proportion of the bourgeois class made up &quot;not strong&quot; Democrats (21
percent) and &quot;not strong&quot; Republicans (17.6 percent). The groups
of strong supporters of both parties were approximately equal.
Among the blue- and white-collar workers the largest groups are
``strong'' (19.1 percent) and &quot;not strong&quot; Democrats (26.4
percent). The total number of supporters of the Democratic Party was
45.5 percent, while Republican backers constituted 19.9 percent or
more than twice as few.</p>

<p>     Our attention was drawn to a sufficiently high share of
independents among the workers (32.6 percent), of whom those
sympathizing with the Democrats (12.9 percent) also outnumbered the
Republican sympathizers (7.2 percent); among the workers there were
even more pure independents than in the upper sections.</p>

<p>     A similar picture of party preferences in the upper and lower
strata of American society is given by the surveys carried out by
Michigan University in the 1970s and the 1980s, despite the fact
that the 1980 poll, for example, was not sufficiently accurate and
representative. Thus, in the total number of respondents by
occupation (1,444 persons) the proportion of higher managerial personnel
and part of the middle strata made up an overwhelming majority
(67.5 percent), while the group of lower white-collar workers and
industrial workers made up only 32.4 percent, which was obviously
at variance with the social structure of American society.</p>

<p>     In the 1970s and early 1980s the bulk of the Democratic mass</p>

<p>     396 Chapter Seventeen</p>

<p>     A Time of Political Disillusionment</p>

<p>     (1970-F.arly 1980s) 397</p>

<p>     some headway in this direction in 1983-1984. However, the
Republicans' platform, their conservative domestic policy providing tor
cuts in vital social spending, and also their foreign policy which in
the first half of the 1980s was marked by an arms buildup,
rejection of constructive Soviet proposals contradicted the objectives
they have set themselves. On the one hand, the growing budget
deficit discredited the postulates of Reaganomics. On the other hand,
however, the positive changes in Soviet-American relations (
particularly success of the Washington summit) have promoted the
Republican Administration's prestige.</p>

<p>     base still consisted of white- and blue-collar workers. The main
change in comparison with previous years was in the growing
number of independents in that category. The increase in the share
of independents and &quot;not strong&quot; Democrats among the workers in
this period made the situation so contradictory because ordinary
Americans, while remaining loyal to former political ideals and
stereotypes, were obviously disappointed and dissatisfied with
specific Democratic policies, which, in turn, undermined and
transformed old views. This, however, does not prove that workers were
growing more conservative yet. An analysis of the parties' mass base
and voting results does not support the hypothesis. A small
majority of the working people preferred the Republicans in 1972 and
1984 when the principal factor influencing their choice was the
hope that the unfavorable economic condition of the masses would
improve. The results of the 1980 elections are contradictory and
inconsistent, but they fail to show a change in the balance between
supporters of Democrats and Republicans among the worker voters.</p>

<p>     The events of the last 10-15 years have shown that serious
changes are occurring in the functioning of the two-party system in
the United States which undermine the influence of parties as
apolitical institution. The causes of these developments lie both in the
electorate and the political parties. Better educated and informed
voters with a slightly higher level of political awareness tend to take
a more critical attitude to parties, which reduces automatism in the
political behavior of the electorate and restricts the possibilities of
the parties in manipulating mass consciousness and behavior. This
long-term process coincided in the period under consideration with
aggravation of social, economic and political contradictions, and the
condition of society's lower sections. This has bred widespread
disillusionment with the parties' policies among a broad group of voters.
The Democratic Party was hurt most of all because it had been the
majority party for many years. The Democrats lost the 1980 and
1984 presidential elections, yet the events of 1986 and 1987 (the
1986 midterms, the Iran-Contras affair, and the fall 1987 currency
upheavals) helped the party to boost its prestige.</p>

<p>     Over the recent years the Republicans have launched wide-scale
efforts to gain the positions left by the Democrats, secure the
support of the broad voter masses and win the status of majority
party. A slight improvement in the economic situation, and
President Reagan's personal popularity helped the Republicans to make</p>

<p>     Conclusion 399</p>

<p>     <b>CONCLUSION</b></p>

<p>     sphere of influence, and bringing various social groups into
amorphous coalitions, the parties largely manipulate the electorate's
political behavior. The seesaw of the two-party system is
simultaneously a kind of shock absorber protecting the American government
machinery from abrupt jolts: if the political course of a governing
party is discredited or obviously fails, this leads not to a loss of
faith in the system as such but only to a change in the party decor in
the Washington halls of power. The parties continue to fulfill other
important functions. They foster, train and sift through the
personnel from among whom government staff is recruited from the local
alderman to the US President. Finally, it is mostly of party material
that the bridge between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue---the
White House and Congress-is built today, parties are still the most
reliable link between different branches of government.</p>

<p>     Then is it possible at all to refer to a crisis of parties in
presentday America? It certainly is. But critical developments are rooted
not only in structural and functional changes in the party-political
system, as American political experts often suggest, not only in
changes in the procedure and system of election funding or new
techniques of election campaigning with an emphasis on extensive
use of the media, political consultant companies and personification
of the candidates, and not only in general antipartisan attitudes
among Americans.</p>

<p>     The underlying causes of the crisis in the two-party system
should be sought in the growing contradiction between the objective
course of history and the direction the US ruling class and its
parties would like it to take. The entire set of problems facing the
country (frequent and deep economic depressions, chronic
inflation, mass unemployment, enormous budget deficits, and the falling
standard of living of society's lower sections) demonstrated that the
political course and ideological views of the major parties were
untanable and that these parties were unable to propose and
implement an effective program of government. Both the Republicans'
and the Democrats' aggressive foreign policies and global ambitions
for a Pax Americana sharply contradict the realities of the modern
world and the interests of an overwhelming majority of the
American nation.</p>

<p>     The weakening of US positions in the capitalist world economy
and the growing domestic economic difficulties reduced the
possibilities of the parties in social maneuvering and wooing different</p>

<p>     <em>This</em> book which examines the 200-year-long history of political
parties in the United States reflects the growing interest of Soviet
historians in this political institution.</p>

<p>     The shrewd reader may wonder whether it is worth investigating
American parties in such detail since, if we are to believe most US
political experts, the parties are losing their basic functions and
approaching their decline. Indeed, contemporary US political
sciences are dominated by the idea of a crisis and decline of parties most
clearly expressed in the works of scholars of End of Parties school
and its unofficial leader, Walter D. Burnham.</p>

<p>     One tends to agree with many conclusions reached by American
authors, but it would seem that individual signs of their growing
weakness do not eliminate the importance of parties in the system
of the US ruling class's domination. No wonder President Reagan's
short inaugural address on January 21, 1985, included words of
praise for the parties: &quot;Our two-party system has served us well
over the years but never better than in those times of great
challenge when we came together not as Democrats or Republicans but
as Americans united in a common cause.''^^1^^</p>

<p>     The flexibility of the parties relying on the strongest economic
potential in the capitalist world, and their omnipresence in all the
echelons and at all levels of the political system help the US ruling
circles survive the acute social and political crises and adapt to an
environment of growing class contradictions. Parties are still
actively used to influence society ideologically with the aim of furthering
respectable bourgeois values. Retaining the population within their</p>

<p>~^^1^^ <em>U.S. News</em> &amp; <em>World Report</em>, February 4, 1985, p. 65.</p>

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<p>     400 Conclusion</p>

<p>     groups of the electorate. The narrow framework of the two
bourgeois parties makes it increasingly difficult to propose programs and
solutions answering the interests of all sections of the population.
So it is not accidental that there is growing disillusionment in the
institution of parties and increasing alienation of citizens from the
party-political system.</p>

<p>     <b>A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY</b></p>

<p>     <b>OF WORKS BY SOVIET</b></p>

<p>     <b>AUTHORS ON THE HISTORY</b></p>

<p>     <b>OF US POLITICAL PARTIES</b></p>

<p>     <em>AMepuKUHCKoeoOiyecTeeHHOe MHeuueu HOJIUTUKO</em>. M., 1978.</p>

<p>     AHTOHOBa Jl.A. <em>PacKOJi e KOKHOM Kpbuie deMOKpatuiecKou</em> napruu <em>ua ewoopax
1948 i. -</em> B KH.: <em>UpoGneMbi aMepuKanucTUKu</em>. Bwn. 2. M., 1983.</p>

<p>     AmoHOBa Jl.A. <em>UapTuuHbiu annapar pecnyonuKUHCKou napntu,---</em> ,,CIiIA: 3KOHO-</p>

<p>     a, nojiHTHKa, HfleonorHa&quot;, 1984, N^^8^^ 2.</p>

<p>     ApSaTOB T.A. <em>Paaeunie coyuanbHbix u noauruiecKux npou.eccoe e CIlIA HO
coepe3Tane. -</em> ,,BecTHHK AH CCCP&quot;, 1978, N^^5^^ 2.</p>

<p>     Eaft6aKOBa Jl.B. <em>K eonpocy o ,,MXHOU crparezuu&quot; pecnyoauKancKou napruu CMA
70-x---Havana 90-x zodoe XIX e,) . -</em> ,,BeciHHK MOCKOBCKOFO yHHBepCHreTa&quot;,
cep. 8, HCTOPHH, 1982, <em>W</em> 2.</p>

<p>     EaftGaKOBa Jl.B. <em>HezpurxucKuu eonpoc e nojiuruxe pecny6auKaHCKOu napruu
COIA (Koaey 70-x - wwio 80-x eodoe XIX e.) </em>. - ..Hoaaa H HOBeftmaa HCTOPHH&quot;,
1982, N&raquo; 6.</p>

<p>     BenHBCKaa H.A. <em>Eypxya3Hbiu pe$opMU3M e CMA</em>. M., 1968.</p>

<p>     EejiHBCKaa H.A. <em>Teodop Pyse&amp;tbT u oGiuecreeHHonojiuTimecKax xusub e CMA</em>.
M., 1978.</p>

<p>     BepoKKOB B.M. <em>BosepaiueHuedeMOKpaToe</em>. -,,CUIA: 3KOHOMHKa, nojiHTHKa,
nneonorHa&quot;, 1976, N&raquo; 12.</p>

<p>     EOBT FT. <em>noauitux pecny&amp;iUKOHCKou napruu no eonpocy pe$opMbi epaxdancKou
cjiyx6bi e COIA (1880-1883) . -</em> B KH.: <em>CouuaribHax crpyKrypa u oGuiecreeHHbie
deuxenux e CTpawx Eeponbi u AMepuKu</em>. M., 1984.</p>

<p>     EOBT FT., fleMeHTbeB H.n. <em>BOCCUSM u Koppynuux e deyxnapmuHou cucreMe
CMA eo etopou nonoeune XIX e. -</em> ,,HoBaH H HOBefluiaa HcropHa&quot;, 1985, N^^8^^ 4.</p>

<p>     EottMeHKo P.P. <em>noaunmecKCM opeaHu&amp;yua CMA. OSmecTseHHbie uHCTuryibi u ux
esauModeucTeue c eocydapcreoM</em>. MHHCK, 1970.</p>

<p>     BonxoBHTHHOB H.H. <em>CMA: npodaeMbi ucropuu u coepetteHHaa ucmpuozpacjiux</em>.
M., 1980.</p>

<p>     EoiKapeB A.T. <em>ffeMOKparutecKan naprua CMA Ha eviGopax 1896 i. -</em> B KH. :
<em>Ilpo6neMbi Hoeou u Hoeeuuieu ucropuu crpan Eeponbi u AxiepuKu</em>. M., 1978.</p>

<p>     Battjib H.M. <em>HeKompbie ocobeuHocru paseumx napruuHOu cucreMbi CMA. -</em>
B KH. : <em>HadupaTejibHbie cucieMbi u napruu e GypxyamoM eocydapcree</em>. M., 1979.</p>

<p>     BanepHHa A.O. <em>Pojib EecnapruuHOu patioveu Jiuzu eo eHyTpunojiunivecKou 6opb6e
e CMA (1936-1938 es.j .---</em> ,,BecTHHK MOCKOBCKOFO yHHBepcirreTa&quot;, cep. 8, HCTOPHH,
1975, N8 6.</p>

<p>     BaniojKeHOT A.B. <em>AMepuKaucKuu nudepajiusM: UJUIKISUU u peatibHOcn</em>. M., 1976.</p>

<p>     BaraojKeHOT A.B. <em>ConuanucruvecKax Mbiaib u deuxenuee CMA</em>. M., 1983.</p>

<p>     Bnacosa M.A. <em>AMepuKaucxan cucrejaa T.Knen u ee ponb e udeuuoM cranoejieHuu</em></p>

<p>     27-749</p>

<p>     Soviet authors on the history
402 of us parties</p>

<p>     Soviet authors on the history</p>

<p>     of us parties 403</p>

<p>     <em>euzcKou napruu. -</em> B KH.: <em>IJpo&amp;ieMbi noeou u Hoeeuuieu ucTOpuu</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     <em>BOUHO 3a nesaeucuMOCTb u oSpasoeaHue CDIA</em>. IIoH pen. T.H. CeBocTbaHosa. M.,
1976.</p>

<p>     BonbcpcoH C.B. <em>OOocHoeaHue JJxc.Q. JJajmecoM eneiUHenonuTutecKou npozpaMMbi
pecnyojiuKOHCKOu napruu na npesudenrCKUx ebiobpax e CllIA e 1952 z. -</em> B KH. : <em>
Bonpocbi ucropuu u MexcdyHapodHbixoTHouteHuu</em>. Bun. 7. TOMCK, 1976.</p>

<p>     rajTKHH H.B. <em>Eopb6a cppaxuuu ua Koneenre deMOKparuvecKou napruu CDIA e
1924 z.---</em> B KH.: <em>IJpotineMbi HOGOU u Hoeeuuieu ucropuu</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     TaJiKHH H.B. <em>napTuuHo-nonuTutecKax ucropux CUIA 1920-1930-x zodoe e
oceeuteHUU ajaepuKOHCKou GypxcyasHou ucropuozpatfiuu. -</em> ..Hosaa H HOBeftmaa Hcropna&quot;,
1983, N9 5.</p>

<p>     TaHTMaH B., MHKOHH C. <em>CDIA: TocydapcTeo. UOJIUTUKO. Bbioopbi</em>. M., 1968.</p>

<p>     FeeBCKHH H.A. <em>PecnyonuKaHifbi u fOz: enepa, cezodnx, saerpa.---</em> ,,CIIIA:
SKOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, Hfleonorna&quot;, 1970, N^^8^^ 8.</p>

<p>     FeeBCKHH H.A. <em>JJeMOKpam e HOUCKOX npozpaMMbi. -</em> ,,CIIIA: SKOHOMHKa,
nonnTHKa, HfleojiorHH&quot;, 1984, N^^8^^ 6.</p>

<p>     TepmoB 3.M. <em>Bydpo Busibcon</em>. M., 1983.</p>

<p>     TjiarojieB H.H. <em>3eoniou.ux Tpaduituonajiustta pecnySnuKOHCKOu napruu. -</em> ,,CIHA:</p>

<p>     <b>3KOHOMHK3, nOJIHTHKa, HfleOnorHS&quot;, 1974, N<SUP>g</SUP> 9, 10.</b></p>

<p>     TpOMbiKo AnaT.A. <em>1036 dneu npesudema Kemedu</em>. M., 1970.</p>

<p>     flapMHeB A.H. <em>Mxceccu ffxeKCOH u vepHbie uaGupareau e KOMHOHUU 1984 e.---</em>
,,CH1A: 3KoHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, Hfleonorna&quot;, 1985, N<SUP>s</SUP> 2.</p>

<p>     JJeMeHTbeB H.fl. <em>Hdeunax 6opb6a e CDIA no eonpocatt sKcnancuu (HO pyGexce
XIX-XXee.)</em>. M., 1973.</p>

<p>     Dementyev I. <em>Imperialists and Anti-Imperialists</em>, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979.</p>

<p>     HeMeHTbes H.n., MaHblKHH A.C., CHBaies H.B., CorpHH B.B., HSBKOB E.O. <em>
Keonpocy o nepuodusayuu ucropuu deyxnapruuHou CUCTCMM CDIA. -</em> B KH. : <em>Bonpocbl
MeTOOOJIOZUU u ucTopuu ucropuvecKou nayKU</em>. Bwn. 2. M., 1978.</p>

<p>     HeMeHTbeB H.n., CorpnH B.B. <em>O ponu udeonozuu e</em> ucropuu <em>deyxnapTUUHOU
cucMbi CDIA. -</em> ,,HoBaa H HOBeftuiaa HCTOPHH&quot;, 1980, N^^8^^ 6.</p>

<p>     fleMeHTbes H.n., MaHblKHH A.C., CmaqeB H.B., CorpHH B.B., JIsbKOB E.O. <em>
OHBKO&#8226;mpbix npuHi4unax (fiyHKiiuoHupoeaiwx deyxnapruuHou cucreMbi CDIA. -</em> ..BBCTHMK
MocKOBCKoro yHHBepCHreTa&quot;, cep. 8, HcropHH, 1981, N<SUP>s</SUP> 6.</p>

<p>     HySoBHUKHft r.A. <em>MeMOKpaiuiecKOH napruH u no/iuruvecKax 6opb6a e CUIA e
nepuod npesudeHTCTea M.BaH-Enpew (1836-1840). -</em> ..BBCTHHK MOCKOBCKOFO
yHHBepcHTeja&quot;, cep. 8, HCTOPHH, 1979, N<SUP>s</SUP> 3.</p>

<p>     flyGoBHUKHtt r.A. <em>fleyxnapTuuHaa CUCTCMO ,,deMOKpam-euiu&quot;: ocoSeHuocni u
pojib</em> e <em>nojiuruvecKOM paseuruu CIIIA e 30-50-e zodbi XIX</em> a. - B KH.: <em>Ms</em> ucropuu
<em>eHyipunoJiuTuiecKou 6opb6bi u oSutecreeHHou Mbicnu CDIA</em>. KyH6biiiieB, 1981.</p>

<p>     E4&gt;HMOB A.B. <em>CDIA: nyru paseurua KanurajiusMa</em>. (floHMnepHajiHcrmecKaa 3
noxa). M., 1969.</p>

<p>     )KaKOB A.H. <em>MeMOKpaTutecKaa naprua e Kompecce CDIA u ee no3uu,ux no
eonpoCOM PeKOHcrpyKifuu Mea (1865-1868) </em>. - B KH.: <em>Comia/ibHax crpyKTypa u o6
uiecTeeHHbie deuxenua e crpahax Eeponw u AmepuKu</em>. M., 1984.</p>

<p>     SonoryxHH B.n. <em>JJeyxnapniuHax CUCTCMU. -</em> B <em>KH.-.rocydapcreeHHbiu crpou CDIA</em>.
M., 1976.</p>

<p>     SonoryxHH B.n. <em>AMepuKancKax deyxnapTuunax CUCTCMO: coepeMeuubie
reudenUuu. -</em> ,,CIIIA: 3KOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, Hfleonorna&quot;, 1975, N^^5^^ 2.</p>

<p>     SonoTyxHH B. <em>Hroeu ebiGopoe e CUIA. -</em> ..Mnposaa 3KonoMHKa H</p>

<p>     Hbie oTHomeHHH&quot;, 1977, N&raquo; 1.</p>

<p>     SonoTyxHH B.n., JIHHHHK B.A. <em>BbiGopbi</em> 6 <em>Kompecc: MexamsM u TeudeHtfuu. -</em>
,,CIIlA: aKOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, Hfleonorna&quot;, 1978, N^^8^^ 10.</p>

<p>     SopHH B. <em>RoMiapvi u nojiuruKa BawuHZTona</em>. M., 1964.</p>

<p>     SopHH B. <em>Kpu3uc deyxnapTUUHOU cuciettbi. -</em> ,,CDIA: sKOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa,
Hfleonorna&quot;, 1970, N^^8^^ 2.</p>

<p>     3opHH B.C., CaaieHKo B.n. <em>Kpusuc deyxnapTUUHOU cucreMbiu 6ydyiu.ue eviGopbi</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>-</em> ,,C!lIA: SKOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, jweonorna&quot;, 1979, N^^8^^ 6.</p>

<p>     HsaHOB P.(D. <em>rpaxcdaHCKUH eoum e CDIA (1861-1865)</em>. M., 1960.</p>

<p>     HsauoB P.O. <em>AepaaM JIuHKOJibH u epaxdancKax eouna e CDIA</em>. M., 1964.</p>

<p>     HuaHou P.O. <em>B.H.JIemho CoeduneHHbix Ulramx AMepumi</em>. M., 1965.</p>

<p>     HsaHoB <em>P.&reg;. flyauT 3u3eitxay3p</em>. M., 1983.</p>

<p>     HBanaH 3.A. <em>Eejibiu MOM: npesudembi u nojiuruKd</em>. M., 1979.</p>

<p>     tfcropu*C7tt4.B4-XTOMax.T. 1 (1607-1877). M., 1983; T. 2 (1877-1918). M., 1985.</p>

<p>     KepTMan T.J1. <em>floKTpuw cou.u&lt;vibHOU OTeeTcieeHHOCTu 6usneca u nosuifux
pecnyBnuKOHCKOu adMUHucrpau.uu e CDIA (1924-1929). -</em> B KH,: <em>npd6netia&gt;i noeou u
Hoeeuuteu ucropuu</em>. M., 1979.</p>

<p>     KepTMaH T.JI. <em>Bopb6a e pecnySauKancKou napntu CDIA no eonpocaM uanoaoeou
nonuTUKU (1925-1928). -</em> ,,BecTHHk MOCKOBCKOFO yHHsepCHTexa&quot;, Cep. 8. HcTopna.
1980, N^^8^^ 5.</p>

<p>     KoseHKO B.fl. <em>,,Hoean deMOKparux&quot; u eouna. BHyrpemxx nonuruKO CUIA (1914-
1917)</em>. CapaTOB, 1980.</p>

<p>     KoaeHKO B.jl <em>IIpoipeccusM e deMOKpanmecKou</em> napruu. - B KH.: <em>Ms ucropuu
enyTpunojiuruvecKOU 6opb6bi u odutecreeHHOU Mbicnu CDIA</em>. KyH6bimeB, 1981.</p>

<p>     KOKOUIHH A.A. <em>CUIA : sa diacaooM zaooajibHou HOJIUTUKU. (BHyrpeHme dxiKiopbi
dJopMupoeanux eHeumeti nonuTUKU ajaepuKOHCKoeo uttnepuanusMa na nopoze 80-x
zodoej.M.</em>, 1981.</p>

<p>     KOKOUIHH A.A. <em>CDIA: xpusuc nosiunmecKou enacru</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     Kormilets A.A., &quot;The Democratic Party in the Northern United States during the
First Part of the Civil War (1861-1862)&quot; in: <em>Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta</em>, Series 8,
History, No. 6, 1982.</p>

<p>     KpacHOB H.M. <em>IIpesudeHTCKue ebioopbi e CDIA 1924 z. -</em> ,,HoBan HHOBettuiaa
HCTopna&quot;, 1979.NS6.</p>

<p>     <em>K CTOJieiwo zpaxoaHCKOu eounbi e CUIA</em>. non pen. A.B. EcpHMOBa H JI.H. 3y6oKa.
M., 1961.</p>

<p>     KyponsTHHK T.n. <em>(DepMepCKoe deuxceuue a CUIA, Or epeuudzcepoe K Hapodnou
napruu. 1867-1896 ez</em>. M., 1971.</p>

<p>     KypoiKHHa E.B. <em>MxcHoe Kpbiao deMOKparuteCKOu napniu CUIA e 1933-1935 zz. u
,,HO8biu Kypc&quot;</em> 0. <em>Pyseenbia.---</em> B KH. : <em>CoifuanbHaa crpyKTypa u oSutecTseHHbie
deuxceHuxe CTpanax Eeponbi u AtiepuKu</em>. M., 1984.</p>

<p>     Jlau B.H. <em>Knaccbi u</em> napruu <em>e CUIA. OtepKu cou.uajibHO-SKOHOMU'iecKou u
nonuruvecKou</em> ucropuu <em>CDIA</em>. M., 1937.</p>

<p>     Jlan B.H. <em>CUIA: OT ucnaHO-ajaepuKaHCKoii do nepeou Mupoeou eouHbl</em>. M., 1975.</p>

<p>     Jlan B.H. <em>CUIA : OT nepeou do eiopou Mupoeou eounbi</em>. M., 1976.</p>

<p>     JIaH B.H. <em>CDIA e eoeHHbieu nocneeoeHHbie zodbi</em>, M., 1978.'</p>

<p>     JlanuiHHa H.K. <em>3aKOHodaTeabHbiu npoifecc npu pasdeaennoM npaejieuuu (
npoxoxodeuue npozpaMMbi adttuHuCTpau.uu M. 3u3euxay3pa vepes 86-u Konzpecc 1959-1960 zz.)</em></p>

<p>     <em>-</em> B KH,: <em>UpoGfieMbi noeou u Hoeeuuieu ucropuu</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     B.A. <em>OcHoenbie GypxyasHbie nonutwecKue napruu u npotpcoiosbi CDIA</em>.</p>

<p>     27&raquo;</p>

<p>     Soviet authors on the history
404 of us parties</p>

<p>     Soviet authors on the history</p>

<p>     of us parties 405</p>

<p>     - B KH. : <em>Cou.ua/ibHax npupoda 6ypxya3Hbix napniii e coepeMCHHOM
KanuTajiucnivecKOMMupe</em>. KHCB, 1980.</p>

<p>     JIHHHHK B.A. <em>ITpesudeHTCKax KOMnmux K. MaKKapru 1968 e.---B</em> KH. : <em>
AjttepuKauCKUU exeeodnuK. 1972</em>. M., 1972.</p>

<p>     HHHHHK B.A. <em>C-bead e IUKOZO (Ms ucmpuu nonuTuwcKou GopbSbi</em> a <em>CMA 1960-x
zz.). -</em> ,,Bonpocbi HcropHH&quot;, 1978, N^^8^^ 6.</p>

<p>     MajibKOB B.J1. <em>,Jfosbiu Kypc&quot; e CIUA</em>. M., 1973.</p>

<p>     MaHHKHH A.C. <em>PecnyQnuKOHCKax nap-run CIUA a nouCKax onbTepHaruebi ,,uoaoMy
Kypcy&quot;. -</em> ,,BecTHHK MOCKOBCKOFO yHHBepcHTexa&quot;, Cep. 8, HcTopna. 1978, N^^8^^ 5.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C. <em>3eojiK&gt;uux opeawisaifuoHHou crpyKTypbi GypxyasHbix napniii.---</em>
,,CIIIA: 3KOHOMHKa, nonHTHKa, Hneojiorna&quot;, 1978, N^^8^^ 10.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C., CHBaies H.B. <em>JJeyxnapntuHax cucrejua e CMA: ucropux u
coepeMeHHocn (neKompbie MemdonoeuiecKue npoGneMbi uccaedoeamx). -</em> ,,HoBaa H
HOBeftuiaa HCTopna&quot;, 1978, N^^8^^ 3.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C. <em>Hcmpux deyxnapruuHou cucreMbi CU1A</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C. <em>Y. YIUIKU u zenesuc ,,uoeozo pecny6nuKauu3Ma&quot;. -</em> B KH.: <em>
AMBpuKOHCKuu exeeoduuK 1980</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C., &pound;3bKOB E.O. <em>Ponb rpenux napruu e napTUUHO-nojiuTuiecKou
cuereMe CDIA. -</em> ,,Bonpocbi HCTOPHH&quot;, 1981, N^^5^^ 2.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C. <em>MeyxnapTuuHax cucreMO Ha nepenyne</em>. - B KH. : <em>Upo&amp;ieMbt
amePUKOHUCTUKU</em>. Bun. 2. M., 1983.</p>

<p>     MaHblKHH A.C. <em>PecnyBnuKOHifbi HO nyru</em> a <em>Eejibiu OOM (deyxnapiuuuan CUCTCMO HO
py6exeSO-x zoooe XXe.). -</em> B KH.: <em>HpooneMbiOMepuKOHUCTUKU</em>. Bbin. 3. M., 1985.</p>

<p>     MmacaH T.E. <em>YipeduTeabUbiu ctesd u npedebiSopnan nnartfJopMa npoepeccuenou
napruu Fenpu Yojuieca.---</em> B KH. : <em>H3 ucropuu enyTpunonunmecKou 6opb6bi u
oSiyecr8CHHOU Mbicnu CM A</em>. KyH6bimeB, 1981.</p>

<p>     MHUIHH A. A. <em>FocydapcreeHHoe npaeo CIIIA</em>. M., 1976.</p>

<p>     Mopoa B.H. <em>ffeMOKpaTutecKosi naptun u paooiuu taiacc CIUA</em>. KHCB, 1971.</p>

<p>     HHKHTHH B.A. <em>CIIIA: npaebiu 3KcrpeMU3M - yzpoaa deMOKpatuu</em>. M., 1971.</p>

<p>     HiiKOJiacBa C.M. <em>Us ucmpuu OMepUKOHCKoeo KoncepearusMa nocaedneu rperu
XIX eeKa. -</em> B KH.: <em>Us ucmpuu eHyrpunonuTuiecKou SopbSbi u oSuiecreeHHoii
MbicJiu CIUA</em>. KyH6biiueB, 1981.</p>

<p>     HHKOHOB B.A. <em>OpzanusaituoHHaa nepecrpouKa e pecnya/iuKancKou napruu CDIA
nocne ee nopaxenua ua sbioopax 1964 z</em>. - B KH.: <em>UpodjieMbi noeou u Hoeeuweu
ucropuu</em>. M., 1980.</p>

<p>     Nikonov V.A., &quot;The Republican Party and Lyndon Johnson's 'Great Society'
Program&quot; in: <em>Vestnik MoskovskogoVniversiteta</em>, Series 8, History, No. 5, 1982.</p>

<p>     HHKOHOB B.A. <em>4&gt;edeptwu3M u Gypxyasubie nojiuruvecKue napruu. -</em> B KH.: <em>IJpoB-</em></p>

<p>     <b><em>JlSMbl OMepUKUHUCTUKU</em>. Bbin. 2. M., 1983.</b></p>

<p>     HHKOHOB B.A. <em>Bonpom paseuTux napruuHo-nojiuTuvecKou cucreiubi CIUA HO
crpaHUUOX .JlxcopHM o&lt;f&gt; nojiuniKc&quot;. -</em> ,,HoBaa H HOBenuiaa ncropHa&quot;, 1984, N^^8^^ 4.</p>

<p>     HHKOHOB B.A. <em>Or 3u3enxay3pa K HuKcouy. Hi ucropuu pecnyGnuKOHCKou napruu
CIIIA</em>. M., 1984.</p>

<p>     <em>,,Hoean nojiumnecKax ucropuu&quot; e CIUA: ananus Konnenifuu u nemdoe</em>. Pecpepa-</p>

<p>     <b>THBHblft cSopHHK. M., 1985.</b></p>

<p>     <em>O6u4ecTeeHHO-nonuTutecKue deuxceuuH e CIllA (60-e-Havajio 70-x eodoe XX e.)</em>.
M., 1974.</p>

<p>     <em>OvepKu Hoeou u Hoeeuuieu ucmpuu CDIA</em>. T. 1-2. IloA pen. T.H. CeBocTbanoBa.
M., 1960.</p>

<p>     HeTpoBCKaa M.M. <em>CMA: nojiuruKa CKeosb npusMy onpocoe</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     IleMaTHOB B.O. <em>ffeMOKpamiecKaH napmx CttIA:u36uparenu u nojiuruKa</em>. M., 1980.</p>

<p>     IleHaTHOB B.O. <em>JJeMOKpaTuiecKax napmx u ee MeKTOpare zodbi ,,Hoeozo Kypca&quot;</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>-</em> B KH.: <em>AMepuKOHCKuu exeeodnuK 1980</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     IleHaTHOB B.O. <em>MeMOKpam e nouctcax noeozo oQnuKa. -</em> ,,CIflA: 3KOHOMHKa,
nonHTHKa, HAeonorna&quot;, 1981, N^^8^^ 7.</p>

<p>     IleHaTHOB B.O. <em>ffeyxnapruuHaji cucrejua u</em> awfibpw. - ,,C!lIA: aKOHOMHKa,
nonnTHKa, Hfleojiorna&quot;, 1982, N^^8^^ 9.</p>

<p>     neiaiHOB B.O. <em>HeKompbie noebie Tendemtuu (pyHKyuoHupoeanux deyxnapmuHou
cucreMbi e 70-x - nawuie 80-x zoooe</em>. - B KH.: <em>UpoQaeMbi oMepuKauucruKu</em>. Bbin. 2.,
M., 1983.</p>

<p>     IleHaTHOB B.O. <em>FaMUJibmH u Hxecfic/iepcoH</em>, M., 1984.</p>

<p>     ILiexanoB C.M. <em>Meuxcenue JJxopdxa VoMieca.---</em> ,,HoBaa H HOBeftuiaa Hcropna&quot;,
1974, N^^8^^1.</p>

<p>     <em>IIonuTuiecKax xatSHb</em> e <em>CIUA. (IIpoBneMbi eHyrpeHHeu nojiuruKuj</em>. M., 1966.</p>

<p>     <em>TIoAUTutecKue napruu CIIIA e noeoeepejux</em>. Don pen. H.B. CnBaneBa. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     <em>UojiunivecKue napruu CIIIA e noeeuuiee epeMX</em>. tloflpeji. H.B. CHBanesa. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     IlonKOBa JI.H. <em>HdeuHo-nojiuruvecKOX npoepaMMa deMOKparuvecKou</em> napruu <em>CIUA
ua ewobpax 1916 z. -</em> B KH.: <em>Cou.uajibH.bie deuxcenux u paseurue o6u4ecreenHou Mbicnu</em>.
M., 1981.</p>

<p>     IIonoB H.II. <em>nojiuTU3au.ux Maccoeozo COSWHUX e CUIA</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     TTopmaKOB C.A. <em>OGpasoeanue pecnyGnuKancKou napruu (1854-1856 ee.).---</em> B
KH.: <em>Us</em> ucropuu <em>enyTpunoauTuvecKou 6opb6bi u oGwecreeHHOu Mbicnu CMA</em>. Kyft6
biiiieB, 1981.</p>

<p>     IIopiiiaKOB C.A. <em>Kpax euecKoii</em> napruu <em>e cepedune 50-x zodoe XIX</em> e. - B KH. :
<em>IIpoSneMbi Hoeou u Hoeeuuieu uciopuu</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     IIopmaKOBa A.A. <em>BHyrpunojiuTuiecKax GopbSa</em> e <em>deMOKpanmeCKOU napruu CIUA</em>.</p>

<p>     <em>-</em> B KH. : <em>FIpoojieMbi Hoeou u Hoeeuuieu</em> ucropuu. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     IIoTexHH A.B., THMomeHKO A.F. <em>IIpo6neMbi Monodexcu CIUA e nonuruKe
npaexWux 6ypxya3Hbix napruu. -</em> B KH. : <em>CoifuaabHax npupoda 6ypxya3Hbix napruu e
coepeMCHHOM KanuTO/iucruvecKOM Mupe</em>. Rues, 1980.</p>

<p>     FIoTOKOBa H.B. <em>3Kcnancux CIUA e Texace u 6opb6a e Konzpecce e nepuod
npesudeHcrea 3. flxeKcoua (1829-1837). -</em> B KH.: <em>Hs</em> ucropuu <em>eHyTpunojiuTuvecKOU 6opb6bi
u o6u4ecTeeHHOu Mbicnu CIUA</em>. KyttSbinieB, 1981.</p>

<p>     Porosa r.B. <em>AMepuKOHCKue npotficoiosbi u deMOKpani: odocTpenue
npoTueopevtu.---</em> ,,Pa6oHHH Knacc H coBpeMeHHUH MHp&quot;, 1980, N^^8^^ 5.</p>

<p>     <em>Ponb GypxyasHbix nonuTuiecKux napruu e odutecreeHHOu JKUSHU CBIA</em>. Pe(pepa-</p>

<p>     <b>THBHblH cSopHHK. M., 1981.</b></p>

<p>     CasenbeB B.A. <em>CMA: cenaru nonuruKa</em>. M., 1976.</p>

<p>     CanoMaTHH A. <em>IIpoBneMa ,,cepe6pxHbix denee&quot; u Kpusuc deMOKparuvecKou napruu
CMA e cepedune 90-x zodoe XIX</em> e. - B KH. : <em>IIpoBneMbi Hoeou u Hoeeuuieu</em> ucropuu.
M., 1982.</p>

<p>     CaxapoB H.A. <em>Ponb denee HO OMepuKancKux ebiBopax. -</em> ,,CIIIA: 3KOHoMHKa,
nojiHTHKa, HfleonorHa&quot;, 1984, N<SUP>?</SUP> 12.</p>

<p>     CaxapoB H.A. <em>Eusuec u pecny&amp;iuKOHCKax napiux</em> e <em>70-e eodbi. -</em> B KH. : <em>
TlpooneMbi aMepuKOHucruKU</em>, Bbin. 3., M., 1985.</p>

<p>     CesocTbaHOB F.H., YTKHH A.M. <em>TOMOC flxce$$epcoH</em>. M., 1973.</p>

<p>     Sivachev N.V., &quot;The Realignment of the Two-Party System of the United States
during the New Deal&quot; in: <em>Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta</em>, Series 8, History, No. 4,
1983.</p>

<p>     Soviet authors on the history
406 of us parties</p>

<p>     Name Index</p>

<p>     CHBaieB H.B., fl3i&gt;KOB <em>E.&lt;f&gt;.Hoeeuiuax ucmpun CMA</em>. M., 1980.</p>

<p>     Sivachev N., Yazkov E. <em>History of the USA since World War I</em>. Progress Publishers,
Moscow, 1976.</p>

<p>     CorpHH B.B. <em>YucroKoe coepeMewtou oypxyaauou udeojiaeuu e CMA</em>. M., 1975.</p>

<p>     CorpHH B.B. <em>HdeuHble Teienua e OMepuKaucKou peeonicmuu XVIIIeeKa</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     CorpHH B.B. <em>HdeonozuH (JJedepanuCTCKOu napruu e CMA (KOHCH XVIII - Havana
XIX a.), -</em> B KH.: <em>AMBPUKOHCKUU exezodmiK 1981</em>. M., 1981.</p>

<p>     Sogrin V. <em>Founding Fathers of the United States. Historical Portraits</em>, Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1988.</p>

<p>     CraHKeBiw C.B. <em>CospeMCHHbie Tendeunuu e paseumu ,,uoeou nojiuTuiecKOu
ucTOpuu&quot; e CMA. -</em> B KH.: <em>AMepuKOucKuu exeeodnuK 1983</em>. M., 1983. <em>CMA:
nojiuTuvecKaaMbicnb u ucmpua</em>. OTB. pen. H.H. HKOBTOB. M., 1976.</p>

<p>     TepexoB B. H. <em>Paseurue 83zjixdoe pecnyGnuKOHitee Ha ponb zocydapcrea e 3
KonoMuiecKou u coiiuajibHou xu3Hu oSufecreo</em> a <em>nepuod npesudencrea M. 3u3enxay3pa.---</em>
&quot;BecTHHK MocKOBCKoro yHHBepCHTeia&quot;, Cep. 8, Hciopiw, 1976, No. <em>5</em>.</p>

<p>     TepexoB B.H. <em>PecnyGauKauifbi y ejiacru: comiajibHO-3KOHOMimecK.au nonuruKa
npaeuTtuibCTeaH. 3u3eHxayspa (1953-1960)</em>. M., 1984.</p>

<p>     TpoaHOBCKaa M.O. <em>TOMOC JJxedidiepcon u nonuTuieCKOx 6opt&gt;6a HO nepeoM
KOHTUHeHTajibHOM KOHtpecce: (K ucropuu ipopMUpoeaHUX nonimmeCKux (ppaKuuii).---</em>
,,BecTHHK MocKOBCKoro yHHBepcHTera&quot;, Cep. 8, HcTopna, 1980, NS4.</p>

<p>     TpoanoBCKaa M.O. <em>JJxetfidiepcoHoecKue pecnyOnuKanubi u Mtoapeo 1807 z.---</em>
B KH.: <em>UpoSneMbi noeou u uoeeuiueu ucropuu</em>. M., 1982.</p>

<p>     VuiaKOB B.A. <em>AMepuKa npu BautumtOHe. UojiuTuvecKue u coyuanbHO--
SKOHOMUnpoGneMbi CMA e 1789-1794</em> ^^. JI., 1983.</p>

<p>     OeflopoB B. <em>KOK usBupaioT npesudenra CMA</em>. M., 1980.</p>

<p>     OypiviaH JJ.E. <em>PenwuH, nojiuruKa u ewdopbi 1980 z. -</em> ,,CulA: 3KOHOMHKa,
nonna, HaeojiorHa&quot;, 1981, N^^8^^ 4.</p>

<p>     d&gt;ypceHKO A.A. <em>AMepuKancKOH peeo/itoifux u oGpasoeanue CMA</em>. JI., 1978.</p>

<p>     OypceHKo A.A. <em>KpitTuveCKoe decxrujienie AMepuKu. 60-e eodbi</em>. JI., 1974.</p>

<p>     fflHpaeB E.A. <em>UOJIUTUWCKOH 6opb6a e CMA. 1783-1801 a</em>. JI., 1981.</p>

<p>     IilnoTOB B.M. <em>QepMepcKoe deuxenue e CMA e 1780-1790-eeodbi</em>. M., 198</p>

<p>     IIlnoTOB B.M. <em>Cosdanue KoncruTyyuu CMA u npoBaeMa deMOKpantu. (1787e.j</em>.
BKH.: <em>AMepUKaucKuu exezodnuK 1977</em>. M., 1977.</p>

<p>     <em>3eojiioi4UH nojiujvvecKOU cucTCMbi CMA</em>. PechepaTHBHbiJt cSopHMK. M., 1984.
H.H. <em>npecrynueiuue zpanb</em>. M., 1970.
H.H. <em>BaiuuHitoH</em>. M., 1972.</p>

<p>     H.H. <em>QpaHKjiUH PyseejibT: tenoeeK u nonutuKa. Hoeoe npovTemie</em>. M.,
1981.</p>

<p>     Yakovlev N. <em>Washington Silhouettes. A Political Round-Up</em>, Progress Publishers,
Moscow, 1985.</p>

<p>     Acheson, Dean---302</p>

<p>     Adams, Charles-102, 162</p>

<p>     Adams, John-36, 42, 44, 46, 49</p>

<p>     Adams, John Quincy-80-83, 86, 88,</p>

<p>     89,91,94,163</p>

<p>     Aiken, George-258, 259</p>

<p>     Albert, Carl-300</p>

<p>     Aldrich, Nelson-203</p>

<p>     Aldrich, Thomas-192</p>

<p>     AUen, William-190</p>

<p>     Allison, William-175, 176</p>

<p>     Ames, Fisher---44</p>

<p>     Archer, John---59</p>

<p>     Arthur, Chester---171</p>

<p>     Ashley, James---148</p>

<p>     Atkinson, Edward---192</p>

<p>     Austin, Benjamin---62</p>

<p>     Bell,John-12I</p>

<p>     Bellamy, Edward-180</p>

<p>     Belyavskaya, I. A.-200</p>

<p>     Benton, Thomas---91</p>

<p>     Bibb, William-58</p>

<p>     Biddle, Nicholas-91, 93, 94</p>

<p>     Birch, John-325</p>

<p>     Birney, James-100, 103</p>

<p>     Black, Huey-248</p>

<p>     Black, Merle-326</p>

<p>     Blackburn, Joseph---204</p>

<p>     Elaine, James-171, 173</p>

<p>     Blair, Francis-114, 119</p>

<p>     Blinov, A. I.-105</p>

<p>     Bloomfield, Joseph-52</p>

<p>     Bochkarev, A. G.-187</p>

<p>     Bogdanov, R. G.-373</p>

<p>     Bolingbroke, Henry---45</p>

<p>     Bolkhovitinov, N. N.-88</p>

<p>     Bonaparte, Napoleon---36</p>

<p>     Borisyuk, V. I.-279</p>

<p>     Bouck, William-224</p>

<p>     Boutwell, George-192</p>

<p>     Bawles, Chester-321</p>

<p>     Boyle, William, Jr.-286</p>

<p>     Brandeis, Louis-215, 219</p>

<p>     Breckinridge, John-124, 134, 135</p>

<p>     Brennan, George---284</p>

<p>     Bridges, Styles-258</p>

<p>     Brock, Waiiam-325, 335, 357</p>

<p>     Brookhart, Smith-231</p>

<p>     Brown, John-122</p>

<p>     B</p>

<p>     Bacon, Augustus---194, 204
Baker, Ray-212
Baldwin, Raymond---258
Bankhead, William-248, 257, 269
Barton, Bruce---259
Batalov, E. Ya.-365, 373
Bates, Edward-119
Bayard, James---134
Burnside, Ambrose---143</p>

<p>     408 Name Index</p>

<p>     Name Index 409</p>

<p>     Brown, Walter-265</p>

<p>     Broyhm,Joel-310</p>

<p>     Bryan, William-189, 191, 193, 195,</p>

<p>     197, 201-203, 205, 209, 210, 214,</p>

<p>     216,218, 236</p>

<p>     Bryce, James---185</p>

<p>     Buchanan, James-109, 121, 122</p>

<p>     Burke, Edmund---45</p>

<p>     Burlatsky, F. M.-377, 390</p>

<p>     Burleson, Albert---219</p>

<p>     Burnham, Walter-373, 398</p>

<p>     Burns, James-12, 363, 373</p>

<p>     Bush, George-340, 371, 380</p>

<p>     Butler, Paul-295, 296, 300-305</p>

<p>     Byrnes, James-248, 257, 277</p>

<p>     93, 94, 96, 101, 103, 107, 111, 115</p>

<p>     Clayton, Henry-204, 218</p>

<p>     Cleveland, Stephen-164, 173, 174,</p>

<p>     185-87,189,190</p>

<p>     Clinton, De Witt-73, 75</p>

<p>     Clinton, George---28, 32</p>

<p>     Cockran, William-203</p>

<p>     Colfax, Schuyler-158</p>

<p>     Colton, Calvin-99</p>

<p>     Commager, Henry---12, 235</p>

<p>     Coolidge, Calvin-230, 231, 234,</p>

<p>     237,238,354</p>

<p>     Cooper, John-3 29</p>

<p>     Corvin, Thomas---119</p>

<p>     Costigan, Edward-248</p>

<p>     Cox, Samuel-145</p>

<p>     Coxey, Jacob---184</p>

<p>     Cramer, WiUiam-310</p>

<p>     Crawford, William-81</p>

<p>     Crittenden, John---121</p>

<p>     Croly, Herbert-213</p>

<p>     Dixon, Archibald---113</p>

<p>     Doctorow, E. L.---206</p>

<p>     Dollinger, Isidore-297</p>

<p>     Dolliver, jonathan-208</p>

<p>     Donnelly, Ignatius-180, 182, 190</p>

<p>     Douglas, Paul-298</p>

<p>     Douglas, Stephen-109, 112, 113,</p>

<p>     123,124,134,135</p>

<p>     Duane, William---47, 52</p>

<p>     Dulles, John-321</p>

<p>     Dupont, Pierre---247</p>

<p>     Dye, Thomas-18</p>

<p>     Frazier, Lynn-231, 342
Fremont, John---121
Freneau, Philip---34
Fulbright, William-329
Fuller, Henry-192</p>

<p>     Gajiyev, K. S.-10, 23, 289</p>

<p>     Galbraith,John-302</p>

<p>     Galkin, A. A.---377, 390</p>

<p>     Gallatin, Albert-47-49, 52, 62-64</p>

<p>     Gallinger, Jacob-204</p>

<p>     Gallup, George-245, 257, 269, 355,</p>

<p>     361, 372, 375, 376, 380, 382</p>

<p>     Garfield, James-148, 151, 171</p>

<p>     Garner, John-248</p>

<p>     Garnett, James---58</p>

<p>     George, Henry-180</p>

<p>     Geyevsky, I. A.-15, 280, 326</p>

<p>     Giddings, Joshua---119</p>

<p>     Gilder, George-352</p>

<p>     Glass, Carter-267</p>

<p>     Godkin, Edwin-192</p>

<p>     Goldwater, Barry-12, 323-25, 330,</p>

354

<p>     Gompers, Samuel-184, 192, 207,</p>

210

<p>     Goodell, Charles-335</p>

<p>     Gore, Albert---308</p>

<p>     Gorman, Arthur---175</p>

<p>     Gramm, Philip-358, 362</p>

<p>     Granger, Francis---89</p>

<p>     Granger, Gideon---47</p>

<p>     Grant, Ulysses-158, 160, 161, 164</p>

<p>     Greeley, Horace-162, 163</p>

<p>     Griffin, Robert-307, 313</p>

<p>     Grundy, Felix---64</p>

<p>     Cabot, George---38</p>

<p>     Cadell, Patrick-348</p>

<p>     Caffery, Donelson-194, 203</p>

<p>     Calhoun, John-64, 65, 68, 81, 87,</p>

<p>     90,95, 102, 107</p>

<p>     Cameron, Simon---119, 171</p>

<p>     Cannon, Joseph-203, 211</p>

<p>     Carnegie, Andrew---194</p>

<p>     Carter, difton-330</p>

<p>     Carter, Jimmy-345, 348-50, 355,</p>

370

<p>     Carter, Thomas---208</p>

<p>     Case, Clifford-22, 329</p>

<p>     Cass, Lewis-109, 112</p>

<p>     Celler, Emmanuel-248, 297</p>

<p>     Chambers, William---98</p>

<p>     Chandler, William-171, 174</p>

<p>     Chase, Salmon-119, 139</p>

<p>     Chase, Samuel-50, 58</p>

<p>     Clapp, Moses-202</p>

<p>     Clapper, Raymond---255</p>

<p>     Clark, Christopher---59</p>

<p>     Clark, Joseph-308</p>

<p>     Clark, Ramsey-326</p>

<p>     Clay, Alexander---202</p>

<p>     Clay, Henry-64, 65, 80, 81, 89-91,</p>

<p>     Eisenhower, Dwight-21, 288, 291-</p>

<p>     94, 296-99, 306, 307-310, 312,318,</p>

<p>     319,324,330,371</p>

<p>     Engels, Frederick-16, 21, 70, 109,</p>

<p>     130, 132,138,172,178, 179</p>

<p>     Entin, L. M.-19</p>

<p>     Ervin, Samuel, Jr.-312, 313, 341</p>

<p>     D</p>

<p>     Farley, James-248, 257</p>

<p>     Faubus, Orval-302</p>

<p>     Fenno, John-34</p>

<p>     Ferguson, Joseph---287</p>

<p>     Ferraro, Geraldine-370, 380</p>

<p>     Fess, Simeon---250</p>

<p>     Fessenden, William---119</p>

<p>     Fillmore, Millard-111, 114, 115,</p>

<p>     121,122</p>

<p>     Finch, Robert-314</p>

<p>     Finkelstein, Arthur---355</p>

<p>     Fish, Hamilton-249, 277</p>

<p>     Fletcher, Henry-250</p>

<p>     Flynn, Ed-248</p>

<p>     Foner, Philip-187</p>

<p>     Ford, Gerald-324, 329, 340, 342-</p>

<p>     44,358</p>

<p>     Fordney, Joseph---230</p>

<p>     Frank, Glenn-261</p>

<p>     Franklin, Benjamin---32</p>

<p>     Daly, Charles-319</p>

<p>     Danaher, John---277</p>

<p>     Daniels, Josephus-203, 216, 219</p>

<p>     Darchiyev, A. N.-368</p>

<p>     Daugherty, Harry---229</p>

<p>     Davis, James-258, 259</p>

<p>     Davis, Jefferson-109, 125</p>

<p>     Davis, John-231,247</p>

<p>     Day, Stephen-277</p>

<p>     Dearborn, Henry---47</p>

<p>     DeBakey, Michael-302</p>

<p>     Debs, Eugene-179, 190, 206, 214</p>

<p>     De Leon, Daniel-179</p>

<p>     Dementyev, Igor---192</p>

<p>     Dewey, George---193</p>

<p>     Dewey, Thomas-258, 265, 283, 330</p>

<p>     Dickinson, Lester---249</p>

<p>     Dingell, John-248</p>

<p>     Dingley, Nelson---175</p>

<p>     Divine, Robert-274, 288</p>

<p>     H</p>

<p>     Hague, Frank-248</p>

<p>     Halleck, Charles-328</p>

<p>     Hamby, Alonzo-281</p>

<p>     Hamilton, Alexander-30-32, 34-36,</p>

<p>     <b>410</b> Name <b>Index</b></p>

<p>     Name Index 411</p>

<p>     38,39,42,44,47,56,57,213</p>

<p>     Hamilton, John---254</p>

<p>     Hanna, Marcus-203</p>

<p>     Harding, Warren-229, 230</p>

<p>     Harper, Robert-37</p>

<p>     Harriman, Averell---300</p>

<p>     Harris, Fred-336</p>

<p>     Harris, George---164</p>

<p>     Harrison, George---302</p>

<p>     Harrison, Pat-248</p>

<p>     Harrison, William-98</p>

<p>     Hart, Gary-364, 367-69</p>

<p>     Hartley, Fred-279, 281, 284, 298</p>

<p>     Harvey, William-188</p>

<p>     Hatfield, Mark-329</p>

<p>     Haugen, Nils---235</p>

<p>     Hawkins, Augustus---347, 348</p>

<p>     Hayes, Rutherford-161, 164, 169,</p>

170

<p>     Hearst, William-166, 193</p>

<p>     Hepburn, William-207, 208, 211</p>

<p>     Hill, David-203</p>

<p>     Hoar, George-139, 204</p>

<p>     Hodges, Luther-300</p>

<p>     Hofstadter, Richard-180, 183</p>

<p>     Holman, Rufus-277</p>

<p>     Hoover, Herbert-229, 230, 234,</p>

<p>     235, 237-41, 249, 250, 252, 255,</p>

<p>     258,260,265,269,293</p>

<p>     Hopkins, Harry-248</p>

<p>     House, Edward-219</p>

<p>     Hull, Cordell-236, 248</p>

<p>     Hume, David---45</p>

<p>     Humphrey, Hubert---14, 280, 298-</p>

<p>     300, 332, 333, 336, 338, 347, 348</p>

<p>     Huntington, Samuel---385</p>

<p>     Jackson, Andrew-54, 81, 83, 86-88,</p>

<p>     90-95, 108, 182</p>

<p>     Jackson, Jesse-367, 368</p>

<p>     James, Henry---192</p>

<p>     Javits,Jacob-329</p>

<p>     Jay, John-31,42, 54, 66</p>

<p>     Jefferson, Thomas-34, 40-58, 60-63,</p>

<p>     180, 182, 196</p>

<p>     Jensen, Richard-98, 393</p>

<p>     Johnson, Andrew-117, 135, 151-57</p>

<p>     Johnson, Eric-270</p>

<p>     Johnson, Hiram-212,241</p>

<p>     Johnson, Lyndon-291, 292, 296,</p>

<p>     297, 299-301, 303, 304, 310, 311,</p>

<p>     316, 323-26, 328-30, 337, 379</p>

<p>     Jonas, Charles---310</p>

<p>     Jones, James---366</p>

<p>     Joyner, Conrad-261, 262</p>

<p>     Julian, George---126</p>

<p>     Kreder, A. A.-262
Kuropyatnik, G. P.-17, 129, 179</p>

<p>     Madison, James-31, 43, 44, 47, 50,</p>

<p>     53, 54, 62-65, 69</p>

<p>     Main, Jackson---28</p>

<p>     Malkov, V. L.-14, 242, 244, 267</p>

<p>     Manatt, Charles-362</p>

<p>     Mansfield, Mike-300, 329, 338</p>

<p>     Manykin, A. S.-183</p>

<p>     Marchenko, M. N.-20</p>

<p>     Marcy, William-94</p>

<p>     Marshall, George-282</p>

<p>     Marshall, John-50</p>

<p>     Martin, Joseph---260</p>

<p>     Martin, Thomas-203</p>

<p>     Marx, Karl-16, 21, 70, 109, 117,</p>

<p>     119, 124, 129, 130, 132, 138, 172,</p>

<p>     178,179</p>

<p>     Mason, William---204</p>

<p>     McAdoo, William-219, 236</p>

<p>     McCarthy, Eugene-305, 308, 329</p>

<p>     McCarthy, Joseph-285, 286, 306</p>

<p>     McClellan, George-132, 147, 148</p>

<p>     McClellan, John-276, 312</p>

<p>     McClernand, John---135</p>

<p>     McComas,Louis-202</p>

<p>     McCormack, John-300, 301</p>

<p>     McCumber, Porter-230</p>

<p>     McDougall, James---135</p>

<p>     McEnery, Samuel-194</p>

<p>     McGovern, George-335-39, 341,</p>

<p>     342, 368</p>

<p>     McKinley Crmsby, Richard---90</p>

<p>     McKinley, William-204</p>

<p>     McLaurin, John---194</p>

<p>     McNamara, Patrick-298</p>

<p>     McNary, Charles-235</p>

<p>     Mead, James-270</p>

<p>     Mellon, Andrew-229, 230, 234</p>

<p>     Metcalf, Lee-308</p>

<p>     Mikhailov, B. V.-365</p>

<p>     Mills, Ogden-250, 253</p>

<p>     Mills, Roger-164, 174</p>

<p>     Mishin, A. A.-9, 19</p>

<p>     Mitchell, Stephen-295</p>

<p>     Moley, Raymond---259</p>

<p>     Mondale, Waiter-367-71, 376</p>

<p>     Ladd, Everett, Jr.-374, 381</p>

<p>     Laffer, Arthur-352</p>

<p>     Lafollette, Phil-258</p>

<p>     La Follette, Robert-208, 212, 213,</p>

<p>     224,231-33,235,251</p>

<p>     La Guardia, Fiorello-232, 251</p>

<p>     Landon, Alfred-253, 254</p>

<p>     Landrum, Phil-307, 313</p>

<p>     Larson, Arthur---298</p>

<p>     Lausche, Frank---296</p>

<p>     Lawrence, Cornelius---94</p>

<p>     Lawrence, David---300</p>

<p>     Lease, Mary-180, 181</p>

<p>     Lee, Richard---302</p>

<p>     Lehman, Herbert-248</p>

<p>     Lenin, V. I.-7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 22,</p>

<p>     100, 178, 191, 200, 213, 218, 221,</p>

390

<p>     Lesinski,John-248</p>

<p>     Lincoln, Abraham-17, 119, 124,</p>

<p>     126, 129-31, 132, 134, 137-39,142,</p>

<p>     143, 148, 151, 152, 185, 245, 249</p>

<p>     Lincoln, Levi---47</p>

<p>     Lindley, Ernest-259, 266, 284</p>

<p>     Lipset, Seymour---21, 355</p>

<p>     Littlefield, Charles-202</p>

<p>     Livingston, Robert---47</p>

<p>     Lloyd, Edward---59</p>

<p>     Lloyd, Henry-180, 190</p>

<p>     Lobanov-Rostovsky, A. B.---188</p>

<p>     Lodge, Henry-229, 258, 282</p>

<p>     Logan, John---134, 173</p>

<p>     Long, Huey---247</p>

<p>     Luce, Henry-271</p>

<p>     M</p>

<p>     Maas, Melvil-277
Maddox,John-203</p>

<p>     K</p>

<p>     Keating, Edward-223
Kefauver, Estes---298, 300
Kelley, Robert-239
Kelly, Edward-248
Kemp, Jack-354, 356, 357
Kennedy, Edward---350
Kennedy, John-291, 298, 312-23
Kennedy, Robert-331
Key, David-169
Keyerleber, Karl-272
Kilgore, Harley-270
King, Martin Luther---331
King, Preston---114
King, Rufus-69
Kirwan, Michael-300
Kissinger, Henry---342
Kleppner, Paul-374, 384-86
Knox, Frank-254
Knudsen, William-267
Kotsebu, E. K.-188, 195</p>

<p>     Ickes, Harold-248
Ilyinsky, I.P.-19
Ivanov, R. F.-17, 129, 160
Ives, Irving---312</p>

<p>     Name <b>Index 412</b></p>

<p>     Name Index 413</p>

<p>     Money, Hernando---194</p>

<p>     Monroe, James---44, 57, 69, 75, 81,</p>

194

<p>     Morgan, John-166, 199, 247</p>

<p>     Morgenthau, Hans---336</p>

<p>     Moss, John---308</p>

<p>     Multer, Abraham---297</p>

<p>     Murray, James-246, 270</p>

<p>     Muskie, Edmund-336, 338</p>

<p>     Perkins, Frances---248</p>

<p>     Perkins, George-204</p>

<p>     Pettigrew, Richard---175</p>

<p>     Phillips, Kevin-333, 359</p>

<p>     Pierce, Franklin-Ill, 113, 114</p>

<p>     Pinchot, Amos---212</p>

<p>     Pinchot, Gifford-212</p>

<p>     Pinckney, Charles---56</p>

<p>     Pinckney, Thomas---54</p>

<p>     Pinckney, William---60</p>

<p>     Pittman, Key-248, 251</p>

<p>     Poff, Richard-310</p>

<p>     Polk, James-99, 103</p>

<p>     Pollard, Ernest-302</p>

<p>     Pomper, Gerald-374, 376, 384-87</p>

<p>     Popov, N. P.-378, 379</p>

<p>     Porter, Peter---64</p>

<p>     Potter, John-132</p>

<p>     Powell, Adam-297</p>

<p>     Pulitzer, Joseph-193</p>

<p>     Pullman, George-179, 184, 186, 190</p>

<p>     324,330,345,355</p>

<p>     Roosevelt, Theodore-196, 202, 204-</p>

<p>     207, 209, 212, 213, 215, 216, 225</p>

<p>     Rossiter, Clinton-12, 304</p>

<p>     Roth, William-354</p>

<p>     Rudman, Warren-358</p>

<p>     Rush, Benjamin---32</p>

<p>     Rutledge, John---55</p>

<p>     Steagall, Henry-248</p>

<p>     Steiwer, Frederick-252</p>

<p>     Stephens, Alexander-101, 102, 111,</p>

<p>     154,164</p>

<p>     Stettinius, Edward---267</p>

<p>     Stevenson, Adlai-291, 292, 295,</p>

<p>     299, 300, 310, 312, 316, 369</p>

<p>     Stockman, David---353</p>

<p>     Stone, Charles-132</p>

<p>     Stone, William-208</p>

<p>     Storey, Moorfield-192, 197, 198</p>

<p>     Sullivan, Mark-269</p>

<p>     Sulzberger, Arthur---276</p>

<p>     Sulzer, William-204</p>

<p>     Sumner, Charles-119, 139, 142</p>

<p>     Swank, James---175,176</p>

<p>     N</p>

<p>     Salamatin, A. Y.-186, 187</p>

<p>     Saltonstall, Leverett---258</p>

<p>     Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr.-92, 101,</p>

<p>     247, 339</p>

<p>     Schurz, Carl-151, 155, 162, 192,</p>

197

<p>     Scott, Dred-122</p>

<p>     Scott, Hugh-335</p>

<p>     Scott, Winfield-111</p>

<p>     Seward, Williain-94, 102, 119</p>

<p>     Seymour, Horatio-135, 147</p>

<p>     Shafroth, John-202</p>

<p>     ShaUenberger, Ashton-202</p>

<p>     Shays, Daniel-28</p>

<p>     Sherman, John-154, 176, 186, 202,</p>

<p>     205,211</p>

<p>     Shouse, Jouett---247</p>

<p>     Simpson, Jerry---180</p>

<p>     Sivachev, N. V.-ll, 23, 272, 290,</p>

294

<p>     Smathers, George-300</p>

<p>     Smelser, Marshall-61, 62</p>

<p>     Smith, Alfred-236, 237, 247</p>

<p>     Smith, John-203</p>

<p>     Smith, Robert---47</p>

<p>     Smith, Samuel---47</p>

<p>     Smith, William-203</p>

<p>     Snell, Bertram-250, 254</p>

<p>     Spalding, Thomas---59</p>

<p>     Stanford, Richard-58</p>

<p>     Stanford, Thomas-58, 59</p>

<p>     Stanley, John-51</p>

<p>     Stassen, Harold-258, 279, 306</p>

<p>     Nechiporenko, L. A.---387</p>

<p>     Nelson, Donald---267</p>

<p>     Nelson, Knute-202, 208</p>

<p>     Neuberger, Richard---298</p>

<p>     Newlands, Francis-202, 208</p>

<p>     Nicholas, Wilson-58</p>

<p>     Nikonov, V. A.-21</p>

<p>     Nixon, Richard-21, 297, 314, 329-</p>

<p>     35, 337, 338, 341-43, 353, 355, 372,</p>

379

<p>     Norris, Frank-192, 212</p>

<p>     Norris, George-235, 251, 268</p>

<p>     Taft, Robert-13, 265, 269, 276,</p>

<p>     277, 279, 281, 283, 284, 287, 288,</p>

<p>     293, 298, 354</p>

<p>     Taft, William-210, 212-14, 216, 219</p>

<p>     Tallmadge, James---73, 74</p>

<p>     Taubeneck, Herman-190</p>

<p>     Taylor, John---44, 57</p>

<p>     Taylor, Zachary-99, 117</p>

<p>     Teller Henry-208</p>

<p>     Thomas, Elbert-248</p>

<p>     Thompson, Frank, Jr.-305, 308</p>

<p>     Thompson, Philip---58</p>

<p>     Thompson, Thomas---58</p>

<p>     Thurmond, J. Strom-291</p>

<p>     Tilden, Samuel-145, 164</p>

<p>     Tillman, Benjamin-194</p>

<p>     Toombs, Robert-101, 111</p>

<p>     Tower, John-3 29</p>

<p>     Trigg, Abram---58</p>

<p>     Troyanovskaya, M.O.---8</p>

<p>     Truman, Harry-280-82, 284, 285,</p>

<p>     291,293,300</p>

<p>     Trumbull, Lyman-119, 155, 156,</p>

162

<p>     Tucker, Raymond---300</p>

<p>     R</p>

<p>     Randolph, John-50, 56-59, 62, 65</p>

<p>     Raskob,John-247</p>

<p>     Rawlings, Joseph---202</p>

<p>     Rayburn, Sam-248, 292, 294, 297,</p>

<p>     299-301,303,304,310</p>

<p>     Reagan, John-164, 177</p>

<p>     Reagan, Ronald-351, 353, 355-58,</p>

<p>     360-63, 365, 366, 368, 369, 371,</p>

<p>     372,376,382,396,398</p>

<p>     Reed, David-250</p>

<p>     Rhett, Robert-109, 110</p>

<p>     Robespierre, Maximilien---36</p>

<p>     Robinson, Arthur---250</p>

<p>     Robinson, Joseph---248</p>

<p>     Rockefeller, John-159, 199</p>

<p>     Rockefeller, Nelson-306, 344</p>

<p>     Romanova, N. K.---92</p>

<p>     Roosevelt, Eleanor-300</p>

<p>     Roosevelt, Franklin Delano-14, 236,</p>

<p>     239, 241-48, 251, 252, 254-64, 266-</p>

<p>     69, 275-77, 280, 281, 294, 305, 307,</p>

<p>     O</p>

<p>     O'Brien, Leo-297
O'Connor, Charles---163
O'Connor, James---347
Olney, Richard-196</p>

<p>     Paine, Thomas-32
Palfrey, John-102
Palmer, Mitchell-228
Parker, Alton-205, 206
Patterson, Thomas---202
Pechatnov, V. O.-18, 258, 281, 327
Peffer, WiUiam-180
Pepper, daude-270</p>

<p>     Name Index 414</p>

<p>     Tugwell, Rexford-248
Twain, Mark-165, 192
Tydings, Joseph-328</p>

<p>     Webster, Daniel-88, 89, 111, 115</p>

<p>     Weed, Thurlow-89, 102, 138, 139</p>

<p>     Weinberger, Caspar---356</p>

<p>     Wells, RolIa-216</p>

<p>     Wheeler, Burton-231</p>

<p>     Wheeler, William-169</p>

<p>     White, William-212</p>

<p>     Whitney, Eli-41</p>

<p>     Williams, David-58</p>

<p>     Williams, G. Mennon---300</p>

<p>     WiUiams, Joseph-203</p>

<p>     Willkie, Wendell-265, 268, 269, 330</p>

<p>     Wilmot, David-104, 112, 114</p>

<p>     Wilson, Henry-119</p>

<p>     Wilson, William-175</p>

<p>     Wilson, Woodrow-164, 175, 214-20,</p>

<p>     225-29, 266</p>

<p>     Winslow, Erwing-198</p>

<p>     Wooten, Dudley-203</p>

<p>     <b>REQUEST TO READERS</b></p>

<p>     Progress Publishers would be glad to have your
opinion of this book, its translation and
design and any suggestions you may have for
future publications.</p>

<p>     Please send all your comments to 17,
Zubovsky Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.</p>

<p>     U</p>

<p>     Underwood, Oskar-218
Ushakov, V. A.-40</p>

<p>     Vail, I. M.-20</p>

<p>     Vallandigham, dement-134, 141,</p>

<p>     145, 146</p>

<p>     Van Buren, Martin-75, 86, 95, 101,</p>

<p>     102, 104,107</p>

<p>     Vandenberg, Arthur-258, 271, 272</p>

<p>     Vanniski, Jude-352</p>

<p>     Verplanck, Gulian---94</p>

<p>     Viorst, Milton---334</p>

<p>     W</p>

<p>     Yakovlev, N. N.-242
Yancey, William-109, 110
Yazkov, Y. F.-183, 272, 294
Yefimov, A. V.-105
Young, Alfred-28
Young, Roland-274</p>

<p>     Wade, Richard-339</p>

<p>     Wagner, Robert-248, 270, 274</p>

<p>     Walker, Robert-102</p>

<p>     Wallace, George-332, 333</p>

<p>     Wallace, Henry-248, 280, 282, 291</p>

<p>     Warren, Francis-208</p>

<p>     Washington, George-34, 35, 40, 42,</p>

190

<p>     Watson, Thomas---180, 190</p>

<p>     Wattenberg, Martin---371</p>

<p>     Weaver, James-190</p>

<p>     Zamoshkin, Y. A.-373
Zeigler, L. Harmon---18
Zolotukhin, V. P.-10
Zubok, L. I.-207</p>

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