

भारतीय प्रौद्योगिकी संस्थान मुंबई

Indian Institute of Technology Bombay

CS 6001: Game Theory and Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Week 9

Swaprava Nath

Slide preparation acknowledgments: Rounak Dalmia

ज्ञानम् परमम् ध्येयम् Knowledge is the supreme goal



- ► Task Allocation Domain
- ► The Uniform Rule
- ▶ Mechanism Design with Transfers
- ► Quasi Linear Preferences
- ▶ Pareto Optimality and Groves Payments



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 - Net payoff = $wt_i c_i t_i^2 \implies \text{maximized}$ at $t_i = w/2c_i$, and **monotone** decreasing on both sides



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
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- There cannot be a single common order over the alternatives s.t. the preferences are single-peaked for all agents



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Definition (Pareto Efficiency)

An SCF *f* is *Pareto efficient* (PE) if there does not exist any profile *P* where there exists a task allocation $a \in A$ such that it is weakly preferred over f(P) by all agents and strictly preferred by at least one. Mathematically,

$$\exists P, \text{ where } \exists a \in A \text{ s.t. } \begin{array}{l} a \ R_i f(P) & \forall i \in N, \\ a \ P_j f(P) & \exists j \in N. \end{array}$$



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Question

Can there be an agent *j* s.t. $f_j(P) > p_j$ if *f* is PE?

Answer

No. If such a *j* exists, increasing *k*'s share of task and reducing *j*'s makes both players strictly better off Therefore, $\forall j \in N, f_j(P) \leq p_j$

● If $\sum_{i \in N} p_i < 1$, by a similar argument, we conclude that $\forall j \in N$, $f_j(P) \ge p_j$



Definition (Anonymity)

An SCF *f* is *anonymous* (ANON) if for every agent permutation $\sigma : N \to N$, the task shares get permuted accordingly, i.e.,

 $\forall \sigma, f_{\sigma(j)}(P^{\sigma}) = f_j(P), \forall j \in N.$



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Example:

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$$N = \{1, 2, 3\}, \ \sigma(1) = 2, \sigma(2) = 3, \sigma(3) = 1$$

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- $f_1(0.7, 0.4, 0.3) = f_2(0.3, 0.7, 0.4)$
- $f_2(0.7, 0.4, 0.3) = f_3(0.3, 0.7, 0.4)$
- $f_3(0.7, 0.4, 0.3) = f_1(0.3, 0.7, 0.4)$



Manipulability: an SCF *f* is **manipulable** if $\exists i \in N$ and a profile *P* such that, $f(P'_i, P_{-i}) P_i f(P_i, P_{-i})$, for some P'_i .



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Strategyproofness (equivalent definition):

$$f(P_i, P_{-i}) P_i f(P'_i, P_{-i}) \quad \text{OR} \quad f_i(P_i, P_{-i}) = f_i(P'_i, P_{-i}), \forall P_i, P'_i \in T, \forall i \in N, \forall P_{-i} \in T^{n-1}.$$



Definition (Serial Dictatorship)

A predetermined sequence of the agents is fixed. Each agent is given either her peak share or the leftover share of the task. If $\sum_{i \in N} p_i < 1$, then the last agent is given the leftover share.



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Question
PE, SP, ANON?
Answer
Not ANON. Also quite unfair to the last agent.





Every player is assigned a share that is *c* times their peaks, s.t. $c \sum_{i \in N} p_i = 1$

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Not SP. Suppose peaks are 0.2, 0.3, 0.1 for 3 players, $c = 1/0.6$



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Not SP. Suppose peaks are 0.2, 0.3, 0.1 for 3 players, $c = 1/0.6$ Player 1 gets 1/3 (more than its peak 0.2) if the report is 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, $c = 1/0.5$, player 1 gets 0.2




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
How to ensure PE, ANON, and SP in the task allocation domain?

• Suppose, $\sum_{i \in N} p_i < 1$






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


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


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- Symmetric for $\sum_{i \in N} p_i > 1$




The Uniform Rule (Sprumont 1991)



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• Case $\sum_{i \in N} p_i = 1$: $f_i^u(P) = p_i$




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




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- Case $\sum_{i \in N} p_i > 1$: $f_i^u(P) = \min\{p_i, \lambda(P)\}$, where $\lambda(P)$ solves $\sum_{i \in N} \min\{p_i, \lambda\} = 1$





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- $f_i^{**}(P) \ge p_i, \forall i \in N, \text{ if } \sum_{i \in N} p_i < 1$ $f_i^{u}(P) \le p_i, \forall i \in N, \text{ if } \sum_{i \in N} p_i > 1$



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- $f_i^u(P) \leqslant p_i, \forall i \in N, \text{ if } \sum_{i \in N} p_i > 1$
- This is PE from our previous observation on PE: *allocations should stay on the same side of the peaks for every agent*

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The converse is also true, i.e.,

Theorem

An SCF in the task allocation domain is SP, PE, and ANON iff it is the uniform rule.

• See Sprumont (1991) : Division problem with single-peaked preferences

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An SCF in the task allocation domain is SP, PE, and ANON iff it is the uniform rule.

- See Sprumont (1991) : Division problem with single-peaked preferences
- Envy-free (EF): Agents do not envy each other's shares also holds for uniform rule



- **Case** $\sum_{i \in N} p_i = 1$: each agent gets her peak, no reason to deviate
- **Case** $\sum_{i \in N} p_i < 1$: then $f_i^u(P) \ge p_i, \forall i \in N$
- Manipulation, only for $i \in N$ s.t. $f_i^u(P) > p_i \implies \mu(P) > p_i$
- The only way *i* can change the allocation is by reporting $p'_i > \mu(P) > p_i$
- Leads to an worse outcome for *i* than $\mu(P)$
- A similar argument for case $\sum_{i \in N} p_i > 1$

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- SP, PE, ANON, EF, polynomial-time computable





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 - Partitioning indivisible objects, S = set of objects, $A = \{(A_1, \dots, A_n) : A_i \subseteq S, \forall i \in N, A_i \cap A_j = \emptyset, \forall i \neq j\}$



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- Utility of player *i*, when its type is θ_i , and the outcome is $x = (a, \pi)$ is given by

 $u_i((a, \pi), \theta_i) = v_i(a, \theta_i) - \pi_i$ (quasi-linear payoff)



• Types θ_i that depend on the outcome $x = (a, \pi)$ this way belongs to the **quasi-linear domain**

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- In the complete domain, both preference orders would have been feasible
- This restriction opens up possibilities of several non-dictatorial mechanisms



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$$p_i: \Theta_1 \times \Theta_2 \times \cdots \otimes_n \to \mathbb{R}, \forall i \in N$$

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$$f^{AM}(\theta) \in \arg \max_{a \in A} (\sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i v_i(a, \theta_i) + \kappa(a)), \text{ where } \lambda_i \ge 0, \text{ not all zero}$$



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— $\lambda_i = 1, \forall i \in N, \kappa \equiv 0$: allocatively efficient; $\lambda_d = 1, \lambda_j = 0, \forall j \in N \setminus \{d\}, \kappa \equiv 0$: dictatorial

Example Allocation Rules



Orrection 5.1 Constant rule, $f^{c}(\underline{\theta}) = a$, $\forall \theta \in \Theta$

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$$f^{MM}(\theta) \in \arg \max_{a \in A} \min_{i \in N} v_i(a, \theta_i)$$



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No deficit: Σ_{i∈N} p_i(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ
No subsidy: p_i(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀i ∈ N



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Definition (DSIC)

A mechanism (f, p) is **dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)** if

 $v_i(f(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) - p_i(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) \geqslant v_i(f(\theta'_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) - p_i(\theta'_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \forall \tilde{\theta}_{-i} \in \Theta_{-i}, \theta'_i, \theta_i \in \Theta_i, \forall i \in N$



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 $N = \{1, 2\}, \Theta_1 = \Theta_2 = \{\theta^H, \theta^L\}, f: \Theta_1 \times \Theta_2 \to A$. The following conditions must hold

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$$v_1(f(\theta^H, \theta_2), \theta^H) - p_1(\theta^H, \theta_2) \ge v_1(f(\theta^L, \theta_2), \theta^H) - p_1(\theta^L, \theta_2), \forall \theta_2 \in \Theta_2$$

$$(1)$$

$${}_1(f(\theta^L,\theta_2),\theta^L) - p_1(\theta^L,\theta_2) \geqslant v_1(f(\theta^H,\theta_2),\theta^L) - p_1(\theta^H,\theta_2), \forall \theta_2 \in \Theta_2$$
(2)

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Player 2:

$$v_{2}(f(\theta^{H},\theta_{1}),\theta^{H}) - p_{2}(\theta^{H},\theta_{1}) \ge v_{2}(f(\theta^{L},\theta_{1}),\theta^{H}) - p_{2}(\theta^{L},\theta_{1}),\forall\theta_{1} \in \Theta_{1}$$

$$v_{2}(f(\theta^{L},\theta_{1}),\theta^{L}) - p_{2}(\theta^{L},\theta_{1}) \ge v_{2}(f(\theta^{H},\theta_{1}),\theta^{L}) - p_{2}(\theta^{H},\theta_{1}),\forall\theta_{1} \in \Theta_{1}$$

$$(3)$$



• Say (f, p) is incentive compatible, i.e., p implements f

Properties of the Payment



- Say (f, p) is incentive compatible, i.e., p implements f
- Consider another payment

$$q_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = p_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) + h_i(\theta_{-i}), \forall \theta, \forall i \in N$$



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- If we can find a payment that implements an allocation rule, there exists uncountably many payments that can implement it
- The converse question: when do the payments that implement *f* differ only by a factor $h_i(\theta_{-i})$?



- Suppose the allocation is same in two type profiles θ and $\tilde{\theta} = (\tilde{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i})$
- i.e., $f(\theta) = f(\tilde{\theta}) = a$, then
- if *p* implements *f*, then $p_i(\theta) = p_i(\tilde{\theta})$ [exercise]



- ► Task Allocation Domain
- ► The Uniform Rule
- ▶ Mechanism Design with Transfers
- ► Quasi Linear Preferences
- ▶ Pareto Optimality and Groves Payments



Definition (Pareto Optimal)

A mechanism $(f, (p_1, ..., p_n))$ is **Pareto optimal** if at any type profile $\theta \in \Theta$, there does not exist an allocation $b \neq f(\theta)$ and payments $(\pi_1, ..., \pi_n)$ with $\sum_{i \in N} \pi_i \ge \sum_{i \in N} p_i(\theta)$ s.t.,

$$v_i(b,\theta_i) - \pi_i \ge v_i(f(\theta),\theta_i) - p_i(\theta), \forall i \in N,$$

with the inequality being strict for some $i \in N$



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- Pareto optimality is meaningless if there is no restriction on the payment
- One can always put excessive subsidy to every agent to make everyone better off
- So, the condition requires to spend at least the same budget

Pareto Optimality in Quasi-linear Domain



Theorem



A mechanism $(f, (p_1, \dots, p_n))$ is **Pareto optimal** iff it is allocatively efficient

• (\Leftarrow) we prove $\neg PO \implies \neg AE$



- (\iff) we prove $\neg PO \implies \neg AE$
- ¬PO, $\exists b, \pi, \theta$ s.t. $\sum_{i \in N} \pi_i \ge \sum_{i \in N} p_i(\theta)$



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- summing over the all these inequalities

$$\sum_{i \in N} v_i(b, \theta_i) - \sum_{i \in N} \pi_i > \sum_{i \in N} v_i(f(\theta), \theta_i) - \sum_{i \in N} p_i(\theta)$$
$$\sum_{i \in N} v_i(b, \theta_i) - \sum_{i \in N} v_i(f(\theta), \theta_i) > \sum_{i \in N} \pi_i - \sum_{i \in N} p_i(\theta) \ge 0$$



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• f is $\neg AE$

Proof (contd.)



• (\implies) $\neg AE \implies \neg PO$



- $(\Longrightarrow) \neg AE \implies \neg PO$
- $\neg AE \implies \exists \theta, b \neq f(\theta) \text{ s.t. } \sum_{i \in N} v_i(b, \theta_i) > \sum_{i \in N} v_i(f(\theta), \theta_i)$



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- also $\sum_{i \in N} \pi_i = \sum_{i \in N} p_i(\theta)$
- Hence *f* is not PO



• Consider the following payment: $p_i^G(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = h_i(\theta_{-i}) - \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(f^{AE}(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_j)$, where $h_i : \Theta_{-i} \to \mathbb{R}$ is an arbitrary function: **Groves payment**



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Example

• Single indivisible item allocation $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$



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- Single indivisible item allocation $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
- $\theta_1 = 10, \theta_2 = 8, \theta_3 = 6, \theta_4 = 4$, when they get the object, zero otherwise



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- If everyone reports their true type, the values of h_i are $h_1 = 4$, $h_2 = 4$, $h_3 = 4$, $h_4 = 6$



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- $p_1 = 4 0 = 4$, $p_2 = 4 10 = -6$, $p_3 = 4 10 = -6$, $p_4 = 6 10 = -4$, i.e., only player 1 pays, other get paid



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- Surprisingly, this is a truthful mechanism

Groves mechanisms are Truthful



Theorem

Groves mechanisms are DSIC

• Consider player *i*

Groves mechanisms are Truthful

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- Consider player *i f*^{AE}(θ_i, θ̃_{-i}) = a, and *f*^{AE}(θ'_i, θ̃_{-i}) = b

Groves mechanisms are Truthful

Theorem

Groves mechanisms are DSIC

- Consider player *i*
- $f^{AE}(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) = a$, and $f^{AE}(\theta'_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) = b$
- By definition, $v_i(a, \theta_i) + \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(a, \tilde{\theta}_j) \ge v_i(b, \theta_i) + \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(b, \tilde{\theta}_j)$



Theorem

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$$f^{AE}(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) = a$$
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 utility of player i when he reports θ_i is

$$\begin{aligned} v_i(f^{AE}(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) &- p_i(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) \\ &= v_i(f^{AE}(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) - h_i(\tilde{\theta}_{-i}) + \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(f^{AE}(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \tilde{\theta}_j) \\ &\geqslant v_i(f^{AE}(\theta_i', \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) - h_i(\tilde{\theta}_{-i}) + \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(f^{AE}(\theta_i', \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \tilde{\theta}_j) \\ &= v_i(f^{AE}(\theta_i', \tilde{\theta}_{-i}), \theta_i) - p_i(\theta_i', \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) \end{aligned}$$



Theorem

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Consider player *i* •

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Since player *i* was arbitrary, this holds for all $i \in N$. Hence the claim. •



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