Program verification 2016

Lecture 2: Symbolic methods

Instructor: Ashutosh Gupta

TIFR, India

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Where are we and where are we going?

We have

- defined a simple language
- defined small step operation semantics of the language
- defined logical view of program statements
- defined strongest post and weakest pre
- defined logical strongest post and weakest pre



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We will

- Hoare logic
- labelled transition system
- we cover some methods that try/avoid to compute lfp



Topic 3.1

Hoare logic





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- Such a proof method has following steps
 - write (guess) a super set of reachable states
 - show it is actually a super set
 - show it does not intersect with error states
- First such method was proposed by Tony Hoare
 - it is sometimes called axiomatic semantics



Hoare Triple

Definition 3.1

$\{P\}{\tt c}\{Q\}$

- P: Σ(V), usually called precondition
 c: P
- $Q: \Sigma(V)$, usually called postcondition



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Definition 3.2 $\{P\}c\{Q\}$ is valid if all the executions of c that start from P end in Q, i.e.,

$$\forall v, v'. v \models P \land ((v, c), (v', \texttt{skip})) \in T^* \Rightarrow v' \models Q.$$



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Example 3.1 Program

```
assume(\top)

r := 1;

i := 1;

while(i < 3)

{

r := r + z;

i := i + 1

}

assert(r = 2z + 1)
```



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Example 3.1 Program

Hoare triple



 $\overline{\{P\}$ skip $\{P\}$ (skip rule)



$$\overline{\{P\}$$
skip $\{P\}$ (skip rule)

$$\frac{1}{\{P[exp/x]\}x := exp\{P\}} (assign rule)$$



$$\overline{\{P\}$$
skip $\{P\}$ (skip rule)

$$\overline{\{P[exp/x]\}x := exp\{P\}} (assign rule)$$

$$\overline{\{\forall x.P\}x := havoc()\{P\}}$$
 (havoc rule)



$$\overline{\{P\}$$
skip $\{P\}$ (skip rule)

$$\overline{\{P[exp/x]\}x := exp\{P\}} (assign rule)$$

$$\overline{\{\forall x.P\}x := havoc()\{P\}} (havoc rule)$$

$$\overline{\{P\}$$
assume(F) $\{F \land P\}$ (assume rule)



$$\overline{\{P\}$$
skip $\{P\}$ (skip rule)

$$\overline{\{P[exp/x]\}x := exp\{P\}} (assign rule)$$

$$\overline{\{\forall x.P\}x := havoc()\{P\}} (havoc rule)$$

$$\overline{\{P\}$$
assume(F) $\{F \land P\}$ (assume rule)

We may freely choose any of sp and wp for pre/post pairs for data statements.



Hoare Proof System (contd.) $\frac{\{P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{Q\}c_2\{R\}}{\{P\}c_1; c_2\{R\}} (\text{composition rule})$



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(composition rule)

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(nondet rule)



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$$\frac{\{F \land P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{\neg F \land P\}c_2\{Q\}}{\{P\}if(F) c_1 \text{ else } c_2\{Q\}} (\text{if rule})$$



Hoare Proof System (contd.) $\frac{\{P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{Q\}c_2\{R\}}{\{P\}c_1; c_2\{R\}}$ (composition rule) $\frac{\{P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{P\}c_2\{Q\}}{\{P\}c_1[]c_2\{Q\}}$ (nondet rule) $\frac{\{F \land P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{\neg F \land P\}c_2\{Q\}}{\{P\}if(F) c_1 \text{ else } c_2\{Q\}} (\text{if rule})$ $\frac{P_1 \Rightarrow P_2 \quad \{P_2\} c\{Q_2\} \quad Q_2 \Rightarrow Q_1}{\{P_1\} c\{Q_1\}}$ (Consequence rule)



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Hoare Proof System (contd.) $\frac{\{P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{Q\}c_2\{R\}}{\{P\}c_1:c_2\{R\}} (\text{composition rule})$ $\frac{\{P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{P\}c_2\{Q\}}{\{P\}c_1[]c_2\{Q\}}$ (nondet rule) $\frac{\{F \land P\}c_1\{Q\} \quad \{\neg F \land P\}c_2\{Q\}}{\{P\}if(F) c_1 \text{ else } c_2\{Q\}} (\text{if rule})$ $\frac{P_1 \Rightarrow P_2 \quad \{P_2\} c\{Q_2\} \quad Q_2 \Rightarrow Q_1}{\{P_1\} c\{Q_1\}}$ (Consequence rule) $\frac{\{I \land F\}c\{I\}}{\{I\}while(F) c\{\neg F \land I\}}$ (While rule)

Non-mechanical step: invent I such that the while rule holds. I is called loop-invariant.

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i := 1;

while(i < 3) { r := r + z

i := i + 1} {r = 2z + 1}



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Example 3.2 Consider loop invariant: $I = (i \le 3 \land r = (i - 1)z + 1)$ $\{\top\}$ r := 1;i := 1;{I} while (i < 3) $\{ I \land i < 3 \}$ $\mathbf{r} := \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{z}$
$$\begin{split} \mathbf{i} &:= \mathbf{i} + 1 \quad \underbrace{\{\top\}\mathbf{r} := 1; \mathbf{i} := 1; \{\mathbf{I}\} \quad \{i < 3 \land \mathbf{I}\}\mathbf{r} := \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{z}; \mathbf{i} := \mathbf{i} + 1\{\mathbf{I}\}}_{\{\top\}\mathbf{r} := 1; \dots; \texttt{while}(\dots) \dots \{\mathbf{I} \land \mathbf{i} \ge 3\}} \quad \mathbf{I} \land \mathbf{i} \ge 3 \Rightarrow r = 2z + 1\} \end{split}$$
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Example Hoare proof





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Topic 3.2

Program as labeled transition system



A more convenient program model

Simple language has many cases to write an algorithm



A more convenient program model

- Simple language has many cases to write an algorithm
- automata like program models allow more succinct description of verification methods



Program as labeled transition system (LTS)

Definition 3.3

A program P is a tuple $(V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$, where

- V is a vector of variables,
- L be set of program locations,
- ℓ_0 is initial location,
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Consider V = [x, y]. The formula represented by the guarded command (x > y, [x := x + 1]) is $x > y \land x' = x + 1 \land y' = y$.



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Definition 3.6

A path $\pi = e_1, \ldots, e_n$ in P is a sequence of transitions such that, for each 0 < i < n, $e_i = (\ell_{i-1}, ..., \ell_i)$ and $e_{i+1} = (\ell_i, ..., \ell_{i+1})$.



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An execution corresponding to path e_1, \ldots, e_n is a sequence of states $(\ell_0, v_0), \ldots, (\ell_n, v_n)$ such that $\forall i \in 1..n, e_i(v_{i-1}, v_i)$ holds true. An execution belongs to P if there is a corresponding path in P.



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Definition 3.8

 P is safe if there is no execution of P from ℓ_0 to ℓ_e .

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 Program verification 2016

 Instructor: Ashutosh Gupta

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Example 3.6 $\begin{array}{c} (\ell_0) & Consider \ path \\ (\ell_0, \mathbf{x} := 1, \ell_1), \ (\ell_1, \mathbf{x} := \mathbf{x} + 2, \ell_1), \ (\ell_1, \mathbf{x} < 0, \ell_e) \\ \mathbf{x} := \mathbf{x} + 2 \overset{\frown}{\bigcirc} (\ell_1) \\ \mathbf{x} < 0 \\ \ell_e \end{array}$

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Example 3.7

```
L0: i = 0;
L1: while( x < 10 ) {
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L4: skip
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L5: assert($i \ge 0$)



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Cut-points

Definition 3.10

For a program $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$, CUTPOINTS(P) is the a minimal subset of L such that every path of P containing a loop passes through one of the location in CUTPOINTS(P).



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CUTPOINTS(P) in LTS loop heads in simple language

Example 3.8

Consider the following program P.



Reminder: symbolic strongest post

$$sp: \Sigma(V) imes \Sigma(V, V') o \Sigma(V)$$

We define symbolic post over labels of P as follows.

$$sp(F, \rho) \triangleq (\exists V : F(V) \land \rho(V, V'))[V/V']$$

We assume that ρ and F are in a theory that admits quantifier elimination


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Using polymorphism, we also define $sp((\ell, F), (\ell, \rho, \ell') \in E) \triangleq (\ell', sp(F, \rho)).$



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For path
$$\pi = e_1, ..., e_n$$
 of P , $sp((\ell, F), \pi) \triangleq sp(sp((\ell, F), e_1), e_2...e_n)$.



Topic 3.3

Loop invariants



Definition 3.11

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 $sp(I(\ell), \rho) \Rightarrow I(\ell').$



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Definition 3.12 For P, a map I : $L \to \Sigma(V)$ is called inductive if, for each $(\ell, \rho, \ell') \in E$, $sp(I(\ell), \rho) \Rightarrow I(\ell')$. Definition 3.13 For P, a map I : $L \to \Sigma(V)$ is called safe if $I(\ell_0) = \top$ and $I(\ell_e) = \bot$ Theorem 3.3 For P, if I is inductive and safe then I is an invariant and P is safe.



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Invariant checking: is I a safe inductive invariant map?



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Exercise 3.1

What is the algorithm for invariant checking? Program verification 2016 Θ

```
Let P be a program and C = \text{CUTPOINTS}(P) \cup \{\ell_0, \ell_e\}.
```

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If I is inductive and safe then I is an cut-point invariant map and P is safe.



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Theorem 3.4

If I is inductive and safe then I is an cut-point invariant map and P is safe.

Proof.

Every path from ℓ_0 to ℓ_e can be segmented into loop free paths between cut-points. Therefore, no such path is feasible. Θ

Instructor: Ashutosh Gupta

Annotated verification: VCC demo

http://rise4fun.com/Vcc



Annotated verification: VCC demo

```
http://rise4fun.com/Vcc
```

```
Exercise 3.2
```

Complete the following program such that Vcc proves it correct

```
#include <vcc.h>
int main()
ł
  int x, y;
  _(assume x > y +3 && x < 3000 )
  while (0 < y) (invariant ....) {
    x = x + 1;
    y = y - 1;
  }
  (assert x \ge y)
  return 0;
}
```

Annotated verification

- There are many tools like VCC that require user to write invariants at the loop heads and function boundaries
- Rest of the verification is done as discussed in earlier slides



Annotated verification

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- Rest of the verification is done as discussed in earlier slides
- User needs to do a lot of work, not a very desirable method



Annotated verification

- There are many tools like VCC that require user to write invariants at the loop heads and function boundaries
- Rest of the verification is done as discussed in earlier slides
- User needs to do a lot of work, not a very desirable method

What if we want to compute the invariants automatically?



Topic 3.4

Concrete model checking - enumerate reachable states





- ► Explore the transition graph explicitly, light weight machinery
- ▶ If edge labels are guarded commands then finding next values are trivial



- Explore the transition graph explicitly, light weight machinery
- ▶ If edge labels are guarded commands then finding next values are trivial
- After resolving non-determinism, concrete model checking reduces to program execution



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- Explore the transition graph explicitly, light weight machinery
- ► If edge labels are guarded commands then finding next values are trivial
- After resolving non-determinism, concrete model checking reduces to program execution
- May be only finitely many states are reachable
- May be impossible to cover all states explicitly, but it may cover a portion of interest
- ► Useful for learning design principles of computing reachable states



Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking

Input: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$

Output: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise



Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking

Input: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ Output: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise reach := \emptyset ; worklist := { $(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}$ };



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Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking

Input: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ **Output**: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise reach := \emptyset : worklist := $\{(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}\}$; while *worklist* $\neq \emptyset$ do choose $(\ell, v) \in worklist$; worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell, v)\};$ if $(\ell, v) \notin reach$ then reach := reach \cup {(ℓ , v)}; foreach $(\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E$ do worklist := worklist \cup { $(\ell', v')|F(v, v')$ };



Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking

```
Input: P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)
Output: SAFE if P is safe, UNSAFE otherwise
reach := \emptyset:
 worklist := \{(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}\};
while worklist \neq \emptyset do
    choose (\ell, v) \in worklist;
    worklist := worklist \setminus \{(\ell, v)\};
    if (\ell, v) \notin reach then
         reach := reach \cup {(\ell, v)};
         foreach (\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E do
            worklist := worklist \cup \{(\ell', v') | F(v, v')\};
```

if $(\ell_{e, -}) \in reach$ then return UNSAFE

else

return SAFE



Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking

```
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         foreach (\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E do
          worklist := worklist \cup {(\ell', v')|F(v, v')};
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Exercise 3.3 Suggest improvements in the algorithm

else

return SAFE



Algorithm 3.1: Concrete model checking **Input**: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ **Output**: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise reach := \emptyset : worklist := { $(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}$ }; while worklist $\neq \emptyset$ do choose $(\ell, v) \in$ worklist; the choice defines the nature of exploration worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell, v)\};$ if $(\ell, v) \notin reach$ then reach := reach \cup {(ℓ , v)}; foreach $(\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E$ do worklist := worklist \cup { $(\ell', v')|F(v, v')$ };

if $(\ell_{e, -}) \in reach$ then return UNSAFE

Exercise 3.3 Suggest improvements in the algorithm

else

return SAFE



Example: concrete model checking

Example 3.9

Consider the following example

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

$$x > 4, x := x - 1,$$

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$$x \le 4 \land i \ne x$$

$$\ell_e$$



Example: concrete model checking

Example 3.9

Consider the following example

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

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$$\ell_e$$

Let V = [x, i]



Example: concrete model checking

Example 3.9

Consider the following example

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Initialization:}\\ 0 < x < 9, i := x\\ x > 4, x := x - 1, \\ i := i - 1\\ x \le 4 \land i \ne x\\ \ell_e \end{array}$$

Let V = [x, i]


Example 3.9

Consider the following example



Let V = [x, i]



Example 3.9

Consider the following example



Initialization: reach = \emptyset , worklist = { $(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^2$ } Choose a state: Lets choose (ℓ_0 , [8, 0])

Update worklist: worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell_0, [8, 8])\}$

Let V = [x, i]



 ℓ_0

Example 3.9

Consider the following example

0 < x < 9, i := x

 $x \leq 4 \land i \neq x$

x > 4, x := x - 1,i := i - 1



Choose a state: Lets choose $(\ell_0, [8, 0])$

Update worklist: worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell_0, [8, 8])\}$

Let V = [x, i]

Add successors in worklist if state not visited: worklist := worklist \cup {(ℓ_1 , [8, 8])} reach := reach \cup {(ℓ_0 , [8, 0])}



 ℓ_0

Example 3.9

Consider the following example

 $0 < \mathtt{x} < 9, \mathtt{i} := \mathtt{x}$

 $x \leq 4 \land i \neq x$

x > 4, x := x - 1,i := i - 1



Choose a state: Lets choose $(\ell_0, [8, 0])$

Update worklist: worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell_0, [8, 8])\}$

Let V = [x, i]

Add successors in worklist if state not visited: worklist := worklist \cup {(ℓ_1 , [8, 8])} reach := reach \cup {(ℓ_0 , [8, 0])}

... go back to choosing a new state from worklist



Search strategies

DFSBFS



Search strategies

- DFS
- BFS
- ► A*
 - worklist is a priority queue,
 - weights are assigned to states based on estimate on possibility of reaching error



Search strategies

- DFS
- BFS
- ► A*
 - worklist is a priority queue,
 - weights are assigned to states based on estimate on possibility of reaching error

Exercise 3.4 Describe A* search strategy



Optimizations: exploiting structure

- Symmetry reduction
- Assume guarantee
- Partial order reduction (for concurrent systems)



Optimizations: reducing space

- hashed states reach set contains hash of states (not sound)
- Stateless exploration no reach set (redundant)
- Trade-off among time, space, and soundness



Optimizations: reducing space

- hashed states reach set contains hash of states (not sound)
- Stateless exploration no reach set (redundant)
- Trade-off among time, space, and soundness

Exercise 3.5

Write concrete model checking using hash tables



Definition 3.17

A proof of a program is an object that allows <u>one</u> to check safety of the program using a low complexity (preferably linear) algorithm in the size of the object.



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Example 3.10

In our concrete model checking algorithm, reach set is the proof. The checker needs to find that no more states can be reached from reach.



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Definition 3.18

A counterexample of a program is an execution that ends at ℓ_e .



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Example 3.10

In our concrete model checking algorithm, reach set is the proof. The checker needs to find that no more states can be reached from reach.

Definition 3.18

- A counterexample of a program is an execution that ends at ℓ_e .
- A verification method may produce three possible outcomes for a program
 - proof
 - counterexample
 - unknown or non-termination



Enabling counterexample generation

Algorithm 3.2: Concrete model checking **Input**: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ Exercise 3.6 **Output**: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise add data structure to *reach* := \emptyset : report counterexample *worklist* := { $(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}$ }; while *worklist* $\neq \emptyset$ do choose $(\ell, v) \in worklist;$ worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell, v)\};$ if $(\ell, v) \notin reach$ then reach := reach \cup {(ℓ , v)}; foreach v' s.t. F(v, v') is sat $\wedge (\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E$ do worklist := worklist $\cup \{(\ell', \nu')\};$

if $(\ell_e, v) \in reach$ then return UNSAFE

else

 $return \,\, {\rm SAFE}$



Enabling counterexample generation

Algorithm 3.2: Concrete model checking **Input**: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ Exercise 3.6 **Output**: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise add data structure to reach := \emptyset ; parents := λx .NAN; report counterexample *worklist* := { $(\ell_0, v) | v \in \mathbb{Z}^{|V|}$ }; while *worklist* $\neq \emptyset$ do choose $(\ell, v) \in worklist;$ worklist := worklist $\setminus \{(\ell, v)\};$ if $(\ell, v) \notin reach$ then reach := reach \cup {(ℓ , v)}; foreach v' s.t. F(v, v') is sat $\wedge (\ell, F(V, V'), \ell') \in E$ do worklist := worklist \cup { (ℓ', v') }; parents $((\ell', v'))$:= (ℓ, v) ;

if $(\ell_e, v) \in reach$ then | return UNSAFE(traverseTolnit(parents, (ℓ_e, v))) else

return SAFE

Topic 3.5

Symbolic methods



Why symbolic?

To avoid, state explosion problem



Symbolic methods

Now, we cover some methods that try/avoid to compute lfp

- Symbolic model checking
- Constraint based invariant generation



Symbolic state

Definition 3.19

A symbolic state s of $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ is a pair (ℓ, F) , where

- ► $\ell \in L$
- ► F is a formula over variables V in a given theory

Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

Input: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$

Output: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise



Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

Input: $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$ **Output**: SAFE if *P* is safe, UNSAFE otherwise reach : $L \rightarrow \Sigma(V) := \lambda x. \bot$; worklist := { (ℓ_0, \top) };



Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

```
Input: P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)

Output: SAFE if P is safe, UNSAFE otherwise

reach : L \rightarrow \Sigma(V) := \lambda x. \bot;

worklist := {(\ell_0, \top)};

while worklist \neq \emptyset do

choose (\ell, F) \in worklist;

worklist := worklist \ {(\ell, F)};
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Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

Input:
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Output: SAFE if P is safe, UNSAFE otherwise
reach : $L \to \Sigma(V) := \lambda x. \bot$;
worklist := $\{(\ell_0, \top)\}$;
while worklist $\neq \emptyset$ do
choose $(\ell, F) \in worklist$;
worklist := worklist \ $\{(\ell, F)\}$;
if $\neg(F \Rightarrow reach(\ell))$ is sat then
| reach := reach $[\ell \mapsto reach(\ell) \lor F]$;



Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

```
Input: P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)
Output: SAFE if P is safe, UNSAFE otherwise
reach : L \to \Sigma(V) := \lambda x. \bot;
 worklist := \{(\ell_0, \top)\};
while worklist \neq \emptyset do
    choose (\ell, F) \in worklist;
    worklist := worklist \setminus \{(\ell, F)\};
    if \neg(F \Rightarrow reach(\ell)) is sat then
         reach := reach[\ell \mapsto reach(\ell) \lor F];
         foreach (\ell, \rho(V, V'), \ell') \in E do
          worklist := worklist \cup {(\ell', sp(F, \rho))};
```



Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

```
Input: P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)
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    if \neg(F \Rightarrow reach(\ell)) is sat then
         reach := reach[\ell \mapsto reach(\ell) \lor F];
         foreach (\ell, \rho(V, V'), \ell') \in E do
              worklist := worklist \cup {(\ell', sp(F, \rho))};
```

if $reach(\ell_e) \neq \bot$ then | return UNSAFE

else

 $return \ {\rm SAFE}$



Algorithm 3.3: Symbolic model checking

Input:
$$P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$$

Output: SAFE if P is safe, UNSAFE otherwise
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worklist := worklist \ $\{(\ell, F)\}$;
if $\neg(F \Rightarrow reach(\ell))$ is sat then
 $| reach := reach[\ell \mapsto reach(\ell) \lor F]$;
foreach $(\ell, \rho(V, V'), \ell') \in E$ do
 $| worklist := worklist \cup \{(\ell', sp(F, \rho))\}$;

if $reach(\ell_e) \neq \bot$ then return UNSAFE Note: We need efficient implementations of various logical operators!

else

 $return \ {\rm SAFE}$

Exercise 3.7

Give a condition for definite termination?



Example 3.11

Consider the following example

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

$$x > 4,$$

$$x := x - 1, \quad \ell_1$$

$$i := i - 1$$

$$x \le 4 \land i \ne x$$

$$\ell_e$$



Example 3.11

Consider the following example

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

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Let V = [x, i]



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Let V = [x, i]



Init: reach = $\lambda x \perp$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) }

Example 3.11 Consider the following example

Init: reach = $\lambda x. \perp$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) } Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) (only choice)

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

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Let V = [x, i]



Init: reach = $\lambda x \perp$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) }

Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) *(only choice)*

Update worklist: worklist := \emptyset

Example 3.11 Consider the following example

0 < x < 9, i := x x > 4, $x := x - 1, \bigcirc \ell_1$ i := i - 1 $x \le 4 \land i \ne x$ ℓ_e

Let V = [x, i]



Init: reach = $\lambda x \perp$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) }

Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) (only choice)

Update worklist: worklist := \emptyset Add successors in worklist:

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Let V = [x, i]

Init: reach = $\lambda x. \bot$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) } Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) (only choice) Update worklist: worklist := \emptyset Add successors in worklist: Since $\neg(\top \Rightarrow reach(\ell_0))$ is sat,



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Let V = [x, i]



Example 3.11 Consider the following example

$$\begin{pmatrix} \ell_0 \\ 0 < x < 9, i := x \\ x > 4, \\ x := x - 1, \land \ell_1 \\ i := i - 1 \\ x \le 4 \land i \ne x \\ \ell_e \end{pmatrix}$$

Init: reach = $\lambda x. \bot$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) } Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) (only choice) Update worklist: worklist := Ø Add successors in worklist: Since $\neg(\top \Rightarrow reach(\ell_0))$ is sat, worklist := worklist \cup { $(\ell_1, 0 < x = i < 9)$ } reach (ℓ_0) := reach $(\ell_0) \lor \top$:= \top

Let V = [x, i]


Example 3.11 Consider the following example

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Init: reach = $\lambda x \perp$, worklist = { (ℓ_0, \top) } Choose a state: (ℓ_0, \top) (only choice) Update worklist: worklist := \emptyset Add successors in worklist: Since $\neg(\top \Rightarrow reach(\ell_0))$ is sat, *worklist* := *worklist* \cup {($\ell_1, 0 < x = i < 9$)} $reach(\ell_0) := reach(\ell_0) \lor \top := \top$ Again choose a state: $\{(\ell_1, 0 < x = i < 9)\}$ Update worklist: worklist := \emptyset Add successors in worklist: Since $\neg (0 < x = i < 9 \Rightarrow reach(\ell_1))$ is sat, worklist := worklist $\cup \{(\ell_1, 3 < x = i < 9), (\ell_e, \bot)\}$

Example 3.11 Consider the following example

$$0 < x < 9, i := x$$

$$x > 4,$$

$$x := x - 1, \bigcirc \ell_1$$

$$i := i - 1$$

$$x \le 4 \land i \ne x$$

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Let V = [x, i]

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complete the run of the algorithm

Exercise 3.8



If the symbolic model checker terminates with the answer SAFE, then it must also report a proof of the safety, which is the *reach* map.



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It has implicitly computed a Hoare style proof of $P = (V, L, \ell_0, \ell_e, E)$.

 $(\ell, \rho(V, V'), \ell') \in E \quad \{reach(\ell)\}\rho(V, V')\{reach(\ell')\}$



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If an LTS program has been obtained from a simple language program then one may generate a Hoare style proof system.



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If an LTS program has been obtained from a simple language program then one may generate a Hoare style proof system.

Exercise 3.9

Describe the construction for the above translation



Topic 3.6

Constraint based invariant generation



Invariant generation using constraint solving

Invariant generation: find a safe inductive invariant map I



Invariant generation using constraint solving

Invariant generation: find a safe inductive invariant map I

This is our first method that computes the fixed point automatically without resorting to some kind of enumeration



Templates

Let
$$L = \{l_0, ..., l_n, l_e\}$$
,
Let $V = \{x_1, ..., x_m\}$



Templates

Let $L = \{l_0, ..., l_n, l_e\}$, Let $V = \{x_1, ..., x_m\}$

We assume the following templates for each invariant in the invariant map.

$$I(I_0) = 0 \le 0$$

 $\forall i \in 1..n. I(I_i) = (p_{i1}x_1 + ... p_{im}x_m \le p_{i0})$
 $I(I_e) = 0 \le -1$

 p_{ij} are called parameters to the templates and they define a set of candidate invariants.



Constraint generation

A safe inductive invariant map I must satisfy for all $(I_i, \rho, I_{i'}) \in E$

$$sp(I(l_i), \rho) \Rightarrow I(l_{i'}).$$

The above condition translates to

$$\forall V, V'. (p_{i1}x_1 + \ldots p_{im}x_m \leq p_{i0}) \land \rho(V, V') \Rightarrow (p_{i'1}x'_1 + \ldots p_{i'm}x'_m \leq p_{i'0})$$

Our goal is to find p_{ij} s such that the above constraints are satisfied. Unfortunately there is quantifier alternation in the constraints. Therefore, they are hard to solve.



Constraint solving using Farkas lemma

If all ρ s are linear constraints then we can use Farkas lemma to turn the validity question into a "conjunctive satisfiablity question"

Lemma 3.1 For a rational matrix A, vectors a and b, and constant c, $\forall X. AX \leq b \Rightarrow aX \leq c \text{ iff}$ $\exists \lambda \geq 0. \ \lambda^T A = a \text{ and } \lambda^T b \leq c$



Application of farkas lemma

Consider $(I_i, (AV + A'V \le b), I_{i'}) \in E$

After applying Farkas lemma on

 $\forall V, V'. (p_{i1}x_1 + \ldots p_{im}x_m \leq p_{i0}) \land \rho(V, V') \Rightarrow (p_{i'1}x'_1 + \ldots p_{i'm}x'_m \leq p_{i'0}),$

we obtain

$$\exists \lambda_0, \lambda. \ (\lambda_0[p_{i1}, \dots, p_{im}] + \lambda^T A) = 0 \land \lambda^T A' = [p_{i'1}, \dots, p_{i'm}] \land$$
$$\lambda_0 p_{i0} + \lambda^T b \le p_{i'0}$$

All the variables p_{ij} s and λ s are existentially quantified, which can be solved by a quadratic constraints solver.



Example 3.12

Consider the following example

$$\begin{array}{c} \begin{pmatrix} \ell_0 \\ x := 2, y := 3 \\ y \le 10, \\ x := x - 1, \\ \psi := y + 1 \\ y > 10 \land x \ge 10 \\ \hline \ell_e \end{array}$$



Example 3.12

Consider the following example

$$\begin{array}{c} \begin{pmatrix} \ell_0 \\ x := 2, y := 3 \\ y \le 10, \\ x := x - 1, \\ y := y + 1 \\ y > 10 \land x \ge 10 \\ \hline \ell_e \end{array}$$



Example 3.12

Consider the following example

We assume the following invariant template at ℓ_1 : $I(\ell_1) = (p_1x + p_2y \le p_0)$





Example 3.12

Consider the following example



Let V = [x, y]

enso

We assume the following invariant template at ℓ_1 : I $(\ell_1) = (p_1 x + p_2 y \le p_0)$

We generate the following constraints for program transitions:

Example 3.12

Consider the following example



We assume the following invariant template at ℓ_1 : $I(\ell_1) = (p_1 x + p_2 y \le p_0)$

We generate the following constraints for program transitions:

For
$$\ell_0$$
 to ℓ_1 ,
 $\forall \mathtt{x}', \mathtt{y}'. \ \mathtt{x}' = 2 \land \mathtt{y}' = 3 \Rightarrow (p_1 \mathtt{x}' + p_2 \mathtt{y}' \le p_0)$



Example 3.12

Consider the following example



We assume the following invariant template at ℓ_1 : I $(\ell_1) = (p_1 x + p_2 y \le p_0)$

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$$\ell_0$$
 to ℓ_1 ,
/x', y'. $\mathbf{x}' = 2 \land \mathbf{y}' = 3 \Rightarrow (p_1\mathbf{x}' + p_2\mathbf{y}' \le p_0)$

For
$$\ell_1$$
 to ℓ_1 ,
 $\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}'$. $(p_1\mathbf{x} + p_2\mathbf{y} \le p_0) \land \mathbf{y} \le \mathbf{10} \land \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{1} \land$
 $\mathbf{y}' = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{1} \Rightarrow (p_1\mathbf{x}' + p_2\mathbf{y}' \le p_0)$



Example 3.12

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For
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 to ℓ_1 ,
 $\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}'$. $(p_1\mathbf{x} + p_2\mathbf{y} \le p_0) \land \mathbf{y} \le \mathbf{10} \land \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{1} \land$
 $\mathbf{y}' = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{1} \Rightarrow (p_1\mathbf{x}' + p_2\mathbf{y}' \le p_0)$

Let V = [x, y]

For
$$\ell_1$$
 to ℓ_e ,
 $\forall x, y. (p_1 x + p_2 y \le p_0) \land y > 10 \land x \ge 10 \Rightarrow \bot$



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Example: invariant generation(contd.)

Now consider the second constraint:

 $\begin{array}{l} \forall \mathtt{x}, \mathtt{y}, \mathtt{x}', \mathtt{y}'. \\ (p_1 \mathtt{x} + p_2 \mathtt{y} \le p_0) \land \mathtt{y} \le \mathtt{10} \land \mathtt{x}' = \mathtt{x} - \mathtt{1} \land \mathtt{y}' = \mathtt{y} + \mathtt{1} \Rightarrow (p_1 \mathtt{x}' + p_2 \mathtt{y}' \le p_0) \end{array}$



Example: invariant generation(contd.)

Now consider the second constraint:

$$\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}'. \\ (p_1\mathbf{x} + p_2\mathbf{y} \le p_0) \land \mathbf{y} \le \mathbf{10} \land \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{1} \land \mathbf{y}' = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{1} \Rightarrow (p_1\mathbf{x}' + p_2\mathbf{y}' \le p_0)$$

Matrix view of the transition relation $\mathtt{y} \leq 10 \wedge \mathtt{x}' = \mathtt{x} - 1 \wedge \mathtt{y}' = \mathtt{y} + 1$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ x' \\ y' \end{bmatrix} \leq \begin{bmatrix} 10 \\ 1 \\ -1 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Example: invariant generation(contd.)

Applying farkas lemma on the constraint, we obtain

$$\begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{0} & \lambda_{1} & \lambda_{2} & \lambda_{3} & \lambda_{4} & \lambda_{5} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p_{1} & p_{2} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & -1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & p_{1} & p_{2} \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{0} & \lambda_{1} & \lambda_{2} & \lambda_{3} & \lambda_{4} & \lambda_{5} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p_{0} \\ 10 \\ 1 \\ -1 \\ -1 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix} \le \begin{bmatrix} p_{0} \end{bmatrix}$$
Exercise 3.10
Apply farkas lemma on the other two implications
 $\langle x', y', x' = 2 \land y' = 3 \Rightarrow (p_{1}x' + p_{2}y' \le p_{0})$

$$\forall x, y. (p_1 x + p_2 y \le p_0) \land y > 10 \land x \ge 10 \Rightarrow \bot$$

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Does this method work?

- Quadratic constraint solving does not scale
- > For small tricky problems, this method may prove to be useful



Topic 3.7

Assignment



Problem 1

1. (1) Prove the following Hoare triple is valid

```
{true}
assume( n > 1);
i = n;
x = 0;
while(i > 0) {
    x = x + i;
    i = i - 1;
}
{ 2x = n*(n+1) }
```



Problem 2

2. (1) Fill the annotations to prove following program correct via Vcc #include <vcc.h> int main() ł int x = 0, y = 2; _(assume 1==1) while (x < 3) (invariant ...) { x = x + 1;y = 3; } (assert y == 3)return 0;



Problem 3

3. (2) extend your tool in the last assignment in the following ways

- define classes for
 - locations,
 - variables,
 - guarded commands,
 - transitions (give names to the transitions), and
 - programs
- encode the program in example 3.12 using the class
- Write a function that computes path constraints for a given path
- Read path from command line as space separated transition names and output the path constraints

