



CS 228 : Logic in Computer Science

Krishna. S

Some Real Life Stories

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- ▶ Involved in **at least six accidents**, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation, **approximately 100 times** the intended dose.
- ▶ Design error in the control software (race condition)

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- ▶ Discovered by a professor working on Brun's constant
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- ▶ Intel offered to **replace all flawed processors**

Ariane 5 (1996)



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 - ▶ **uncaught exception: data conversion from 64-bit float to 16-bit signed int**

Toyota Prius (2010)



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 - ▶ software “glitch” found in anti-lock braking system
 - ▶ Eventually fixed via software update in total 185,000 cars recalled, at huge cost

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- ▶ Nest Thermostat, the smart, learning thermostat from Nest Labs
 - ▶ software “glitch” led several homes to a frozen state, reported in NY times, Jan 13, 2016. May be, old fashioned mechanical thermostats better!

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 - ▶ for performance
- ▶ **High costs incurred: financial, loss of life**
- ▶ **Failures avoidable**

Formal Methods

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“Applied Mathematics for modelling and analysing ICT systems”

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- ▶ obtaining an **early integration** of verification in the design process
- ▶ providing **more effective** verification techniques (higher coverage)
- ▶ **reducing** the verification time

Simulation and Testing


Basic procedure

- ▶ Take a model
- ▶ Simulate it with certain inputs
- ▶ Observe what happens, and if this is desired

Important Drawbacks

- ▶ possible behaviours very large/infinite
- ▶ unexplored behaviours may contain fatal bug
- ▶ can show presence of errors, **not** their absence

Model Checking



- ▶ Year 2008 : ACM confers the **Turing Award** to the pioneers of Model Checking: **Ed Clarke, Allen Emerson, and Joseph Sifakis**
- ▶ Why?


Model checking

- ▶ Model checking has evolved in last 25 years into a widely used verification and debugging technique for software and hardware.
- ▶ Cost of *not* doing formal verification is high!
 - ▶ The France Telecom example
 - ▶ Ariane rocket: kaboom due to integer overflow!
 - ▶ Toyota/Ford recalls


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- ▶ Model checking used (and further developed) by companies/institutes such as **IBM, Intel, NASA, Cadence, Microsoft, and Siemens**, and has culminated in many freely downloadable software tools that allow automated verification.

What is Model Checking?



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Model Checker as a Black Box

- ▶ Inputs to Model checker : A finite state system M , and a property P to be checked.
- ▶ Question : Does M satisfy P ?
- ▶ Possible Outputs
 - ▶ Yes, M satisfies P
 - ▶ No, here is a counter example!.

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Transition Systems

- ▶ States labeled with propositions
- ▶ Transition relation between states
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Expressivity

- ▶ Programs are transition systems
- ▶ Multi-threading programs are transition systems
- ▶ Communicating processes are transition systems
- ▶ Hardware circuits are transition systems
- ▶ What else?

What are Properties?

Example properties

- ▶ Can the system reach a deadlock?
- ▶ Can two processes ever be together in a critical section?
- ▶ On termination, does a program provide correct output?

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
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Logics of Relevance

- ▶ Classical Logics
 - ▶ First Order Logic
 - ▶ Monadic Second Order Logic
- ▶ Temporal Logics
 - ▶ Propositional Logic, enriched with modal operators such as \square (always) and \diamond (eventually)
 - ▶ Interpreted over state sequences (linear)
 - ▶ Or over infinite trees (branching)

Two Traffic Lights



1. The traffic lights are never green simultaneously
 $\forall x(\neg(\text{green}_1(x) \wedge \text{green}_2(x)))$ or $\Box(\neg(\text{green}_1 \wedge \text{green}_2))$
2. The first traffic light is infinitely often green
 $\forall x\exists y(x < y \wedge \text{green}_1(y))$ or $\Box\Diamond\text{green}_1$
3. Between every two occurrences of traffic light 1 becoming red, traffic light 2 becomes red once.

The Model Checking Process

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- ▶ **Analysis Phase**

- ▶ property satisfied? → check next property (if any)
- ▶ property violated? →
 - ▶ analyse generated counter example by simulation
 - ▶ refine the model, design, property, . . . and repeat entire procedure
- ▶ out of memory? → try to reduce the model and try again

The Pros of Model Checking

- ▶ widely applicable (hardware, software...)
- ▶ allows for partial verification (only relevant properties)
- ▶ potential “push-button” technology (tools)
- ▶ rapidly increasing industrial interest
- ▶ in case of property violation, a counter example is provided
- ▶ sound mathematical foundations
- ▶ not biased to the most possible scenarios (like testing)

The Cons of Model Checking

- ▶ model checking is only as “good” as the system model
- ▶ no guarantee about **completeness** of results (incomplete specifications)

Nevertheless:

Model Checking is an effective technique to expose potential design errors

Striking Model-Checking Examples

- ▶ **Security : Needham-Schroeder encryption protocol**
 - ▶ error that remained undiscovered for 17 years revealed (model checker SAL)
- ▶ **Transportation Systems**
 - ▶ Train model containing 10^{47} states (model checker UPPAAL)
- ▶ **Model Checkers for C, JAVA, C++**
 - ▶ used (and developed) by Microsoft, Intel, NASA
 - ▶ successful application area: device drivers (model checker SLAM)
- ▶ **Dutch storm surge barrier in Nieuwe Waterweg**
- ▶ **Software in current/next generation of space missiles**
 - ▶ NASA's
 - ▶ Java Pathfinder, Deep Space Habitat, Lab for Reliable Software

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 - ▶ from programs, circuits, communication protocols to transition systems
- ▶ What are properties?
 - ▶ Safety, Liveness, fairness
- ▶ How to check **regular** properties?
 - ▶ finite state automata and regular safety properties
 - ▶ Buchi automata and ω -regular properties

Relevant Topics

- ▶ How to express properties **succintly**?
 - ▶ First Order Logic (FO) : syntax, semantics
 - ▶ Monadic Second Order Logic (MSO) : syntax, semantics
 - ▶ Linear-Temporal-Logic (LTL) : syntax, semantics
 - ▶ What can be expressed in each logic?
 - ▶ Satisfiability and Model checking : algorithms, complexity

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- ▶ How to make models **succint**?
 - ▶ Equivalences and partial-orders on transition systems
 - ▶ Which properties are preserved?
 - ▶ Minimization algorithms