

DABANGG: A Case for Noise Resilient Flush-Based Cache Attacks

Anish Saxena
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology[§]
anish.saxena@cc.gatech.edu

Biswabandan Panda
Department of CSE
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
biswa@cse.iitb.ac.in

Abstract—Flush-based cache attacks like Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush are highly precise and effective. Most of the flush-based attacks provide high accuracy in controlled and isolated environments where attacker and victim share OS pages. However, we observe that these attacks are prone to low accuracy on a noisy multi-core system with co-running applications. Two root causes for the varying accuracy of flush-based attacks are: (i) the dynamic nature of core frequencies that fluctuate depending on the system load, and (ii) the relative placement of victim and attacker threads in the processor, like same or different physical cores. These dynamic factors critically affect the execution latency of key instructions like `clflush` and `mov`, rendering the pre-attack calibration step ineffective.

We propose DABANGG, a set of novel refinements to make flush-based attacks resilient to system noise by making them aware of frequency and thread placement. First, we introduce pre-attack calibration that is aware of instruction latency variation. Second, we use low-cost attack-time optimizations like fine-grained busy waiting and periodic feedback about the latency thresholds to improve the effectiveness of the attack. Finally, we provide victim-specific parameters that significantly improve the attack accuracy. We evaluate DABANGG-enabled Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks against the standard attacks in side-channel and covert-channel experiments with varying levels of compute, memory, and IO-intensive system noise. In all scenarios, DABANGG+Flush+Reload and DABANGG+Flush+Flush outperform the standard attacks in stealth and accuracy.

Index Terms—Side-Channel Attacks, Dynamic Voltage & Frequency Scaling, Side-Channel Detectors

I. INTRODUCTION

On-chip caches on modern processors provide the perfect platform to mount side-channel and covert-channel attacks as attackers exploit the timing difference between a cache hit and a cache miss. A miss in the Last-level Cache (LLC) fetches data from DRAM, providing a measurable difference in latency compared to a hit in the LLC. Some common cache attacks are flush-based attacks like Flush+Reload [1] and Flush+Flush [2] and eviction-based attacks [3], [4], [5]. Compared to eviction based attacks, flush-based attacks provide better precision and accuracy as flush-based attacks require OS page sharing between the attacker and the victim. Thus, the attacker can precisely flush (with the `clflush` instruction) and reload (or flush again, in case of Flush+Flush attack) a particular cache line. Like any other timing-based

[§]The author was a student at Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur during this work.




Fig. 1. Variation in `reload` cache hit latency with `sleep()` system call invoked every 100 thousandth iteration.

attack, flush-based cache attacks rely on accurate calibration of the threshold which differentiates a cache hit from a cache miss. As `clflush` invalidates the cache line from the entire cache hierarchy, the threshold needs to precisely differentiate between an LLC hit from a miss.

The problem: Flush-based attacks perform poorly in the presence of I/O, compute, and memory-heavy system noise. To understand the effect of these system noises on the effectiveness of flush-based attacks, we perform simple side-channel and covert channel attacks that use `clflush`. In a covert channel attack, Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush attacks suffer from maximum error rates of 45% and 53%, respectively. In contrast, Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush provide high accuracy in controlled environments where only the attacker and the victim run concurrently. One of the primary reasons for this trend is that with the system noise, existing latency calibration mechanisms fail to provide a precise cache access time threshold. Prior works [6], [7] try to improve noise-resilience of Flush+Reload attacks tackle noise in covert-channel attacks only, which cannot be translated to side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose a generic approach to handle the system noise.

The root cause: To understand the subtle problem, we perform the Flush+Reload attack in a highly controlled environment (with no noise from co-running threads). We perform the following steps: (i) *Flush* a cache line, (ii) *Wait* for the victim's access by yielding the processor (sleeping), and (iii) *Reload*




Fig. 2. Variation in `reload` cache hit latency with relative placement of attacker and victim processes. All cores run at the (fixed) base frequency.

the same cache line that is flushed in step (i). We perform these three steps for thousands of attack iterations, where one iteration involves the above mentioned three steps. Figure 1 shows the variation in execution latency of a `reload` cache hit with the `movl` instruction. For the rest of the paper, we refer to `movl` as the `reload` instruction. We use the `rdtsc` instruction to measure the execution time of instructions. At every 100 thousandth iteration, we use `sleep()` function to sleep for 1 second, which results in the black curve. Note that in a real attack, an attacker will not sleep for one second. Next, we fix the processor frequency at 4.3 GHz and repeat the same experiment. The latency remains constant at around 100 cycles.

It is clear from Figure 1 that the `reload` latency increases drastically just after the `sleep()` system call. The increase in latency is due to a change in processor frequency, which is triggered by the underlying Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) [8] controller. If an attacker sets a latency threshold to distinguish a cache hit from a miss anywhere between 100 to 400 cycles, this results in false positives and reduces the effectiveness of flush-based attacks. The frequency-oblivious latency threshold leads to low accuracy in flush-based cache attacks.

Even if we fix the frequency of all the cores, the latency of `reload` cache hit is still dependent on where the victim and attacker threads are located in the processor (refer to Figure 2). The `reload` hit latency when the two threads run on the same (multi-threaded) physical core is different from when they run on different physical cores. Didier and Maurice [9], for instance, show that incorporating CPU interconnect topology plays an important role in calibrating `clflush` threshold. In this paper, we study the effect of frequency on latency variation that impacts accuracy of attacks, even on a single core CPU.

Thus, in a noisy system with various co-running applications, the DVFS controller throttles up and down the processor frequency according to system load. However, instructions such as `rdtsc` that measure the timing are unaffected by the change in the processor frequencies. Consequently, when the processor runs at a lower frequency, `rdtsc` reports higher

latency even in case of a cache hit. This is further complicated by the relative placement of victim and attacker threads on the processor.

Our goal is to improve the effectiveness of flush-based attacks in presence of extreme system noise by making them resilient to the effect of frequency and thread placement changes.

Our approach: We propose refinements that ensure the cache access latency threshold remains consistent and resilient to system noise by improving the calibration technique and the attacker’s waiting strategy. We name our refinements as DABANGG §. Overall, our key contributions are as follows:

- We analyze the major shortcomings of existing flush-based attacks and argue for noise resilient flush-based attacks (Section III).
- We propose DABANGG refinements that makes the flush-based attacks resilient to system noise (Section IV).
- We evaluate the standard and DABANGG-refined attacks in the presence of different levels of compute, memory, and I/O system noise (Section V).

In the following sections, we discuss current flush-based attacks, defenses, and optimizations (Section II), analyze the shortcomings of current attacks (Section III), describe our refinements (Section IV), present experimental results (Section V), discuss countermeasures (Section VI), and finally present our conclusions (Section VIII).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Dynamic Voltage & Frequency Scaling

Frequency and voltage are the two important run-time parameters managed through DVFS. Hardware and software components work cooperatively to realize this scheme.

Hardware support: A majority of modern processors are capable of operating in various clock frequency and voltage combinations referred to as the Operating Performance Points (OPPs) or Performance states (P-states) [10]. Conventionally, frequency is actively manipulated by the software component. Therefore, performance scaling is sometimes referred to as *frequency scaling*. The P-states can be managed through kernel-level software. They can also be managed directly through a hardware-level subsystem, termed Hardware-managed P-states (HWP). Intel uses the Enhanced SpeedStep technology [11], and AMD uses Cool’n’Quiet and PowerNow! [12] technologies for HWP. In this case, the processor selects P-states based on its assessment of system load, although the driver can provide hints to the hardware. The nature of these hints depends on the scaling algorithm (power governor). Another technology of interest is Intel’s Turbo Boost [13] (analogously, AMD’s Turbo Core [14]) technology, which allows to temporarily boost the processor’s frequency to values above the base frequency.

Depending on the processor model, Intel processor provides core-level granularity of frequency-scaling termed as the Per-Core P-State (PCPS), which independently optimizes

§DABANGG is a Hindi word that means *fearless*. We believe DABANGG refinements will make a flush-based attacker fearless of the system noise.

frequency for each physical core [15].

Software support: The `CPUFreq` subsystem in Linux coordinates frequency scaling in software and is accessible by a write-privileged user via the `/sys/devices/system/cpu/` policy interface. Fine-tuning of this interface is possible through the `sysfs` interface objects. Modern Intel processors come with `pstate` drivers providing fine granularity of frequency scaling. It works at a logical CPU level, that is, a system with eight physical cores with hyper-threading enabled (two logical cores per one physical core) has 16 `CPUFreq` policy objects, although the physical frequency domain is at the physical core level (in case of PCPS) or at the socket level.

B. Timekeeping mechanism

Most of the `x86_64` based processors use the `IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER` Model-Specific Register (MSR) to provide a timekeeping mechanism. Different processor families increment the timestamp counter (TSC) differently. There are two modes of incrementing TSC: (i) to increment at the same rate as the processor clock and (ii) to increment at a rate independent of the processor clock. Modern Intel processors use the second mode [16]. Thus, the TSC increments at a constant rate and is invariant of processor core frequency changes.

C. Flush-Based Cache Attacks

Flush-based attacks such as Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush use `clflush` instruction that invalidates cache block(s) from all levels of cache hierarchy and the corresponding data is written back to memory [16]. In a cross-core attack, the attacker core flushes (using `clflush` instruction) cache line address(es) from all levels of caches including remote cores' caches and the shared LLC. Later, the attacker core reloads (Flush+Reload) or flushes (Flush+Flush) the same line address(es).

The three phases: Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush work in three phases: (i) flush phase, where the attacker core flushes (using `clflush` instruction) the cache line address(es) of interest. (ii) Wait phase, where the attacker waits for the victim to access the flushed address, as it is not present in the entire cache hierarchy. If the victim accesses the flushed address, then it loads the address into the shared LLC. (iii) Reload (Flush in case of Flush+Flush) phase, where the attacker reloads (or flushes) the cache line address and measures the latency. If the victim accesses the cache line between phase I and III, then in case of Flush+Reload attack, the attacker core gets an LLC hit (LLC access latency), else an LLC miss (DRAM access latency). In case of Flush+Flush attack, the attacker core gets a `clflush` hit latency if the victim accesses the cache line between phase I and III, else a `clflush` miss latency. Since no memory accesses are performed in the case of Flush+Flush attack, it is harder to detect using performance counters which record cache references and misses, compared to Flush+Reload attack [2]. This makes the Flush+Flush attack stealthy.

TABLE I
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION FOR ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTS.

Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS, 8 Hyper-Threaded Intel Xeon W-2145 Skylake cores
Frequency: Base - 3.7 GHz, Minimum - 1.2 GHz, Turbo - 4.5 GHz
L1-D and L1-I: 32KB, 8 way, L2: 1 MB, 16-way
Shared L3: 11MB, 11-way, DRAM: 16 GB

Latency threshold and wait time: Flush-based attacks exploit the difference in execution latency of `clflush` and `reload` instructions depending on whether they get a cache hit or a miss for the monitored address(es). The attacker waits in between phase I and phase III to provide adequate time for the victim to access the cache. Waiting time plays an important role in the overall effectiveness of flush-based attacks. Usually, the three phases are executed step-by-step in a loop, which we refer to as the *attack loop*. The attacker program may be synchronous or asynchronous with respect to the spy program.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Experimental Setup

Table I shows our system configuration. Though we use an Intel machine, we perform our experiments and find our proposal is equally effective on AMD based `x86_64` machines (AMD A6-9220 RADEON R4) and macOS X (Version: 10.15.4). We use the `stress` tool [17] to generate compute-intensive and IO-intensive noise, and SPEC 2017 `mcf` [18] benchmark to generate memory-intensive noise. `mcf` is a standard benchmark used in the computer architecture community for memory systems research with an LLC misses per kilo instructions (MPKI) of over 100.

Noise Levels: We generate noise as a combination of Compute-Memory-IO (C-M-I) intensive noise, where each component can have a low (L) or high (H) noise-level, thereby generating 8 combinations spanning L-L-L to H-H-H.

At the high noise level (H-H-H), eight CPU-intensive, eight IO-intensive and eight memory-intensive threads are running simultaneously, pushing the core runtime-usage to 100% on all cores (observed using `htop`). High level of compute-intensive noise results in high core frequencies on which the relevant code executes. In contrast, a high level of IO-intensive noise result in lower core frequencies because IO-intensive applications sleep and wake up on interrupts. Power governors take clues from application behavior to tune the frequency domains accordingly.

B. Variable Execution Latency

The flush-based attacks rely on the execution timing difference between a cache hit and a miss. The attacker expects instruction latency to vary based on the microarchitectural state (that is, cache hit or cache miss), and this is the premise for flush-based attacks. However, the latency variation for the same microarchitectural state (for example, a `reload` instruction that hits in cache) is not accounted for in the standard flush-based attack loops. We plot the variable cache hit and miss latency for `clflush` instruction as a function





Fig. 3. (a) and (b) show the variation of `clflush` and `reload` latency, respectively, at default frequency scaling settings. The attacker and victim processes run at L-L-L noise level and are not pinned to any cores. As the attacker loop runs for more iterations, the processor frequency increases, resulting in lower observed latency. We compute the threshold using standard attack calibration tools available at https://github.com/IAIK/flush_flush.

of attack loop iterations in Figure 3(a), and for `reload` instruction in Figure 3(b).

Root Causes: The variation in latency of instruction execution with same microarchitectural state is due to two root-causes: (i) the Dynamic Voltage & Frequency Scaling (DVFS) and (ii) OS scheduling behavior.

1) *Dynamic Voltage & Frequency Scaling:* DVFS changes the frequency of the processor, while the timekeeping mechanism in modern $\times 86_{64}$ based machines is invariant of these frequency changes. Thus, the time-stamp counter increments like a wall-clock and the DVFS-induced latency variation is visible in its readings. Modern processors use different frequency domains for the cores and the LLC and memory controllers that, as per Intel terminology, form part of the Uncore [19]. The Uncore’s frequency and power are managed separately and in general do not change frequency when a core frequency transition occurs.

2) *OS Scheduling Behavior:* The OS can schedule processes on any logical CPU as per its scheduling policy behavior. Usually, at lower noise-levels (L-L-L, L-L-H, L-H-L, H-L-L), the OS tries to schedule distinct processes on distinct physical cores to maximize availability of resources like private caches for each process. Thus, the attacker and victim processes are present on distinct cores, sharing only the LLC. However, at high noise-levels (H-H-H, H-H-L, H-L-H, L-H-H), as such scheduling is not always possible, the attacker and victim processes may be scheduled on the same physical core. The latency of an LLC cache reference depends on the mapping of attacker and victim processes to cores. This latency difference is more pronounced if the LLC is sliced [20], which is common for processors with large number of cores, including the Xeon processor in our experimental setup. The same argument extends to NUMA nodes wherein the latency difference is even more significant [9].

We now analyze the effect of (i) and (ii) together and its impact on instruction latency by focusing on `clflush`. Figure 4 shows the variation in `clflush` latency at different configurations of fixed processor frequencies and relative




Fig. 4. Variation of `clflush` latency for different configurations at fixed frequencies (denoted by the curves) and L-L-L noise level. The attacker runs on core-0 (C_0). In configuration 1, there are no victim accesses and attacker measures `clflush` miss latency. In configurations 2 and 3, victim runs on f_{C_0g} (same logical core) and f_{C_1g} (different physical core), respectively. In configurations 4 to 6, a multi-threaded victim runs on $f_{C_0}; C_1g$, $f_{C_1}; C_2; C_3g$, and $f_{C_0}; C_1; C_2; C_3g$ respectively. Attacker measures `clflush` hit latency in configurations 2 to 6.

victim placement. For all curves (representing system at different frequencies), going from same logical core to different physical core (configurations 2 and 3, respectively) represents a measurable increase in `clflush` hit latency. Moreover, for all configurations (representing different relative placement of victim and attacker processes), there is considerable difference in latency at low processor frequency (red curve) and high processor frequencies (black and green curves). Depending on the system noise level, any of red, green, or black curves at configurations 2 to 6 can represent the `clflush` hit latency.

Takeaway: The instruction execution latency at a given microarchitectural state depends on frequency as well as mapping of victim and attacker processes to logical and physical cores.

C. *clflush* and *reload* Instructions

We now compare the accuracy of F+F and F+R attacks by analyzing the behavior for `clflush` and `reload` instructions.

clflush: Figure 3(a) shows the latency of `clflush` instruction (at L-L-L noise level) as a function of attack-loop iterations. The instruction latency decreases as the attacker code iterates through the attack loop and stabilizes after 75,000 iterations, taking up 335 million cycles (one iteration is about 4,500 cycles). The latency difference between a `clflush` hit and a miss at the stabilized latency is 100 cycles. Figure 4 showcases the different latencies for `clflush` cache hit at different frequency configurations. The attacker and victim cores run at high frequencies while other cores run at lower frequencies. The `clflush` hit latency varies widely with frequency and the difference between a hit and a miss is, on average, 17% of the hit latency.

reload: Figure 3(b) shows the variation of `reload` latency over attack-loop iterations. The `reload` cache hit latency stabilizes to 100 cycles within 15,000 iterations. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the hit latency for same logical core is only 60 cycles. Whereas, the lowest `reload` miss latency is DRAM access latency at 400 cycles. On our system, the variation of `reload` miss latency with processor frequency is such that the highest hit latency is less than the lowest miss latency. Note that this behavior varies depending on the processor.

Takeaway: Flush+Reload attack is more resilient to frequency changes due to a significant difference between `reload` hit and miss latency. Flush+Flush attack is vulnerable to latency variation as the hit and miss latency are of comparable magnitude.

D. *Waiting phase of the Attack*

The Linux scheduler is called proactively by the attacker using `sched_yield()` function call in standard attacks. Cooperatively yielding hints the power governor to assess the frequency and potentially change it, and allows the OS scheduler to context switch the attacker process to another core. It is pragmatic to replace the `sched_yield()` based cooperative approach with a more aggressive compute-intensive approach. We run compute intensive operations in a busy-wait type loop, which steps up the processor frequency. It allows the execution latency of instructions to stabilize quickly. It also provides control over the waiting times in the attack loop.

Therefore, we use a compute-heavy loop for `wait_gap` iterations in each waiting phase of the attack loop. Here, the variable `wait_gap` can be dynamically changed to provide precise control over the waiting period. If an address is accessed multiple times by the victim in a gap period, there is no way to ascertain one access from the other. On the other hand, if the attacker flushes the addresses in rapid succession, a true cache-hit may be missed due to overlap with phase-I of the attack. A suitable waiting period is therefore, empirically derived. Existing literature [6] suggests that a waiting period of 5,000 to 10,000 cycles is sufficient to detect individual




Fig. 5. Variation of reload hit latency with attack iterations.

cache accesses in many important flush-based attacks. We can apply this analysis to the phase-II of synchronous attacks. In the case of asynchronous attacks, we don't need to wait a lot between probes. In that case, however, to eliminate the frequency-induced variation in latency, we run the compute-intensive loop for a few million cycles to stabilize the core at high frequency. We call the `Compute_Heavy_Code()` function once before going into the attack loop with a large `wait_gap (105)`.

IV. DABANGG ATTACK REFINEMENTS

Taking into account the insights uncovered in previous sections, we outline three refinements over baseline flush attacks. We call these the DABANGG refinements. They make the attacker frequency-aware and victim-aware and consequently noise-resilient.

Refinement #1: We calibrate comprehensively to capture the frequency and core placement-based latency variation to obtain multiple thresholds.
Refinement #2: We periodically verify the victim's memory access pattern and whether the current threshold is correct in the attack through a feedback loop.
Refinement #3: We use a compute-intensive loop providing fine grained control over waiting period in the attack loop.

The following sub-sections detail the implementation of DABANGG refinements.

A. *Calibration*

In this pre-attack step, the calibration program determines attacker-specific parameters. The attacker profiles the victim application to identify the target memory address(es) according to the attack scenario and threat model. Table II provides the details of all the parameters that DABANGG attack loop uses and we refer to it throughout this section.

The calibration program derives attacker-specific parameters from the latency vs iterations behavior. We use Figure 5 (a fine-grained version of Figure 3(b)) to explain the method

TABLE II
SPECIFICATIONS OF PARAMETERS AND RUNTIME VARIABLES USED BY DABANGG ATTACK LOOP (REFER ALGORITHM 1).

Parameters	Name	Description
Attacker-Specific	T_array	An array with each entry stores a tuple of lower and upper latency thresholds $\langle TL; TH \rangle$.
	regular_gap	Regular waiting period of attacker in Phase II.
	step_width	Average width of a step in terms of number of attack loop iterations in latency vs #iterations plot.
Victim-Specific	acc_interval	Average number of attack loop iterations between two victim accesses without considering burst-mode accesses in between.
	burst_seq	In case of burst-mode access sequence by victim, number of victim accesses to target memory address in a single burst.
	burst_wait	Waiting time gap in terms of attack loop iterations before discarding an incomplete burst-mode access sequence as a false positive.
	burst_gap	Reduced waiting time gap to monitor burst-mode access sequence.
Runtime Variables in Algorithm 1	iter_num	A counter that counts the number of attack loop iterations.
	$\langle TL; TH \rangle$	Pair of lower (TL) and upper (TH) latency threshold to detect cache hit.
	reload_latency	Execution latency of reload instruction in processor cycles.
	last_hit	Number of attack loop iterations since last true cache hit. A true cache hit is recorded by attacker when victim access interval (acc_interval) and victim burst-mode access sequence (burst_seq) criteria are satisfied, in addition to reload_latency $\langle TL; TH \rangle$.
	potential_hit	Number of attack loop iterations since last potential cache hit. A potential hit may be either a false positive or a part of burst-mode access sequence by victim application.
	seq_id	Sequence identifier, stores the number of potential cache hits which, if it forms a burst-mode access sequence, implies a true cache hit.

to compute these parameters. The reload hit latency detected should be $\frac{20,000}{40} = 500$ cycles. This implies a stepped distribution and T_array captures this a burst_gap = 10, which increases attack granularity distribution. Multiple pairs of $\langle TL; TH \rangle$ are stored as (compared to regular_gap = 200). Moreover, to reduce tuples in T_array (refer to Table II). From Figure 5, four false negatives, we tolerate some missed cache-hits to distinct steps are visible. The width of each step, which terminate the sequence burst_seq = $\frac{40}{burst_wait}$ and = x the extent of each step on the x-axis (step_width), is where burst_wait is small compared to 40. For example, 4000 attack loop iterations. The first step, where iter_num burst_seq = 20 for burst_wait = 2. That is, the attack loop tolerates 2 iterations of cache misses between burst measured latency is between 375 and 400 cycles. Therefore, accesses before discarding the access sequence.

T_array[0] = $\langle 375; 400 \rangle$. Similarly, we add three more tuples to T_array. These parameters are independent of victim applications. regular_gap parameter depends on the type of attack mounted (asynchronous or synchronous). regular_gap = 200 provides a waiting period of 5,000 to 10,000 cycles (refer to Section III-D for details).

B. Victim Profiling

In the initial phase of the attack, the attacker derives victim specific parameters by observing the memory access pattern for target addresses of the victim. We briefly explain the method that we use to compute these parameters.

Consider that the victim application accesses the critical memory address once in one million cycles on average, and an attack-loop iteration takes 10,000 cycles at low processor frequency, then $acc_interval = \frac{1,000,000}{10,000} = 100$. A burst-mode access sequence occurs when the target address is accessed several times within a few thousand cycles, or within a few regular_gap based attack loop iterations. Consider that the victim accesses the address 40 times within 20,000 cycles, for example. If we wait using the regular_gap, (Line 4), then the tuple is updated. This is done by looking up which takes 10,000 cycles at low frequency, we can only observe 2 cache hits. We utilize the burst-mode parameters $\langle TL_{new}; TH_{new} \rangle$ (Line 5). Lines 6 and 7 update the tuple and iter_num, respectively. Verification and feedback burst_seq = 40 (since we have 40 accesses by victim in burst-mode) and waiting period when a burst which differ from Figure 5 in extremely noisy environments.

ALGORITHM 1: DABANGG+FLUSH+RELOAD

```
1 Initialization: last_hit, potential_hit, iter_num, seq_id = 0
2 while true do
3   iter_num += 1
4   <TL,TH> = T_array[  $\frac{\text{iter\_num}}{\text{step\_width}}$  ] // update <TL,TH>
5   flush(addr) // PHASE-I: Flush
6   // PHASE-II: Wait
7   if (!rand()%400) then // branch taken 0.25% of
8     time
9     Verify_Threshold(iter_num, addr) // Algorithm 2
10    sched_yield() // cooperatively yield the CPU
11  else if (seq_id > 0) then // burst sequence detected
12    Compute_Heavy_Code(burst_gap)
13  else
14    Compute_Heavy_Code(regular_gap)
15  // PHASE-III: Reload
16  reload_latency = MeasureReloadLatency(addr) // Similar
17  to code in [1]
18  if (reload_latency2[TL,TH] and (last_hit > acc_interval)
19  and (seq_id > burst_seq)) then // true hit
20    last_hit, seq_id = 0 // reset variables
21    print "low reload latency, it is a cache hit!"
22  else if (reload_latency2[TL, TH]) then // potential hit
23    potential_hit = last_hit
24    seq_id += 1 // increment sequence identifier
25  else
26    last_hit += 1 // +1 iteration since last hit
27    print "high reload latency, it is a cache miss!"
28    if ((last_hit - potential_hit) > burst_wait) then
29      seq_id = 0 // discard seq as false
30      positive
```

After verifying thresholds, the control flow returns to Algorithm 1, Line 8. `sched_yield()` function yields the processor cooperatively (once in a while based on the condition in Line 6) to prevent detection of an attack loop based on continuous usage of computationally heavy code. Most of the time, however, the attacker runs a compute-heavy code (Lines 10 and 12) and `wait_gap` is appropriately chosen. Line 9 checks if an active burst sequence is present (that is, `seq_id > 0`), and uses `burst_gap` to reduce the waiting period of the attack loop.

In the third phase of the attack. Line 14 performs the reload and calculates its execution latency. Line 15 checks for a true cache hit. Here, the condition `last_hit > acc_interval` checks if access interval since the last true cache hit is adequate and `seq_id > burst_seq` checks if the burst sequence pattern is identified. In this case, the variables are reset in Line 16 and a true cache hit is registered in Line 17. Line 18 deals with a potential cache hit, wherein Line 20 increments the sequence identifier and `potential_hit` variable is updated.

Line 22 increments the `last_hit` variable if `reload_latency \geq [TL,TH]`. Line 23 records a cache-miss for the current iteration of the loop. However, instead of resetting the sequence identifier (that is, `seq_id`) right away, the attack loop iterations and disassembles the victim program's binary through `objdump` exists (in Line 24). The waiting window allows us to account for cache-hits missed by the attack loop. A cache-hit missed by the attacker occurs due to overlapping in phase I (Flush

ALGORITHM 2: Verify_Threshold

```
1 Input: iter_num, addr
2 reload(addr)
3 = MeasureReloadLatency(addr)
4 if (  $\geq$ [TL,TH]) then
5   // T_array[i].TL < < T_array[i].TH where
6   i is index of tuple in T_array
7   9 < TL_new, TH_new > = T_array[i] : 2[TL_new, TH_new ]
8   <TL,TH> = <TL_new, TH_new >
9   iter_num = stepwidth i
10 end
```

TABLE III
PARAMETERS FOR KEYLOGGING ATTACK

Parameter	D+F+F	D+F+R
acc_interval	1000	1000
burst_seq	15	20
burst_wait	3	2
burst_gap	40	30
regular_gap	100	50

phase) of the attack loop with access to monitored cache line by the victim, wherein the attack loop ushes the line right after the victim accesses it. Line 25 resets `seq_id` to zero if the waiting window is exceeded. This concludes an attack loop iteration, and the control switches back to Line 3 of the attack. Flush+Flush attack can similarly be extended to DABANGG+Flush+Flush. Note that in all the relements, we do not use or demand privileged operations

In the following section, we evaluate the DABANGG re ned attacks in many real-world scenarios and compare the accuracy and stealth with standard Flush+Flush and Flush+Reload attacks.

V. EXPERIMENTS

We give an overview of our experimental setup, review the attacks and threat models, and present results.

For all experiments, we use the same attacker-specific parameters as computed in Section IV-A and we state the victim-specific parameters of each attack scenario.

As Side-channel Attack based on Keylogging

The objective of this attack is to infer a character sequence processed by the victim program. We use an array of 1024 characters. The distribution of characters is uniform and random. The victim program takes as input a character from a set of accepted characters, and for each character, calls a unique function that runs a loop a few thousand times. The victim program processes multiple characters every second, with a waiting period between two characters to emulate the human typing speed.

Threat model: As all the ush-based attacks demand page sharing between the victim and the attacker, the attacker maps the victim program's binary (using `objdump` function) to find out the addresses of interest. The attacker then monitors the characters and infers if the specified characters are processed by the victim.

TABLE IV
ACCURACY OF VARIOUS FLUSHBASED ATTACKS ON MULTIPLE CHARACTER KEYLOGGING.

Attack	L-L-L	L-L-H	L-H-L	L-H-H	H-L-L	H-L-H	H-H-L	H-H-H
F+F	37.2%	21.1%	31.4%	16.7%	36.4%	27.2%	19.7%	34.6%
D+F+F	94.5%	92%	94.1%	92.2%	95.4%	94.6%	93.2%	96.7%
F+R	84.2%	69.3%	74.9%	82.5%	85.1%	75.4%	71.6%	78.2%
D+F+R	99.6%	91.2%	97.2%	96.5%	98.5%	97.2%	99.2%	98.1%

(a)

(b)

Fig. 6. Accuracy comparison of Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush, DABANGG+Flush+Reload, and DABANGG+Flush+Flush attacks at selected noise levels (for clarity) for different numbers of attack iterations where each iteration performs 4 encryption calls.

Fig. 7. Error rates of different attacks in covert channel scenario at various noise levels.

Fig. 8. Bandwidth of different attacks in covert channel scenario at various noise levels.

We derive victim-specific parameters specified in Table III and threshold. At high noise levels, the standard attacks which are calculated as per the pre-attack steps (section IV-A) yield the CPU unnecessarily, missing input characters (false positives). The power-scaling settings are set to default state. We utilize the Levenshtein distance (Lev) algorithm [21] to compare the accuracy of various attacks at all the system noise levels. The increase in attack accuracy with an increase in compute-Lev algorithm compares the actual input sequence with the sequence observed by the attacker and computes accuracy based on the number of insertion, substitution and deletion operations.

Results: As shown in Table IV, DABANGG-related attacks produce accurate results and more noise-tolerant than the standard attacks. The Flush+Flush attack, in particular, suffers from highly variable flush latency and yielding the CPU too often. The standard attacks suffer significantly from false positives at low noise levels due to imprecise calibration in the AES Key Extraction in OpenSSL. We exploit the T-Table based implementation of AES in OpenSSL [22], which is still in use commercially, notably in the FIPS mode of OpenSSL 1.0.2 [23]. We build the

TABLE V
PARAMETERS FOR AES ATTACK.

Parameters	D+F+F	D+F+R
acc_interval, burstseq, and burstwait	0	0
burst_gap and regular_gap	400	400

TABLE VI
PARAMETERS FOR COVERT CHANNEL ATTACK

Parameter	D+F+F	D+F+R
acc_interval	10	10
burst_seq	2	2
burst_wait	1	1
burst_gap	5	5
regular_gap	20	20

library version 1.1.0f from source and enable T-Tables through configuration options.

Threat model: We mount an asynchronous known ciphertext attack, where the victim finishes execution before the attacker evaluates the memory addresses. The average execution time of AES_Encrypt is 750 cycles, too small for attacker synchronization on a busy system. We monitor the first memory address of $F_i^{(10)}; i \in [0; 3]$. We only need to flush one cache line before every encryption, without requiring the plaintext. This provides us with the reload-frequency of the ciphertext C bytes, $(c_0; \dots; c_{15})$. We then determine the correct secret key k bytes. The algorithm for ciphertext determination and consequent key determination is outlined by G. Irazoqui et al [24].

The parameters specific to this attack are specified in Table V. We do not need to monitor any burst-mode sequences since this is an asynchronous attack. We aim to minimize the number of AES_Encrypt function calls that perform the 10 AES rounds. We again use the Levenshtein distance to determine accuracy over 1000 attack runs. We vary the number of attack iterations where each iteration requires AES_Encrypt function calls, each on randomly generated plaintext and the same secret key, from 10^3 to 10^6 attack iterations.

Results: Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the benefits of DABANGG refinements. The F+R attack has an average accuracy of 90% at 100K iterations while D+F+R reaches the same accuracy within 20K iterations, a 5x improvement. The dynamic thresholds help distinguish between reload and hit and miss when the frequency isn't stable. The lower number of encryptions required primarily increases the stealth of F+R attack. If software countermeasures are implemented to detect repeated calls to AES_Encrypt within a short period, D+F+R is much more likely to evade detection.

Figure 6(a) illustrates the much quicker rise in accuracy for increasing attack iterations by integrating refinement #3 to the standard Flush+Flush attack. While the number of AES_Encrypt function calls is higher than F+R attack for both variants of F+F attack, the D+F+F attack achieves 90% accuracy in 200,000 iterations, twice as quick than the 400K iterations required for Flush+Flush. D+F+F attack also produces an accuracy of more than 50% at the 15K iterations mark, far lower than 100K+ iterations required by the F+F attack. Again, we see a stealthier attack that is more likely to evade detection.

C. Covert Channel Attack

We cooperatively leak data using a sender-receiver model where the victim machine through a covert channel based on user-based cache attacks.

Threat model: The sender core sends a bit-stream through a socket, which is monitored by the receiver using a user-based covert channel. The presence of the cache line corresponding to the memory address of the socket is interpreted as a set bit by the receiver, otherwise is interpreted as a reset bit. Note that the socket does not establish any direct connection between the programs, and is used by the sender to send the bit-stream. The size of the bit-stream is 1000 bytes for our experiment. Table VI shows the parameters of interest.

Results: Figure 7 illustrates the error rate of these attacks at various noise levels. We also plot the bandwidth of different attacks in Figure 8. The bandwidth increases as the average core frequency (that is, compute or memory-intensive noise level) increases. We obtain a peak bandwidth of 217 KBps using the DABANGG+Flush+Reload attack, with an overall error-rate of 0.01%. While bandwidth increases as noise levels increase, a consistent low error rate is crucial for feasibility of the covert channel, which is provided by the DABANGG refinements. The bandwidth increases at higher noise levels (that is, L-H-H, H-L-H, H-H-L, and H-H-H levels) because all core of our PCPS-enabled processor run at high frequency at these noise levels (refer to Section III-A for details). This allows the programs to send and receive more bits per second.

VI. COUNTERMEASURES

As DABANGG-refined attacks are fundamentally user-based attacks, mitigation and detection techniques that are applicable to user-based attacks, also apply to DABANGG-enabled attacks. From the Operating System's view, DABANGG-enabled attacks increase the CPU utilization of the attacker thread, compared to standard attacks, as we rarely yield the CPU. Many workloads have high CPU utilization, but the OS can potentially use other indicators (like performance counters, explained below) to pinpoint the attacker thread with more confidence. We now discuss several mitigation and detection techniques in detail.

A. Mitigation Techniques

Ever since cache-based side-channels were showcased for the case of AES by Osvik et al. [5], several classes of mitigation techniques have been proposed, like partitioning mappings to the cache to avoid monitoring of victim cache lines by the attacker [25] [26] [27] [28] and limiting the granularity or privilege of instructions crucial to user-based cache attacks, like `clflush` and `clflushopt` [29] [30] [31]. Limiting resolution of instructions, requiring privileged access to these instructions, and partitioning the cache does work, but is rarely employed due to impact on performance and

utility. Moreover, many software-based mitigations suffer from latency variation on single-core machines. Bangerter et al. [68] tackle OS scheduling issues using a coordinated Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack by launching hundreds of threads to single-step the victim. However, such a scheme severely impacts the stealth of the attack due to the cache activity of the helper threads that can be tracked back to the attacker. Noise can be filtered out during post-processing [39], [38] but it requires more traces (that is, more attack loop iterations) which in-turn impacts stealth of the attack.

B. Detection Techniques

A large number of detection techniques [32] [33] rely on identifying anomalous cache behavior by utilizing performance measuring hardware counters, like Intel's PMC [16] [34]. Detection routine at run-time in such techniques is a two-step process. In the first step, the detector records performance counter readings for all processes. The detector then analyzes representative parameters like number of cache references, cache misses, miss-rate, etc. to identify suspicious behavior. This analysis can be done by a heuristics-based approach [32] or by a learning-based approach [35] [36], where trained model infers a particular program as malicious, or otherwise. Note that most detection mechanisms also fundamentally use thresholds and are vulnerable to extreme system noise. Developing noise-resilient cache attack detectors is a promising future direction of research.

VII. RELATED WORKS

A. Cache Attack Toolkits

Mounting accurate flush-based cache attacks requires precise calibration and considerable setup time. Existing toolkits like Mastik [37] and Cache Template Attacks [4] provide implementations of cache attacks, including flush-based attacks. They provide generic techniques to identify memory addresses of interest, perform calibration, and mount attacks without the need to delve into low-level details of their implementation. In particular, Mastik attempts to resolve the issue of varying latency of instruction execution by utilizing a compute-intensive loop instead of sleeping in the wait period of the attack. While such techniques and toolkits reduce the barrier of entry to mount flush-based cache attacks, they do not eliminate the concern of this paper, that of inconsistent accuracy in presence of system noise due to variable instruction execution latency. We note that DABANGG enhances the underlying attack loop and can be seamlessly integrated with attack toolkits.

B. Existing Flush-Based Cache Attack Replacements

It is known that cache-based side channels and covert channels are susceptible to system noise. Maurice et al. [7] characterize noise mathematically and implement run-time error-correction techniques to design a noise-resistant Prime+Probe based cache covert channel. Error-correction is a powerful technique, but it is not applicable in a side-channel scenario as the victim does not follow the data-transfer protocol required to correct errors on-the-fly. Didier and Maurice [9] take the CPU interconnect topology into account while calibrating Flush+Flush attack, but they cannot calibrate for

VIII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we analyze the dependence of the accuracy of flush-based attacks on execution latency of threshold-denying instructions. We showcase that dynamic core frequencies due to Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) result in varying `clflush` and `reload` instruction latencies. We also reveal the change in latency due to the relative positioning of attacker and victim programs on CPU cores. To make flush-based attacks resilient to system noise, we propose a set of three replacements, termed DABANGG, over standard flush-based attacks. We outline techniques to perform latency-variation-aware and victim-aware calibration. We use the set thresholds to enable busy waiting and periodic feedback at attack runtime. We test DABANGG-enabled attacks in side-channel based keylogging, AES secret key extraction, and covert channel scenarios, and show the effectiveness across different system noise levels.

AVAILABILITY

The Github repository with the source code is available at <https://github.com/DABANGG-Attack/Source-Code>.

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



Fig. 9. Utility of (a) Compute-intensive code and (b) Victim-specific parameters on DABANGG+Flush+Flush attack.




Fig. 10. Effect of thread migration based on CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR.

APPENDIX A SENSITIVITY STUDY

Utility of compute-intensive loop: Figure 9(a) shows the advantage of compute-intensive loops over cooperative-yielding loops. The DABANGG+Flush+Flush attack utilizing `sched_yield()` suffers from excessively yielding the CPU which reduces the accuracy considerably. Note that the attacks corresponding to zero `sched_yield()` function calls and `regular_gap = 0` are equivalent.

Utility of victim-specific parameters: Figure 9(b) illustrates the importance of victim-specific parameters along with the compute-intensive loop. There are two issues with standard attacks: (i) a single cache hit in a victim where burst-mode access is present does not signify a true hit; it may be a false positive, and (ii) if we keep count of burst-mode accesses, a nearly correct sequence may be discarded by the attack loop due to a missed cache-hit. This reduces the accuracy of the attack. DABANGG refined attacks resolve these problems by (i) identifying burst-mode sequence (`seq_id` variable) and correlating it with victim-specific expected sequence (`burst_seq` parameter) and memory access interval (`acc_interval` parameter), and (ii) allowing missed cache-hits in the attack by keeping a waiting window of `burst_wait` iterations.

Effect of thread migration: Figure 10 corresponds to a thread migration analysis. An attack resilient to frequent core switches is desirable, as the latency changes based on the relative positioning of the victim and attacker programs on the processor cores. We artificially migrate the attacker core randomly, essentially de-scheduling the process from the current core and scheduling it on the intended core. We run a single character lookup experiment with all four attacks. DABANGG+Flush+Flush attack, whose accuracy is more dependent on processor frequency, is more affected by random core migrations compared to DABANGG+Flush+Reload attack. The number of attack loop iterations that are allowed to elapse before changing the core affinity is marked by the `CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR`, which we vary and record the corresponding attack accuracy. The Linux scheduler may change the program core within a few 10s of milliseconds, which corresponds to `CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR` of around 10^4 . However, we test for `CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR` ranging from 10^0 (10 microseconds) to 10^9 (few hours). We also experiment with hardware prefetchers ON/OFF at L1 and L2 levels, and we find it has a negligible effect on the DABANGG refinements.

The DABANGG refined attacks provide higher accuracy at each `CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR`. The general trend obtained signifies that the accuracy increases with larger `CHANGE_AFFINITY_FACTOR`, which translates to more time available to stabilize the core frequency and in case of DABANGG-refined attacks, also to provide periodic feedback about the accuracy of thresholds.