




CS773: Computer Architecture for Performance and Security

Lecture 5: It's the Memory Stupid

DIMM



Row Buffer

Access Address:


(Row 0, Column 0)

(Row 0, Column 1)

(Row 0, Column 85)

(Row 1, Column 0)

Row address 0



Commands of interest:

ACTIVATE

PRECHARGE

COLUMN READ

Page policy:


OPEN

CLOSED



Row Buffer ~~CONFLICT!~~

Column address 05



Data

DRAM

Capacity

Latency

Bandwidth

Power

Reliability


Security

..

DRAM Addressing

2GB DRAM, 8 Banks, 16K rows, 2K Columns per bank


Cache Interleaving: Consecutive cache blocks in consecutive banks



Row Interleaving: Consecutive rows in consecutive banks



DRAM Controller




DRAM Bandwidth

Names	Memory clock	I/O bus clock	<u>Transfer rate</u>	Theoretical bandwidth
DDR-200, PC-1600	100 MHz	100 MHz	200 MT/s	1.6 GB/s
DDR-400, PC-3200	200 MHz	200 MHz	400 MT/s	3.2 GB/s
DDR2-800, PC2-6400	200 MHz	400 MHz	800 MT/s	6.4 GB/s
DDR3-1600, PC3-12800	200 MHz	800 MHz	1600 MT/s	12.8 GB/s
DDR4-2400, PC4-19200	300 MHz	1200 MHz	2400 MT/s	19.2 GB/s
DDR4-3200, PC4-25600	400 MHz	1600 MHz	3200 MT/s	25.6 GB/s
DDR5-4800, PC5-38400	300 MHz	2400 MHz	4800 MT/s	38.4 GB/s
DDR5-6400, PC5-51200	400 MHz	3200 MHz	6400 MT/s	51.2 GB/s

High Bandwidth Memory (HBM)

- Base logic layer (blue), CPU and Memory glued by TSV
- Multiple DRAM chip layers
- Significantly higher bandwidth (200 to 800 GB/s)
- What is the problem then? Capacity 😞
- HBM3: 819.2 GB/sec **Capacity: 24GB** 😞




DRAM/DRAM-Controller for Performance


Heavily mined research area: DRAM scheduling, DRAM address mappers, fairness, QOS, prefetch awareness,

The Performance Perspective

- All of Google's Data Center Workloads (ISCA 2015):




Data Movement vs. Computation Energy



*A memory access consumes ~1000X
the energy of a complex addition*

Data Movement vs. Computation Energy

- **Data movement** is a major system energy bottleneck
 - Comprises 41% of mobile system energy during web browsing [2]
 - Costs ~115 times as much energy as an ADD operation [1, 2]



[1]: Reducing data Movement Energy via Online Data Clustering and Encoding (MICRO'16)

[2]: Quantifying the energy cost of data movement for emerging smart phone workloads on mobile platforms (IISWC'14)



Processing Near Memory

Move compute near memory


What compute to move? (simple functions)

Mapping computation (heterogenous computing) ?

Virtual memory ?



Non-volatile Persistent Memory



Two modes

Application mode: Non-volatile, app/OS can decide what/where..

Memory mode: Volatile, DRAM acts like a cache 😊 More capacity

Non-volatile LLC too 😊 Write-latency is higher than volatile LLC 😞₁₄



PAUSE




From Performance to Security

DRAM Row Shared ☹️




Sandy Bridge /w 1 DIMM



2 pages per row


Side Channel



Side-channel attacks

Row-hits: Fast access
Conflicts: Slow access

Covert Channel




Covert-channel attacks




Something more: Integrity attacks

Rowhammer



*Repeatedly opening and closing a row induces **disturbance errors** in adjacent rows*


Rowhammer




“It’s like breaking into an apartment by repeatedly slamming a neighbor’s door until the vibrations open the door you were after” – Motherboard Vice

The Code Please


x86 CPU



DRAM Module




1. Avoid *cache hits*
 - Flush **X** from cache
2. Avoid *row hits* to **X**
 - Read **Y** in another row



The code please

```
loop:  
  mov  (X), %eax  
  mov  (Y), %ebx  
  clflush (X)  
  clflush (Y)  
  mfence  
  jmp  loop
```



Why? Electromagnetic Coupling

Toggling the wordline voltage briefly increases the voltage of adjacent wordlines

Slightly opens adjacent rows → Charge leakage

Row Hammer DRAM Bug Now Exploitable via JavaScript, Most DDR3 Memory Chips Vulnerable

Row Hammer DRAM Bug Now Exploited, Unlocks Access to Physical Memory, March 9 2015

Once thought safe, DDR4 memory shown to be vulnerable to "Rowhammer"

Row Hammer DRAM Bug Exploited, Unlocks Access to Physical Memory, March 9 2015

Row Hammer DRAM Bug Now Exploited, Flipping DRAM bits - maliciously, Memo December 29, 2014

July 29 2015

Two Days
Before

Spechammer 😞




Cold boot attacks



Before powering off


Freeze it to -50°C

Cool it






After 5
Seconds



30 Seconds



60 Seconds



300 Seconds
Think about non-
volatile memory

Thanks

