

CS783: Theoretical Foundations of Cryptography

Lecture 6 (16/Aug/24)


Instructor: Chethan Kamath

Recall from Last Lecture...

- Sub-task: how to encrypt *multiple* messages using a short key


Recall from Last Lecture...

- Sub-task: how to encrypt *multiple* messages using a short key
- Sub-task reduces to constructing PRF
- PRG $\rightarrow$ PRF: GGM tree-based construction
 - Proof via hybrid argument



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 - Proof via hybrid argument
- Chosen-plaintext attack
 - PRF $\rightarrow$ SKE secret against chosen-plaintext attackers



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
- Chosen-plaintext attack

- PRF $\rightarrow$ SKE secret against chosen-plaintext attackers

- Everything built on top of PRG

- Only one construction yet: unpredictable sequences $\rightarrow$ PRG

⚠ All eggs in one basket



$SKE \leftarrow PRF \leftrightarrow PRG$


Factoring

Plan for This Lecture

- This lecture: hardness vs. pseudo-randomness

- Hardness in the form of one-wayness:

- One-way function (OWF)
- One-way permutation (OWP)



OWF
↑
OWP



Plan for This Lecture

- This lecture: hardness vs. pseudo-randomness

- Hardness in the form of one-wayness:

- One-way function (OWF)
 - One-way permutation (OWP)

- Several candidates for OWF and OWP



Plan for This Lecture

- This lecture: hardness vs. pseudo-randomness

- Hardness in the form of one-wayness:

- One-way function (OWF)



- One-way permutation (OWP)

- Several candidates for OWF and OWP

- One-wayness and hard-core predicates

- Hard-core predicate for OWP $\rightarrow$ PRG

- Hard-core predicate for any OWP/length-preserving OWF



Plan for This Lecture

- This lecture: hardness vs. pseudo-randomness

- Hardness in the form of one-wayness:

- One-way function (OWF)

- One-way permutation (OWP)


- Several candidates for OWF and OWP

- One-wayness and hard-core predicates

- Hard-core predicate for $OWP \rightarrow PRG$


- Hard-core predicate for any OWP/length-preserving OWF

- Corollary: $OWP \rightarrow PRG$




Plan for This Lecture

- 1 One-Way Functions and Permutations




- 2 Hard-Core Predicate



- 3 Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Predicate

Plan for this Lecture

1 One-Way Functions and Permutations




2 Hard-Core Predicate

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Let's Define One-Way Functions...

- Intuitively: “easy to compute” function f that is “hard to invert”




Let's Define One-Way Functions...

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"Solution"



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
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“Puzzle”

- What does “hard to invert” entail? Attempt :


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
- Problem:** This is not sufficient (worst-case hardness)

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
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- What does “hard to invert” entail? Attempt 3:

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
- Problem: This is not sufficient (weak-case hardness)

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
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
- Problem:** What about $f(x) := 0^{|x|}$? (easy hardness)

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
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
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
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- Problem: ?

Let's Define One-Way Functions...

- Intuitively: “easy to compute” function that is “hard to invert”

Definition 1 (One-way function (OWF))

A function family $f := \{f_n : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{m(n)}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is one-way if

- there exists an efficient algorithm F such that $\forall x : F(x) = f(x)$
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Let's Define One-Way Functions...


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
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- One-way permutation: f is length-preserving and *bijective*

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
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- Length-preserving OWF: $m(n) = n$
- One-way permutation: f is length-preserving and *bijective*
- Convenient to consider “collection” of OWF:

$$\{f_I : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}_I\}_{I \subseteq \{0,1\}^*}$$

OWF or Not?

❓ Some generic constructions:

- 1 $f_1(x) := f(x)0^{|x|}$, where f is a OWF
- 2 $f_2(x_1x_2) := x_1f(x_2)$, where f is a OWF
- 3 $f_3(x_1x_2) := x_1f(x_1x_2)$, where f is a OWF
- 4 $f_4(x) := G(x)$, where G is a PRG

OWF or Not?

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❓ A concrete construction:

- 4 $f_5(x_1x_2) := x_1 \cdot x_2$, where x_1 and x_2 are parsed as integers

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Exercise 1

- 1 Show using security reduction that f_1 , f_2 and f_4 are OWFs
- 2 Come up f s such that f_3 i) remains one-way and ii) becomes invertible

OWF Collection or Not?



large $\leftarrow$ $\rightarrow$ constant in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$

- 1 Multiplication modulo prime p : $f_{p,a}(x) := ax \bmod p$

OWF Collection or Not?



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1 Multiplication modulo prime p : $f_{p,a}(x) := ax \bmod p$

2 Squaring modulo prime p : $f_p(x) := x^2 \bmod p$

OWF Collection or Not?



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1 Multiplication modulo prime p : $f_{p,a}(x) := ax \bmod p$



2 Squaring modulo prime p : $f_p(x) := x^2 \bmod p$ $\rightarrow$ "generator"

3 Exponentiation modulo prime p : $f_{p,g}(x) := g^x \bmod p$

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 - Inversion is the discrete logarithm problem: believed hard
- 4 Squaring modulo composite $N = pq$: $f_N(x) := x^2 \bmod N$ $\rightarrow$ large primes

OWF Collection or Not?



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~OWF!
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4 Squaring modulo composite $N = pq$: $f_N(x) := x^2 \bmod N$

■ Inversion as hard as factoring $N!$ → large primes

5 Matrix multiplication modulo prime p : $f_{\bar{A}}(x) := x^T \bar{A} \bmod p$
→ $n \times m$ matrix over $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$

OWF Collection or Not?



large $\leftarrow$ constant in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$


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 - Inversion as hard as factoring N ! $\rightarrow$ large primes
- 5 Matrix multiplication modulo prime p : $f_{\bar{A}}(x) := x^T \bar{A} \bmod p$
 - Inversion easy by Gaussian elimination $\rightarrow$ $n \times m$ matrix over $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$
 - But, inversion seems hard if we add small noise to the output
LWE: coming up in Lecture 10! $\rightarrow$

Exercise 2


Show that taking square root modulo N is equivalent to factoring N . (Hint: use the identity $x^2 - y^2 = (x + y)(x - y) \bmod N$)

Plan for this Lecture

1 One-Way Functions and Permutations




2 Hard-Core Predicate



3 Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Predicate


Plan for this Lecture

1 One-Way Functions and Permutations



2 Hard-Core Predicate


↗ "unpredictable"



3 Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Predicate


Let's Try to "Extract" a Hard-Core Bit

- Our goal: length-preserving OWF/OWP $f \rightarrow$ PRG G
- Our template: $G(x) := f(x)b$ for some bit $b \Rightarrow b$ must be unpredictable given $f(x)$



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
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 - What about least significant bit (LSB) $b := x_n$?
 - LSB is unpredictable (e.g.) for squaring function modulo N

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
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
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 - MSB is unpredictable (e.g.) for exponentiation function modulo p
 - **Problem:** There exist OWFs such that each bit is predictable with a non-negligible probability

Exercise 3


Come up with such a OWF. What about such a OWP?

Therefore, Hard-core Predicates ..

- Takeaway: cannot just output some bit of the input


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

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- What about a predicate of the input?
- Intuitively, we need a predicate that is:
 - Easy to compute given x
 - Hard to predict given $f(x)$





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

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

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Definition 2

A predicate $hc : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is hard-core for a function family $f_n : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$, if for every PPT predictor P , the following is negligible

$$\delta(n) := \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} [P(f(x)) = hc(x)] - 1/2$$

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- For “lossy” functions (e.g., $f_n(x) = 0^n$), unpredictability stems from information loss
- For “non-lossy” functions (e.g., OWP), unpredictability is computational and stems from one-wayness

Hard-Core Predicate $\rightarrow$ Pseudo-Random Generator...

Theorem 1

Let f be a OWP and hc be a hard-core predicate for f . Then the PRG $G(x) := f(x)hc(x)$ is a PRG.

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Proof sketch. 💡 Idea: use next-bit unpredictability.

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Proof sketch. 💡 Idea: use next-bit unpredictability.

Goal: $\exists$ predictor P^1 for $hc \Leftarrow \exists$ next-bit predictor P for G


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$$f(x) = y = y_1 \dots y_n$$




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
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
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
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
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👁 1) P can only be exploited if $i=n$


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- 1) P can only be exploited if $i=n$
- 2) P has no advantage in predicting $y_1 \dots y_n$!


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- 👁 1) P can only be exploited if $i=n$
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- ❓ $\rightarrow f$ permutation implies $y_1 \dots y_n$ is uniformly random

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Exercise 4

What happens if we use a length-preserving OWF instead of OWP?

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
What happens if we use a length-preserving OWF instead of OWP?

Corollary 2


- *We get PRG from hardness of following problems:*
 - *Exponentiation modulo prime p : $f_{p,g}(x) := g^x \bmod p$*
 - *Inversion hard by discrete logarithm assumption*
 - *Squaring modulo composite $N = pq$: $f_N(x) := x^2 \bmod N$*
 - *Inversion hard by factoring assumption*

Plan for this Lecture

1 One-Way Functions and Permutations



2 Hard-Core Predicate



3 Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Predicate

Hard-core Predicate for “Any” OWP

- We want: one hard-core predicate that works for every OWP

Hard-core Predicate for “Any” OWP

- We want: one hard-core predicate that works for every OWP
-  This is not quite possible

Exercise 5

Show that one function $hc : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ cannot be hard-core predicate for all one-way functions.

Hard-core Predicate for “Any” OWP

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This is not quite possible

Exercise 5

Show that one function $hc : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ cannot be hard-core predicate for all one-way functions.

- Compromise:

- 1 OWP $\rightarrow$ “leaky” OWP

- For a OWP f , the “leaky” OWP is $f'(x, r) := (f(x), r)$.

- 2 One hard-core predicate that works for every “leaky” OWP

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Theorem 3 (Goldreich-Levin Theorem)

For a OWP f , let $f'(x, r) := (f(x), r)$. Then $hc(x, r) := \langle x, r \rangle_2$ is a hard-core predicate for f' .

inner product modulo 2
 $\sum_{i \in [1, n]} x_i r_i \bmod 2$

Let's First Prove the Simplest Case: Perfect Predictors

Theorem 3 (Goldreich-Levin Theorem)

For a OWP f , let $f'(x, r) := (f(x), r)$. Then $hc(x, r) := \langle x, r \rangle$ is a hard-core predicate for f' .

Proof. $\exists$ Inverter $\text{Inv} \Leftarrow \exists$ Perfect Predictor P .



Let's First Prove the Simplest Case: Perfect Predictors

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


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


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


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$$\Pr_{x, r \leftarrow f(x)} [P(f(x), r) = \langle x, r \rangle] = 1$$




$\forall x, r: P$ predicts $\langle x, r \rangle$ correctly

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


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


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


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


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


Next Let's Consider "Good" Predictors

Theorem 3 (Goldreich-Levin Theorem)

For a OWP f , let $f'(x, r) := (f(x), r)$. Then $hc(x, r) := \langle x, r \rangle_2$ is a hard-core predicate for f' .

Proof. $\exists$ Inverter $Inv \Leftarrow \exists$ Good Predictor P .
(focus on x_1)



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(focus on x_1)

$$\Pr_{x, r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [P(f(x), r) = \langle x, r \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

$y = f(x)$

Inverter Inv
"Reduction"


Predictor P

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Claim 1 $\textcircled{?} \downarrow$ "good"
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Predictor P
 $\Pr_{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [P(f(x), r) = \langle x, r \rangle] \geq \frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{2p(n)}$

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

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


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


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


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


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

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


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


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


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


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


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
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To Recap

- We saw pseudo-randomness via one-wayness

- $OWP \rightarrow \text{hard-core bit} \rightarrow PRG$
- Several examples of OWP:
 - 1 Exponentiation modulo prime p (discrete-log assumption)
 - 2 Squaring modulo composite $N = pq$ (factoring assumption)
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
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
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
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
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- Hardness $\leftrightarrow$ Unpredictability $\leftrightarrow$ Pseudorandomness



Next Lecture

- So far: adversaries who don't tamper with ciphertext
 - Eavesdropper of various forms, chosen-plaintext attacker



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- Message authentication codes (MAC)
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More Questions?

References

- 1 For a historical take on OWFs, see [DH76].
- 2 The construction of PRG from OWP via hard-core predicate is from [BM84]. There they rely on the discrete-log based OWP.
- 3 The squaring based OWP was first studied by Rabin [Rab79].
- 4 The Goldreich-Levin theorem is from [GL89]. The proof described here closely follows Vinod Vaikuntanathan's proof in Lecture 6 of MIT6875. See [Gol01, §2.5.2] for a formal description of the proof.
- 5 The construction of PRG from OWF is due to [HILL99]



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