

CS409m: Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 07 (22/Aug/25)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath

Recall from Previous Lecture...

- Task: secure communication of *long messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: computational secrecy against eavesdroppers

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How to Construct PRGs?



PRG Length Extension



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

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

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
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Main tool: hybrid argument

Recall from Previous Lecture...

Theorem 1

If G is a PRG, then so is G′.

Proof. ∃ distinguisher D for G ⇐ ∃ distinguisher D′ for G′.



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

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



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



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



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Two worlds of PRG G′:

pseudorandom world H_0

hybrid world H_1

hybrid world H_2

⋮

hybrid world H_{i-1}

hybrid world H_i

⋮

random world H_{2n}





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

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

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$\underbrace{\omega = \omega^- \| \omega^+}$

G(s) or random r $\rightarrow$

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

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

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

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

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

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

Analysis: similar to claims 1 and 2.

$\Pr[D'(H_0)=0] - \Pr[D'(H_{2n})=0] \geq \delta \Rightarrow$ $\qquad \Pr[i^*=i] = 1/2n$

$\exists i \in [0, 2n-1]$ such that $\Pr[D'(H_i)=0] - \Pr[D'(H_{i+1})=0] \geq \delta/2n$

Let's Take Stock of Theorem 1

- Construction and Theorem 1 work for any polynomial stretch
  - What happens if we stretch it *exponentially*?

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  - One way to measure how "wasteful" the reduction is

Exercise 1

- Think of a less wasteful reduction strategy for Theorem 1. Do you feel it is possible?
- Maybe need a different construction?

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: secure communication of *multiple messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: computational secrecy against eavesdroppers

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Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)



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GGM PRF

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Let's Encrypt Many Messages Using PRG G...

- Setting: Caesar and his general share a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and want to secretly communicate n messages from $\{0,1\}^n$ in presence of eavesdropper Eve*



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

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

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

- SKE construction: use output of G as n pseudorandom OTPs

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

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

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

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

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

- SKE construction: use output of G as n pseudorandom OTPs
- Problem: construction *stateful*; synchrony must be maintained
  - We lose correctness if (e.g.) ciphertexts delivered out of order
  - ? Come up with a scenario that leads to loss of secrecy

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

What if the stretch is n^3?

$n \rightarrow n^3$



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

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

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Problem? Collision

- Underlying problem: only poly. pseudorandom OTPs available

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

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

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

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  - Not all pseudorandom OTPs are efficiently "accessible"
- Need "PRG" with
  1. Exponential stretch
  2. Output bits "efficiently" accessible (also called locality)

Let's Encrypt Many Messages Using an Oracle in the Sky

- Setting:
  - Caesar and his general have shared a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$
  - Everyone (including Eve*) has access to a *random function oracle* $R : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^n$

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

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

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

How will you construct a stateless encryption scheme given R?

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Exercise 2

What if Caesar and his general did not have the shared key k? Can they still do something given the oracle in the sky?

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: secure communication of *multiple messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: computational secrecy against eavesdroppers

Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)



GGM PRF

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

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



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

Number of functions in $\{F_k\}$ vs. number of functions $\mathcal{F}_n$?

- Why is it still useful?
  - Helps generate exponentially-many *pseudorandom* OTPs

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  - How? (Recall: run-time measured w.r.to size of input)
- Way around:
  - Distinguisher given *oracle* access to the functions
  - One query=one unit of running time $\rightarrow$ efficient PPT distinguisher can only make polynomially-many queries

How Exactly to Define Pseudorandomess for Functions?...

Definition 1 (Two worlds)

A family of functions $\{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^n}$ is a PRF if for every PPT *oracle distinguisher* D

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



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





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PRF or not? Below $F^{(1)}$ and $F^{(2)}$ are PRFs

1. $F_k(x) := k \oplus x$
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Exercise 3

In all the "yes" cases above, formally prove; in all the "no" cases, describe a counter-example.

Construction 1 (Replace random oracle with PRF)



(Stateless) Symmetric-Key Encryption from PRF

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

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

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

Note: encryption is randomised and thus length of ciphertext is longer than plaintext (first such scheme in this course)

Exercise 4 (Hint: reduction similar to computational OTP)

1. Formulate the eavesdropper threat model for multiple encryptions
2. Prove that Construction 1 is secure against eavesdroppers

Hint: Reduction Similar to Computational OTP...

Theorem 2 (Recall, Lecture 05-06)

If G is a PRG, then Comp. OTP is comp. secret against eavesdroppers

Proof by reduction. $\exists$D for G $\Leftarrow$ $\exists$Eve breaking Computational OTP.



□

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- Practical PRFs: block ciphers like AES
  - Usually only support certain key-sizes (128, 192, 256)
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- For encrypting larger messages (e.g., for disk encryption) “modes of operation” used (Coming up in Lecture 08!)
  - E.g: Cipher block-chaining (CBC) mode



  - My laptop uses LUKS for disk encryption, which uses AES-XTS



Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: secure communication of *multiple messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: computational secrecy against eavesdroppers

NEW Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)



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NEW GGM PRF

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Let's Try to Construct a PRF



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- Recall the problem with expanding exponentially:
  - Takes exponential time to access most pseudorandom OTPs

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

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  - Hint: Use length-doubling PRG

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

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How to reconcile the two requirements?

- Hint: Use length-doubling PRG
- Use binary tree instead of chain!

Tree-Based Construction from Length-Doubling PRG G

$n \to n^2$

Construction 2 (GGM PRF $\{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^n}$)

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Construction 2 (GGM PRF $\{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^n}$)



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

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

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

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

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

- Define $F_k(x) =$

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

- Define $F_k(x) = s_x$ with $s_\varepsilon := k$

Exercise 5

1. Write down the construction formally.
2. What if we use d-ary tree instead of binary tree?

How do We Prove that Construction 2 is a PRF?...

Theorem 3

If G is a length-doubling PRG, then Construction 2 is a PRF.

Proof. First attempt: off-the-shelf hybrid argument.

Strategy: replace, breadth-first, pseudorandom by random

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

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

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



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



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H_2: hybrid world





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



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


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

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

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Problem: exponential number of hybrids

Solution: hybrid argument with on-the-fly/lazy sampling!

Recap/Next Lecture



- Defined and constructed PRFs
  - GGM tree-based construction from length-doubling PRGs
  - Another application of hybrid argument



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



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- Constructed a *stateless* SKE from PRF
  - Next lecture: chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)



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



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

- Other applications of PRFs
  - Authentication (coming up: Lecture 09)
  - Natural proofs: barrier to resolving the P $\stackrel{?}{=}$ NP question

Further Reading

1. PRFs were introduced in [GGM84], where the namesake construction from PRGs was also presented.
2. [Gol01, §3.6] for a formal proof of Theorem 3
3. [KL14, §3.5] for a formal description of Construction 1.
4. To read more about natural proofs, and the role of PRFs there [Aar03, §4] or [Cho11] are good sources.

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Is P versus NP formally independent?
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