

CS409m: Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 08 (29/Aug/25)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath

Recall from Previous Lecture...

- Task: secure communication of *multiple messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: computational secrecy against eavesdroppers (EAV*)

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Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)



PRF $\Longrightarrow$ EAV*-secure SKE



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



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



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



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

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

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

Theorem 1

If F *is a PRF, then Construction 1 (Lecture 07) is EAV*-secure*

Proof.

Similar to proof of PRG $\Longrightarrow$ EAV-SKE $\square$

But How to Construct a PRF?



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

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Need "PRG" with

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2. Output bits "efficiently" accessible (also called locality)

How to reconcile the two requirements?

Hint: Use length-doubling PRG

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

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Use binary tree instead of chain!

Tree-Based Construction from Length-Doubling PRG G

Construction 2 (GGM PRF $\{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^n}$)

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Theorem 2

If G is a length-doubling PRG, then Construction 2 is a PRF.

Proof: a "frugal" hybrid argument: see [Gol01, §3.6].



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PRFs IRL

- Practical PRFs: block ciphers like AES
  - − Usually only support certain key-sizes (128, 192, 256)
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

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

  - My laptop uses LUKS for disk encryption, which uses AES-XTS

Size 510 GB (5,10,10,91,55,328 bytes)
Contents LUKS Encryption (version 2) — Unlocked

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: secure comm. of multiple messages with shared keys
- Threat model: comp. secrecy against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)

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Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)

PRF $\Longrightarrow$ CPA-secure SKE



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

Exercise 1

Prove that if an SKE Π is CPA-secure then it is EAV-secure.

Chosen-Plaintext Attack IRL

- "[...] during World War II, British placed mines at certain locations, knowing that the Germans—when finding those mines—would encrypt the locations and send them back to headquarters." [KL14]

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

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

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

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

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- Computer viruses might not have access to secret key, but can still send encrypted messages

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: secure comm. of *multiple messages* with shared keys
- Threat model: comp. secrecy against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)

Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)

PRF $\Longrightarrow$ CPA-secure SKE



How to Construct CPA-Secure SKE?

- Attempt 1: consider the PRF-based scheme $\mathsf{Enc}(k, m) := \mathsf{F}_k(m)$
  - Assume $\forall k \in \{0,1\}^n$, $F_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ is a *permutation* (more on this in Lecture 09!)



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

Do you think it is CPA-secure?

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

Do you think it is CPA-secure? No! How to attack? E.g.:

1. Query encryption oracle on $0^n \in \{0,1\}^n$ to obtain c
2. Challenge on $(0^n, 1^n)$ to obtain c^*
3. Output $b' = 0$ if $c = c^*$

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

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☆ Takeaway: CPA-secure SKE *cannot* have deterministic Enc!

What About PRF-based SKE from Lecture 07?

Construction 1 (Lecture 07, PRF $\Longrightarrow$ SKE)



❓ Is Enc deterministic?

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

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

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Theorem 3

If F *is a PRF, then Construction 1 (Lecture 07) is CPA-secure.*

- Proof on whiteboard

Recap/Next Lecture

- Defined an "active" threat model: CPA
  - CPA adversary can control the messages to be encrypted



⚠ Enc deterministic $\Longrightarrow$ CPA-insecure!

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

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

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

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

- Constructed a (stateless) CPA-secure SKE from PRF

- Next lecture
  - Block cipher a/k/a pseudo-random permutation (PRP)
  - *Modes of operation* for efficiently encrypting *long* messages

Further Reading

1. [Gol01, §3.6] for a formal proof of Theorem 2
2. You can find a formal treatment of PRF-based SKE in [KL14, §3.5.2] – in particular, Theorem 1 is Theorem 3.29 there, and a formal proof follows.


Oded Goldreich.

The Foundations of Cryptography - Volume 1: Basic Techniques.

Cambridge University Press, 2001.


Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell.

Introduction to Modern Cryptography (3rd ed.).

Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2014.