

CS409m: Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 14 (01/Oct/25)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath

Announcements



- Quiz 2 moved to 10/Oct (next Friday), 08:25-09:25, in CC103

 Bounty on Problem 7.3 still on!
 - Come up with a *simple* construction of MAC from weak PRF
 - Construction provided in solution set is too complex!




Recall from Last Two Lectures

- Tasks: key exchange (KEx) and public-key encryption (PKE)
- 2-Round KEx ⇔ PKE


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Diffie-Hellman KEx



Elgamal PKE




Recall from Last Two Lectures

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
Diffie-Hellman KEx

Elgamal PKE




$$\bigstar$$
 Structure we exploited: $(g^a)^b=g^{ab}=(g^b)^a$ \bigstar

Recall from Last Two Lectures...




Group-based hard problems: DLP, CDH and DDH


Plan for Today's Lecture



Today: Integer Factoring and its friends!

Plan for Today's Lecture





Plan for Today's Lecture...

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
- Threat model: IND-CPA



Goldwasser-Micali PKE





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Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
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




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Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
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🖈 Algebraic setting: multiplication modulo semiprime (RSA group)🖈

■ Problem: Given a integer N, find 1 that divides <math>N

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- ② Can you think of an algorithm that takes \sqrt{N} steps? $\overset{\circ}{\bigcirc}$

Pseudocode 1

- **1** $For <math>1 \le i \le \lceil \sqrt{N} \rceil$:
 - If $i^2 = N$ then output i

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
Pseudocode 1

- **1** $For <math>1 \le i \le \left\lceil \sqrt{N} \right\rceil$:
 - If $i^2 = N$ then output i
- Output "Prime!"
- Let's try to sample hard-to-factor integer N
 - What about a random integer N?

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
- **②**What about a random *odd* integer *N*? *N* divisible by 3 with probability 1/3 🗥
- What seems hardest?

- Problem: Given a integer N, find 1 that divides N
- \bigcirc Can you think of an algorithm that takes \sqrt{N} steps?

Pseudocode 1

NaiveFactor(N):

- - If $i^2 = N$ then output i
- 2 Output "Prime!"
- Let's try to sample hard-to-factor integer N
 - **②** What about a *random* integer *N*? *N* even with probability 1/2 \triangle



What seems hardest? Semiprime, i.e., N product of two primes

Pseudocode 2

Semiprime sampler $S(1^n)$:

- Sample two random primes p and q of length $\approx n$
- Output N := pq

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$$\delta(n) := \Pr_{N \leftarrow S(1^n)}[A(N) \text{ divides } N]$$

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$$\delta(n) := \Pr_{N \leftarrow S(1^n)}[A(N) \text{ divides } N]$$

Best known algorithm (Number-Field Sieve) requires $\approx 2^{|N|^{\frac{1}{3}}}$ time Assumption does not hold against *quantum* adversaries!

■ Shor's algorithm factors in *polynomial time* on quantum computer

Integer Factoring in the Wild!



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≡ RSA Factoring Challenge

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The **RSA Factoring Challenge** was a challenge put forward by RSA Laboratories on March 18, 1991^[1] to encourage research into computational number theory and the practical difficulty of factoring large integers and cracking RSA keys used in cryptography. They published a list of semiprimes (numbers with exactly two prime factors) known as the RSA numbers, with a cash prize for the successful factorization of some of them. The smallest of them, a 100-decimal digit number called RSA-100 was factored by April 1, 1991. Many of the bigger numbers have still not been factored and are expected to remain unfactored for quite some time, however advances in quantum computers make this prediction uncertain due to Shor's algorithm.

					_
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ü						
	RSA617	617	2048			
	RSA2048	617	2048	US\$200,000 ^[d]		

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
- Threat model: IND-CPA














🖈 Algebraic setting: multiplication modulo semiprime (RSA group)🖈







```
Multiplication mod prime p
♦ order p-1
♦ cyclic
```

```
Multiplication mod semiprime pq
```

What are the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pa}^{\times} ? Every $0 \leq a < N$ that is invertible

Multiplication mod prime p

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- What are the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pa}^{\times} ? Every $0 \leq a < N$ that is invertible
 - 0 is not invertible

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Multiplication mod semiprime pq
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- **4** What are the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pq}^{\times} ? Every $0 \leq a < N$ that is invertible
 - 0 is not invertible
 - **p** and its multiples are not invertible (proof on whiteboard)

Multiplication mea_{i} $i = g^{p-1} mod p$ $f = g^{p-1} mod p$ $g = g^{p-1} mod p$ gMultiplication mod prime p


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- What are the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pa}^{\times} ? Every $0 \leq a < N$ that is invertible
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 - q and its multiples are not invertible


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- What are the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{pa}^{\times} ? Every $0 \leq a < N$ that is invertible
 - 0 is not invertible
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 - q and its multiples are not invertible
- What is the order of the \mathbb{Z}_{pq}^{\times} ?


$$pq - 1 - (q - 1) - (p - 1) = pq - p - q - 1$$
$$= (p - 1)(q - 1) =: \phi(N)$$




■ 2-1 map




- lacksquare 2-1 map \Rightarrow Half the elements $\mathbb{Z}_p^ imes(+)\subset\mathbb{Z}_p^ imes$ have square roots
- $\square / \triangle \blacksquare$ Is it possible to *test* if $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}(+)$?




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 - \bigcirc 2 Output "square" if x is even



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
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 - **1** Compute $sign\ y^{(p-1)/2} \in \{\pm 1\}$ (Legendre symbol)
 - \bigcirc 2 Output "square" if sign is +1




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Exercise 1 (Exercise 2, Assignment 4)

Show that DDH assumption doesn't hold in $(\mathbb{Z}_p^{\times},\cdot)$




■ Chinese Remaindering Theorem: $\mathbb{Z}_N^{\times} \cong \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\times}$ (on whiteboard)




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$$Z_{p}^{\times} = 1$$
 2 ... y_{p} ... z_{p} ... z_{p}


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- lacksquare \Rightarrow 4-1 map \Rightarrow 1/4 of elements $\mathbb{Z}_N^{ imes}(+,+)\subset \mathbb{Z}_N^{ imes}$ have square roots




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
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
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 - lacksquare Output "square" if $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}(+)$ and $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\times}(+)$
- Is it possible to *efficiently test* if $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)$? Unclear
- Can efficiently distinguish $\mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+) \cup \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)$ from



Assumption 2 (Quadratic residuosity (QR) assumption w.r.to S...)

...holds if for all PPT distinguishers D, the following is negligible:

$$\delta(n) := \left| \Pr_{\substack{N \leftarrow S(1^n) \\ y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)}} \left[\Pr_{\mathbb{Q}}(N,y) = 0 \right] - \Pr_{\substack{N \leftarrow S(1^n) \\ y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)}} \left[\Pr_{\mathbb{Q}}(N,y) = 0 \right] \right|$$



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Exercise 2

- Show that QR assumption implies Factoring assumption
- 2 Show that *computing* square root mod N is equivalent to factoring

Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
- Threat model: IND-CPA



Goldwasser-Micali PKE




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Algebraic setting: multiplication modulo semiprime (RSA group)



- Key idea: encode message in the "sign" $0 \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)$ and $1 \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)$

 - Exploit the fact that $-1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)$

- Key generation $Gen(1^n)$:
 - **1** Sample semiprime with factors $(N, (p, q)) \leftarrow S(1^n)$
 - 2 Output (pk := N, sk := (p, q))

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- Encryption Enc(pk, m):
 - **1** Sample random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}$
 - Output $c := (-1)^m \cdot r^2 \mod N$

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 - 1 Sample random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}$
 - Output $c := \begin{pmatrix} -1 \end{pmatrix}^m \cdot r^2 \mod N$
- Decryption Dec(sk,c): output

$$\begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+) \cong \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}(+) \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\times}(+) \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Key idea: encode message in the "sign" $0 \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)$ and $1 \mapsto \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)$

 - Exploit the fact that $-1 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(-,-)$

Pseudocode 3 (Goldwasser-Micali PKE for $\mathcal{M}_n := \{0, 1\}$)

- Key generation $Gen(1^n)$:
 - **1** Sample semiprime with factors $(N, (p, q)) \leftarrow S(1^n)$
 - 2 Output (pk := N, sk := (p, q))
- Encryption Enc(pk, m):
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 - Output $c := (-1)^m \cdot r^2 \mod N$
- Decryption Dec(sk, c): output

$$Sec(sk,c)$$
: output
$$\begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } c \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+) \cong \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}(+) \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\times}(+) \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

• Correctness of decryption: Since $r^2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)$, $c \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}(+,+)$ iff m=0

Theorem 1 (QR ightarrow IND-CPA security1)

Goldwasser-Micali PKE is CPA-secret under QR assumption.





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Goldwasser-Micali PKE is CPA-secret under QR assumption.





Theorem 1 (QR ightarrow IND-CPA security1)


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Theorem 1 (QR ightarrow IND-CPA security1)

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


Theorem 1 (QR ightarrow IND-CPA security1)


Goldwasser-Micali PKE is CPA-secret under QR assumption.




Theorem 1 (QR \rightarrow IND-CPA security1)




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Plan for Today's Lecture

- Task: public-key encryption (PKE)
- Threat model: IND-CPA








@Oded Goldreich



©cs.miami.edu (Rosenberg)


Algebraic setting: multiplication modulo semiprime (RSA group)

Powering Map $x \mapsto x^e \mod pq$




- Consider $f_{N,e}(x) := x^e \mod N$ for $3 \le e \le \phi(N)$
 - $f_{N,e}$ is a permutation if e is coprime to $\phi(N)$
 - Efficiently computable via square-and-multiply

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Assumption 3 (RSA assumption w.r.to S...)

... holds if for all PPT A, the following is negligible:

$$\delta(n) := \Pr_{\substack{(N,(\rho,q)) \leftarrow S(1^n) \\ e \leftarrow [1,\phi(N)] \\ x \leftarrow [1,N]}} [A(N,x^e) = x]$$

Key idea: apply the power map to encrypt

Pseudocode 4 (RSA PKE for $\mathcal{M}_n := \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times}$)

- Key generation $Gen(1^n)$:
 - 1 Sample semiprime with factors: $(N, (p, q)) \leftarrow S(1^n)$
 - 2 Sample $e \leftarrow [1, \phi(N)]$ such that $gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$
 - 3 Compute d such that $ed = 1 \mod \phi(N)$
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
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- Correctness of decryption : $\forall m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times} : (m^e)^d = m^{ed} = m \mod N$

Exercise 3

- Show that RSA PKE is not IND-CPA secure
- Show that RSA PKE is OW-CPA secure (see Assignment 4)


Recap/Next Lecture

- Group-based functions (easy) vs. their inverse (hard):
 - \blacksquare \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times} : exponentiation $(x \mapsto g^x)$ vs discrete-log
 - \blacksquare \mathbb{Z}_N^{\times} : squaring $(x \mapsto x^2 \mod pq)$ vs square root
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- Takeaway: structure, structure, structure



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- Next Lecture(s): how to deal with active adversary?
 - Digital signatures: public-key version of MAC
 - How to construct digital signature

References

- [KL14, Chapter 9.2] for more on the number theory used in this lecture
- 2 Goldwasser-Micali PKE was proposed in [GM82]. That paper is considered to be the first paper on "provable security"
- 3 A description of the RSA PKE can be found in [KL14, Chapter 12.5]



Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali.

Probabilistic encryption and how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information.

In 14th ACM STOC, pages 365–377. ACM Press, May 1982.



Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell.

Introduction to Modern Cryptography (3rd ed.).

Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2014.