

CS409m: Introduction to Cryptography

Lecture 18 (17/Oct/25)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath

Journey So Far...

MODULE 1
(Shared keys)

MODULE 2
(Public keys)

For a large part of history


Advent of internet



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
~1970s

~1990s

Present

Journey So Far...

The Cryptographic Landscape



Plan for Module III: Applications!

MODULE 1
(Shared keys)

MODULE 2
(Public keys)

MODULE 3
(Applications)

For a large part of history

Advent of internet



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helios
Trust the vote.



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~1970s

~1990s

Present

Plan for Today's Lecture...

💡 What really constitutes a proof?

NEW Interactive Proof (IP)



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


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Zero-Knowledge IP **NEW**



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Plan for Today's Lecture...




What really constitutes a proof?



Interactive Proof (IP)



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


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Zero-Knowledge IP




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★ Main tools: simulation paradigm, Chernoff bound... ★


(ZK)IPs are Useful!

- Applications of IP: Verifiable outsourcing



(ZK)IPs are Useful!

- Applications of IP: Verifiable outsourcing



- Applications of ZKP:

- eVoting: coming up in Lecture 20!

helios
Trust the vote.



- Crypto(currencies): prove validity of transaction without revealing details: coming up in Lecture 23!



- Efficient digital signatures: Schnorr ID protocol

Plan for Today's Lecture...

💡 What really constitutes a proof?

NEW Interactive Proof (IP)

Zero-Knowledge IP **NEW**




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Traditional “NP” Proof...

■ Axioms $\xrightarrow{\text{derivation rules}}$ theorems=true statements

■ E.g.: Axioms of Euclidean geometry

→ Theorem: “Sum of angles of a triangle equals 180°”




Traditional “NP” Proof...

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- Prover vs. verifier



Prover does the **heavy lifting**: derives the proof


- 1 Construct a line through B parallel to $\overline{AC}$
- 2 $\angle DBA = \angle a$ and $\angle EBC = \angle c$ (alternate interior angles)
- 3 $2 \Rightarrow \angle a + \angle b + \angle c = \angle DBA + \angle b + \angle EBC = 180^\circ$

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Verifier checks the proof, step by step

Traditional “NP” Proof...

- Corresponds to the *class* NP
 - A language $\mathcal{L} \in \text{NP}$ if there exists a polynomial-time *deterministic* machine V such that

statement $\rightarrow \forall x \in \mathcal{L} \exists \text{ “short” } \pi : V(x, \pi) = 1$ $\leftarrow$ witness/proof

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- NP is the *class* of all such $\mathcal{L}$ s (e.g., Sudoku)

5	3			7			
6			1	9	5		
	9	8				6	
8				6			3
4			8		3		1
7				2			6
	6					2	8
			4	1	9		5
				8			7
						7	9

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
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- “Proof system” view of NP

- Prover P is *unbounded*: finds short proof π for x (if one exists)
- Verifier V is *efficient*: checks proof π against the statement x


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
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
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
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- “Proof system” view of NP

- Prover P is *unbounded*: finds short proof π for x (if one exists)
- Verifier V is *efficient*: checks proof π against the statement x
- **Completeness**: $x \in \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \exists \pi \text{ s.t. } V(x, \pi) = 1$
- **Soundness**: $x \notin \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \nexists \pi \text{ s.t. } V(x, \pi) = 1$


Which Languages have “NP” Proofs?

Quadratic residuosity (QR)




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
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


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


Quad. non-residuosity (QNR)




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


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


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
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


Graph isomorphism (GI)




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
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


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


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
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
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


Graph non-isomorphism (GNI)




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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
Sudoku




Chess

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Sudoku




Chess




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
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
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
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
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
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Interactive Proof (IP)

▲ Difference from NP proofs:


- ① Verifier V is *randomised*
- ↔ ② Prover P and V *interact* and V accepts/rejects in the end



Interactive Proof (IP)

▲ Difference from NP proofs:

- 1 Verifier V is *randomised*
- 2 Prover P and V *interact* and V accepts/rejects in the end




Definition 1

An interactive protocol (P, V) for a language $\mathcal{L}$ is an *interactive proof (IP)* system if the following holds:

Interactive Proof (IP)

▲ Difference from NP proofs:

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
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
- **Completeness:** for every $x \in \mathcal{L}$, $\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle P, V \rangle(x)] \geq 1 - 1/3$
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 $\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle P^*, V \rangle(x)] \leq 1/3$



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
completeness error $\epsilon_c(n)$

soundness error $\epsilon_s(n)$

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
Exercise 1 (Definition 1 is robust)

Show that languages captured by Definition 1 doesn't change when $\epsilon_c \leq 1/2^{|x|}$ and $\epsilon_s \leq 1/2^{|x|}$ (Hint: repeat protocol, use Chernoff bound)

Power of Randomness+Interaction: IP for GNI...



Idea: $G_0 \not\cong G_1 \Rightarrow$ for any graph H , $G_0 \cong H$ and $G_1 \cong H$ both cannot hold





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Protocol 1 (Π_{GNI} : IP for GNI)



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


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


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


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


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


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
Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

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
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Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

Theorem 1

Π_{GNI} is an IP for $\mathcal{L}_{GNI}$

Power of Randomness+Interaction: IP for GNI...


Theorem 1

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Proof.

- Completeness:

- $G_0 \not\equiv G_1 \Rightarrow P$ can recover b_i from H_i with certainty



$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle P, V \rangle(G_0, G_1)] = 1 \geq 2/3$$

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
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
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$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle P, V \rangle(G_0, G_1)] = 1 \geq 2/3$$

■ Soundness:

- $G_0 \cong G_1 \Rightarrow H_i$ loses information about bits b_i
- Hence best P^* can do is guess b_i s




$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle P^*, V \rangle(G_0, G_1)] = 1/2^p < 1/3$$




Which Languages have IPs?


Quadratic residuosity (QR)




Quad. non-residuosity (QNR)




Graph isomorphism (GI)




Graph non-isomorphism (GNI)



Sudoku




Chess




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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
Sudoku



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
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Chess




Which Languages have IPs? PSPACE Languages


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
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
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
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Sudoku




Chess




Plan for Today's Lecture...

💡 What really constitutes a proof?

NEW Interactive Proof (IP)




Zero-Knowledge IP **NEW**




★ Main tools: simulation paradigm, Chernoff bound... ★

Any Issues with the NP Proofs We Saw?


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
Quad. non-residuosity (QNR)



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
Sudoku




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
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
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


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- Verifier gains “non-trivial knowledge” about witness w
 - Not desirable, e.g., when $x = pk$ and $w = sk$ (identification)

What About the IP We Saw?


Protocol 1 (Π_{GNI} : IP for GNI)



Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

What About the IP We Saw?

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


Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

- Seems V gains no knowledge beyond validity of the statement

What About the IP We Saw?

Protocol 1 (Π_{GNI} : IP for GNI)



Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

- Seems V gains no knowledge beyond validity of the statement
- We will see that Π_{GNI} is (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge!

How to Capture “V Gains No Knowledge”?

- Knowledge vs. **information** *← in the information-theoretic sense*
 - Knowledge is computational

How to Capture “V Gains No Knowledge”?

- Knowledge vs. **information** ← in the information-theoretic sense




- Knowledge is computational: e.g., consider NP proof for GI

- Given (G_0, G_1) , the isomorphism π contains no *information*
- But when given π , V “**gains knowledge**” since she couldn’t have computed π herself

How to Capture “V Gains No Knowledge”?


- Knowledge vs. **information** ← in the information-theoretic sense



- Knowledge is computational: e.g., consider NP proof for GI
- Given (G_0, G_1) , the isomorphism π contains no *information*
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- Knowledge pertains to **public objects**:
 - Flipping a *private* fair coin b and (later) revealing its outcome leads to V gaining *information*
 - But V *does not gain knowledge*: she could herself have tossed the private coin and revealed it


How to Capture “V Gains No Knowledge”?

- Knowledge vs. **information** *← in the information-theoretic sense*



A diagram showing two cartoon characters, a man and a woman. The man has a thought bubble containing $G_0 \cong G_1$. An arrow points from the man to the woman, labeled $\pi: G_1 = \pi(G_0)$.

- Knowledge is computational: e.g., consider NP proof for GI
- Given (G_0, G_1) , the isomorphism π contains no *information*
- But when given π , V “**gains knowledge**” since she couldn’t have computed π herself




A diagram showing two cartoon characters, a man and a woman. The man has a thought bubble containing $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$. An arrow points from the man to the woman, labeled b .

- Knowledge pertains to **public objects**:
- Flipping a *private* fair coin b and (later) revealing its outcome leads to V gaining *information*
- But V *does not gain knowledge*: she could herself have tossed the private coin and revealed it

 Intuitively, “V gains no knowledge” if anything $\wedge$ *(other than the validity of x)* V can *compute* after the interaction, V could have computed *without it*


Defining Zero Knowledge via Simulators

- Formalised via “simulation paradigm”: $View_V(\langle P, V \rangle(x))$ can be *efficiently* simulated given only the instance




Defining Zero Knowledge via Simulators

- Formalised via “simulation paradigm”: $View_V(\langle P, V \rangle(x))$ can be *efficiently* simulated given only the instance





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

Definition 2 (Honest-Verifier Perfect ZK)

An IP Π is *honest-verifier perfect ZK* if there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for *all* distinguishers D and all $x \in \mathcal{L}$, the following is zero

$$\Pr[D(\text{View}_V(\langle P, V \rangle(x))) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Sim}(x)) = 1]$$

Defining Zero Knowledge via Simulators

- Formalised via “simulation paradigm”: $\text{View}_V(\langle P, V \rangle(x))$ can be efficiently simulated given only the instance x .
 $\rightarrow V$'s “view” = x + transcript τ + coins



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
Exercise 2

What happens when one invokes the simulator on $x \notin \mathcal{L}$?


Plan for Today's Lecture...

💡 What really constitutes a proof?

NEW Interactive Proof (IP)



Zero-Knowledge IP **NEW**




★ Main tools: simulation paradigm, Chernoff bound... ★

Π_{GNI} is *Honest-Verifier* ZK

Theorem 2

Π_{GNI} is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge IP for $\mathcal{L}_{GNI}$




Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

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Proof.

$$\text{view}_V(\langle P, V \rangle(G_0, G_1)) := ((G_0, G_1), (b_i, H_i, b'_i)_{i \in [1, p]})$$

$$\forall G_0 \not\equiv G_1:$$

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$\forall G_0 \neq G_1:$



$\text{Sim}(G_0, G_1) := \forall i \in [1, p]: \text{sample } b_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \text{ and } H_i \leftarrow \tilde{G}_{b_i}$
o/p $((G_0, G_1), (b_i, H_i, b_i)_{i \in [1, p]})$

$\forall G_0 \neq G_1: \text{view}_V(\langle P, V \rangle(G_0, G_1))$ identically distributed to $\text{Sim}(G_0, G_1)$.

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Exercise 3


- 1 What happens if V is “malicious” and can deviate from protocol?
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Honest-Verifier ZKP for GI...



Idea for ZK:

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


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


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Protocol 2 (Π_{GI} : IP for GI)




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Protocol 2 (Π_{GI} : IP for GI)

compute $\pi: G_1 = \pi(G_0)$



$G_0 \cong G_1$




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


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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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(Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness)

Theorem 3

Π_{GI} is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge IP for $\mathcal{L}_{GI}$

Honest-Verifier ZKP for GI...

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Proof (💡 idea for ZK: out of order sampling).

- Completeness: $G_0 \cong G_1 \Rightarrow P$ can answer both challenges $\Rightarrow V$ always accepts
- Soundness: $G_0 \not\cong G_1 \Rightarrow$ for any H P^* commits to, $G_0 \cong H$ and $G_1 \cong H$ cannot both hold $\Rightarrow$ best P^* can do is guess b

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$\uparrow$ bit



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$\sigma(G_1)$ $\xrightarrow{\text{bit}}$ $\begin{cases} \sigma \circ \pi & \text{if } b=0 \\ \sigma & \text{if } b=1 \end{cases}$

$\forall G_0 \stackrel{\pi}{\cong} G_1$: $\text{sim}(G_0, G_1)$: sample $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$, $\psi \leftarrow$ permutation on $[1,n]$



set $H := \psi(G_b)$
o/p $((G_0, G_1), (H, b, \psi))$


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Exercise 4


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Which Languages have ZKPs?


Quadratic residuosity (QR)




Quad. non-residuosity (QNR)




Graph isomorphism (GI)




Graph non-isomorphism (GNI)



Sudoku




Chess




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
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
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
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
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


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


Which Languages have ZKPs? PSPACE Languages


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
Quad. non-residuosity (QNR)




Graph isomorphism (GI)




Graph non-isomorphism (GNI)



Sudoku



Chess



Are Randomness and Interaction Necessary?



$\Leftrightarrow$ Interaction is necessary

Fact 4

If $\mathcal{L}$ has a non-interactive (i.e, one-message) ZKP then $\mathcal{L}$ is “trivial”

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 Randomness is necessary

Exercise 5

If $\mathcal{L}$ has an IP with deterministic verifier then $\mathcal{L} \in \text{NP}$

Fact 5

If $\mathcal{L}$ has an ZKP with deterministic verifier then $\mathcal{L}$ is “trivial”

Recap/Next Lecture

- Traditional “NP” proofs vs *interactive* proofs
 - IP is more powerful: IP for GNI

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- Traditional “NP” proofs vs *interactive* proofs
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- (Honest-verifier) ZKP for GNI (A5: QNR) and GI (A5: QR)
- Next Lecture:
 - Computational ZKP for all of NP!
 - New cryptographic primitive: commitment schemes
 - Return to ID protocols: zero-knowledge proof of knowledge

References

- 1 [Gol01, Chapter 4] for details of today's lecture
- 2 [GMR89] for definitional and philosophical discussion on ZK
- 3 The ZKPs for GI and GNI are taken from [GMR89, GMW91]
- 4 IP for all of PSPACE is due to [LFKN92, Sha90]. Computational ZKP for all of PSPACE is due to [GMW91].



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