

# CS789: Introduction to Probabilistic Proof Systems

Lecture 1 (06/Jan/25)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath

## Administrivia

- Timing and Venue: Slot 8 (14:00-15:25, Mondays and Thursdays) in CC101
- Contact hours: drop by my office (CC305) any time!
- Teaching assistants: TBA

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- Resources
  - Slides and other resources will be posted on course website
    - cse.iitb.ac.in/~ckamath/courses/2025s/CS789.html
  - Announcements/online discussion on Moodle:
    - moodle.iitb.ac.in/course/view.php?id=5986

#### Administrivia...

#### Grading Scheme

Weightage	Towards
30%	End-sem
25%	Mid-sem
20%	Paper presentation (two students per paper)
15%	Three graded assignments
5%	Class participation
5%	Scribing (~2 lectures per student)

Attendance is not mandatory (but encouraged)

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
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- Any volunteers for class rep?



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
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■ Taught in CS208: Automata Theory and Logic


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- Axioms  $\xrightarrow{\text{derivation rules}}$  theorems=true statements
  - E.g.: Axioms of Euclidean geometry

Theorem: "Sum of angles of a triangle equals 180°"



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


Prover vs. verifier

- Prover does the heavy lifting: derives the proof
  - **1** Construct a line  $\overline{DE}$  through *B*, parallel to  $\overline{AC}$
  - 2  $\angle DBA = \angle a$  and  $\angle EBC = \angle c$  (alternate interior angles)
  - 3  $2 \Rightarrow \angle a + \angle b + \angle c = \angle DBA + \angle b + \angle EBC = 180^{\circ}$

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
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- Verifier can *check/verify* the proof, step by step

- $\blacksquare$  Can be considered to correspond to class  $\ensuremath{\textbf{NP}}$ 
  - A language  $\mathcal{L} \in \mathbf{NP}$  if there exists a polynomial-time *deterministic* machine V such that

statement  $x \in \mathcal{L} \Leftrightarrow \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{\mathsf{poly}(|x|)} : \mathsf{V}(x,w) = 1$ 

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
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$$x \in \mathcal{L} \Leftrightarrow \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{\mathsf{poly}(|x|)} : V(x,w) = 1$$



- "Proof system" view of NP
  - Prover is *unbounded*: finds witness w for x (if one exists)
  - Verifier is *efficient*: checks whether V(x, w) = 1

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
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
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
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
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
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



- "Proof system" view of NP
  - Prover is *unbounded*: finds witness *w* for *x* (if one exists)
  - Verifier is *efficient*: checks whether V(x, w) = 1
  - Completeness:  $x \in \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow$  prover finds  $w \Rightarrow V(x, w) = 1$
  - Soundness:  $x \notin \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{\mathsf{poly}(|x|)}$  s.t. V(x, w) = 1












#### What Are Probabilistic Proofs?



Relaxation of traditional notion of proof

#### What Are *Probabilistic* Proofs?




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- Key differences from traditional proofs:
  - (1) Verifier is *randomised* 
    - $\implies$  Verifier may accept false statements ("soundness error")

#### What Are *Probabilistic* Proofs?



- Relaxation of traditional notion of proof
- Key differences from traditional proofs:
  - I Verifier is randomised
    - $\implies$  Verifier may accept false statements ("soundness error")
  - $\subseteq$  2 Verifier may *interact* with the prover
    - $\implies$  proof not necessarily a string

1 Far more expressive than traditional proofs



- 2 Extremely useful for real-world applications
  - Blockchain applications, verifiable computation etc

#### **Zk-SNARKs: Under the Hood**



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This is the third part of a series of articles explaining how the technology behind zk-SNARKs works; the previous articles on <u>quadratic arithmetic programs</u> and <u>elliptic curve pairings</u> are required reading, and this article will assume knowledge of both concepts. Basic knowledge of what zk-SNARKs are and what they do is also assumed. See also <u>Christian Reitwiessner's article here</u> for another technical introduction.

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3 Still an area of active research



### Computer Scientists Combine Two 'Beautiful' Proof Methods



Ben Brubaker Staff Writer

October 4, 2024

w do you prove something is true? For mathematicians, the answer is simple: Start with some basic assumptions and proceed, step by step, to the conclusion. QED, proof complete. If there's a mistake anywhere, an expert who reads the proof carefully should be able to spot it. Otherwise, the proof must be valid. Mathematicians have been following this basic approach for well over 2,000 years.

■ Goal: formally study several types of probabilistic proofs

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  - 1 Introduce the formal model (e.g., interactive proof)
  - 2 Construct proof for various problems of interest (e.g., UNSAT)
  - 3 Formally prove its properties (e.g., soundness)

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  - Soft prerequisites: basic complexity theory and cryptography
  - Focus on depth
- You will enjoy the course if you enjoyed other theory courses (CS105, CS208, CS760, CS783)
  - We'll encounter lots of new tools

### This Lecture: An Overview of the Course

1 Module I: Interactive Proof

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
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
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
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
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
- When can we say "this position is winning for black"?
- What could a traditional proof for this statement look like?
  - Seems too big to write down
- We will learn how a verifier can *interactively check* that black is winning!

■ IP is powerful. In this course, we'll construct IP for:

- UNSAT, the celebrated *Sumcheck Protocol*
- TQBF, which captures polynomial-space computations!


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Some issues with interactive proof:

- Requires interaction
  - Undesirable in practical applications (latency)
- May leak unnecessary information
  - Undesirable, e.g., when the witness is a secret

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## Zero-Knowledge (ZK) IP

5 6	3			7				
6			1	9	5			
	9	8					6	
8				6				3
8 4			8		3			1
7				2				6
	6					2	8	
			4	1	9			5 9
				8			7	9





■ NP proof *reveals* the witness

## Zero-Knowledge (ZK) IP

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8	5	9	7	6	1	4	2	3
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7	1	3	9	2	4	8	5	6
9	6	1	5	3	7	2	8	4
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
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- Can a prover convince the verifier that it knows a witness without leaking any information about it?

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




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


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
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- We will learn how this is possible using *interaction* 
  - Construct ZK IP for GNI and some number-theoretic problems
  - Study class SZK, which is important for cryptography

## Probabilistically-Checkable Proof (PCP)



■ To verify NP proof, verifier must check *the whole witness* 

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- To verify **NP** proof, verifier must check *the whole witness*
- In PCPs, the proof is written such that the verifier needs to check only a few random parts of the proof!

## Probabilistically-Checkable Proof (PCP)...

■ In this course, we will:

■ Construct PCP for **NP** (the celebrated PCP Theorem)

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## nature

News Published: 10 September 2012

### Proof claimed for deep connection between primes

Philip Ball

<u>Nature</u> (2012) Cite this article

7407 Accesses | 1372 Altmetric | Metrics

#### If it is true, a solution to the *abc* conjecture about whole numbers would be an 'astounding' achievement.

Mathematician Shinichi Mochizuki of Kyoto University in Japan has released a 500-page proof of the *abc* conjecture, which proposes a relationship between whole numbers – a 'Diophantine' problem.

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- Probabilistic proofs where certain guarantees (e.g., soundness) hold only under *cryptographic hardness assumptions*
  - E.g.: hardness of factoring integers for probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms


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  - 2 Bridge from theory to practice, where emphasis is on efficiency
    - Efficient prover and verifier
    - Non-interactive
    - Short proofs (succinctness)


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  - 2 Bridge from theory to practice, where emphasis is on efficiency
    - Efficient prover and verifier
    - Non-interactive
    - Short proofs (succinctness)
    - Reasonable to assume all parties (including adversaries) are bounded in practice

## (Non-Interactive) Computational Zero-Knowledge




■ Recall: (Statistical) ZK IP for NP unlikely to exist


## (Non-Interactive) Computational Zero-Knowledge




- Recall: (Statistical) ZK IP for NP unlikely to exist
- Under appropriate hardness assumptions, we construct
  - Computational ZK IP for NP
  - Non-interactive computational ZK for NP




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- Recall: in NP proof, prover must send whole witness
- Can prover send something *shorter* and still convince verifier?
- We will learn how by relaxing to *computational soundness* 
  - Construction relies on PCP
- Useful for verifiable computation

## An Example

# Probabilistically Checking Matrix Multiplication (On whiteboard)

## References

- For a discussion on NP and mathematical proofs, see [AB09, §2.7.2]
- 2 Most of Module I will be based on Alessandro Chiesa's CS294 (Fall 2020)
- 3 Module II will largely be based on the above course and [Gol01, AB09]
- 4 For Module III we will mostly follow Justin Thaler's monograph [Tha22]
- 5 The description of Freivalds' algorithm here is from [Mat10, Miniature 11]
- 6 More resources can be found on the course website



Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak.

Computational Complexity - A Modern Approach.

Cambridge University Press, 2009.



#### Oded Goldreich.

*The Foundations of Cryptography - Volume 1: Basic Techniques.* Cambridge University Press, 2001.

#### Jiří Matoušek.

*Thirty-three Miniatures: Mathematical and Algorithmic Applications of Linear Algebra.* 

American Mathematical Society, 2010.



#### Justin Thaler.

#### Proofs, Arguments, and Zero-Knowledge.

 $https://people.cs.georgetown.edu/jthaler/ProofsArgsAndZK.html,\ 2022.$