

Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography


Lecture 3
Secret-Sharing (ctd.)

Secret-Sharing

- Last time
 - (n,t) secret-sharing
 - (n,n) via additive secret-sharing
 - Shamir secret-sharing for general (n,t)
 - Shamir secret-sharing is a linear secret-sharing scheme


Linear Secret-Sharing

- Linear Secret-Sharing over a field: message and shares are field elements
- Reconstruction by a set $T \subseteq [n]$: solve $W_T \begin{bmatrix} M \\ r \end{bmatrix} = s_T$ for M



Linear Secret-Sharing: Computing on Shares


- Suppose two secrets m_1 and m_2 shared using the same secret-sharing scheme



- Then for any $p, q \in \mathbb{F}$, shares of $p \cdot m_1 + q \cdot m_2$ can be computed locally by each party i as $\sigma_i = p \cdot \sigma_{1i} + q \cdot \sigma_{2i}$


Linear Secret-Sharing: Computing on Shares

- More generally, can compute shares of any linear transformation



Switching Schemes

- Can move from any linear secret-sharing scheme W to any other linear secret-sharing scheme Z “securely”



- Given shares $(w_1, \dots, w_n) \leftarrow W.\text{Share}(m)$
- Share each w_i using scheme Z : $(\sigma_{i1}, \dots, \sigma_{in}) \leftarrow Z.\text{Share}(w_i)$
- Locally each party j reconstructs using scheme W :
 $z_j \leftarrow W.\text{Recon}(\sigma_{1j}, \dots, \sigma_{nj})$




Switching Schemes

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$$\begin{bmatrix} R \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} w_1 \\ \vdots \\ w_n \end{bmatrix} = m$$

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


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- Note that if a set of parties $T \subseteq [n]$ is allowed to learn the secret by either W or Z , then T learns m from either the shares it started with or the ones it ended up with
- Claim: If $T \subseteq [n]$ is not allowed to learn the secret by both W and Z , then T learns nothing about m from this process

• Exercise

Efficiency


- Main measure: size of the shares (say, total of all shares)
 - Shamir's: each share is as big as the secret (a single field element)
 - cf. Naïve scheme for arbitrary monotonic access structure \mathcal{A} , with "basis" \mathcal{B} : if a party is in N sets in \mathcal{B} , N basic shares
 - N can be exponential in n (as \mathcal{B} can have exponentially many sets)
 - **Share size must be at least as big as the secret:** "last share" in a minimal authorized set should contain all the information about the secret
 - Ideal: if all shares are only this big (e.g. Shamir's scheme)
 - Not all access structures have ideal schemes
 - Non-linear schemes can be more efficient than linear schemes

A More General Formulation

- A generalised access structure consists of a monotonically “increasing” family \mathcal{A} (allowed to learn), and a monotonically “decreasing” family \mathcal{F} (forbidden from learning), with $\mathcal{A} \cap \mathcal{F} = \emptyset$
- $T \in \mathcal{A} \Rightarrow \forall S \supseteq T, S \in \mathcal{A}. \quad T \in \mathcal{F} \Rightarrow \forall S \subseteq T, S \in \mathcal{F}.$
- For $T \notin \mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{F}$, no requirements of secrecy or learning the message
- E.g., Ramp secret-sharing scheme: $\mathcal{A} = \{ S \subseteq [n] \mid |S| \geq t \}$ and $\mathcal{F} = \{ S \subseteq [n] \mid |S| \leq s \}$, where $s < t$
- When $s = t-1$, a threshold secret-sharing scheme

Packed Secret-Sharing

- Shamir's scheme can be generalized to a ramp scheme, such that longer secrets can be shared with the same share size
- $m_j = f(z_j)$ and $s_i = f(a_i)$ where $\{z_1, \dots, z_k\} \cap \{a_1, \dots, a_n\} = \emptyset$ and f has degree $t-1$ (t being the reconstruction threshold)
- Access structure: $\mathcal{A} = \{S : |S| \geq t\}$ and $\mathcal{F} = \{S : |S| \leq t-k\}$



- $T \in \mathcal{A}$ if A spanned by W_T , and $T \in \mathcal{F}$ if every row of A independent of W_T