Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 7 Secure 2-Party Computation: Yao's Garbled Circuit


MPC without Honest-Majority

Plan (Still sticking with passive corruption): 0 Two protocols, that are secure computationally 3 The "passive-GMW" protocol for any number of parties A 2-party protocol using Yao's Garbled Circuits Both rely on a computational primitive called <u>Oblivious Transfer</u> Last time: OT and Passive-GMW (Not exactly the version from the GMW'87 paper.) Today: 2-Party protocol using Yao's Garbled Circuits

2-Party SFE

Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) IDEAL:

Trusted party takes (X;Y). Outputs g(X;Y) to Alice, f(X;Y) to Bob



Randomized Functions: g(X;Y;r) and f(X;Y;r) s.t. neither party knows r (beyond what is revealed by output)

• OT is an instance of a (deterministic) 2-party SFE

 $g(x_0, x_1; b) = none; f(x_0, x_1; b) = x_b$

Single-Output SFE: only one party gets any output

2-Party SFE

Can <u>reduce</u> general SFE (even randomized) to a single-output deterministic SFE

 f'(X, M, r₁; Y, r₂) = (g(X; Y; r₁⊕r₂)⊕M, f(X; Y; r₁⊕r₂)).

 Compute f'(X, M, r₁; Y, r₂) with random M, r₁, r₂

 Bob sends g(X, Y; r₁⊕r₂)⊕M to Alice

Passive secure

For active security too: f' authenticates (one-time MAC) as well as encrypts g(X; Y; r1⊕r2) using keys input by Alice
Generalizes to more than 2 parties too [Exercise]
Yao: Reduces single-output deterministic 2-party SFE to OT
Single round of interaction, but with only computational security (cf. GMW: information-theoretic, but many rounds)

ech Oblivious Transfer Pick one out of two, without revealing which

> Intuitive property: transfer partial information "obliviously"

If we had a trusted third party

I need

just one

But can't tell you

which

ОТ

up

A:up, B:down

We Predict

STOCKS!!

All 2 of

them!

Sure

00

Why is OT Useful? Naïve 2PC from OT

recall

Say Alice's input x, Bob's input y, and only Bob should learn f(x,y)

- Alice (who knows x, but not y) prepares a table for f(x, ·) with
 D = 2^{|y|} entries (one for each y)
- Bob uses y to decide which entry in the table to pick up using 1-out-of-D OT (without learning the other entries)
- Bob learns only f(x,y) (in addition to y). Alice learns nothing beyond x.
 Secure protocol for f using
- OT captures the essence of MPC:
 Secure computation of any function f can be reduced to OT
 Problem: D is exponentially large in |y|
 Plan: somehow exploit efficient computation (e.g., circuit) of f

Functions as Circuits

Directed acyclic graph


Recall

Nodes: multiplication and addition gates, constant gates, inputs, output(s)


Edges: wires carrying values from F

Each wire comes out of a unique gate, but a wire might fan-out

Can evaluate wires according to a topologically sorted order of gates they come out of



2-Party MPC for General Circuits





General": evaluate any arbitrary (boolean) circuit

- One-sided output: both parties give inputs, only one party gets outputs
- Seither party maybe corrupted passively
- Consider evaluating OR (single gate circuit)
 - Alice holds x=a, Bob has y=b; Bob should get OR(x,y)

A Physical Protocol

- Alice prepares 4 boxes B_{xy} corresponding to 4 possible input scenarios, and 4 padlocks/keys K_{x=0}, K_{x=1}, K_{y=0} and K_{y=1}
- Inside B_{xy=ab} she places the bit OR(a,b) and locks it with two padlocks K_{x=a} and K_{y=b} (need to open both to open the box)
- She un-labels the four boxes and sends them in random order to Bob. Also sends the key K_{x=a} (labeled only as K_x).
 - So far Bob gets no information
- Bob "obliviously picks up" K_{y=b}, and tries the two keys K_x,K_y on the four boxes. For one box both locks open and he gets the output.





A Physical Protocol

Secure?


For curious Alice: only influence from Bob is when he picks up his key K_{y=b}

But this is done "obliviously", so she learns nothing

For curious Bob: What he sees is predictable (i.e., can be simulated), given the final outcome

What Bob sees: His key opens K_y in two boxes, Alice's opens K_x in two boxes; only one random box fully opens. It has the outcome.


Note when y=1, cases x=0 and x=1 appear same



Larger Circuits

Idea: For each gate in the circuit Alice will prepare locked boxes, but will use it to keep keys for the next gate

For each wire w in the circuit (i.e., input wires, or output of a gate) pick 2 keys K_{w=0} and K_{w=1}




Larger Circuits

Idea: For each gate in the circuit Alice will prepare locked boxes, but will use it to keep keys for the next gate

For each wire w in the circuit (i.e., input wires, or output of a gate) pick 2 keys K_{w=0} and K_{w=1}
 For each gate G with input wires (u,v) and output wire w, prepare 4 boxes B_{uv} and place K_{w=G(a,b)} inside box B_{uv=ab}. Lock B_{uv=ab} with keys K_{u=a} and K_{v=b}

Give to Bob: Boxes for each gate, one key for each of Alice's input wires

Obliviously: one key for each of Bob's input wires
Boxes for output gates have values instead of keys



Larger Circuits

Evaluation: Bob gets one key for each input wire of a gate, opens one box for the gate, gets one key for the output wire, and proceeds


Gets output from a box for the output gate

Security similar to before

Curious Alice sees nothing

Bob can simulate his view given final output: Bob could prepare boxes and keys (stuffing unopenable boxes arbitrarily); for an output gate, place the output bit in the box that opens





Garbled Circuit

Coming up

That was too physical!

- Yao's Garbled circuit: boxes/keys replaced by Symmetric Key Encryption (specifically, using a <u>Pseudorandom Function</u> or <u>PRF</u>)
 - Senck(m) = PRFk(index) ⊕ m, where index is a wire index (distinct for different wires fanning-out of the same gate)
 - Double lock: Enc_{Kx}(Enc_{Ky}(m))
 - PRF in practice: a block-cipher, like AES
- Uses Oblivious Transfer for strings: For passive security, can just repeat bit-OT several times to transfer longer keys
- Security? Need to first <u>define</u> security when computational primitives are used! (Next time!)

Garbled Circuit

One issue when using encryption instead of locks

- Given four doubly locked boxes (in random order) and two keys, we simply tried opening all locks until one box fully opened
- With encryption, cannot quite tell if a box opened or not! Outcome of decryption looks random in either case.
- Simple solution: encode the keys so that wrong decryption does not result in outputs that look like valid encoding of keys
- Better solution: For each wire 0 & 1 keys have distinct "shape" labels, assigned at random. Each locked box marked with the shape of the two keys needed to unlock it.



Pseudorandomness

- Basic notions in (symmetric-key) cryptography
 - A Pseudorandomness Generator (PRG) and a Pseudorandom Function (PRF)
- PRG takes a short seed and (deterministically) outputs a longer string: G_k: {0,1}^k→{0,1}^{n(k)} where n(k) > k
- A PRF is essentially a PRG with a "long" output, with an extra input (index) which specifies a block to be selected from this output
- Security definitions based on computational indistinguishability


Indistinguishability

Recall

Distribution ensembles {A_k}, {B_k} computationally indistinguishable if ∨ Probabilistic Polynomial Time tests T, ∃ negligible v(k) s.t.
 | Pr_{x←A_k}[T(x)=1] - Pr_{x←B_k}[T(x)=1] | ≤ v(k)

 $A_k \approx B_k$





Pseudorandom Function (PRF)

A PRF is essentially a PRG with a "long" output

- A function F(s;i) outputs the ith block of the pseudorandom string corresponding to seed s
- When the number of blocks is small (polynomial in the security parameter), this is the same as a PRG with a longer output

This suffices for Garbled Circuits

More generally a PRF supports exponentially many blocks (i.e., large domain for i)

Needs a new security definition as the adversary can't be given the entire string

Pseudorandom Function (PRF)

- A compact representation of an exponentially long (pseudorandom) string
 - Allows "random-access" (instead of just sequential access)
 - A function F(s;i) outputs the ith block of the pseudorandom string corresponding to seed s
 - Exponentially many blocks (i.e., large domain for i)
- Security definition

If the domain of i is polynomial sized (as is sufficient for Garbled Circuits), can implement PRF using a PRG

- Need to define pseudorandomness for a function (not a string)
- Idea: the view of an adversary <u>arbitrarily interacting with the function</u> is indistinguishable from its view when interacting with a random function

Pseudorandom Function (PRF)

