Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 4

Secure Multi-Party Computation:

Passive Corruption + Honest-Majority

Must We Trust ebay ?

- Can we have an auction without an auctioneer?!
  - Declared winning bid should be correct
  - Only the winner and winning bid should be revealed



Using data without sharing?

- Hospitals which can't share their patient records with anyone
  - But want to data-mine on combined data



Secure Function Evaluation

- A general problem
- To compute a function of private inputs without revealing information about the inputs
  - Beyond what is revealed by the function



Poker With No Dealer?

- Need to ensure
  - Cards are shuffled and dealt correctly
  - Complete secrecy
  - No "cheating" by players, even if they collude
- No universally trusted dealer



The Ambitious Goal

- Without any trusted party, securely do
  - Distributed Data mining
  - E-commerce
  - Network G
  - E-voting
  - Secure fun
  - ....

Any task that uses a trusted party!

Secure
Multi-Party Computation
(MPC)

Mental Poker

Adi Shamir, Ronald L. Rivest and Leonard M. Adleman

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ABSTRACT

Can two potentially dishonest players play a fair game of poker without using any cards—for example, over the phone? This paper provides the following answers:

1. No. (Rigorous mathematical proof supplied.)
2. Yes. (Convert and comply to protocol given.)

Emulating Trusted Computation

- Encryption/Authentication allow us to emulate a trusted channel
- Secure MPC: to emulate a source of trusted computation
  - Trusted means it will not "leak" a party's information to others
  - And it will not cheat in the computation
- A tool for mutually distrusting parties to collaborate

Is it for Real?

- Getting there! Many implementations/platforms
  - Fairplay, VIFF
  - Sharemind
  - SCAPI
  - Obliv-C
  - JustGarble
  - SPDZ/MASCOT
  - ObliVM
  - ...
  - multipartycomputation.com/mpc-software

Is it for Real?

- And many practical systems using some form of MPC
  - Danish company Partisia with real-life deployments (since 2008)
    - sugar beet auction, electricity auction, spectrum auction, key management
  - A prototype for credit rating, supported by Danish banks
  - A proposal to the Estonian Tax & Customs Board
  - A proposal for Satellite Collision Analysis
  - Legislation in the US to use MPC for applications like a "higher education data system"
  - ...

MPC

- Several dimensions
  - Passive (Semi-Honest) vs. Active corruption
    - Passive: corrupt parties still follow the protocol
  - Honest-Majority vs. Unrestricted corruption
  - Information-theoretic vs. Computational security
  - ...

Security Definition

- Simplest case: Passive corruption, Information-theoretic security
  - Need honest-majority (or similar restriction)
- In passive corruption, the adversary can see the internals of all the corrupt parties, but cannot control their actions
  - Main concern will be secrecy (correctness is automatic, provided the protocol is corrupt in the absence of corruption)
  - Will ask for Perfect Secrecy
    - Similar to secret-sharing

Security Definition

- Multiple parties in a protocol could be corrupt
  - Collusion
  - Modelled using a single adversary who corrupts the parties
    - Its view contains all the corrupt parties' views
- Security guarantee given against an "adversary structure"
  - Sets of parties that could be corrupt together

Security Definition

- For secret sharing we needed to formalise "x is secret"
- Now want to say: x is **secret except for f(x)** which is revealed
- ∀ x, x' **s.t. f(x)=f(x')**, { view | input=x} ≡ { view | input=x' }

Information-Theoretic Passive-Secure MPC

- **Perfectly secure MPC against passive corruption**
- Today: For linear functions
- Next time: For general functions

MPC for Linear Functions

- Client-server setting



MPC for Linear Functions: Using Linear Secret-Sharing



MPC for Linear Functions: Using Linear Secret-Sharing



Each column with an input client

Each row given to a server

Each column sent to an output client

MPC for Linear Functions: Using Linear Secret-Sharing



Security

- Adversary allowed to corrupt any set of input and output clients and any subset T of servers s.t. T is not a privileged set (i.e., not in the access structure) for the secret-sharing scheme
- View of adversary should reveal nothing beyond the inputs and outputs of the corrupted clients
  - Claim: Consider any input y of corrupt clients. If x, x′ of uncorrupted clients such that for each corrupt output client i $f_i(x,y)=f_i(x',y)$, then the view of the adversary in the two cases are identically distributed
    - Because for any given view of the adversary, the solution space of randomness has the same dimension in the two cases
    - Exercise