Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 6

Secure Multi-Party Computation without Honest Majority:

"GMW" Protocol

MPC without Honest-Majority

- Plan (Still sticking with passive corruption):
- Two protocols, that are secure computationally
  - The "passive-GMW" protocol for any number of parties
  - A 2-party protocol using Yao's Garbled Circuits
  - Both rely on a computational primitive called Oblivious Transfer
- Today: OT and Passive-GMW
  - (Not exactly the version from the GMW'87 paper.)

Oblivious Transfer

- Pick one out of two, without revealing which
  - Intuitive property: transfer partial information "obliviously"





Is OT Possible?

- No **information theoretically secure** 2-party protocol for OT
  - Because OT can be used to carry out information-theoretically secure 2-party AND (coming up)
- **Computationally secure** OT protocols exist under various computational hardness assumptions
  - Will define computational security of MPC later, comparing the protocol to the ideal functionality

An OT Protocol
(against passive corruption)

- Using **(a special) public-key encryption**
  - In which one can sample a public-key without knowing secret-key
- c_{1-b} inscrutable to a <u>passive</u> corrupt receiver
- Sender learns nothing about b





Why is OT Useful?

- Say Alice's input x, Bob's input y, and only Bob should learn f(x,y)
- Alice (who knows x, but not y) prepares a table for f(x,·) with $D = 2^{|y|}$ entries (one for each y)
- Bob uses y to decide which entry in the table to pick up using 1-out-of-D OT (without learning the other entries)
- Bob learns only f(x,y) (in addition to y). Alice learns nothing beyond x.
- OT captures the essence of MPC:

  Secure computation of any function f can be **reduced** to OT

  (Secure protocol for f using access to ideal OT)
- Problem: D is exponentially large in |y|
  - Plan: somehow exploit efficient computation (e.g., circuit) of f

Passive GMW

- Adapted from the famous Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (1987) protocol (due to Goldreich-Vainish, Haber-Micali,...)
- Passive secure MPC based on OT, without any other computational assumptions
  - Will assume that a trusted party is available to carry out OT between any pair of parties (replaced by a cryptographic protocol, later)
  - Tolerates any number of corrupt parties
- Idea: Computing on **additively secret-shared values**
  - For a variable (wire value) s, will write $[s]_i$ to denote its share held by the i^{th} party

Computing on Shares: 2 Parties

- Let gates be + & × (XOR & AND for Boolean circuits)
- Plan: Similar to BGW: shares of each wire value will be computed, with Alice holding one share and Bob the other. At the end, Alice sends her share of output wire to Bob.
- w = u + v : Each one locally computes $[w]_i = [u]_i + [v]_i$



Computing on Shares: 2 Parties

- What about $w = u \times v$?
  - $[w]_1 + [w]_2 = ([u]_1 + [u]_2) \times ([v]_1 + [v]_2)$
  - Alice picks $[w]_1$ and lets Bob compute $[w]_2$ using the naive (proof-of-concept) protocol
    - Note: Bob's input is $([u]_2,[v]_2)$. Over the binary field, this requires a single 1-out-of-4 OT.



Passive GMW

- Secure?
- View of Alice:
  - Input x and random values it picks through out the protocol ✓
- View of Bob:
  - Input y and random values it picks through out the protocol
  - A random value (picked via OT) for each wire out of a $\times$ gate
  - f(x,y) - own share, for the output wire
- This distribution is the same for x, x′ if f(x,y)=f(x′,y) ✓
- Exercise: What goes wrong in the above claim if Alice reuses $[w]_1$ for two $\times$ gates?

Computing on Shares: m Parties

- m-way sharing: $s = [s]_1 + ... + [s]_m$
- Addition, local as before
- Multiplication: For $w = u \times v$
  $[w]_1 + .. + [w]_m = ([u]_1 + .. + [u]_m) \times ([v]_1 + .. + [v]_m)$
  - Party i computes $[u]_i[v]_i$
  - For every pair (i,j), i≠j, Party i picks random a_{ij} and lets Party j securely compute b_{ij} s.t. $a_{ij} + b_{ij} = [u]_i[v]_j$ using the naive protocol (a single 1-out-of-2 OT)
  - Party i sets $[w]_i = [u]_i[v]_i + \Sigma_j (a_{ij} + b_{ji})$

MPC for Passive Corruption

- Story so far:
  - For honest-majority: Information-theoretically secure protocol, using Shamir secret-sharing [BGW]
  - Without honest-majority: Using Oblivious Transfer (OT), using additive secret-sharing [GMW]

Oblivious Linear-function Evaluation (OLE) for large fields (Exercise)

- Up next
  - A 2-party protocol (so no honest-majority) using Oblivious Transfer and Yao's Garbled Circuits
    - Uses additional computational primitives and is limited to arithmetic circuits over small fields (e.g., boolean circuits)
    - Needs just one round of interaction