Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 12 MPC: UC-secure OT

UC-Secure OT

UC-secure OT is impossible (even against PPT adversaries) in the "plain model" (i.e., without the help of another functionality)

But possible from simple setups

e.g., noisy channel (without computational assumptions)

e.g., common random coins (needs computational assumptions)

Today: from <u>Common random string</u>

Like common random coins, but reusable across multiple sessions

An OT Protocol (passive corruption) Using (a special) encryption PKE in which one can sample a public-key without knowing secret-key ○ c_{1-b} inscrutable to a passive corrupt receiver Sender learns nothing $c_0 = Enc(x_0, PK_0)$ about b $c_1 = Enc(x_1, PK_1)$ PKo, PK1 C0,C1 ×0,×1

 $(SK_b, PK_b) \leftarrow KeyGen$ Sample PK_{1-b} $\bullet \bullet$ $x_b=Dec(c_b;SK_b)$

Towards Active Security Should not let the receiver pick PK₀ and PK₁ independently! (PK₀,PK₁) tied together, in which at most one can be decrypted (PK₀,PK₁,SK) Gen(b) s.t. check(PK₀,PK₁) = True

- SK decrypts Enc(m;PKb), but not Enc(m;PK1-b).
 (PK0,PK1) hides b.
- But a simulator should be able to extract b from (PK₀,PK₁) (if Receiver corrupt) and m from Enc(m;PK_{1-b}) (if Sender corrupt)
 - Scheme will use a <u>common random string</u> Q (to be generated by a trusted party)
 - During simulation Simulator can generate (Q,T) where T is a Trapdoor that can be used for extraction

Towards Active Security

Need: Gen(Q,b) and check(PK₀,PK₁,Q) such that If (PK₀,PK₁,SK)←Gen(Q,b): SK decrypts Enc(m;PK_b), (PK₀,PK₁) hides b. If $check(PK_0, PK_1, Q) = True: Enc(m; PK_c)$ hides m for some c (even if (PK_0, PK_1) maliciously generated). Simulator should have trapdoors. Suppose two different types of setups possible such that: Type 1 setup: Honestly generated (PK₀,PK₁) statistically hides b. Trapdoor decrypts both $Enc(m; PK_0)$ and $Enc(m; PK_1)$. Type 2 setup: Honest Enc(m;PK_c) statistically hides m for some c. Trapdoor extracts such a c from any (PK_0, PK_1) . Type 1 setup ≈ Type 2 setup (computationally) PK_c said to be "lossy" (PK_0, PK_1) computationally hides b in Type 2 setup too. Enc(m;PK_c) computationally hides m for some c in Type 1 setup too. Simulation when Sender corrupt: Use Type 1 setup Simulation when Receiver corrupt: Use Type 2 setup

Dual-Mode Encryption (DME)

- Algorithms: Setup_{Dec}, Setup_{Ext}, Gen, Check, Enc, Dec
 Q from Setup_{Dec} and Setup_{Ext} indistinguishable
 If (PK₀,PK₁,SK) ← Gen(Q,b), then Check(PK₀,PK₁,Q)=True, and Dec(Enc(x,PK_b), SK) = x
- Two more algorithms required to exist by security property: FindLossy and TrapKeyGen
 - Given trapdoor from Setup_{Ext}, and a pair PK₀, PK₁ which passes the Check, FindLossy can find a lossy PK out of the two
 - Given trapdoor from Setup_{Dec}, TrapKeyGen can correctly generate (PK₀, PK₁), along with decryption keys SK₀, SK₁

OT from DME

Protocol could use either Setup_{Dec} or Setup_{Ext}

 $(PK_0, PK_1, SK) \leftarrow Gen(Q, b) =$

 $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q): c_0 = Enc(x_0,PK_0) c_1 = Enc(x_1,PK_1)$ $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q): c_0 = Enc(x_0,PK_0) c_1 = Enc(x_1,PK_1)$ $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q): c_0 = Enc(x_0,PK_0) c_1 = Enc(x_0,PK_1) c_0$ $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q): c_0 = Enc(x_0,PK_0) c_1 = Enc(x_0,PK_0) c_1$ $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q): c_0 = Enc(x_0,PK_1) c_0$ $(If Check(PK_0,PK_1,Q)$


OT from DME

Simulation for corrupt sender:

- 0. $(Q,T) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{\text{Dec}}$, send Q.
- 1. $(PK_0, PK_1, SK_0, SK_1) \leftarrow TrapKeyGen(T)$, and send (PK_0, PK_1)
- 2. On getting (c_0,c_1), extract (x_0,x_1) using (SK₀,SK₁) and send to F_{OT}

For corrupt receiver:


- 0. $(Q,T) \leftarrow \text{Setup}_{Ext}$, send Q.
- 1. On getting (PK_0 , PK_1), send b:=1-FindLossy(PK_0 , PK_1 ,T) to F_{0T} , get x_b
- 2. Send $c_b = Enc(x_b, PK_b)$ and $c_{1-b} = Enc(0, PK_{1-b})$



Dual-Mode Encryption (DME)


High-level idea for constructing a DME Ð PKE s.t. a (hidden) subset of the PK-space is "lossy" \bigcirc Q = PK. Require that PK₀·PK₁ = PK Receiver can pick only one PKb. Other gets determined by Q But maybe both can still be non-lossy! Fix: Non-lossy subset is a sub-group, and Q = PK, a lossy key Coming up: A primitive called SPH which allows a DME construction 0 as above

And a construction of SPH from "Decisional Diffie-Hellman" assumption



Public parameters θ used by all algorithms. Trapdoor τ
Encode: M → M* is a group homomorphism
H ⊆ M group s.t. given only θ, distributions {μ*}_{μ ← H} ≈ {μ*}_{μ ← M\H}
But using τ, can perfectly distinguish the two distributions
So, μ ∈ H ⇔ μ* ∈ H*, where H* = { μ* | μ ∈ H } a group

DME from SPH



SPH gives a PKE scheme, with Hash as Enc, Hash* as Dec
Setup: Sample SPH params (θ,τ). Let μ←M. Let Q=(μ*,θ), T=(μ,τ)
Setup_{Dec}: μ ∈ H. Setup_{Ext}: μ ∉ H.
If μ* ∉ H*, given (μ₀*,μ₁*) s.t. μ₀* · μ₁* = μ*, at least one of μ₀,μ₁ ∉ H. Can find using τ. (FindLossy)
If μ* ∈ H*, using μ, can find (μ₀,μ₁) s.t. μ₀* · μ₁* = μ* and both μ₀,μ₁ ∈ H (TrapKeyGen)

Groups

- A set G (for us finite, unless otherwise specified) and a "group operation" * that is associative, has an identity, is invertible, and (for us) commutative
- Texamples: Z = (integers, +) (this is an infinite group),
 Z_N = (integers modulo N, + mod N),
 Gⁿ = (Cartesian product of a group G, coordinate-wise operation)
 Order of a group G: |G| = number of elements in G
 For any a∈G, a^{|G|} = a * a * ... * a (|G| times) = identity

g^{N-1} g⁰


g1

- Finite Cyclic group (in multiplicative notation): there is one element g such that $G = \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^{|G|-1}\}$
 - Prototype: Z_N (additive group), with g=1. Corresponds to arithmetic in the exponent.

Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption

- Assumption about a distribution of finite cyclic groups and generators
- $(G, g, g^{x}, g^{y}, g^{xy}) (G,g) \leftarrow Gen; x,y \leftarrow [|G|] \approx \{(G, g, g^{x}, g^{y}, g^{r})\} (G,g) \leftarrow Gen; x,y,r \leftarrow [|G|]$
- Note: Requires that it is hard to find x from g^x
- Typically, G required to be a prime-order group. So arithmetic in the exponent is in a field.
- A formulation equivalent to DDH in prime-order groups:
 - $(G, g, g^{a}, g^{b}, g^{au}, g^{bu}) (G,g), a, b, u \approx \{ (G, g, g^{a}, g^{b}, g^{au}, g^{bv}) \} (G,g), a, b, u, v \}$
 - If can distinguish the above, then can break DDH: map (G, g, g[×], g^y, h) → (G, g, g^a, g[×], g^{y.a}, h)

SPH from DDH Assumption



SPH from DDH assumption on a prime order group G

 $(G, g, g^{a}, g^{b}, g^{au}, g^{bu})$ (G,g),a,b,u $\approx \{ (G, g, g^{a}, g^{b}, g^{au}, g^{bv}) \}$ (G,g),a,b,u,v

$$\begin{aligned} & \theta = (G,g,g^{a},g^{b}), \ \tau = (a,b) \\ & \eta = (s,t) \ \text{and} \ \eta^{*} = g^{as+bt}. \\ & \mu = (u,v) \ \text{and} \ \mu^{*} = (g^{a.u}, \ g^{b.v}). \ \mu \in H \ \text{iff } u=v. \\ & \text{Hash}(\mu^{*},\eta) = g^{a.u.s} \ g^{b.v.t} \ \text{and} \ \text{Hash}^{*}(\mu,\eta^{*}) = g^{(as+bt).u} \end{aligned}$$