Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 15 MPC: Beyond General MPC

General MPC

Information-theoretic security

- Passive with corruption threshold t < n/2
- Passive with OT setup



BGW

- Guaranteed Output UC with t < n/3</p>
- Guaranteed Output UC with t < n/2 and Broadcast "Rabin-BenOr"</p>
- Selective Abort UC, with OT \ "Kilian." (Also: GMW paradigm implemented

Computational security

using OT-based proof)

Passive Composing Yao or Passive GMW with a passive-secure OT protocol

Standalone

Recall

GMW: using ZK proofs

Selective Abort UC, with CRS

Composing Kilian with a CRS-based UC-secure OT protocol

Feasibility of General MPC

Given honest majority, or given OT as a setup:

- General MPC is possible with the highest security guarantee (information-theoretic, UC security)
 - Variations: t<n/3 vs. t<n/2+broadcast. Perfect vs. Statistical. Guaranteed output delivery vs. unfair.


0	Otherwise:	Passive	Stand-alone	UC
	ΡΡΤ	\checkmark	\checkmark	×
	Info. Th.	×	×	×

When general MPC is not possible, which functions admit MPC?

A functionality that admits MPC protocols without a setup in a security model is called <u>trivial</u> in that model

Trivial Functionalities: PPT Setting

General MPC under the assumption that there is a passive-secure protocol for OT (a.k.a. **sh-OT**) For n=2, we have an explicit characterisation of trivial functions (splittable functions). Extends to n=3 as well.



Trivial Functionalities: Information-Theoretic


- For n-party information-theoretic passive security, for each corruption threshold t: the Privacy Hierarchy
 - All n-party functions appear till level [(n-1)/2] in this hierarchy (e.g., by Passive-BGW). Some reach level n: e.g., XOR or more generally, group addition. Level n-1 is same as level n.
 - At all intermediate levels t, examples known to exist which are not in level t+1
 - Open problem: For all n, characterise the functions at each level
 t (or even for t=n)
 - For n=2 we do have a characterisation

Trivial <u>2-Party</u> Functionalities: Information-Theoretic

		Passive	Stand-alone	UC
	PPT	1	✓	×
I	nfo. Th.	×	×	×

For deterministic SFE: Trivial \Leftrightarrow <u>Decomposable</u> Decomposable Function (For simplicity will restrict to symmetric SFE)

Examples of Decomposable Functions



Examples of Undecomposable Functions




	I	2
4	5	2
4	3	3

Т	Г	4	2
4	3	3	2
4	2	Ι	

"Spiral

Decomposable Function






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partial transcripts


full transcripts

Trivial <u>2-Party</u> Functionalities: Information-Theoretic



Decomposable Function

Examples of Decomposable Functions



Not Uniquely Decomposable

Not Saturated


2

3

2


3

This strategy doesn't correspond to an input



Trivial <u>2-Party</u> Functionalities: Information-Theoretic





Completeness

- We saw OT can be used to (passive- or UC-) securely realise any functionality
 - i.e., any other functionality can be reduced to OT
- The Cryptographic Complexity question:
 - Can F be reduced to G (for different reductions)?
 - F reduces to G: will write $F \sqsubseteq G$
 - G complete if everything reduces to G
 - F trivial if F reduces to everything (in particular, to NULL)

PPT Setting: Completeness

PPT Passive security and PPT Standalone security

Under sh-OT assumption, all functions are trivial and hence all are complete too!

PPT UC security, n=2:

Recall, only a few (splittable) functionalities are trivial


Under sh-OT, turns out that every non-trivial functionality is complete

IT Setting: Completeness

Information-Theoretic Passive security

Ø (Randomized) SFE: Complete ⇔ Not Simple
Ø What is Simple?

Simple vs. Non-Simple



Edge ((x,a),(y,b)) exists iff f(x,y)=(a,b)

IT Setting: Completeness


Information-Theoretic Passive security

- - In the characteristic bipartite graph, each connected component is a biclique
 - If randomized, within each connected component w(u,v) = w_A(u) × w_B(v)

Simple vs. Non-Simple (Randomized)

Edge ((x,a),(y,b)) weighted with Pr[(a,b) | (x,y)] where x,y inputs and a,b outputs $(0,0) \qquad (\pm,0) \\ (0,1) \qquad \frac{1/2}{2} \qquad (\pm,1) \\ (1,0) \qquad \frac{1/2}{2} \qquad (\pm,\pm) \\ (1,1) \qquad \frac{1/2}{2} \qquad (\pm,\pm) \\ (1,1) \qquad \frac{1/2}{2} \qquad (\pm,\pm) \\ (1,1) \qquad \frac{1/2}{2} \qquad (\pm,\pm) \\ (\pm,\pm) \qquad (\pm,\pm) \qquad$

Simple: within connected component w(u,v) = w_A(u)∙w_B(v)



IT Setting: Completeness

Information-Theoretic Passive security

(Randomized) SFE: Complete \Leftrightarrow Not Simple

Information-Theoretic Standalone & UC security

(Randomized) SFE: Complete \Leftrightarrow Core is not Simple

What is the core of an SFE?

SFE obtained by removing "redundancies" in the input and output space

A Map of 2-Party Functions

