Advanced Tools from Modern Cryptography

Lecture 7

Secure 2-Party Computation:

Yao's Garbled Circuit

Recall

MPC without Honest-Majority

- Plan (Still sticking with passive corruption):
- Two protocols, that are secure computationally
  - The "passive-GMW" protocol for any number of parties
  - A 2-party protocol using Yao's Garbled Circuits
  - Both rely on a computational primitive called Oblivious Transfer
- Last time: OT and Passive-GMW
  - (Not exactly the version from the GMW'87 paper.)
- Today: 2-Party protocol using Yao's Garbled Circuits

2-Party SFE

- Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) IDEAL:
  - Trusted party takes (X;Y). Outputs g(X;Y) to Alice, f(X;Y) to Bob



    - Randomized Functions: g(X;Y;r) and f(X;Y;r) s.t. neither party knows r (beyond what is revealed by output)
- OT is an instance of a (deterministic) 2-party SFE
  - $g(x_0,x_1;b)$ = none; $f(x_0,x_1;b) = x_b$
  - Single-Output SFE: only one party gets any output

2-Party SFE

- Can reduce general SFE (even randomized) to a single-output deterministic SFE
  - $f'(X, M, r_1; Y, r_2) = (g(X; Y; r_1 \oplus r_2) \oplus M, f(X; Y; r_1 \oplus r_2))$. Compute $f'(X, M, r_1; Y, r_2)$ with random M, r_1, r_2
  - Bob sends $g(X, Y; r_1 \oplus r_2) \oplus M$ to Alice
  - Passive secure
  - For active security too: f' authenticates (one-time MAC) as well as encrypts $g(X; Y; r_1 \oplus r_2)$ using keys input by Alice
  - Generalizes to more than 2 parties too [Exercise]
- **Yao**: Reduces single-output deterministic 2-party SFE to OT
  - Single round of interaction, but with only computational security (cf. GMW: information-theoretic, but many rounds)

Recall

Oblivious Transfer

- Pick one out of two, without revealing which
  - Intuitive property: transfer partial information "obliviously"





Recall

Why is OT Useful?

Naïve 2PC from OT

- Say Alice's input x, Bob's input y, and only Bob should learn f(x,y)
- Alice (who knows x, but not y) prepares a table for $f(x,\cdot)$ with $D = 2^{|y|}$ entries (one for each y)
- Bob uses y to decide which entry in the table to pick up using 1-out-of-D OT (without learning the other entries)
- Bob learns only f(x,y) (in addition to y). Alice learns nothing beyond x.
- OT captures the essence of MPC:
  Secure computation of any function f can be **reduced** to OT

Secure protocol for f using access to ideal OT

- Problem: D is exponentially large in |y|
  - Plan: somehow exploit efficient computation (e.g., circuit) of f

Recall

Functions as Circuits

- Directed acyclic graph
  - Nodes: multiplication and addition gates, constant gates, inputs, output(s)
  - Edges: wires carrying values from F
  - Each wire comes out of a unique gate, but a wire might fan-out
  - Can evaluate wires according to a topologically sorted order of gates they come out of



2-Party MPC for General Circuits



- "General": evaluate any arbitrary (boolean) circuit
  - One-sided output: both parties give inputs, one party gets outputs
  - Either party maybe corrupted passively
- Consider evaluating OR (single gate circuit)
  - Alice holds x=a, Bob has y=b; Bob should get OR(x,y)

A Physical Protocol

- Alice prepares 4 boxes B_{xy} corresponding to 4 possible input scenarios, and 4 padlocks/keys $K_{x=0}$, $K_{x=1}$, $K_{y=0}$ and $K_{y=1}$
- Inside $B_{xy=ab}$ she places the bit OR(a,b) and locks it with two padlocks $K_{x=a}$ and $K_{y=b}$ (need to open both to open the box)
- She un-labels the four boxes and sends them in random order to Bob. Also sends the key $K_{x=a}$ (labeled only as K_x).
  - So far Bob gets no information
- Bob "obliviously picks up" $K_{y=b}$, and tries the two keys K_x,K_y on the four boxes. For one box both locks open and he gets the output.







A Physical Protocol

- Secure?
- For curious Alice: only influence from Bob is when he picks up his key $K_{y=b}$
  - But this is done "obliviously", so she learns nothing
- For curious Bob: What he sees is predictable (i.e., simulatable), given the final outcome
  - What Bob sees: His key opens K_y in two boxes, Alice's opens K_x in two boxes; only one random box fully opens. It has the outcome.
  - Note when y=1, cases x=0 and x=1 appear same







Larger Circuits

- Idea: For each gate in the circuit Alice will prepare locked boxes, but will use it to keep keys for the next gate
  - For each wire w in the circuit (i.e., input wires, or output of a gate) pick 2 keys $K_{w=0}$ and $K_{w=1}$



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  - For each wire w in the circuit (i.e., input wires, or output of a gate) pick 2 keys $K_{w=0}$ and $K_{w=1}$
  - For each gate G with input wires (u,v) and output wire w, prepare 4 boxes B_{uv} and place $K_{w=G(a,b)}$ inside box $B_{uv=ab}$. Lock $B_{uv=ab}$ with keys $K_{u=a}$ and $K_{v=b}$
  - Give to Bob: Boxes for each gate, one key for each of Alice's input wires
    - Obliviously: one key for each of Bob's input wires
  - Boxes for output gates have values instead of keys



Larger Circuits

- Evaluation: Bob gets one key for each input wire of a gate, opens one box for the gate, gets one key for the output wire, and proceeds
  - Gets output from a box for the output gate
- Security similar to before
  - Curious Alice sees nothing
  - Bob can simulate his view given final output: Bob could prepare boxes and keys (stuffing unopenable boxes arbitrarily); for an output gate, place the output bit in the box that opens



Garbled Circuit

Coming up

- That was too physical!
- Yao's Garbled circuit: boxes/keys replaced by Symmetric Key Encryption (specifically, using a Pseudorandom Function or PRF)
  - $Enc_K(m) = PRF_K(index) \oplus m$, where index is a wire index (distinct for different wires fanning-out of the same gate)
  - Double lock: $Enc_{Kx}(Enc_{Ky}(m))$
  - PRF in practice: a block-cipher, like AES
- Uses Oblivious Transfer for strings: For passive security, can just repeat bit-OT several times to transfer longer keys
- Security? Need to first define security when computational primitives are used! (Next time!)

Garbled Circuit

- One issue when using encryption instead of locks
  - Given four doubly locked boxes (in random order) and two keys, we simply tried opening all locks until one box fully opened
  - With encryption, cannot quite tell if a box opened or not! Outcome of decryption looks random in either case.
  - Simple solution: encode the keys so that wrong decryption does not result in outputs that look like valid encoding of keys
  - Better solution: For each wire 0 & 1 keys have distinct "shape" labels, assigned at random. Each locked box marked with the shape of the two keys needed to unlock it.