
## Public-Key Cryptography

Lecture 11
Some Trapdoor OWP Candidates
Chinese Remainder Theorem

CECALL

# CPA-secure PKE for Trapdoor OWP

- CPA secure PKE from Trapdoor PRG
  - PRG family with a (PK,SK). PK specifies the family member.
  - Can encapsulate the seed for the PRG such that:
    - PRG output remains pseudorandom even given PK and encapsulated seed
    - Can recover PRG output from encapsulated seed and SK
  - El Gamal: encapsulated seed = gx, PRG output = Yx
- Trapdoor PRG from Trapdoor OWP



## Candidate Trapdoor OWPs

- Two candidates using composite moduli
  - **RSA function**:  $f_{RSA}(x; N,e) = x^e \mod N$  where N=PQ, P,Q k-bit primes, e s.t. gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 (and x uniform from  $\{0...N-1\}$ )
    - Fact: f<sub>RSA</sub>(.; N,e) is a permutation
    - Fact: While picking (N,e), can also pick d s.t. xed = x
  - Rabin OWF: f<sub>Rabin</sub>(x; N) = x<sup>2</sup> mod N, where N = PQ, and P, Q are k-bit primes (and x uniform from {0...N-1})
    - Fact: f<sub>Rabin</sub>(.; N) is a permutation among quadratic residues, when P, Q are = 3 (mod 4)
    - Fact: Can invert f<sub>Rabin</sub>(.; N) given factorization of N

## ZN\*

- Group operation: "multiplication modulo N"
  - Has identity, is associative
- Group elements: all numbers (mod N) which have a multiplicative inverse modulo N
  - e.g.:  $\mathbb{Z}_6^*$  has elements  $\{1,5\}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}_7^*$  has  $\{1,2,3,4,5,6\}$
- a has a multiplicative inverse modulo N
  - $\Rightarrow \exists \text{ integers b, c s.t. ab = 1+cN}$
  - - $(\Rightarrow) \operatorname{gcd}(a,N) \mid (ab-cN)$


- Extended

  Euclidean algorithm to find (b,d)

  given (a,N). Used to efficiently invert

  elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$
- (←) from Euclid's algorithm: ∃ b, d s.t. gcd(a,N) = ab+dN

## Zp\*, P prime



- $\circ$  Recall  $\mathbb{Z}_P^*$

- Discrete Log assumed to be hard
- Quadratic Residues form a subgroup QRP\*

## In\*, N=PQ, two primes

- e.g.  $\mathbb{Z}_{15}^* = \{1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14\}$ 
  - $\phi$   $\phi(15) = 8$

Also works with P, Q co-primes

- Group operation and inverse efficiently computable
- Oyclic?
  - No! In  $\mathbb{Z}_{15}^*$ ,  $2^4 = 4^2 = 7^4 = 8^4 = 11^2 = 13^4 = 14^2 = 1$  (i.e., each generates at most 4 elements, out of 8)
- $\circ$  "Product of two cycles":  $\mathbb{Z}_3^*$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_5^*$ 
  - Chinese Remainder Theorem

#### Chinese Remainder Theorem

- ${}_{\circ}$  Consider mapping elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_{15}$  (all 15 of them) to  $\mathbb{Z}_3$  and  $\mathbb{Z}_5$ 
  - $a \mapsto (a \mod 3, a \mod 5)$
- CRT says that the pair (a mod 3, a mod 5) uniquely determines a (mod 15)!
  - All 15 possible pairs occur, once each
- In general for N=PQ (P, Q relatively prime), a → (a mod P, a mod Q) maps the N elements to the N distinct pairs
  - In fact extends to product of more than two (relatively prime) numbers

<b>Z</b> <sub>15</sub>	<b>Z</b> <sub>3</sub>	<b>1</b> 5
0	0	0
1	1	1
2	2	2
3	0	3
4	1	4
5	2	0
6	0	1
7	1	2
8	2	3
9	0	4
10	1	0
11	2	1
12	0	2
13	1	3
14	2	4

## Chinese Remainder Theorem and $\mathbb{Z}_{N}$

- $_{\text{O}}$  CRT representation of  $\mathbb{Z}_{N}$ : every element of  $\mathbb{Z}_{N}$  can be written as a unique element of  $\mathbb{Z}_{P}\times\mathbb{Z}_{Q}$ 
  - Addition can be done coordinate-wise
  - a(a,b) + (mod N) (a',b') = (a + (mod P) a',b + (mod Q) b')
- Can efficiently compute the isomorphism (in both directions) if P, Q known [Exercise]

<b>Z</b> <sub>15</sub>	$\mathbb{Z}_3$	<b>Z</b> 5
0	0	0
1	1	1
2	2	2
3	0	3
4	1	4
5	2	0
6	0	1
7	1	2
8	2	3
9	0	4
10	1	0
11	2	1
12	0	2
13	1	3
14	2	4

## Chinese Remainder Theorem

### and $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$

- $\circ$  Elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ 
  - $\circ$  Consider the same mapping into  $\mathbb{Z}_P \times \mathbb{Z}_Q$
  - Multiplication (and identity, and inverse)
     also coordinate-wise
  - No multiplicative inverse iff (0,b) or (a,0)
  - Else in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ : i.e., (a,b) s.t.  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_P^*$ ,  $b \in \mathbb{Z}_Q^*$

•  $\varphi(N) = |\mathbb{Z}_N^*| = (P-1)(Q-1) (P \neq Q, primes)$ 

C MADE	Military
<b>Z</b> <sub>3</sub>	<b>Z</b> 5
0	0
1	1
2	2
0	3
1	4
2	0
0	1
1	2
2	3
0	4
1	0
2	1
0	2
1	3 4
2	4
	0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0

#### RSA Function

- $f_{RSA[N,e]}(x) = x^e \mod N$ 
  - Where N=PQ, and  $gcd(e,\varphi(N)) = 1$  (i.e.,  $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(N)}^*$ )
  - $f_{RSA[N,e]}: I_N \rightarrow I_N$ 
    - Alternately,  $f_{RSA[N,e]}: \mathbb{Z}_N^* \to \mathbb{Z}_N^*$
- $f_{RSA[N,e]}$  is a permutation over  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  with a trapdoor (namely (N,d))
  - In fact, there exists d s.t. f<sub>RSA[N,d]</sub> is the inverse of f<sub>RSA[N,e]</sub>
    - d s.t. ed = 1 (mod  $\varphi(N)$ )  $\Rightarrow x^{ed} = x \pmod{N}$
    - Why? In  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  because order of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$  is  $\varphi(N)$
    - In  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  too, by CRT:  $\mathbb{Z}_N \cong \mathbb{Z}_P \times \mathbb{Z}_Q$ 
      - Exponentiation works coordinate-wise
      - ed=1 (mod  $\varphi(N)$ ) ⇒ ed=1 (mod  $\varphi(P)$ ) and ed=1 (mod  $\varphi(Q)$ )

#### RSA Function


- $f_{RSA[N,e]}(x) = x^e \mod N$ 
  - Where N=PQ, and  $gcd(e,\varphi(N)) = 1$  (i.e.,  $e \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(N)}^*$ )
  - $f_{RSA[N,e]}: I_N \rightarrow I_N$ 
    - a Alternately,  $f_{RSA[N,e]}: \mathbb{Z}_N^* \to \mathbb{Z}_N^*$
- $f_{RSA[N,e]}$  is a permutation over  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  with a trapdoor (namely (N,d))
- **RSA Assumption:**  $f_{RSA[N,e]}$  is a OWF collection, when P, Q random k-bit primes and e < N random number s.t.  $gcd(e,\phi(N))=1$  (with inputs uniformly from  $\mathbb{Z}_N$  or  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ )
  - Alternate version: e=3, P, Q restricted so that  $gcd(3,\phi(N))=1$
- RSA Assumption will be false if one can factorize N
  - Then knows  $\varphi(N) = (P-1)(Q-1)$  and can find d s.t. ed = 1 (mod  $\varphi(N)$ )
  - Converse not known to hold
- Trapdoor OWP Candidate

#### Rabin Function

- $f_{Rabin[N]}(x) = x^2 \mod N$  where N=PQ, P,Q primes = 3 mod 4
  - Is a candidate OWF collection (indexed by N)
    - Equivalent to the assumption that f<sub>mult</sub> is a OWF (for the appropriate distribution)
      - If can factor N, will see how to find square-roots
        - So (P,Q) a trapdoor to "invert"
      - Fact: If can take square-root mod N, can factor N
  - $\bullet$  Coming up: Is a permutation over  $\mathbb{QR}_N^*$ , with trapdoor (P,Q)

## Square-roots in $\mathbb{Z}_{P}^{*}$

- What are the square-roots of x<sup>2</sup>?
- $\sqrt{1} = \pm 1$ 
  - - $\Rightarrow$  (x+1)=0 or (x-1)=0 (mod P)
    - P is prime
- $\Leftrightarrow$  x=1 (mod P) or x=-1 (mod P)
- Where  $-1 = g^{(P-1)/2}$
- More generally  $\sqrt{(x^2)} = \pm x$  (because  $x^2 = y^2$  (mod P)  $\Leftrightarrow x = \pm y$ )
  - $\circ$  -x = -1·x,



## Square-roots in $\mathbb{Z}_{P}^{*}$

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- $\sqrt{1} = \pm 1$


$$\Rightarrow$$
 (x+1)=0 or (x-1)=0 (mod P)

$$\Leftrightarrow$$
 x=1 (mod P) or x=-1 (mod P)







$$\circ -x = -1 \cdot x,$$



## Square-roots in QRP\*


- $\circ$  In  $\mathbb{Z}_{P}^{*} \sqrt{(x^2)} = \pm x$
- $\bullet$  How many square-roots stay in  $\mathbb{QR}_{P}^*$ ?
  - Depends on P!
  - $\circ$  e.g.  $\mathbb{QR}_{13}^* = \{\pm 1, \pm 3, \pm 4\}$ 
    - 1,3,-4 have 2 square-roots each. But -1,-3,4 have none within  $\mathbb{QR}_{13}^*$
    - $\bullet$  Since  $-1 \in \mathbb{QR}_{13}^*$ ,  $x \in \mathbb{QR}_{13}^* \Rightarrow -x \in \mathbb{QR}_{13}^*$
    - $\bullet$  -1  $\in \mathbb{QR}_{P}^*$  iff (P-1)/2 even
- If (P-1)/2 odd, exactly one of ±x in  $QR_P$ \* (for all x)
  - $\bullet$  Then, squaring is a permutation in  $\mathbb{QR}_P^*$





## Square-roots in QRP\*

- o In  $\mathbb{Z}_{P}^{*} \sqrt{(x^{2})} = \pm x$  (i.e., x and  $-1 \cdot x$ )
- $\circ$  If (P-1)/2 odd, squaring is a permutation in  $\mathbb{QR}_P^*$ 
  - $\circ$  (P-1)/2 odd  $\Leftrightarrow$  P = 3 (mod 4)



- But easy to compute both ways!
  - In fact  $\sqrt{z} = z^{(P+1)/4} \in \mathbb{QR}_P^*$  (because (P+1)/2 even)
- Rabin function defined in  $\mathbb{QR}_N^*$  and relies on keeping the factorization of N=PQ hidden

## QRN\*

- $\bullet$  What do elements in  $\mathbb{QR}_N^*$  look like, for N=PQ?
  - **a** By CRT, can write  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  as  $(x,y) \in \mathbb{Z}_P^* \times \mathbb{Z}_Q^*$
  - CRT representation of  $a^2$  is  $(x^2, y^2) \in \mathbb{QR}_P^* \times \mathbb{QR}_Q^*$

  - - © Can efficiently do this, if can compute (and invert) the isomorphism from  $\mathbb{QR}_N^*$  to  $\mathbb{QR}_P^* \times \mathbb{QR}_Q^*$ 
      - (P,Q) is a trapdoor
    - Without trapdoor, OWF candidate
      - Follows from assuming OWF in  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , because  $\mathbb{QR}_N^*$  forms  $1/4^{th}$  of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$

#### Rabin Function

- $f_{Rabin[N]}(x) = x^2 \mod N$ 
  - Candidate OWF collection, with N=PQ (P,Q random k-bit primes)
  - o If P, Q = 3 (mod 4), then in  $QR_N^*$ 
    - A permutation
    - Has a trapdoor for inverting (namely (P,Q))
- Candidate Trapdoor OWP

### Summary

- A DLA candidate: Z<sub>P</sub>\*
- A DDH candidate: QRp\* where P is a safe prime
- Chinese Remainder Theorem
  - o  $I_N \cong I_P \times I_Q$
  - $a \mathbb{Z}_N^* \cong \mathbb{Z}_P^* \times \mathbb{Z}_Q^*$
  - $\overline{Q} \mathbb{R}_{N}^{*} \cong \mathbb{Q} \mathbb{R}_{P}^{*} \times \mathbb{Q} \mathbb{R}_{Q}^{*}$
- Trapdoor OWP candidates:
  - $f_{RSA[N,e]} = x^e \mod N$  where N=PQ and  $gcd(e, \varphi(N))=1$ 
    - Trapdoor:  $(P,Q) \rightarrow \varphi(N) \rightarrow d=e^{-1}$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(N)}^*$
  - $f_{Rabin[N]} = x^2 \mod N$  where N=PQ, where P,Q = 3 (mod 4)
    - Trapdoor: (P,Q)
- Trapdoor OWP can be used to construct Trapdoor PRG
  - Trapdoor PRG can give IND-CPA secure PKE