
Public-Key Cryptography

Lecture 13 CCA Security (ctd.)

REW SIM-CCA Security (PKE)



CCA Secure PKE

RECALL

In SKE, to get CCA security, we used a MAC
Bob would accept only messages from Alice
But in PKE, Bob <u>wants to</u> receive messages from Eve as well!

But only if it is indeed Eve's own message: she should know her own message!

CCA Secure PKE Schemes

Several schemes in the heuristic "Random Oracle Model"

RSA-OAEP

Fujisaki-Okamoto

OHIES (doesn't need the full power of ROM)

Hybrid Encryption schemes: Improving the efficiency of PKE

Today: Cramer-Shoup Encryption: A provably secure CCA scheme, under DDH assumption

CCA Secure PKE: Cramer-Shoup

- El Gamal-like: Based on DDH assumption
- \odot Uses a prime-order group (e.g., \mathbb{QR}_{p}^{*} for safe prime p)

H a "collision-resistant hash function" (Later) \circ C = (g₁×, g₂×, MY×) and S = (WZ^H(C))× Prime order group \Rightarrow all non-id g₁, g₂, Y, W, Z are part of PK
 g₁, g₂, Y, W, Z are part of PK
 g₁ elements are generators • g_1, g_2 random generators, $Y=g_1^{y_1}g_2^{y_2}$, $W=g_1^{w_1}g_2^{w_2}$, $Z=g_1^{z_1}g_2^{z_2}$ SK contains (y₁, y₂, w₁, w₂, z₁, z₂) -Multiple SKs can explain the same PK Trapdoor: Using SK, and (g1×,g2×) can find Y×, W×, Z× (unlike El Gamal) • If $a = g_1 \times and b = g_2 \times Y \times a^{y_1} b^{y_2}$, $W \times a^{w_1} b^{w_2}$, $Z \times a^{z_1} b^{z_2}$ Decryption: Compute Y[×], W[×], Z[×] from C using SK. Check S and extract M.

Proof Outline

- A hybrid where an "invalid encryption" is used for challenge:
 - Indistinguishable from valid encryption, under DDH assumption
 - It contains no information about the message (given just PK)
- But CCA adversary is not just given PK. Could she get information about the specific SK from decryption queries?
 - By querying decryption with only valid ciphertexts, adversary gets no information about SK (beyond given by PK)
 - Adversary can't create <u>new</u> "invalid ciphertexts" that get past the integrity check (except with negligible probability)
 - Relies on <u>collision-resistance</u> of H (used for efficiency)

Can replace H with an injective mapping to a <u>pair</u> of exponents, if longer keys and <u>ciphertext can be used</u>. But anyway assuming DDH, collision-resistance is easy (later).

Proof: Hybrid is Indistinguishable

With 1-negl probability, x1+x2 • $C = (g_1 \times, g_2 \times, MY \times)$ and $S = (WZH(C)) \times$ • $Y = q_1^{y_1} q_2^{y_2}, W = q_1^{w_1} q_2^{w_2}, Z = q_1^{z_1} q_2^{z_2}$ Hybrid experiment: challenge ciphertext is prepared from random $q_1^{x_1}$ and $q_2^{x_2}$ and "Yx, Wx, Zx" computed using SK Indistinguishable from real experiment, by DDH (even given SK) • (g1, g1×1, g2, g2×2) where g1,g2 random generators (i.e., random, \neq 1): • If x_1 , x_2 random, then (g, g^x , g^y , g^z) for random g,x,y,z. • If $x_1 = x_2 = x$, random, then (g, g^x , g^y , g^{xy}) for random g,x,y. By DDH the two cases are indistinguishable (even given SK)

Proof: Hybrid has no Information

• $C = (g_1^{\times}, g_2^{\times}, MY^{\times})$ and $S = (WZ^{H(C)})^{\times}$

• $Y = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, W = g_1^{w_1} g_2^{w_2}, Z = g_1^{z_1} g_2^{z_2}$

Invalid ciphertext uses x₁ ≠ x₂ and "Y×, W×, Z×" computed using SK
 For invalid ciphertext, values of "Y×, W×, Z×" will depend on the SK, and not just PK

• e.g. " $Y^{x''} = a^{y_1}b^{y_2} = g_1^{(x_1-x_2)y_1} \cdot Y^{x_2}$ varies with SK if $x_1 \neq x_2$

• Even if PK, x_1 , x_2 are given, $g_1(x_1-x_2)y_1$ is uniformly random

So an invalid challenge ciphertext (created using SK) is independent of the message, as "Y×" is a one-time pad

> Recall, only one challenge ciphertext in the IND-CCA experiment for PKE

Proof: Hybrid has no Information

- Remains to show that adversary (almost) never learns anything beyond PK about the keys
 - By querying decryption with only valid ciphertexts, adversary gets no information about SK beyond given by PK (decryption can be information-theoretically carried out using PK alone)
 - Adversary can't create <u>new</u> "invalid ciphertexts" that get past the integrity check (except with negligible probability)

Coming up Any invalid ciphertext with a <u>new</u> H(C) can fool at most a negligible fraction of the possible SKs: so the probability of adversary fooling the specific one used is negligible

- <u>Collision-resistance</u> of $H \Rightarrow$ same H(C) requires same C
- And, same C requires same (C,S), since S is a deterministic function of C

Proof: Invalid Ciphertexts Get Caught

- Claim: Even a computationally unbounded adversary can't create "invalid ciphertexts" (i.e., with x1≠x2) with H(C) different from that of the (invalid) challenge ciphertext, and get past the integrity check (except with negligible probability)
 - Working with exponents to the base g_1 : let $g_2 = g_1^{\alpha}$, where $\alpha \neq 0$ Public key has: (α, y, w, z) , where $y = y_1 + \alpha y_2$, $w = w_1 + \alpha w_2$, $z = z_1 + \alpha z_2$ Challenge ciphertext for message $M = g_1^{\mu}$ consists of $x_1, \alpha x_2, c = \mu + x_1 \cdot y_1 + \alpha \cdot x_2 \cdot y_2$, $s = (w_1 + \beta z_1) x_1 + \alpha (w_2 + \beta z_2) x_2$, where $\beta = H((g_1 x_1, g_1^{\alpha \cdot x_2}, g_1^{c}))$
 - Claim: adversary can't find (x'_1, x'_2, β', s') with $x'_1 \neq x'_2$ and $\beta' \neq \beta$ and $s' = (w_1 + \beta' z_1)x'_1 + \alpha(w_2 + \beta' z_2)x'_2$
 - $s = (w+\beta z)x_1 + \alpha(w_2+\beta z_2)(x_2-x_1)$, where $x_2-x_1 \neq 0$.

So suppose we give $\gamma = (w_2 + \beta z_2)$ to the adversary (and μ, y_1, y_2).

- $s' = (w+\beta'z)x'_1 + \alpha\gamma(x_2-x_1) + \alpha(\beta'-\beta)z_2(x_2-x_1)$
- But z_2 is random (given the 3 linear equations for w, z, γ for the 4 variables {w_i,z_i | i \in {1,2} }), and hence there is negligible probability that candidate s' given by the adversary will be correct

Identity-Based Encryption

In PKE, KeyGen produces a random (PK,SK) pair Can I have a "fancy public-key" (e.g., my name)? No! Not secure if one can pick any PK and find an SK for it! But suppose a trusted authority for key generation Then: Can it generate a valid (PK,SK) pair for any PK? Identity-Based Encryption: a key-server (with a master) secret-key) that can generate such pairs

- Encryption will use the master public-key, and the receiver's "identity" (i.e., fancy public-key)
- In PKE, sender has to retrieve PK for every party it wants to talk to (from a trusted public directory)
- In IBE, receiver has to obtain its SK from the authority

Identity-Based Encryption

- Security requirement for IBE (will skip formal statement):
 - Environment/adversary decides the ID of the honest parties
 - Adversary can adaptively request SK for any number of IDs (which are not used for honest parties)
 - "Semantic security" for encryption with the ID of honest parties (i.e., with no access to decryption: CPA security)
- IBE (even CPA-secure) can easily give CCA-secure PKE!
 - IBE: Can't malleate ciphertext for one ID into one for another
 - PKEnc_{MPK}(m) = (id, C=IBEnc_{MPK}(id; m), sign_{id}(C))
 - Security: can't create a different encryption with same id (signature's security); can't malleate using a different id (IBE's security)

Digital Signature with its public-key used as the ID in IBE



CCA secure PKE
Cramer-Shoup Encryption
Identity Based Encryption
Next up: Hash functions, Digital Signatures