# Active Adversary

Lecture 7 CCA Security MAC


#### Active Adversary

An active adversary can inject messages into the channel
 Eve can send ciphertexts to Bob and get them decrypted
 Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
 If Bob decrypts all ciphertexts for Eve, no security possible

What can Bob do?

# SIM-CCA Security

Authentication <u>not required</u>. Adversary <u>allowed</u> to send own messages



#### Symmetric-Key Encrypt IND-CCA + IND-CCA Security Equivalent to


 Experiment picks b←{0,1} and K←KeyGen Adv gets (guarded) access to Dec<sub>k</sub> oracle
 For as long as Adversary wants

Adv sends two messages m<sub>0</sub>, m<sub>1</sub>
 to the experiment

Expt returns Enc(m<sub>b</sub>,K) to the adversary

Adversary returns a guess b'

- Experiments outputs 1 iff b'=b
- IND-CCA secure if for all feasible adversaries Pr[b'=b] ≈ 1/2



## CCA Security

How to obtain CCA security?

- Use a CPA-secure encryption scheme, but make sure Bob "accepts" and decrypts only ciphertexts produced by Alice
  - i.e., Eve can't create new ciphertexts that will be accepted by Bob
  - Achieves the stronger guarantee: in IDEAL, Eve can't send its own messages to Bob
- CCA secure <u>SKE</u> reduces to the problem of CPA secure SKE and (symmetric key) message authentication
  - Symmetric-key solution for message authentication: Message Authentication Code (MAC)

# Message Authentication Codes

MACK

MAC<sub>K</sub>(M

Mi

A single short key shared by Alice and Bob

- Can sign any (polynomial) number of messages
- A triple (KeyGen, MAC, Verify)
- Correctness: For all K from KeyGen, and all messages M, Verify<sub>K</sub>(M,MAC<sub>K</sub>(M))=1
- Security: probability that an adversary can produce (M,s) s.t. Verify<sub>K</sub>(M,s)=1 is negligible unless Alice produced an output s=MAC<sub>K</sub>(M)

Advantage = Pr[ Ver<sub>K</sub>(M,s)=1 and (M,s) ∉ {(M<sub>i</sub>,s<sub>i</sub>)} ]

Verk

#### CCA Secure SKE

•  $CCA-Enc_{K1,K2}(m) = (c:= CPA-Enc_{K1}(m), t:= MAC_{K2}(c))$ CPA secure encryption: Block-cipher/CTR mode construction MAC: from a PRF or Block-Cipher (coming up) SKE can be entirely based on Block-Ciphers A tool that can make things faster: Hash functions (later) Or, in principle, from any One-Way Function


# Making a MAC

# One-time MAC

- To sign a single n bit messageA simple (but inefficient) scheme
  - Shared secret key: 2n random strings (each k-bit long) (r<sup>i</sup><sub>0</sub>,r<sup>i</sup><sub>1</sub>)<sub>i=1..n</sub>
  - Signature for m<sub>1</sub>...m<sub>n</sub> be (r<sup>i</sup>mi)<sub>i=1..n</sub>
  - Negligible probability that Eve can produce a signature on m'≠m



 Has a statistical security parameter k (unlike one-time pad which has perfect security)
 More efficient one-time MACs exist (later)



r <sup>1</sup> 0	r² <sub>0</sub>	<b>r</b> ³ <sub>0</sub>
r <sup>1</sup> 1	r²1	r <sup>3</sup> 1

(Multi-msg) MAC from PRF When Each Message is a Single Block

• PRF is a MAC!


•  $MAC_{K}(M) := F_{K}(M)$  where F is a PRF

• Ver<sub>K</sub>(M,S) := 1 iff  $S=F_K(M)$ 

 $\odot$  Output length of  $F_K$  should be big enough

 If an adversary forges MAC with probability ε<sub>MAC</sub>, then can break PRF with advantage O(ε<sub>MAC</sub> - 2-m(k)) (m(k) being the output length of the PRF) [How?]

• If random function R used as MAC, then probability of forgery,  $\varepsilon_{MAC^*} = 2^{-m(k)}$ 



Adversary for PRF using forger: Given access to truly random R or PRF, use it to get MAC tags. Output 1 if forger succeeds.

## MAC for Multiple-Block Messages What if message is longer than one block?

- MAC'ing each block separately is not secure (unlike in the case of CPA secure encryption)
  - Eve can rearrange the blocks/drop some blocks
- Coming up: two solutions
  - 1. A simple but inefficient scheme from MAC for single-block messages
  - 2. From a PRF (block cipher), build a PRF that takes <u>longer</u> <u>inputs</u>

# MAC for Multiple-Block Messages

A simple solution: "tie the blocks together"

Add to each block a random string r (same r for all blocks), total number of blocks, and a sequence number

•  $MAC(M) = (r, (MAC(B_i))_{i=1..+})$ 

r prevents mixing blocks from two messages, t prevents dropping blocks and i prevents rearranging

Inefficient! Tag length increases with message length


## CBC-MAC

PRF domain extension: Chaining the blocks

• cf. CBC mode for encryption (which is not a MAC!)

t-block messages, a single block tag

Can be shown to be secure



- If restricted to t-block messages (i.e., same length)
- Else attacks possible (by extending a previously signed message)

Security crucially relies on not revealing intermediate output blocks

# Patching CBC-MAC

- Patching CBC MAC to handle message of any (polynomial) length but still producing a single block tag (secure if block-cipher is):
  - The prive K as  $F_{K'}(t)$ , where t is the number of blocks
  - Our Use first block to specify number of blocks
    - Important that first block is used: if last block, message extension attacks still possible
  - EMAC: Output not the last tag T, but  $F_{K'}(T)$ , where K' is an independent key (after padding the message to an integral number of blocks). No need to know message length a priori.
- <u>CMAC:</u> XOR last message block with a key (derived from the original key using the block-cipher). Also avoids padding when message is integral number of blocks. 
  <u>NIST Recommendation. 2005</u>
  <u>Later: Hash-based HMAC</u> used in TLS and IPSec 
  <u>IETF Standard. 1997</u>

## Authenticated Encryption

Doing encryption + authentication better

Generic composition: encrypt, then MAC

Needs two keys and two passes

MAC-then-encrypt is not necessarily CCA-secure

AE aims to do this more efficiently

Several constructions based on block-ciphers (modes of operation) provably secure modelling block-cipher as PRP

One pass: IAPM, OCB, ... [patented]

Two pass: CCM, GCM, GCM-SIV, ... [included in NIST standards]

AE with Associated Data: Allows unencrypted (but authenticated) parts of the plaintext, for headers etc.

## SKE today

SKE in IPsec, TLS etc. mainly based on AES block-ciphers
 AES-128, AES-192, AES-256

A recommended choice: AES Counter-mode + CMAC (or HMAC), encrypt-then-MAC. Gives CCA security, and provides authentication.

Alternately, more optimised AES modes for <u>Authenticated</u> <u>Encryption</u> with Associated Data (e.g., AES-GCM)

Older components/modes still in use

Supported by many standards for legacy purposes

In many applications (sometimes with modifications)

e.g. RC4 still used in BitTorrent

API of libraries tend to be "too low-level,"
 e.g., Block-cipher, instead of Enc, Dec, KeyGen,
 leading to errors (e.g., use of ECB mode, nonce reuse, key cycles)

KeyGen

Key

Dec