

# CS760: Topics in Computational Complexity


Lecture 21(?) (18/Oct/24)

Instructor: Chethan Kamath (Stand-in for Rohit Gurjar)

- What constitutes a proof?
  - Traditional "NP" proofs vs *interactive* proofs



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- Examples. ZKP for:
  - Graph isomorphism (GI)
  - Quadratic residuosity (QR)
  - Graph non-isomorphism (GNI)
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
 $(G_0=([I_1\Pi],E_0)\cong G_1=([I_1\Pi],E_1)$   $f = \text{permutation} = G_1$  on  $[I_1\Pi]$   $f = G_2$   $f = G_1$   $f = G_2$   $f = G_2$ 

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 $(G_0=([i,n],E_0)\cong G_1=([i,n],E_1)$  (3 permutation -  $G_0=([i,n],E_0)$ ) (3 permutation -  $G_0=([i,n],E_0)$ ) (6)

1 Interactive Proof (IP)

2 Zero Knowledge (Interactive) Proof (ZKP)

3 Class SZK: Statistical Zero-Knowledge Proof


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
- lacksquare Axioms  $\xrightarrow{\text{derivation rules}}$  theorems=true statements
  - E.g.: Axioms of Euclidean geometry

    Theorem: "Sum of angles of a triangle equals 180°"



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
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- Prover vs. verifier
  - Prover does the heavy lifting: derives the proof
    - 1 Construct a line through B parallel to  $\overline{AC}$
    - 2  $\angle DBA = \angle a$  and  $\angle EBC = \angle c$  (alternate interior angles)
    - 3  $2 \Rightarrow \angle a + \angle b + \angle c = \angle DBA + \angle b + \angle EBC = 180^{\circ}$

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  - Verifier checks the proof, step by step

- Corresponds to class NP
  - lacksquare A language  $\mathcal{L} \in \mathsf{NP}$  if there exists a polynomial-time deterministic machine  $\mathsf{V}$  such that

$$\forall x \in \mathcal{L} \ \exists \pi \in \{0,1\}^{\mathsf{poly}(|x|)} : \mathsf{V}(x,\pi) = 1$$

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
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
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  - Prover P is *unbounded*: finds short proof  $\pi$  for x (if one exists)
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
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
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
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
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
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



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  - Prover P is *unbounded*: finds short proof  $\pi$  for x (if one exists)
  - lacktriangle Verifier f V is *efficient*: checks proof  $\pi$  against the statement x
  - Completeness:  $x \in \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow P$  finds  $\pi \Rightarrow V(x, \pi) = 1$
  - Soundness:  $\mathbf{x} \notin \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \exists \pi \in \{0,1\}^{\mathsf{poly}(|x|)} \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{V}(x,\pi) = 1$



























































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  - (\$) 1 Verifier **V** is randomised
  - → 2 Prover P and V *interact* and V accepts/rejects in the end



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### Exercise 1 (Robustness of Defintion 1)

Show that languages captured by Defintion 1 doesn't change when 1)  $\epsilon_c \leq 1/2^{|x|}$ ,  $\epsilon_s \leq 1/2^{|x|}$ ; 2)  $\epsilon_c \leq 1/2 - 1/|x|$ ,  $\epsilon_s \leq 1/2 - 1/|x|$ 

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
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
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
### Power of Randomness+Interaction: IP for GNI





Idea:  $G_0 \not\cong G_1 \Rightarrow$  for any graph H,  $G_0 \cong H$  and  $G_1 \cong H$  both cannot hold


























Theorem 1

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#### Proof.

- Completeness:
  - $G_0 \not\cong G_1 \Rightarrow P$  can recover  $b_i$  from  $H_i$  with certainty



$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V} \rangle (G_0, G_1)] = 1 \geq 2/3$$

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#### $\Pi_{GNI}$ is an IP for $\mathcal{L}_{GNI}$


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
$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \langle \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V} 
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- Soundness:
  - $\blacksquare$   $G_0 \cong G_1 \Rightarrow H_i$  loses information about bits  $b_i$
  - Hence best  $P^*$  can do is guess  $b_i$ s







## Which Languages have IPs?




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# Which Languages have IPs? PSPACE Languages




### Plan for Today's Lecture

1 Interactive Proof (IP


2 Zero Knowledge (Interactive) Proof (ZKP)

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### Any Issues with the NP Proofs We Saw?




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


- Verifier gains "non-trivial knowledge" about witness w
  - Not desirable, e.g., when x = pk and w = sk (identification)

#### What About the IP We Saw?




#### What About the IP We Saw?



■ Seems V gains no knowledge beyond validity of the statement

#### What About the IP We Saw?



- Seems V gains no knowledge beyond validity of the statement
- We will see that  $\Pi_{GNI}$  is (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge!

- Knowledge vs. information in the information-theoretic sense
  - Knowledge is computational

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  - Knowledge is computational: e.g., consider NP proof for GI
    - Given  $(G_0, G_1)$ , the isomorphism  $\pi$  contains no *information*
    - But when given  $\pi$ , V "gains knowledge" since she couldn't have computed  $\pi$  herself

■ Knowledge vs. information in the information-theoretic sense



- lacksquare Given  $(G_0, G_1)$ , the isomorphism  $\pi$  contains no *information*
- But when given  $\pi$ , V "gains knowledge" since she couldn't have computed  $\pi$  herself
- Knowledge pertains to public objects:
  - Flipping a private fair coin b and (later) revealing its outcome leads to V gaining information
  - But V does not gain knowledge: she could herself have tossed the private coin and revealed it

■ Knowledge vs. information in the information-theoretic sense





But when given  $\pi$ , V "gains knowledge" since she couldn't have computed  $\pi$  herself



 Flipping a private fair coin b and (later) revealing its outcome leads to V gaining information

■ But V *does not gain knowledge*: she could herself have tossed the private coin and revealed it

(ther than the validity of x)

Intuitively, "V gains no knowledge" if anything V can *compute* after the interaction, V could have computed *without it* 

■ Formalised via "simulation paradigm": View<sub>V</sub>( $\langle P, V \rangle(x)$ ) can be *efficiently* simulated given only the instance




> V's "view"=x+ transcript + coins

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### Defintion 2 (Honest-Verifier Perfect ZK)

An IP  $\Pi$  is honest-verifier perfect ZK if there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for all distinguishers D and all  $x \in \mathcal{L}$ , the following is zero

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#### Exercise 2

What happens when one invokes the simulator on  $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ ?

### $\Pi_{GNI}$ is Honest-Verifier ZK


Theorem 2

 $\Pi_{ extit{GNI}}$  is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge IP for  $\mathcal{L}_{ extit{GNI}}$ 

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


Parallel/sequentially repeat to boost soundness

### $\Pi_{GNI}$ is Honest-Verifier ZK

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 $\Pi_{ extit{GNI}}$  is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge IP for  $\mathcal{L}_{ extit{GNI}}$ 

Proof.

$$\text{View}_{V}\left(\langle P,V\rangle \left(G_{o_{i}}G_{i}\right)\right):=\left(\left(G_{o_{i}}G_{i}\right)\left(b_{i},H_{i},b_{i}\right)_{i\in\{1,p\}}\right)$$

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$$\forall \ \mathsf{G}_{l_0} \not\cong \mathsf{G}_{l_1} : \\ \forall \ \mathsf{G}_{l_0} \not\cong \mathsf{G}_{l_1} : \\ \mathsf{Sim} \left( \mathsf{G}_{l_0} \mathsf{G}_{l_1} \right) := \bigcirc$$

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$$0/P \left( \left( G_{0}, G_{1} \right) \left( b_{1}, H_{1}, b_{1} \right)_{l \in \left[ I, P \right]} \right)$$

#### Exercise 3

- $oxed{\mathbb{I}}$  What happens if V is malicious and can deviate from protocol?
- 2 Using ideas from  $\Pi_{GNI}$ , build honest-verifier ZKP for  $\mathcal{L}_{QNR}$

## Are Randomness and Interaction Necessary?

Exercise 4

If  $\mathcal L$  has a non-interactive (i.e, one-message) ZKP then  $\mathcal L \in \mathsf{BPP}$ 

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
HIED: Pr[V(x)=1] 723.

LEBPP & JPPT V: Yxdd: Pr[V(x)=1] 813

Bounded-error probabilistic polyomial (BPP):

#### Exercise 4

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Bounded-error probabilistic polyomial (BPD)

#### Exercise 4

If  $\mathcal L$  has a non-interactive (i.e, one-message) ZKP then  $\mathcal L \in \mathsf{BPP}$ 

§ Randomness is necessary

#### Exercise 5

If  $\mathcal L$  has an IP with deterministic verifier then  $\mathcal L \in \mathsf{NP}$ 

#### Exercise 6

If  $\mathcal{L}$  has an ZKP with deterministic verifier then  $\mathcal{L} \in \mathsf{BPP}$ 




## Plan for Today's Lecture

1 Interactive Proof (IP)


2 Zero Knowledge (Interactive) Proof (ZKP)

3 Class SZK: Statistical Zero-Knowledge Proof


## Which Languages have ZKPs?



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# Which Languages have ZKPs? PSPACE Languages



■ The class of languages which admit *malicious verifier* statistical zero-knowledge proofs

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- Why is it interesting?
  - Contains a host of languages with connections to cryptography.
    - 1 Number-theoretic problems: QR, QNR
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  - Has complete problems: e.g., statistical difference (SD)
    - Given two circuits  $C_0$ ,  $C_1$ :  $\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m$ , decide whether the distributions induced inputting  $C_0$  and  $C_1$  are statistically "close" or "far".


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#### Exercise 7

Can you think of a honest-verifier SZK proof for SD?


#### What do we know about SZK?

+ Closed under complement, i.e., SZK = coSZK




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- Class SZK

#### References

- 1 [Gol01, Chapter 4] for details of today's lecture
- **2** [GMR89] for definitional and philosophical discussion on ZK. Salil Vadhan's thesis [Vad99] is also an excellent resource.
- 3 The ZKPs for GI and GNI are taken from [GMR89, GMW91]
- IP for all of PSPACE is due to [LFKN92, Sha90]. Computational ZKP for all of PSPACE is due to [GMW91].
- [Oka96] showed that SZK is closed under complement. That NP cannot be contained in SZK (unless PH collapses) is due to [For87]



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